Q.B.D

241; 16 Q. B. 832. The same rule is adopted in some states in certain cases in which the offense was necessarily a joint one committed by two persons; Turpin v. State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 72; State v. Mainor, 28 N. C. 340; State v. Rinehart, 106 N. C. 787, 11 S. E. 512; and repudiated in others; Alonzo v. State, 15 Tex. App. 378, 49 Am. Rep. 207; State v. Caldwell, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 576. It is argued in a note on the subject that the last two cases are more in accord with reason; as one defendant might be a party to a joint act without criminal intent, and in the first English case cited the plea of guilty outweighs the verdict, which means nothing more than not proven; 16 llarv. L. Rev. 142. Civil Liability. It is an early saying in the law that a conspiracy of itself gives no cause of action. There must be some overt act by one of the parties to the injury of another, Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen (Mass.) 499 (though there is a dictum, contra, in Patten v. Gurney, 17 Mass. 1S2, 9 Am. Dec. 141); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 104; Bush v. Sprague, 51 Mich. 41, 16 N. W. 222; Hauser v. Tate, 85 N. C. 81, 39 Am. Rep. 689; 1 lid. Rayin. 374; and an act which is lawful wheu committed by one will not be rendered unlawful when two or more conspire to do it; Boston v. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461, 23 N. E. 210, 6 L. R. A. 629, 15 Am. St. Rep. 230; Martens v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N. W. 840; De Wulf v. Dix, 110 la. 553, 81 N. W. 779; Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. (U. S.) 407, 16 L. Ed. 696; [1898] 1 Q. B. 181; but it is held otherwise in Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 2S Atl. 190, 23 L. R. A. 135, 39 Am. St Rep. 686; and this is supported by a dictum in State v. Huegin. 110 Wis. 189, 85 spiracies to injure in person or reputation, as by maliciously prosecuting; Breux v. Domec, 18 Cal. 83; or by making false charges; Irvine v. Elliott, 208 Pa. 15 Atl. 859; or to injure one in proj»erty or business; Van Horn v. Van Horn. 52 N. J. L. 284, 20 Atl. 485, 10 L. EL A. 184; Garst v. Charles, 1&7 Mass. 144, 72 x. k. B39; Mapstricfe v. Eamge, '•> Neb':;'.«», 2 X. W. 7 Am. Rep. 415; Casey v. Typographical I No. 3, 45 Fed. 135, 12 L. It. A. 193 Q. B. 715; Kartell v. White. 185 69 N. E. 10S5, 64 L. K. A. 260, 102 Am. St. Etep. 'HI; as by fraudulent use of Legal proceedings; Yerplanck v. Van Luren, 76 N. Y. 217. An association of ship owners to secure a profitable and exclusive carrying trade, having agreed to limit the number of ships to be sent by members, and to allow a rebate on freights to all shippers who dealt only with members, is not an actionable conspiracy, as it was done with the lawful object of protecting and increasing trade and profit and no unlawful means had been used; [1892] A. C. 25, where the House of Lords affirmed the judgment in 23 Q. B. D. 598, where the C. A. affirmed the judgment of Lord Cole ridge in 21 Q. B. D. oil. Corporations as Conspirators. The law of conspiracy is applicable to corporations, and a combination of corporations for an unlawful purpose, either as an end or means, is a conspiracy in any case where a combination of natural persons would be such, and the converse of the proposition is equally true; Noyes, Intercorp. Rel. § 32d. "We entertain," said the New York Court of Appeals, "no doubt that an action against a corporation may be maintained to cover da: caused by a conspiracy," and "it is well settled... that the malice and wicked intent needful to sustain such action, may be imputed to such corporations"; Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 106 N. Y. 670. 12 N. E. 826; Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40 S. E 56 L. R, A. S04, S8 Am. St. Rep. S95. Both of these were civil actions against the Standard Oil Company, but apparently the same reason should apply in making a corporation liable for criminal conspiracy as well as civil, and such was the opinion of Judge No] expressed in the section of his text book above cited. But this view was authoritatively declared when an Indictment and conviction of the same company (its individual co-defendant being acquitted) were sustained on appeal. The court said: "Corporations can unquestionably commit and be guilty of a criminal conspiracy denounced by the statute, as it so expressly enacts, and they, therefore, must be counted," and further.that "independent of statute, upon principle and in furtherance of sound public policy, both corparties to it"; Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S. W. 705, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1015. Where it is provided, as in the laws of several states, that corporations as well as individuals shall be subject to the provisions of anti-trust laws the construction given to these laws has been that they "did not contemplate the commission of an offense by an impalpable abstraction, which could neither think nor act; but it was intended to bind this corporate entity by the imputed actions of its human agencies"; National Lead Co. v. Paint Store Co., 80 Mo. App. 247; State v. Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 37, 52 S. W. 595, 45