Perpetuity

Any limitation tending to take the subject of it out of commerce foi a longer period than a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years beyond, and, in case of a posthumous child, a few months more, allowing for the term of gestation. Rand. Perp. 48. Such a limitation of property as renders it unalienable beyond the period allowed by law. Gilb. Uses (Sugd. Ed.) 260, note. An interest subject to a condition precedent, which condition is not to be fulfilled within twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. Gray, Perp. § 216. Mr. Justice Powell, in 12 Mod. 278, distinguished perpetuities into two sorts, — absolute and qualified; meaning thereby, and the case where an estate is limited on a contingency, which might happen within a reasonable compass of time, but where the estate nevertheless, from the nature of the limitation, might be kept out of commerce longer than was thought agreeable to the policy of the common law. But this distinction would not now lead to a better understanding or explanation of the subject; for whether an estate be so limited that it cannot take effect until a period too much protracted, or whether on a contingency which may happen within a moderate compass of time, it equally falls within the line of perpetuity, and the limitation is therefore void; for it is not sufficient that an estate may vest within the time allowed, but the rule requires that it must. Rand. Perp. 49. See Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 23; 1 Belt, Supp. Ves. 406; 2 Ves. Jr. 357; 3 Saund. 388; Comyn Dig. "Chancery" (4 G 1); 3 Chanc. Cas. 1; 2 Bouv. Inst, note 1890.

Any limitation tending to take property out of commerce for a longer period than a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years beyond, and, in case of a posthumous child, a few months more, allowing for the term of gestation. Randall, Perp. 48. Such a limitation of property as renders it inalienable beyond the period allowed by law. Gilbert, Uses, Sugd. ed. 260, n. “A future limitation, whether executory or by way of remainder, and of real or personal property, which is not to vest till after the expiration of or which will not necessarily vest within, the period prescribed by law for the creation of future estates, and which is not destructible by the person for the time being entitled to the property subject to the future limitation, except with the concurrence of the person interested in the contingent event” Lewis, Perpetuities ch. 12. This was said by Gibson, C. J., to be the nearest approach to a perfect definition of a perpetuity; Ilillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. 334. It is suggested that some confusion has arisen in connection with the law of perpetuities because of a certain ambiguity in the legal definition of the term itself. ‘‘The original meaning of a perpetuity is an inalienable, indestructible interest. The second artificial meaning is, an interest which will not vest to a remote period. This latter is the meaning which is attached to the term when the rule against perpetuities is spoken of;” Gray, Perp. § 140. The author last cited considers it a matter of regret that the rule should not have been known as the rule against remoteness, rather thap the rule as against perpetuities. The comment was made upon this statement that notwithstanding the declaration quoted from this author, ‘‘yet in all his Miffin’s Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525, 1

The quality of indefinite duration without change; the quality by which an estate becomes inalienable either perpetually, or for a very long period; a modification of an estate by which it ie made inalienable perpetually or indefinitely; a modification of an estate by which it is made inalienable beyond the period allowed by law, — the period of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years with the term of gestation added in case of a posthumous child; tht estate so modified or perpetuated.

1. Of the sovereign! absolute immortality in his political capacity. ' 3. The settlemeht of an interest in property, which will go in the succession prescribed, without any power of alienation.^ A grant of property wherein the vesting of an interest is unlawfully postponed.* So called, not because the grant, as written, would actually make the estate perpetual, but because it transgresses the limits which the law has set in restraint of grants that tend to a perpetual suspense of the title, or of its vesting, or, as it Is sometimes expressed, with less accuracy, to a perpetual prevention of alienation,^ A limitation of property which renders it inalienable beyond the period allowed by law,8 — a life or lives in being and twentyone years more, with a fraction of a year added for the term of gestation, in cases of posthumous birth. All that is required is that the estate shall vest within the prescribed period. The right Of possession may be postponed longer.' Perpetuities are abhorred by the law. They make estates incapable of answering the ends of social commerce, and providing for the sudden contingencies of private life, for which property was at first established.^ Trusts created for charitable or public pmT)oses are not subject to the rule.' See Accumulation; Charity, 2; Mortmain. 1 3 Bl. Com. 450. = 2 Story, Eq. §§ 1505-13; Hall v. Stout, 4 Del. Oh. 873 (1871); 3 Daniel, Oh. Pr. 955; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. §§ 83, 810. » 1 Bl. Com. 249. » 2 Bl. Com. 174. s City of Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. 26 (1868), Lowrie, C. J.; 10 id. 334; 88 td. 495. «Ould V. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 318 (1877), Swayne, J. See also Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 494 (1860): Saund. Uses, &c. 196; Mo Arthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 383- 83 (1885), cases. Gray, J. ' Bruce v. Nickerson, 141 Mass. 403 (1886). « 3 Bl. Com. 174; Quid's Case, sapra; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis). 474 (1884); 76 Va. 147.

An estate unalienable for a long than that allowed by law. Such limitation, may be longer than lives in being at the twenty-one years nine months after, is void

Has a technical signification, is applied to attempts to invest money or restrict the alienation of land in such way as for ever to retain it for the benefit or in the enjoyment of the persons of a particular line of descent. Attempts to create perpetuities are disapproved and vigorously restricted by English laws and by the laws of most of the states.

in estates, may be defined to be any limitation tending to take the subject of it out of commerce for a longer period, than a life or lives in being, and twentyone years beyond; and in case of a posthumous child, a few months more, allowing for the term of gestation, Randell on Perpetuities, 48; or it is such a limitation of propérty as renders it unalienable beyond the period allowed by law. Gilbert on Uses, by Sugden, 260, note. Mr. Justice Powell, in Scattergood v. Edge, 12 Mod. 278, distinguished perpetuities into two sorts, absolute and qualified; meaning thereby, as it is apprehended, a distinction between a plain, direct and palpable perpetuity, and the case where an estate is limited on a contingency, which might happen within a reasonable compass of time, but where the estate nevertheless, from the nature of the limitation, might be kept out of commerce longer than tinction would not now lead to a better understanding or explanation of the subject; for whether an estate be so limited that it cannot take effect, until a period too much protracted, or whether on a contingency which may happen within a moderate compass of time, it equally falls within the line of: perpetuity and the limitation is therefore void; for it is not sufficient that an estate may vest within the time allowed, but the rule requires that it must.. Randell on Perp. 49. Vide Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 23; 1 Supp. to Ves. Jr. 406; 2 Ves. Jr. 457; 3 Saund. 388 h. Com. Dig. Chancery, (4 G 1); ate Chan. Cas. 1.