Optimus

Best. The initial word of several Latin maxims. Optimus interpres rerum usus. The best interpreter of things is usage. The principle that custom or usage is an important guide to construction, particularly of statutes, is expressed in several maxims: Optimus interpres legum consuetudo, — the best interpreter of laws is custom; otherwise, optima est legum interpres consuetudo, — custom is the best interpreter of laws, &c. The signification is that a custom or usage, following upon a statute, is the best interpreter of what the statute was meant to enact, as showing what was regarded as the meaning and purpose of the statute among those by whom, or for whom, the act was passed. Trayn. Max. Another view of the principle is, that the exposition of a law is to be preferred which is approved by constant and continual use and experience. Broom Max. This maxim may not inaptly be called a creature of circumstance, and the reason of it, a state of things acquiesced in rather than agreed to, the law of times of ignorance and indifference; and though old customs still remain, and habit and practice, for convenience of people and encouragement of commercial enterprise, assume with us the name of custom, yet written law is, in modern times, gradually assuming the ascendancy over, if not the total abrogation of, custom. Custom, however, whether particular or general, is law, and usage is evidence of custom. Common or general custom is the common law of the country, and particular custom the particular law of the place, person, or thing to which it applies. There are, however, some limits to a custom. It must be obligatory, reasonable, and certain. It must not be against the good of the public, nor the many, and in favor of a few, or one person. It must not be against a public statute, or express contract inter partes. The maxim, modus et conventio vincunt legem, may also be considered in connection with this. Whart. Max. 152. The true and appropriate office of a usage or custom is, to interpret the otherwise indeterminate intentions of parties, and to ascertain the nature and extent of their contracts, arising, not from express stipulations, but from mere implications and presumptions, and acts of a doubtful and equivocal character. It may also be admitted to ascertain the true meaning of a particular word in a given instrument, when the word or words have various senses, some common, some qualified, and some technical, according to the subject-matter to which they are applied. But it can never be proper to resort to any usage or custom to control or vary the positive stipulations in a written contract, and, a fortiori, not in order to contradict them. The Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567. This maxim approves a statute, which is so clearly expressed and well defined as to leave the judge little room, if any, for the exercise of his own judgment or opinion; a law so clear, that the rights or duties thereby created may be at once discerned; while the judge is approved who adheres most to the terms of the law he is administering, and relies as little as possible on his own views of its interpretation, meaning, or intention. Trayn. Max. 413. Optima est lex quae minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis, optimus judex qui minimum sibi. That law is the best which leaves least to the discretion of the judge; that judge is the best who acts least upon his own. That system of law is the best which confides as little as possible to the discretion of the judge; that judge the best who relies as little as possible on his own opinion. Broom Max. 84.