Jus Naturale

Natural law; the rule and dictate of right reason, showing the moral deformity or moral necessity there is in any act according to its suitableness to a reasonable nature. Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 1, c. 1, c. 3. The term is used interchangeably with jus gentium. Tayl. Civ. Law, 128.

The name given to those rules of conduct which are universally binding upon men and which are sanctioned by the dictates of right reason, as opposed to rules of conduct prescribed and enforced by the sovereign power of the state which are called positive law,N known to the Romans as Jus civil Cy and in modern Jurisprudence as municipal law. The jus fuituraley or law of nature, is simply the jus gentium, or law of nations, seen In the light of a peculiar theory. Maine, Auc. Law 62. Sir P. Pollock refers to this as “an unhappy term,’' which seems to be a mere external ornament borrowed from Greek philosophers in excegs of zeal to make a show of philosophical culture, and inconsistent with the proper Roman use of jus. Oxford Lectures 7. A much quoted definition of Ulpian was that which nature attaches to animals. Of this it has are collected many definitions of the Roman Jurists* Sandars considers the passage from Ulpian unfortunately borrowed by Justinian and thereby removed from the connection in which it was used, which was a subsidiary and divergent line of thought, and had nothing to do with the main theory. Accordingly “in considering what the Roman jurists meant by Jus naturals this fragment of Ulpian may be dismissed almost entirely from our notice.” Sand. Inst. Just. 7. The conception of the Jtis naturals came from the Stoics and has been termed “by far the most important addition to the system of Roman law, which the jurists introduced from Greek philosophy/* Sand. Inst. Just. Introd. xxii. And Maine says of it that “the importance of this theory to mankind has been very much greater than its philosophical deficiencies would lead us to expect.'* Anc. L. 71. 'While it Is undoubtedly true that the highest conception of law is that natural law and positive law should be entirely harmonious, It is in the domain of international law that this conception more nearly approaches realization. The Jus gentium was a system largely based upon the jus naturale, and it is due to that fact that the Roman system so largely formed the basis upon which Grotius commenced to build, the system which has developed into modern international law. It has been said that while he “rejected Ulplan's definition of the jus naturale, he accepted the Idea of natural law expressed in the later Jus gentium of the Romans as a body of principles based upon the common reason of mankind. It was therefore possible for him to extend the equitable principles already developed in the Roman jus gentium to the relations existing between sovereign states. States were looked upon as moral persona-subjects of the natural law, and as equal to each other in their moral rights and obligations.*’ Morey, Rom. L. 208. See Jus Gentium; Law of Natubb; Law.

The natural law, or law of nature; law, or legal principles, supposed to be discoverable by the light of nature or abstract reasoning, or to be taught by nature to all nations and men alike; or law supposed to govern men and peoples in a state of nature, i. e., in advance of organized governments or enacted laws. This conceit originated with the philosophical jurists of Rome, and was gradually extended until the phrase came to denote a supposed basis or substratum common to all systems of positive law, and hence to be found, in greater or less purity, in the laws of all nations. And, conversely, they held that if any rule or principle of law was observed in common by all peoples with whose systems they were acquainted, it must be a part of the jus naturale, or derived from it. Thus the phrases "jus naturale" and "jus gentium" came to be used interchangeably.