Probable

Having the appearance of truth; appearing to be founded in reason.

Having the appearance of truth ; having the character of probability; appearing to be founded in reason or experience. Bain v. State, 74 Ala. 39; Sinte v. Thiele, 119 Iowa, 659, 94 N. W. 256.

— Probable cause. "Probable cause" may be defined to be an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry, (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders convenient and proper,) which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged, or, in a civil case, that a cause of action existed. Alsop v. Lid-den, 130 Ala. 548, 30 South. 401; Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Ml chi 590, 36 N. W. 664. 13 Am. St. Rep. 362 ; Mitchell v. Wall, ill Mass. 497; Driggs v. Burton. 44 Vt. 146; Wansei v. Wyckoff, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 179; Lacy v. Mitchell, 23 Ind. 67; Hutchinson v. Wenzel, 155 Ind. 49, 56 N. E. 845. "Probable cause," in malicious prosecution, means the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime fur which he was prosecuted. Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 544, 16 In Ed. 765.

— Probable evidence. See Evidence.

— Probable reasoning. In the law of evidence. Reasoning founded on the probability of the fact or proposition sought to be proved or shown ; reasoning in which the mind exercises a discretion in deducing a conclusion from premises. Burrill.

Apparently founded in fact or reason; reasonable. 'Probable cause: reasonable cause for the prosecution of a person. Probable CTidence: presumptive evidence, so called froin its foundation in probability. Probable reasoning': reasoning founded on probability; reasoning in which the mind exercises a discretion in deducing a conclusion from premise^.

^ Apparently true or real; seeming to be founded in fact or reason; reasonable: as, probable cause. See Cause, 2; Doubt; Presumption; Prosecution, Malicious. ' The Nuestra Seflora De Eegla, 108 U. S. 101, 103 ' See 66 Ga. 715; 89 N. C. 513; 1 Bl. Com. 346; S id. 278; 3 id. 13, 243; 4 id. 261, 268. s Thomas v. Osborn, 10 How. 2!) (1866). •Pennimau v. Stanley, 122 Mass. 316 (1877); 7 How. Pr. 415. ' Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 405 (1881): 19 Am. Law Probably. An instruction, otherwise correct, was held not vitiated by the conclusion that " if there be a reasonable doubt whether the person premeditated to kill the deceased, or to do him bodily harm which would probably [necessarily] occasion death, the jury ought not to find the accused guilty of murder in the first degree." ' Probability. " Probab Uity " and "proof" each expresses a particular effect of evidence; but " proof " is the stronger term. The dictionaries give different definitions of " probability," as see Worcester and Webster.^ A committee of viewers reported that certain land would " in all probability " continue to be used for railroad freight purposes. Held, that if a degree of probability amounting to a practical certainty was Intended, the facts on which the conclusion was based should have been stated, that the court might see on what it rested; also, that a lighter degree of probability could not affect the case.'