Moral Obligation

A duty which one owes, and which he ought to perform, but which he is not legally bound to fulfill.,These obligations are of two kinds: (1) Those founded on a natural right; as, the obligation to be charitable, which can never be enforced by law. (2) Those which are supported by a good or valuable antecedent consideration; as, where a man owes a debt barred by the act of limitations, this cannot be recovered by law, though it subsists in morality and conscience; but if the debtor promise to pay it, the moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for the promise, and the creditor may maintain an action of assumpsit to recover the money. 1 Bouv. Inst, note 623. See "Consideration." MORARI (Lat.)

In old English law. To delay; to pause or rest. Moratur in lege, (he) rests or pauses in law; (he) demurs. MORBOSUS (Lat. from morbus).

In the civil law. Diseased. See Dig. 21. 1. 1-16. MORBUS SONTICUS (Lat.)

In the civil law. A sickness which rendered a man incapable of attending to any business (qui cuique rei nocet). Dig. 50. 16. 113; 1 Mackeld. Civ. Law, 137, § 127, note. A sickness of the severer kind, having the power of causing great pain. A. Gellius, Noct. Att. lib. 20, c. 1. A sickness w'hich excused a nonappearance in court. Calv. Lex.; Adams, Rom. Ant. 245, 272. Bracton uses_ this term in treating of the law of essoins, but gives it the meaning of an incurable disease. Bracton, fol. 344b. MORE COLONICO (Lat.)

In old pleading. In husbandlike manner. Towns. PI. 108.

A duty which one owes, and which he ought to perform, but which he is not legally bound to fulfil. These obligations are of two kinds: Ist, those founded on a natural right: as, the obligation to be charitable, which can never be enforced by law. 2d, those which are supported by a good or valuable antecedent consideration: as, where a man owes a debt barred by the act of limitations, or contracted during Infancy; this cannot be recovered by law, though It subsists In morality and conscience. A doctrine prevailed for some time in the courts of England and this country that an express promise made Id discharge of an antecedent moral obligation created a valid contract, and the contract was then said to be supported by the previous moral obligation; Cowp. 290; 5 Taunt 86; Willing V. Peters, 12 S. A R. (Pa.) 177. This opinion appears to have been entertained by Lord Mansfield; 5 Taunt. 36. In a note to Wennall v. Adney, 3 B. A P. 249, this idea was controverted, and in Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. A E. 438 (6 Eng. *Rul. Cas. 41); the notion of the validity of a moral consider;) ation was finally overruled. The rule existed, If It does hot still exist, in Pennsylvania, as late as Hemphill v. Mc Cllmans, 24 Promises by an Infant, after coming of age, to pay a debt incurred during infancy, of a bankrupt to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy, and of a debtor to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, are sometimes considered as Instances of contracts supported by moral considerations; as is a note given as surety by wife for husband, renewed after his death; Rathfon v. Locher, 215 Pa. 674, 64 Atl. 790. But the promise of the Infant Is rather a ratification of a contract which was voidable, but not void. The promise of the bankrupt operates as a waiver of the defence gU’en to the bankrupt by statute, the certificate of discharge not having extinguished the debt, but merely having protected the defendant from an action on it, by means of the statutory bar. In both of these cases the action is founded upon the original debt. The case of a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations is said to stand upon anomalous grounds. The true explanation of the doctrine seems to be that it was an ingenious device for evading the statute adopted at a time when the courts regarded it with disfavor. Here too the action is upon the old debt, and not upon the new promise; Ilsley V. Jewett, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 439. The subject is learnedly treated by Mr. Langdell (Contr. §71). Some cases have held a feme bound by a promise after coverture to pay a debt contracted during coverture; Hemphill v. McCIimans, 24 Pa. 371; see Ewell, L. C. Cov. 332. Under the English Bankruptcy Act of 18C9, debts discharged cannot be revived by a promi.se made after adjudication; and under the Infants* Relief Act of 1874, any promise made after full age to pay a debt contracted during infancy Is void. The discharge of a merely moral obligation of another will not create a debt, unless made in pursuance of an express request or actual agreement to that effect; Leake, Contr. 86.

A duty which is valid and binding in the forum of the conscience but is not recognized by the law as adequate to set in motion the machinery of justice; that is, one which rests upon ethical consideration's alone, and is not imposed or enforced by positive law. Taylor v. Hotchkiss, 81 App. Div. 470, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1042; Goulding v. Davidson, 25 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 483; Bailey v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 569, 31 Ail. 925, 46 Am. St. Rep. 691.

Defined under Obligation in Black's Law Dictionary.

A duty which is valid and binding in the forum of theconscience, but is not recognized by the law as adequate to set in motion the machinery of justice; that is, one which rests upon ethical considerations alone, and is not imposed or enforced by pusitive law.