procedure

The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.

The rule of pleading and practice by which, rights are enforced. It is generally considered as not including the law of evidence.

The methods of conducting litigation and judicial proceedings. “Practice,” like “procedure,” which is used in the Judicature Acts, denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right, and which, by means of the proceeding, the court is to administer; the machinery, as distinguished from its product. Per Lush, L. J., in 7 Q. B. Div. 333. Prof. Thayer says (Evid. 200) that in the early days procedure was more important than law. It is the life of ancient law; 1 P. & M. XXXIII. The term is so broad In its signification that it is seldom employed in our books as a term of art. It includes In its meaning whatever is embraced by the three technical terms, pleading, evidence, and practice, And practice in this sense means those legal rules which direct the course of proceeding to bring parties into the court and the course of the court after they are brought in; and evidence as a part of procedure signifies those rules of law whereby we determine what testimony is to be admitted and what rejected in each case, and what is the weight to be given to the testimony admitted. Bish. Cr. Proc. § 2; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 2^1, 2 Sup. Ct 443, 27 L. Ed. 506. See Cochran v. Ward, 5 Ind. App. 05, 29 N. E. 705, 31 N. E. 581, 51 Am. St. Rep. 229. The term is, wit'll respect to its present use, rather a modern one. Recently the supreme court of the United States comit. Apart from observations of the most general character the subject is one which does not admit of distinct or detailed treatment under this title. It includes all the practical titles of the law to which reference should be had, with respect to any particular matter, as they are separately treated in this work. Probably the most salient fact with respect to legal procedure in civil cases is the modern tendency in England and the United States to obliterate technical distinctions between law and equity and to authorize the enforcement of equitable remedies, as well in courts of law as of chancery. But with respect to this tendency it has been very justly said: “Although, under modern systems, courts of law may enforce equitable rights, the proof must agree with the pleadings, and the relief granted must be within the prayer for relief and the grounds relied on.” Eddy & B. Live-Stock Co. v. Blackburn, 70 Fed. 949, 17 C. C. A. 532. Another feature of modern thought on the subject of procedure is the controversy between the advocates of common-law practice and that under codes. In England the most radical changes in procedure have been introduced by the Judicature Acts, which title see. Under the changes thus introduced, where one formerly, in seeking relief from judicial tribunals, was obliged to use different forms of procedure in different courts, these acts, and the rules made pursuant to them, “have to a very large extent introduced uniformity in this respect into the practice of the different divisions of the court” 1 Brett, Com. 330. In criminal procedure there is a strong tendency indicated towards simplification and expedition. The most notable tendency of a general character is that towards the abolition or modification of the grand jury system, as to which see that title. Comprehensive changes have been made in the criminal procedure of France relating to the preliminary examination of accused persons. See Juge D’Instruction. A new criminal code, notable both as to the changes introduced and the care with which it was prepared, went into effect in Italy in 1890, an analysis of which will be found in 35 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 699. In Great Britain the criminal procedure of Scotland is very different from that of England notwithstanding the Union, and a carefully detailed account of it may be found in 35 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 619. As to code changes in other countries, see Code. In a case defining the functions and authority of a prosecuting attorney and his right to enter a nolle prosequi after conviction, the supreme court of Louisiana directed attention to some differences between lish precedents. The great power ghen to the prosecuting officer under the common law is greatly diminished in that state, and the court concludes its examination of the subject by this classification: “First. The inauguration or preliminary stage, when the prosecuting officer has absolute control of his indictments. “Second. The trial of the cause, and its incidents, during which the court has control and the power of the prosecuting officer is suspended. “Third. The period between the verdict of the jury and the sentence of the court, when the pardoning power comes into operation.” State v. Moise, 48 La. Ann. 109, 18 South. 913, 35 L. R. A. 701. See Postulatio.

The body of rules by which rights are given effect by governing process, pleading and the course of trial, to judgment and execution.

The formal steps in an action; the rules governing the process, pleading, and method of trial, judgment, and execution. Proces-verbal,yr. An inventory; official minutes; a relation of what has been said or done in the presence of an officer, duly attested by him.

This word is commonly opposed to the sum of legal principles constituting the substance of the law, and denotes the body of rules, whether of practice or of pleading, whereby rights are effectuated through the successful application of the proper remedies. It generally comprehends practice and pleading, but excludes evidence, and the law of substantive rights and wrongs, or the rules upon which the claims of parties are ultimately decided.