Railroad Relief Funds

A term applied to funds raised by periodical contributions of corporation employees, or by them jointly with the corporation, for the purpose families in case of death, In the service. They are usually managed jointly by the corporation and representatives of the employees, the business facilities being furnished by the corporation, which usually guarantees the funds and undertakes to make good deficiencies. Their management usually constitutes a department of the corporation business. They have been instituted in England and in some of the largest railroad systems in the United States. Compulsory contribution to funds for charitable, financial, etc., purposes, is forbidden in some states. In Massachusetts, acts provide for such societies for employees of railroad, street railroad, and steamboat companies. Members are usually required to contract that the acceptance of relief benefits from the fund in case of injury or death shall operate as a release to the company of all rights of action for damages for injury or death made by, or on behalf of, the member or his legal representatives. Such contracts are sustained as defences to actions for personal injuries; Ecknian v. It. Co., 100 111. 312, 48 N. E. 406, 38 L. It. A. 750; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bell, 44 Net). 44, 02 N. W. 314; Maine v. R. Co., 100 la. 260, 70 N. W. 630, 80 N. W. 315; Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 Fed. 931; Lease v. Pennsylvania Co., 10 Ind. App. 47, 37 N. E. 423; O’Neil v. Iron Co., 63 Mich. 690, 30 N. W. 688; Martin v. R. Co., 41 Fed. 125; State v. R. Co., 36 Fed. 655; 9 Q. B. Div. 357; L. R. 3 Q. B. 555. A provision in a relief agreement that the acceptance of benefits shall bar a suit for damages for personal injury is not contrary to public policy; Hamilton v. R. Co., 118 Fed. 92; Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 Fed. 931; Day v. R. Co., 179 Fed. 26, 102 C. C. A. 654; contra, State v. Mfg. Co., 18 U. I. 16, 25 Atl. 246, 17 L. R. A. 856; Barden v. R. Co., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971. A contract by which, if the member or his representatives accept benefits, he or they thereby release all rights of action against the company, for damages for injury, etc., is valid; and when the injured party after the right of action has arisen accepts the benefits, lie is merely settling for the past; Johnson v. R. R., 163 Pa. 133, 29 Atl. 854. See Reese v. R. Co., 233 Pa. 363, 82 Atl. 461. But it was held that where, under such a contract, the widow of a member accepted a benefit upon her husband’s death, and personally released the fund and the company, the contract of the husband did not waive a right of action, and that neither the contract nor the widow’s receipt of the benefit discharged her right of action; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wymore, 40 Neb. 645, 58 N. W. 1120. In Miller v. Ry. Co., 65 Fed, 308, the court, on a demurrer to such a defence, upheld the demurrer and held the contract and release void, and expressed its surprise at fences. This case was affirmed on appeal, though not quite on such broad ground as was taken below; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller, 76 Fed. 439, 22 C. C. A. 264. Where a widow had collected part of the benefits and then was defeated in an action on that ground, still she could recover the residue of the relief benefits; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bigley, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 225, 95 N. W. 344; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Healy, 76 Neb. 783, 107 N. W. 1005, 111 N. W. 598, 10