pay

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To discharge a debt, to deliver a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in goods, to his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged. Peals v. Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 527. See Tolman v. Ins. Co., 1 Cush. (Mass.) 7G.

To discharge an obligation by a terms or requirements, whether in money,

To discharge an obligation by a performance according to its terms or requirements, whether the obligation be for money, merchandise, or services.^ To deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, in either money or goods, to his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged. 3 n. Money, other property, or services, accepted in discharge of an obligation: as, an amount given to a person in the military service, in consideration of personal service.* See Fix, 3. Payable. Dischargeable by delivery of an equivalent in value, usually in money; also, due in present time, matured. See Due. Payee. He to whom payment has been or is to be made. Payer. He who makes or ought to make payment. Payor is rare. Payee refers, in particular, to the person in whose favor a bill of exchange, check, or draft is drawn. Repay. May be synonymous with " restore." 5 Unpaid. Is more commonly applied to a debt due than to a debt undue.* Payment. 1. Delivery by a debtor to his creditor of the amount due.' Opposed, nonpayment. That is payment which the parties contract shall be accepted as payment. It may be made in something else than money.s Originally, the performance of a promise to pay money, at the time and in the manner required by the terms of the contract; but has been extended to include the delivery of money in satisfaction of a debt after default made in paying according to the contract.' If a commodity, like wood, is accepted, upon a note for money, in pursuance of a subsequent agreement, the transaction constitutes an " accord and satisfaction." • Implies a voluntar.y act by the debtor looking to the satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the demand.^" ' F. paier, payer, to content; L. pacere, to pacify, appease. 5 Tolman v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 1 Cush. 76 (1848), Forbes, J. ' [Beals V. Home Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 627 (1867), Hunt, J.; 15 Barb. 274. « See Sherburne v. United States, 16 Ct. CI. 496 (1880). » Dunnegan v. United States, 17 Ct. 01. 258 (1881). 'Sloaneu Anderson, 57 Wis. IZ^ (1888). ' [Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 250 (1868), Chase, C. J. s Huffmans v. W^alker, 26 Gratt. 316 (1875). » Ulsoh V. Muller, 143 Mass. 379 (1887), Field, J. 3. As a plea, money or its equivalent in value., In Pennsylvania, the courts of law, from a time antedating 1770, have exercised chancery powers upon a plea of '* payment, with leave, etc." This plea, after notice of the special matter proposed to be offered by way of defense, enables the defendant to give evidence of anything which will prove that in equity and good conscience the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. The notice is considered as, in effect, a bill in equity; and the plea and the notice operate substantially as a bill of injunction. The defendant's equity is administered through the medium ol a jury."' Involuntary or compulsory payment, A payment made under compulsion, coercion, or duress. Voluntary payment. A payment made from choice. A "voluntary payment is made by the debtor on his own motion, without compulsory process. A payment made upon execution is not, therefore, a voluntary payment.^ The coercion or duress which will render a payment involuntary must in general consist of some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed, or believed to be possessed, by the person exacting or receiving the payment, over the person or property of another, from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief, than by making payment. ^ An action does not lie to recover money claimed without right, if the payment was made voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the facts upon which the claim was predicated. It is not enough that the payment was made under protest. To authorize a recovi ery, the payment must have been compulsory, that is, made under coercion, actual or legal. A payment made to prevent a seizure of property which can only take place by legal proceeding, in which the defendant may defend, is voluntary.* Where a party pays an illegal demand w ith knowledge of the facts which render it illegal, without immediate and urgent necessity therefor, and not to release from detention nor to prevent an immediate seizure of his person or property, such payment must be deemed voluntary, and cannot be recovered. Filalso 2 La. An. 26; 23 Mo. 285; 3 Duer, 441; 19 Barb. 15; 6 Heisk. 136; 12 W. Va. 780. ' Hawk V. Geddis. 16 S. & R. *28 (1827); 1 Eawle, 304; 9 Pa. St. 123; 11 S. & E. *190; 94 N. Y. 333; 2 Greenl. Ev. %% 616-36. 2 [Nichols ■!). Knowles, 3 Mc Crary, 478 (1882), Mc Crary, Judge. a Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 272 (1861), Field, C. J.; Eadioh v. Hutchins, 95 U. S. 210 (1877), Field, J. ■■ Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Tappan, 16 Blatch. ing a written protest cannot make a payment involuntary, i That is a correct statement of the rule at common law. Cases may be found in which the language of the court, separated from the facts, would seem to imply that a protest alone was sufficient to show that the payment was not voluntary; but on examination it will be found that the protest was used to give effect to other attending circumstances,* It suffices if the payment, caused on the one part by an illegal demand, is made on the other part reluctantly, and in consequence of that illegality, and without the person being able to regain possession of his property except by submitting to the payment.^ See further Duress; Extortion; Protest, 1; Revenue; Tax, 2. Non-payment. See Protest, 3. Part payment. The part payment of a debt which will take a case out of the statute of limitations means the payment of a smaller sum on account of a larger sum due. Payment of part of an outlawed debt implies an admission that the balance is still due and a promise to pay it. The act of payment on account takes the case out of the statute.* The principle is that the payer intends to acknowledge the greater debt to be still due.^ Oral agreements are competent to prove ihat a payment of money, the delivery of a note, the settlement of accounts, or the assuming of an obligation of a pecuniary nature, are, as between the parties, payments on account or in reduction of a note or other debt within the meaning of the statute.? Nothing can justly be considered as payment in fact but that which is in truth such, unless something^else is expressly agreed to be received in its place.' In ordinary transactions, a. check on a bank, payable on demand, is payment. But a note of the debtor, or of a third party, is not a payment of a precedent debt, unless specialli" agreed to.^ By the general commercial law, a promissory note 1 Wabaunsee County v. Commissioners,' 8 Kan. 436 (1871), cases, Valentine, J. 2 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 544, 643 1,1878), cases, Waite, C. J. » Swift Co. V. United States, 111 U. S. 29 (1884), oases, Matthews, J., quoting Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How. 266 (1860), Woodbury, J. See also Maxwell v. San Luis Opispo County, 71 Cal. 463 a880); 18 Cent. Law J. 188-CO (1884), cases; 20 id. 224-28 (1886), cases; 20 Cent, Law J. (1886), cases; 68 Ga. 122; 74 Me. 84; 100 Pa..346; 101 id. 255-57. As to recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact, see 1 Harv. Law Rev. 211-22 (1887), cases. ■1 Waters v. Tompkins, 2 Crompt,, M, & E. *726 (1635), Parke, B. i> United States v. Wilder, 13 Wall. 266 (1871). » Blanchard v. Blauchard, 122 Mass. 563 (1877), cases, Endicott, J.; Taylor v. Foster, 133 Mass, 33 (1883), cases; 6 Col, 589; 29 Minn. 171; 91 N, Y. 210; 87 Hun, 97; 22 N. H. 219; 28 Eng, L. & E. 454. does not extingjuish the debt for which it is given, unless that be the express agreement; it merelj- extends the period for payment of the debt. Acceptance of the note is considered as accompanied with the condition of its payment.' Demand of payment of commercial paper must be made on the maker or acceptor personally at his place of business or dwelling. Neither bankruptcy nor death ■will excuse a neglect. The holder is the proper person to make the demand, but the law makes a notary public his agent. What the notary does must appear distinctly in his protest.' See Application, 2; Assumpsit; Debt; Defer; De-

To deliver, in satisfaction of a debt, duty, or obligation, the thing due. Paid: discharged by delivery of the value called for. To pay, as usually understood, means to deliver money; this is, however, not necessarily involved. The word does, however, imply a delivery of value, and that it is the value called for by the engagement to be discharged. For, when that engagement calls for something performance is the proper term; and ■when something else than what it calls for is delivered and accepted, this is a compromise, or a discharge, but "pay " does not apply. To pay is to deliver a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in goods, to his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged. Beals V. Home Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 522. The word implies an indebtedness. Lent V. Hodgman, 15 Barb. 274. The word does not necessarily import a discharge of the obligation by money. To pay is to discharge an obligation by a performance according to its terras or requirements: if the obligation be for money, the payment is made in money; if for merchandise or labor, a delivery of the merchandise or a performance of the labor is payment; or if for the erection of a building, performance according to the terms of the contract is payment. The assent of insurers to an indorsement upon a policy of the words, " Pay the loss to T," does not impair their right, if the policy so allows, to discharge their obligation by replacing the property insured, instead of paying its value. Tolman v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 1 Cush. 73.