Memory

Understanding; a capacity to make contracts, a will, or to commit a crime, so far as intention is necessary. Memory is sometimes employed to express the capacity of the understanding, and sometimes its power. When we speak of a retentive memory, we use it in the former sense; when of a ready memory, in the latter. Shelf. Lun. Introd. 29, 30. The reputation, good or bad, which a man leaves at his death. This memory, when good, is highly prized by the relations of the deceased, and it is therefore libellous to throw a shade over the memory of the dead, when the writing has a tendency to create a breach of the peace, by inciting the friends and relations of the deceased to avenge the insult offered to the family. 4 Term R. 126; 5 Coke, 125; Hawk. P. C. bk. 1, c. 73, § 1.

Uilderstandlng; a capacity to make contracts, a will, or to commit a crime, so far as Intention is necessary. Memory is sometimes employed to express the capacity of the understanding, and sometimes its power; when we speak of a retentive memory, we use it In the former sense; when of a ready memory, in the latter. Shelf ord, Lun. Intr. 29, 30. The reputation, good or bad, which a man leaves at his death. This memory, when good, is highly prized the memory of the dead, when the writing has a tendency to create a breach of the peace, by inciting the friends and relations of the deceased to avenge the insult offered to the family. 4 Term 126; 6 Co. 125; Hawkins, PI. Cr. b. 1, c. 73, s. 1. See Libel; PbivacY. As to witness refreshing his memory, see Memoeandum.

Menial capacity; the mental power to review and recognize the sucoessive states of consciousness in their consecutive order. This word, as used in jurisprudence to denote one of the psychological elements necessary in the making of a valid will or contract or the commission of a crime, implies the mental power to conduct a consecutive train of thought or an orderly planning of affairs, by recalling correctly the past states of the mind and past events, and arranging them in their due order of sequence and in their logical relations with the events and mental states of the present. The phrase "sound and disposing mind and memory" means not merely distinct recollection of the items of one's property and the persons among whom it may be given, but entire power of mind to dispose of property by will. Abbott. Also the reputation and name, good or bad, which a man leaves at his death.

— Legal memory. An ancient usage, custom, supposed grant (as a foundation for prescription) and the like, are said to be immemorial when they are really or fictitiously of such an ancient date that "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," or. in other words, "beyond legal memory." And legal memory or "time out of mind," according to the rule of the common law, commenced from the reign of Richard I., A. D. 1189. But under the statute of limitation of 32 Hen. VIII. this was reduced to 60 years, and again by that of 2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 71, to 20 years. In the American states, by statute, the time of legal memory la generally fixed at a period corresponding to that prescribed for actions for the recovery of real property, usually about 20 years. See 2 Bl. Comm. 31; Miller v. Gar-lock, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 153.

The faculty by which mental impressions are reproduced; understanding; full possession of the mental powers, as in the expression sound and disposing mind and memory.

In English law. Memory or memory of man, legal memory: a period

TIME OF. According to the English common law, which bas been altered by 2&8 Wm. IV. c. 71, the time of memory commenced from the reign of hichadI., A.D. 1189. 2 Bl. Comm. 31.

1. Mental capacity. The phrase, sound and disposing mind and memory, means, not merely distinct recollection of the items of one's property and the persons among whom it may be given, but entire power of mind to dispose of property by will. 2. According to the ancient theory of the common law, customs, rights, possessions, &c., which had existed from a time ante-dating history, or from time immemorial, or before the memory of man, became obligatory and valid without proof of an original authority or grant by which they commenced. The time of this legal memory was originally indefinite. In 1276, by the statute of Westminster, the commencement of the reign of Richard I. was named as the date when legal memory should be deemed to commence. Under that enactment, a custom depending on length of existence only might be impeached and deprived of force as law, by proof that it had not existed uninterruptedly from that date. Of com-se, the lapse of centuries after that (or any other) fixed date gradually rendered it more and more difficult that any custom or right should be traced back to the beginning of legal memory; hence, in 1832, by Stat. 2 & 3 Wm. IV. ch. 71, the plan of dating legal memory from a fixed point of time was abandoned, and the principle introduced, that rights which had been enjoyed for full twenty proof that they did not exist at some earlier date. This rule substantially prevails throughout the United States. The adoption of a term of years dating back from the date of controversy, in place of a date assumed as the commencement of legal history, has deprived the phrase, time of legal memory, of any special significance or importance. In older books it occurs, used with reference to the commencement of the reign of Richard I. More recently, the expression is found, referring to the change in the law introduced in Wm. IV., — the time of legal memory is twenty years.