Joint Tortfeasors

Wrongdoers;, or Injury, they may generally be sued jointly, or any number less than the whole may be sued, or each one may be sued separately; Williams v. Sheldon, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 654. Each is liable for himself, because the entire damages sustained were occasioned by each, each sanctioning the acts of the others, so that by suing one alone, he is not charged beyond his just proportion. Any number less than the whole may be sued, because each is answerable for his companion’s acts. Thus a joint action may be brought against several for an assault and battery, or for composing and publishing a libel; 2 Saund. 117 a; Bacon, Abr. Actions in General (C); Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. (Vt.) 129, 4 Am. Dec. 728. But to this rule that for a Joint injury a joint action may be brought, there is an exception, namely, that no joint action can be maintained for a joint slander; this exception seems to proceed upon the ground that each man’s slander is his own, and it cannot by any means be considered that of another. Although this exception appears to be fully established, yet it is difficult to see the reason of it; when one of several trespassers gives the blow, he is considered as acting for the others, and, if they acted jointly, they may be jointly sued; why not consider the speaker, when acting in Concert with others, as the actor for the w’hole in uttering the words? The blow is no more tliat of the person who did not give it than the words are the words of him who only united with the other in an agreement that they should be spoken. In either case, upon principle, the maxim, qui facit per aliuin facit pci' se, ought to have its force. Such however, is not the law. Where a pereon is Injured by a joint, tort and accepts satisfaction from one of the wrongdoers, he cannot sue the other; Spurr V. R. Co., 56 N. J. L. 346, 28 Atl. 582. A railroad company may be sued jointly with the servant whose negligence caused the Injury, although it was not independently at fault; Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Houchins, 121 Ky. 526, 89 S. W. 5-30, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 375, 123 Am. St. Rep. 205. A covenant not to sue one of two joint tortfeasors does not operate as a release of the other from liability; [1892] 2 Q. B. 511; nor does the dismissal of an action against one, with the execution, for a valuable consideration, of an agreement not to sue him, release the other; City of Chicago v. Babcock, 143 111. 358, 32 N, E. 271; nor does the fact that where property is jointly converted by two persons, and one of those converting accounts to the owner, who accepts part of the proceeds, remove the other’s liability; Horseley v; Moss, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 341, 23 S. W. 1115. a manner which may be Injurious to another, they cannot be held jointly liable for the acts of each other; Livesay v. Nat. Bank, 36 Colo. 626, 86 Pac. 102, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598, 118 Am. St. Rep. 120; Blalsdell v. Stephens, 14 Nev. 17, 33 Am. Rep. 523; Forbes V. Marsh, 15 Conn. 384; Larkins v. Eckwurzel, 42 Ala. 322, 94 Am. Dec. 651; Miller V. Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 433, 25 Pac. 650, 22 Am. St Rep. 254. Where unlawful attachments were simultaneously sued out by different creditors acting through the same attorney and levied by the same officer on the same property at the same time, but so that one constituted a prior lien on the personalty, and the other a prior lien on the realty attached, the creditors were held not joint wrongdoers, since neither was interested in the success of the other, and their actions, though simultaneous, wei*e not for a common purpose; Miller v. Bock, 108 la. 676, 79 N. W. 344. But it has bobn held that where several creditors sue out at different times separate writs of attachment against a common debtor and cause them to be simultaneously levied by the same officer, they will be regarded, the levy l)eing wrongful, as Joint wrongdoers, though they may have acted separately without concert; Spai'kman v. Swift, 81 Ala. 231, 8 South. 160; Vose v. Woods, 26 Hull (N. Y.) 486. In Ellis v. Howard, 17 Vt. 330, it was hold that where the attachments are levied at the same time, by the same officer, and upon the same property, there is prima facie a joint trespass. If the plaintiff allege that the concurrent negligence of both defendants caused his injtiry, he may join them in one action. It depends on the averments of his complaint, and if the state court so decides, he may join them even though the liability of one is statutory and the 'other rests on the common law; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U. S. 102, 33 Sup. Ct. 684, 57 L. Ed. 1090.