Lucid Intervals

In medical jurisprudence. Periods in which a lunatic is so far free from his disease that the ordinary legal consequences of insanity do not apply to acts done therein. LUCRATIVA CAUSA (Lat.)

In Roman law. A consideration which is voluntary; that is to say, a gratuitous gift, or such like. It was opposed to onerosa causa, which denoted a valuable consideration. It was a principle of the Roman law that two lucrative causes could not concur in the same person as regarded the same thing; that is to say, that, when the same thing was bequeathed to a person by two different testators, he could not have the thing (or its value) twice over. Brown. LUCRATIVA USUCAPIO (Lat.) This species of usucapio was permitted in Roman law only in the case of persons taking possession of property upon a decease of its late owner, and in exclusion or deforcement of the heir, whence it was called "usucapio pro haerede." The adjective "lucrativa" denoted that property was acquired by this usucapio without any consideration or payment for it by way of purchase; and, as the possessor who so acquired the property was a mala fide possessor, his acquisition, or usucapio, was called also "improba," i. e., dishonest; but this dishonesty was tolerated (until abolished by Hadrian) as an incentive to force the haeres to take possession, in order that the debts might be paid and the sacrifices performed; and, as a further incentive to the haeres, this usucapio was complete in one year. Brown.

In Medical Jurisprudence. Periods in which an insane person is so far free from his disease that the ordinai'y legal conseiiueuces of insanity do not apply to acts done therein. A lucid interval is not a perfect restoration to reason, but a restoration so far as to be able, beyond doubt, to comprehend and do the act with such perception, memory, and judgment as to make it a legal act. Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 263; Whart & Still6, Med. Jur. S 2. Lucid intervals were regarded as more common and characterized by greater mental clearness and vigor, by earlier niedical writers than the later ones. This view was shared by legal authorities, who treated a lucid interval as a complete^ though temporary, restoration. D’Aguesseau, in the case of the Abb6 d’Orl^ans, concludes: "It must not be a mere diminution, a remission, of the complaint, but a kind of temporary cure, an Intermission so clearly marked as in every respect to resemble the restoration of health.” which the mind, having thrown off the disease, had recovered its general habit.” 3 Bro. 0. 0. 234. Possibly there may be such lntermls.sions of absolute restoration but they are of rare occurrence. Usually, with apparent clearness, there is a real loss of mental force and acuteness, — not necessarily apparent to a superficial observer, but, upon critical examination, showing confusion of ideas and singularity of behavior indicative of serious though latent disease. In this condition the patient may hold some correct notions, even on a matter of business, and yet be quite Incompetent to embrace all the relations connected with a contract or a will, even though no delusion was present to warp his Judgment. This conclusion is aided by the recorded experiences of patients after entire recovery. See Georgfet, Des 'i Mai. Men. 46; Reid, Essays on Hypochondriacal Affections, Essay 21; Combe, Men. Derang. 241; Ray, Med. Jur. 376. Of late years the interest of the courts in connection with lucid intervals both in civil and criminal cases is confined to the ascertainment of the mental capacity of the person concerned with relation to the transaction in question. This idea has even been carried to the excess of treating the reasonableness of the act itself as the test of the capacity of the Individual, or the existence of a lucid interval; 1 Phill. Lect. 90; 2 C. & P. 415. But this has been said to be a mere begging of the question, inasmuch as persons undeniably insane constantly do and say things which appear perfectly rational; 2 Hagg. 433, where two wills, both perfectly reasonable, were set aside because within a short time prior to their execution there had been admitted insanity. And it was said: "When there is not actual recovery, and a retuim to the management of himself and his concerns... the.proof of a lucid interval is extremely difiicult.” In criminal cases this difficulty is intensified, since the very term lucid interval implies that the disease has not disappeared, but only that its outward manifestations have ceased and there remains an abnormal condition of the brain, by whatever name it may be called, whereby the power of the mind to sustain provocations, resist temptations, or withstand any other cause? of excitement, is greatly weakened. Being in their nature, as temporary and of uncertain duration, there is no presumption that they will continue; Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 South. 689; contra, Wright v. Jackson, 59 Wis. 669, 18 N. W. 486; and see Snow v. Benton, 28 111. 306. Lucid intervals are not to be confounded with periods of apparent recovery between two successive attacks of mental disorder, nor with transitions from one phase of insanity to another. These are said to be nervous Irritability, which renders them peculiarly susceptible to many of those incidents and influences Vhich lead to crime; Ray, Med. Jur. ch, Luo. Int. Both in civil and criminal cases the burden rests upon the party who contends for a lucid interval to prove it, since a person once insane is presumed so until it is shown that he had a lucid interval or has recovered; Co. Litt. 185, n.; 3 Bro. Ch. 441; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Eq. 243; Emery v. Hoyt, 4G 111. 258; 8 Can. S. C. 335. This presumption may be rebutted by proof of a change of mentol condition and a lucid Interval at the time: 41 Miss. 291; and it arises only where habitual Imsanlty is shown, and in cases of temporary or recurrent insanity, no burden is thrown upon the party seeking to take advantage of the lucid interval; Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 South. 665, 85 L. R. A. 118; People V. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 207; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 South. 618, 17 L, R. A. 484; State v. Schaeffer, 116 Mo. 96, 22 S. W. 447; Com. v. Wlnnemore, 1 Brews. (Pa.) 356. A contract made during a lucid Interval is valid; Norman v. Trust Co., 92 Ga. 295, 18 S. E. 27; Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177, 29 N. E..380. And the same is true of deeds, wills, and of the performances of any civil act. But where a lucid interval is relied upon, it must appear to have been of such a character as to enable the person to comprehend Intelligently the nature and character. of the transaction; Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 South. 689. Proof of a lucid interval, where it is required, must be made to the satisfaction of the jury; Vance v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476, 1 S. W. 179. There is no presumption of continuance of a lucid interval; it is temporary in its nature; Pike v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642, 16 South. 689. Insane persons, during a lucid interval, are conipetent witnesses, but the question of their competency is for the court to determine when the witness is produced to be sworn; People v. N. Y. Hospital, 3 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 229; which see for a note on the practice in su<h cases. The general rule “is that a lunatic, or person affected with insanity, is adndssible as a witness, if he have suflicient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath, and to be capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in reference to the questions at issue; and whether he have that understanding is a question to be determined by the court upon examination of the party himself, and any competent witnesses who can speak to the nature and extent of his insanity.” District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 619, 2 Sup. Ct. 840, 27 L. Ed. 618; Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.) 64; Tucker v. Shaw, 158 111. 326, 41 N. E. 914; L. R. 11 Eq. 420; Walker Holcomb V. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177; Hlett v. Shull, 36 W. Va. 663, 15 S. E. 146. In State V. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) 380, 36 Atl. 458, the witness was an inmate ol an insane asylum and was admitted by an equally (jivided court to testify in a case of homicide in the asylum. The modern doctrine is that the fact of insanity goes to the credibility rather than to the competency of the witness; 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 547; 2 Den. C. C. 254; 5 Cox, C. C. 259; Mc Cutchen v. Pigue, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 665. See Clevenger, Med. Jur. of Insan. 607. See 35 L. R. A. 117, n.; Insanity.

In medical jurisprudence. Intervals occurring in the mental life of an insane person during which he is completely restored to the use of his reason, or so far restored that he has sufiielent intelligence, judgment, and will te enter into contractual relations, or perform other legal acts, without disqualification by reason of hi. disaase.