parties

Parties in that connection include all who are directly interested in the subject-matter, and who had a right to make defence, control the proceedings, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and appeal from the judgment. Persons not having those rights substantially are regarded as strangers to the cause, but all who are directly interested in the suit and have knowledge of its pendency, and who refuse or neglect to appear and avail themselves of those rights, are equally concluded by the proceedings.

The persons who take part in the performance of any act or who are directly interested in any affair, contract or conveyance or who are actively cencerned in the prosecution and defense of any legal proceeding. In S. v. Henderlong (C. C.) 102 Fed. 2; Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 672, 18 L. Bid. 427; Green v. Bogue, 158 U. S. 478, 15 Sup. Ch 975, 39 L. Ed. 1061; Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446, 5 In R. A. 637, 15 Am. St. Rep. 386. See also Party. In the Roman civil law, the parties were designated as "actor" and "reus." In the common law, they are calied "plaintiff" and "defendant ;" in real actions, "demandant" and "tenant;" in equity, "complainant" or "plaintiff" and "defendant;" in Scotch law, "pursuer" and "defender;" in admiralty practice, "libelant" and "respondent;" in appeals, "appellant" and "respondent" sometimes, "plaintiff in error" apd "defendant in error;" in criminni proceedings, "prosecutor" and "prisoner." Classification. Formal parties are those who have no interest in the controversy between the immediate litigants, but have an interest in the subject-matter which may be conveniently settled in the suit, and thereby prevent further litigation; they may be made parties or not, at the option of the complainant. Ohadbourne v. Coe, 51 Fed. 479, 2 C. C. A. 327.

— Necessary partias. those parties who have such an interest in the subject-matter of a snit in equity, or whose rights are so involved in the controversy, that no complete and effective decree can be made, disposing of the matters in issue and dispensing complete justice, unless they are before the court in such a manner as to entitle them to be heard in vindication or protection of their interests. See Chandler v. Ward, 188 111. 322, 58 N. E. 919; Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Cleveland Co.., 58 Hun, 606, 11 N. Y. Supp 873; Chadbourne v. Coe, 5i Fed. 480, 2 C. O. A. 327; Burrili v. Garst, 19 R. I. 38, 31 Atl. 436; Castle v. Madison. 113 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 156; Iowa County Sup'rs v. Mineral Point R. Co., 24 Wis. 132. Nominal parties are those who are joined as plaintiffs or defendants, not because they have any reni interest in the subject-matter or because any relief is demanded as against them, hut merely because the technical rules of pleading require their presence on the record. It should he noted that some couris make a further distinction between "necessary" parties and "indispensable" parties. Thus, it la said that the supreme court of the United States divides parties in equity suits into three different classes:
(1) Formal parties, who have no interest in the controversy between the immediate litigants, but have such an interest in the subject-matter as may be conveniently settled in the suit, and thereby prevent further litigation;
(2) necessary parties, who have an interest in the controversy, bnt whose interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, and will not he directly affected by a decree which does complete and full justice between them;
(3) indispensable parties, who not only have an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and food conscience. Hicklin v. Marco, 56 Fed. 52, 6 C. C. A. 10, citing Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, 15 L. Ed. 158; Ribon v. Railroad Co., 16 Wall. 450, 21 L. Ed. 367; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 571, 22 L Ed. 184; Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 425, 24 In Ed. 1061.

— Parties and privies. Parties to a deed or contract are those with whom the deed or contract is actually made or entered into. By the term "privies," as applied to contracts, is frequently meant those between whom the contract is mutually binding, although not literally parties to such contract. Thus, in the case of a lease, the lessor and lessee are both parties and privies, the contract being literally made between the two, and also being mutually binding; but, if the lessee assign his interest to a third party, then a privity arises between the assignee and the original lessor, although such assignee is not literally a party to the original lease. Brown.

v. Party.

See Party.