may

where power is given to public officers, in the language of the act before us, or in equivalent language—whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise—the language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered to do for a third person the law requires shall be done. The power is given, not for their benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depositary to meet the demands of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held that the intent of the legislature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose 'a positive and absolute duty.

See also "Shall." Construction in General. That "may" always means "must" is a misconception, 44 Ch. D. 270. It is ordinarily permissive, 52 N. Y. 96; 107 Mass. 196. It gives a power as to the exercise of which there is discretion. 44 Ch. D. 270. An enabling and discretionary power. 174 Mass. 245; is permitted to; has liberty to. In the absence of any controlling consideration the word is not considered as mandatory, 122 Iowa 669, but when the power is given in the interest of public justice; or whenever the object of the power is to effectuate the public interests, or a private, or legal right; where the public or third persons have a claim, de jure, that the power shall be exercised, 77 111. 273; 56 N. J. L. 300; 68 N. Y. 119; 21 Wis. 371; 49

Is permitted to; has liberty to. In interpreting statutes the word may should be construed as equivalent to shall or must in cases where the sense of the entire enactment requires it; People v. Common Council, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 404; Kansas City, W. &

In the con.struction of public statutes, is often to be construed " must."

Though primarily importing permission, is often used, in construing statutes, in the sense of " shall " or " must." Where public interest or private right requires that a thing should be done, " may " is construed to mean "must." I Equivalent to "must " or "shall " when important rights of an accused person depend upon it, and when the context and general purpose of a statute require it.' Construed "must " in all cases where the legislature meant to impose, a positive and absolute duty, and not merely a discretionary power. The ordinaiy meaning of the language must be presumed intended, unless that would defeat the object of the provision.^ But it is only where it is necessary to give effect to the clear policy and intention of the legislature that suchliberty can be taken with the plain words of statutes.* When power is given to public of Scers, and the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in form, is' in fact peremptory.^ See Kequibe. May be. The expression, in a statute, that " the county court in which any part of the route of the said railroad may be," may subscribe to the stock, is to be construed with reference to the situation of the subject-matter. Used of a railroad already built, "maybe "would be equivalent to "exists," "is built," "in operation," or the like. But referring to a road not yet built, not located or surveyed, nor organized, it must have a different meaning." May have. Possessions that a testator "may have " do not necessarily refer to future time.' "May have" and "may have been" are presumably retrospective. 8 ' People V. Supervisors, 68 N. T. 119 (1877); People v. Supervisors, 51 id. 406-7 (1873), cases. estate V. Neuner, 49 Conn. 233 (1881), cases; Commonwealth V. Smith, 111 Mass. 407 (1873). ' Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll, 22 How. 434 (1859), Grier, J. ' Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 64 (1828), Story, J. ' Supervisors v. United States, 4 Jf all. 446^7 (1866), cases, Swayne, J.; Jones v. Statesville, 97 N. C. 86 (1887). See also Leighton v. Maxay, 76 Va. -870 (1882); Exp. Lester, 77 id. 673(1883); 9 rfow. 269; 5 Wall. 705; 95U. S. 170; 17 F. E. 814; 2 Flip. 373; 7 Ct. CI. 334; 12 Ala. 693; 28 id. 28; 45 Cal. 696; 70 111. 690; 77 id. 373; 7 Ind. 122; 18 id. 27; 53 Me. 438; 61 id. 566; 107 Mass. 197; 125 id. 201; 141 id. 104; 11 Minn. 101; 35 id. 186; 39 Mo. 521; 48 id. 167, 390; 3 Neb. 224; 4 id. 150; 11 Nev. 260; 39 N. H. 485; 27 N. J. L. 407; 24 N. Y. 495; 62 id. 27; 91 id. 637; 81 Pa. 349; 8 Phila. 625; 1 Wash. T. 51; 9 Wis. 309; 36 id. 498; 64 id. 347; 73 E. C. L. 755. » County of Calloway v. Foster, 93 U. S. 573 (1876). ' Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. & B. *443 (1812). May in anywise. Not always the same as " may by any possibility," or "may under any circumstances." ' May or may not give. Where a statute provides that for willful neglect, punitive damages may or may not be given in the discretion of the jury, it is error to instruct a jmy that they " should " give punitive damages if they found willful neglect." But an erroneous instruction that if the defendant was guilty of willful neglect the jury "ought" to award punitive damages, is not cured by another instruction that they " co^ld " find any sum as punitive May pay. In an agreement for re-insurance, may mean " liable to pay." ' May receive. An agreement to credit on a note any amount the payee may receive, may refer to money thereafter received.* May saw. An agreement to sell all the plank one may saw during a winter was held not to bind the defendant to saw any plank at all." " May summon " the master of a vessel to show cause why process should not issue against the vessel,' means shall be at liberty, is permitted, to summon him.'

To be permitted; to be at liberty; to have the power. Whenever a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice or the public good, the word may is the same as shall. For example, the 23 H. 6, says, the sheriff may take bail, that is construed he shail, for he is compellable to do so. Carth. 293; Salk. 609; Skin. 370. The words shall and may in general acts of the legislature or in private constitutions, are to be construed imperatively, 3 Atk. 166; but the construction of those words in a deed depends on circumstances. 3 Atk. 282. See 1 Vern. 152, case 142.