Philippine Islands

War was declared with Spain on April 25, 1898. On May 1, 1898, the forces of the United States captured Manila bay and harbor. The protocol of August 12, 1898, provided that the United States would occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending tho control, disposition and government of the Philippines. Manila was opened as a port of entry on August 20, 1898, and Cebu on March 14, 1899. The executive order of July 12, 1S98, was not proclaimed in Cebu until February 22, 1899, or later. The treaty of peace was signed on December 10, 1898, but ratifications were not exchanged until April 11, 1S99. The Spanish forces evacuated the island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional governor. Shortly thereafter the native inhabitants formerly in insurrection against Spain took possession of the island, formed a so-called republic and administered the affairs of the island until possession was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1899, prior to which time the United States had not been in possession of the islands. After the treaty of peace with Spain, the Philippines ceased to be a “foreign country” in the view of the tariff act; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 743, 45 L. Ed. 1041; the subsequent insurrection did not constitute it such; Lincoln v.-U. S., 197 U. S. 419, 25 Sup. Ct. 455, 49 L. Ed. 816. No distinction can be made, so far as concerns between Porto Rico and the Philippines; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. U. S., 183 U. S. 176, 22 Sup. Ct. 59, 46 L. Ed. 138. The inhabitants continuing to reside there, who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and resided there and their children born subsequently thereto are made citizens of the Philippines and entitled to the protection of the United States, excepting such as have elected to remain subjects of Spain. For a history of matters growing out of the Spanish-American war, see U. S. v. Heinszen, 2(36 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed. 1098, 11 Ann. Cas. 688; Macleod v. U. S., 229 TJ. S. 416, 33 foup. Ct. 955, 57 L. Ed. 1260. Congress in dealing with the Philippine Islands may delegate legislative authority to such agencies as it may select; U. S. v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed. 1098, 11 Ann. Cas. 688. In 1901 it had been held tl\at while the president, as commander-in-chief, had authority to impose customs duties in Porto Rico on goods coming into that country from the United States prior to the ratification of the treaty, no such executive power existed after that ratification; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 743, 45 L. Ed. 1041. After the ratification of the treaty with Spain, congress passed the Foraker Act, imposing tariff duties. These, too, were held lawful because they were imposed, not simply by virtue of the authority of the president, acting under the military power, but in conformity with a valid act of congress; Dooley v. U. S., 1S3 U. S. 151, 22 Sup. Ct. 62, 43 L. Ed. 128. On the same day, in a case involving the validity of tariff duties levied on diamonds brought into the United States from the Philippines, it was held that such duties were unlawful; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. U. S., 183 U. S. 176, 22 Sup. Ct. 59, 46 L. Ed. 138; because the Philippines were not foreign territory. In January and in March, 1902, in two cases, it was sought to recover duties paid on goods taken into the Philippines, after the ratification of the treaty with Spain and before the passage of the act of congress of March 8, 1902. It was held that the president was without power, after the ratification of the treaty, and in the absence of express authority from congress, to impose the duties in question; Lincoln v. U. S., 197 U. S. 419, 25 Sup. Ct. 455, 49 L. Ed. 816; id., 202 U. S. 484, 26 Sup. Ct. 728, 50 L. Ed. 1117. An act of congress of June 30, 1906, then ratified the collection of duties levied under the order of the president. In a case commencing after the decision in Fourteen Diamond Rings v. U. S., 183 U. S. 176, 22 Sup. Ct. 59, 46 L. Ed. 138, it was contended that congress had not the power to ratify, by legislation, an order and that congress could not delegate to the president the right of prescribing a tariff of duties. The court held that, though the duties were illegally exacted, the illegality was not the result of an inherent want of power in the United States to have authorized the imposition of the duties, but simply arose from the failure td delegate to the official the authority essential to give immediate validity to his conduct in enforcing the payment of the duties; that the illegal act of the president might be ratified by congress in accordance with the law of agency, and that congress might delegate legislative authority to the president or to any other agent it might select; U. S. v.‘ Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed. 1098, 11 Ann. Cas. 688.