Punctuation

The division of a written or printed instrument by means of points, such as the comma, semicolon, and the like. Courts of law in construing statutes and deeds must read them with such punctuation as will give effect to the whole; 4 Term 65. In construing deeds, it is said that no regard is to be had to punctuation, and although stops are sometimes used, they are not to be regarded in the construction of the instrument; 3 Washb. R. P. 397. See O’Brien v. Brice, 21 W. Va. 707. Punctuation is not allowed to throw light on printed statutes in England; 24 Beav. 330; nor to interfere with the natural and usual meaning of the language employed; O’Brien v. Brice, 21 W. Va. 704. In an act of parliament there are no such things as brackets, any more than there are such things as stops; 24 Q. B. D. 478. Punctuation may be considered in determining the meaning of a contract, when it is doubtful; Com. v. Kelley, 177 Mass. 221, 58 N. E. 691. Where a comma after a word in a statute, if any force were attached to it, would give the section containing it broader scope than it would otherwise have, it was held that that circumstance should not have a controlling influence. Punctuation is no part of the statute; Hammock v. Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, 2G L. Ed. 1111; in construing statutes, courts will disregard punctuation; or, if need be, repunctuate, to render the true meaning of the statute; Hamilton v. The R. B. Hamilton, 16 Ohio St. 432, approved in Hammock v. Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, 26 L. Ed. 1111; President &c. v. Ruse, 14 C. L. R. (Australia) 224; State v. Brodigan, 34 Nev. 486, 125 Pac. 699; In re Gyger’s Estate, 65 Pa. 311; Cushing v. Worrick, 9 Gray (Mass.) 385. It may shed some light on the construction of statutes, but the court will read them with such stops as will give effect to the whole; Crawford v. Burke, 195

Compare Grammar. When the meaning of a clause in an instrument is doubtful, the cpnrt may insert punctuation to show of what constniction the words are capable; and if by such a Sd the com-t is enabled to see that the language can bear an interpretation which will make the whole instrument rational and self-consistent, it is bound to adopt that interpretation, in preference to another Field. J.; Grisaru Mc Dowell, 6 Wall. 372 (1867); More V. Steinbach, 127 U. S, 70, 78 C1888), cases. ' Trenouth v. San Francisco, ante. 2 Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 336 (1866), Field, J. 3 Palmer v. Low, 98 U. S. 16 (1878), Waite, C. J.; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 id. 768 (1884). which would attribute to the parties an intention utterly capricious, insensible and absurd.^ In the interpretation of written instruments veiy little consideration is given by the courts to the punctuation, and it is never allowed to interfere with or control the meaning of the language used. The words must be given their common and natural effect regardless of the punctuation or grammatical construction." When the punctuation is strictly consistent with one or two senses, equally grammatical, and inconsistent with the other, it should be allowed the force of opening the question of construction to receiving aid from the context, and from the purpose in view.'*