Prize Court

In English law. That branch of admiralty which adjudicates upon cases of maritime captures made in time of war. A special commission issues in England, in time of war, to the judge of the admiralty court, to enable him to hold such court. See "Admiralty." Some question has been raised whether the prize court is or is not a separate court from the admiralty court. Inasmuch as the commission is always issued to the judge of that court, and the forms of proceeding are substantially those of admiralty, while the law applicable is derived from the same sources, the fact that the commission of prize is only issued occasionally would hardly seem to render the distinction a valid one. In the United States, the admiralty courts discharge the duties both of a prize and an instance court.

In English Law. That branch of admiralty which adjudicates upon cases of maritime captures made in time of war. A special commission issues in England, in time of war, to the judge of the admiralty court, to enable him to hold such court. See Admiralty. Some question has been raised whether the prize court is or is not a separate court from the admiralty court. Inasmuch as the commission is always issued to the judge of that court, and the forms of proceeding are substantially those of admiralty, while the law applicable is derived from the same sources, the fact that the commission of prize is only issued occasionally would hardly seem to render the distinction a valid one. But Lord Mansfield said that the whole system of procedure, litigation, and jurisprudence is different; Dougl. 613. See Judicature Acts. In the United States, the admiralty courts prize courts; Glass v. The Betsey, 3 Dali. (U. S.) 6, 1 L. Ed. 485. And are given such jurisdiction by the Judicial Code, March 3, 1911, with a direct appeal to the supreme court. On the breaking out of hostilities the district court appoints commissioners, not exceeding three, to examine witnesses, etc., under the direction of the court; one shall be a retired naval officer, and at least one of the others shall be a member of the bar of the court; R. S. § 4021. For the practice see Bened. Adm. §§ 509-512; 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 494, note; 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 429, note; and as to the English practice, 2 Ilalleck, Int L., Baker’s ed. 421. Questions of booty may be referred to the admiralty by the crown; Knapp, P. C. 360. If there is probable cause for the seizure of a vessel that is not a good prize, the captors may have their costs though the vessel is not condemned; Hooper v. U. S., 22 Ct. Cls. 408; they are not liable in damages; The Rover, 2 Gall. 240, 325, Fed. Cas. No. 12,091; but if a captor unreasonably delays bringing suit for condemnation, he is liable for demurrage if the court decrees a restoration; U. S. v. The Nuestra Senora De Regia, 108 U. S. 92, 2 Sup. Ct. 287, 27 L. Ed. 662, where the United States was held liable for demurrage from the time when surrender might have been made, at the rate fixed by the charter party. A captor does not lose his right by delay in sending home a prize for adjudication, if he thinks it necessary and uses discretion and good faith; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 How. (U. S.) 110, 15 L. Ed. 311. It is the usual practice of the prize court to give freight to the neutral carrier of enemy’s goods that are seized; 3 Phill. Int. L. 373. The burden of proof that the prize is neutral rests upon the claimant; and if he fails to show it, condemnation ensues; 2 C. Rob. 77; he must clear himself of suspicion; Hooper v. U. S., 22 Ct. Cls. 408. A prize court of the captors cannot sit in neutral territory, though it may in conquered territory, and in that of a co-belligerent; 2 Ilalleck, Int. L., Baker’s cd. 401. The decision of a prize court is conclusive against the subject of the state and as to the property in the subject-matter against all parties; but unlawful condemnation may subject the state of the cdptors to demands for indemnity by a foreign state; id. 407. But courts of other nations may examine as to the jurisdiction of a prize court, and if a condemnation therein was not according to the rules of international law, may treat it as a nullity; id. 411. Condemnations of prize courts are final in actions between individuals, and as to the vessel condemned, giving purchasers a good title against all the world, but do not bind foreign nations, There is a clearly marked distinction be- 1 tween proceedings for prize and forfeiture. “The libel for prize is founded upon the law of nations, and depends for proof upon the facts of her acts upon the high seas. The libel for forfeiture is for the violation of a municipal statute, and depends upon a set of facts and circumstances entirely different from that of piratical aggression. The offences charged are separate and distinct, and the cause of action is in no wise the same.” The City of Mexico, 28 Fed. 150. In the case of The Itata, it was said that “when a ship is libelled for prize, and the facts fail to sustain the libel, but make out a strong prima facie case of a statutory forfeiture, it would be the duty of the court to remand the case for a new libel; but under no circumstances could a ship be libelled for one offence, and have a decree entered against it for another distinct and separate offence.” The Itata, 56 Fed. 505, 515, 5 C. C. A. 608. The duties of prize courts are thus deserib- 1 ed by Lord S to well: “In forming my judgment, I trust that it has not for a moment escaped my anxious recollection what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me; namely, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interests, but to administer, with indifference, that justice which the Law of Nations holds out, without distinction, to independent States, some happening to be neutral, and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally here, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here, to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question, if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances; and to impose no duties on S\Veden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character.” I C. Rob. 340. In another case, he says: “It, is to be recollected that this is a court of the Law of Nations, though sitting here under the authority of the King of Great Britain. It belongs to other nations as well as to our own; and what foreigners have a right to demand from it, is the administration of the Law of Nations simply, and exclusively of the introduction of principles borrowed from our own municipal jurisprudence, to which it is well known they have at all times expressed no inconsiderable reluctance.” 6 id. 349. There are obvious objections to the system of national prize courts. Although in theory they apply international law to cases country. In consequence, their decisions have often given rise to controversies, especially between the belligerent and neutral states. In 1877, the Institute of International Law proposed a reform of the system by the establishment of a court of five judges, two to be appointed by the belligerents and three by neutral powers. At the Second Hague Conference a Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court was adopted, consisting of 57 articles, providing for the jurisdiction and, constitution of the court and the procedure to be followed by it. The international court is a court of appeal, so that jurisdiction in the first instance is still to be exercised by the prize courts of the belligerent captor. A number of states refused to sign the Convention, while others objected to the constitution of the court. As it has not yet been generally ratified, its fate is still in doubt. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, 407- 444. Nevertheless, British prize courts have at times enforced doctrines of prize law which have been vigorously attacked by other governments. The doctrine of “continuous voyages’* as applied by the British courts to contraband, holding that a vessel is liable to condemnation, even if bound for a neutral port, if it be shown that the vessel is to go thence with the same cargo to an enemy port, is condemned by the majority of continental writers. Likewise the application of the doctrine of “continuous voyages’’ to blockade, made by the American prize courts during the civil war, has called forth protests from British as well as continental writers. 2 Opp. § 401.

v. Court, 92.

Engl. law, the for making a charge against the acname of a court which has jurisdic- cused, however malicious the intention of all captures made in war on tion of the accuser may have been. the contrary appears. In an action, and it does not appear to such supethen, for a malicious prosecution, the rior court that the suggestion upon plaintiff is bound to show total ab- which the cause has been removed, gence of probable cause, whether the is sufficiently proved; in which case original proceedings were civil or the superior court by this writ recriminal. 5 Taunt. 580; 1 Camp. mits the cause to the court from