multifariousness

A bill cannot be said to be multifarious unless it embraces distinct matters, which do not affect all the defendants alike.

In equity pleading. The demand in one bill of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants. Cooper, Eq. PI. 182; 18 Ves. 80; 2 Mason (U. S.) 201; 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 682; 2 Gray (Mass.) 467. The uniting in one bill against a single defendant several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected. This latter is more properly called "misjoinder" (q. v.) The subject admits of no general rules, but the courts seem to consider the circumand OB the other inconvenience and hardship to the defendants from being obliged to answer matters with which they have, in great part, no connection, and the complication and confusion of evidence. 1 Mylne & C. 618; 5 Sim. 288; 3 Story, C. C. (U. S.) 25; 2 Gray (Mass.) 471; Story, Eq. PI. §§ 274, 630. It is to be taken advantage of by demurrer (2 Anstr. 469), or by plea and answer previous to a hearing (Story, Eq. PI. 530, note), or by the court of its own acccod at any time (1 Myline & K. 546; 3 How. [U. S.] 412; 5 How. [U. S.] 127). See, generally. Story, Eq. PL §§ 274-290, 530-540; 4 Bouv. Inst, note 4243.

In Equity Plead* Ing. The demand in one bill of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants. Cooper, Eq. PI. 182; 18 Ves. 80; Fellows v. 'Fellows, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 682, 15 Am. Dec. 412; White v. Curtis, 2 Gray (Mass.) 467. See Dan. Oh. Pr. 2093. The uniting In one bill against a single defendant several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected. More commonly called misjoinder of claims. See Misjoindeb. Multifariousness of the first kind is where the plaintiff joins several distinct claims against the same defendant and prays relief in respect to all; and of the second kind is where a plaintiff having a valid claim against one defendant Joins another person as defendant in the same suit with a large part of which he is not connected. The objection Is discouraged where it might defeat the ends of justice; Marshall v. Means, 12 Ga. 61, 66 Am. Dec. 444; but Joinder will be allowed unless it is apparent that the defence will be seriously embarrassed by confusing, different issues and proofs in the same litigation; Nourse v. Allen, 4 Blatchf. 376, Fed. Cas. No. 10,367. A bill is multifarious where there is a misjoinder of distinct and independent causes of action. See Savage V. Benham, 17 Ala. 119. Thus, unconnected demands against different estates cannot be united in the same bill, though the defendant is executor in both; Daniel v. Morrison’s Ex’r, 6 Dana (Ky.) 186; nor will a bill lie against two different partnerships, though one defendant is a partner in both; Griffin v. Merrill, 10 Md. 364; nor a bill combining Individual claims with claims in a representative capacity; Carter v. Treadwell, 3 Story 25, Fed. Cas. No. 2,480; but a bill may be brought by several persons claiming under a common title but in different shares; Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (U. S.) 253, 15 L. Ed. 368; and where there is a joinder of a legal and an equitable claim and a prayer for relief as to both, the bill is not multifarious; Carpenter v. Hall, 18 Ala. 439. To justify dismissal on this ground, it must appear that the interests are so diverse that they cannot be properly Included in one decree; Mlchan v. Wyatt, 21 Ala. 813. The vice of multifariousness is the union of causes of action which, or of parties whose claims, It is either Impractical or inconvenient to adjudicate in a single suit Where it is a^l practical and convenient for there Is no multifariousness; Westlnghouse A. B. Co. V. R. Co., 137 Fed. 26, 71 0. O. A 1. It does not apply where all the defendants’ acts are of like character, their effect on complainant is identical, and the same relief is sought against all, the defenses being the same; Bitterman v. R. Co., 207 U. S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct 91, 52 L. Ed. 171, 12 Ann. Cas. 693. The question is always largely within the discretion of the court; Horner-Gaylord Co. V. Miller, 147 Fed. 297; U. S. v. Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 90, 32 L. Ed. 460; Brown v. Deposit Co., 128 U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct. 127, 32 L. Ed. 468; Shafer v. O’Brien, 31 W. Va. 601, 8 S. E. 298. A bill for Infringement of a patent and for unfair trade is not; Onondaga I. W. Co. V. Mfg. Co., 182 Fed. 832; contra, Keasby & Mattlson Co. v. Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 432; nor is a bill by the equitable owner of a patent for its Infringement and to compel a transfer; Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Lighting Co., 164 Fed. 60; nor for infringement of several patents with an averment that the inventions are capable of ‘‘conjoint use”; Southern Plow Co. V. Agr. Works, 165 Fed. 214; nor is a bill multifarious because it seeks to enforce two series of bonds, both owned by the complainant and issued by the same city; Burlington Sav. Bank v. Clinton, 106 Fed. 269. A bill framed with a double aspect Is not multifarious; Baines v. Mc Gee, 1 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 208; Murphy v. Clark, id., 221. There is no general rule by which to determine whether a bill is multifarious because it joins another person as defendant in a suit with a large part of which he is unconnected; it must be left to the discretion of the court; Oliver v. Platt, 3 How. (U. S.) 333, 11 L. Ed. 622; Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (U. S.) 259, 15 L. Ed. 368; the courts do not disregard previous decisions, but have a due regard to general convenience and the advancement of justice; Dunn v. Cooper, 3 Md. Ch. 47. Defendants should not be put to the unnecessary trouble and expense of answering litigated matters in a bill in which they are not Interested; Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 432; but where the Interests of different parties are so complicated in different transactions that entire justice could not be conveniently done without uniting the whole, the bill is not multifarious; Oliver V. Platt, 3 How. (U. S.) 333, 11 L. Ed. 622; Page v. Whldden, 69 N. H. 607, The objection is confined to cases where the cause of each defendant is entirely different in subject-matter from that of his co-defendants, but it does not apply to a case where a general right is claimed by the plaintiff, though the defendants may have separate and distinct rights; Hef^e v. Hill, contain not only separate and distinct matters, but such that each entitles the complainant to separate equitable relief; Adams, Eq. 310. The objection should be raised by demurrer; Grove v. Fresh, 9 GUI & J. (Md.) 280; filing an answer and taking the testimony on the merits waives the objection, and It cannot be made on appeal after a decree pro confesso; id.; Gilmore v. Sapp, 100 111. 297; or after a final decree on the merits of one part of the bill; Betts v. Betts, 18 Ala. 787. In Persch v. Quiggle, 67 Pa. 247, it was held that It was too late to object at the hearing. But In such case It has also been held that its allowance rests in the discretion of the court: Felder v. Davis, 17 Ala. 426. It may be taken by plea, answer, or demurrer, but not at the hearing; but the court may raise It at any time; Oliver V. Piatt, 3 How. (U. S.) 333, 11 L. Ed. 022. One defendant cannot demur on the ground of the Joinder of another defendant who does not object See 38 N. J. Eq. 89, note. A demurrer goes to the whole suit, and, If sustained, the bill should be dismissed; Dunn V. Cooper, 3 Md. Ch. 46; Mc Intosh v. Aleyander, 16 Ala. 87. See Misjoindeb.

In equity pleading, the improper joining in one bill of distinct and independent matters, thereby confounding them, as, of several matters against one defendant, or several matters against several defendants.

In _ equity pleading. The fault of improperly joining in one bill distinct and independent matters, and thereby confounding them; as, for exi ample, the uniting in one bill of several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected against one defendant, or the demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants, in the same bill. Story, Eq. Pl. § 271.

A defect in equity pleading, consisting in the uniting in one bill of several claims of a distinct and independent nature, and which ought to be the subject of distinct suits. A bill obnoxious to this objection is said to be " multifarious." Multifariousness, in equity pleading, is improperly joining in one bill distinct and independent matters, and thereby confounding them; as, for example, the uniting in one bill of several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants in the same bill. In strictness, to use " misjoinder," where different and distinct claims are mixed in the same bill against the same defendant, would be more correct. What is more familiarly understood by the term multifariousness, as applied to a bill, is where a party is able to say he is brought as a defendant upon a record, with a large portion of which, and of the case made by which, he has no connection whatever. But to lay down any rule, applicable universally, or to say what constitutes multifariousness as an abstract proposition, is, upon the authorities, utterly impossible. Wharton.