Reparation

The redress of an injury; amends for a tort inflicted. See "Remedy."

The redress of an injury; amends for a tort inflicted. See Remedy.

See Damages; Redress; Remedy. REPEAIi.5 The revocation or abrogation of one written law by another. May be used of a statute, an ordinance, a rule of court, or a constitution. Express repeal. When the later enactment directs that the earlier shall be repealed. Implied repeal. When the later is irreconcilably inconsistent with the earlier enactment. The latest expression of the legislature prevails." When the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute, and an old statute to a new one: upon the principle of universal law that leges posteriores priores contrarias abrbgani (or, as expressed in the TTi-elve Tables, quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto). But this is the rule only when the later statute is couched in negative terms, or when its matter is so clearly repugnant that it implies a, negative. If both statutes be merely af Brmative, and their substance such that both may stand together, the latter does not repeal the former,— they have a concurrent efficacy. If a statute that repeals another is itself afterward repealed, the first is thereby revived, without formal words for that purpose.' " Whenever an act is repealed, which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be re- '■ vived, unless it shall be expressly so provided." * A repealed statute is treated as remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining action for the enforcement of any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred thereunder." A repeal by implication must be by necessary implication. It is not sufficient to establish that the subsequent law or laws cover some or even all of the cases provided for by 1 Passenger Ry. Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 80 Pa. 76 (1875). 2 People V. City of Brooklyn, 21 Barb. 488 (1856). 3 Re Fulton Street, 29 How. Pr. 430 (1865). > Blood V. City of Bangor, 66 Me. 156 (1877). » F. rapeler, to call back, recall, revoke. • Hogaboon v. Highgate, 55 Vt. 414 (1883), cases. ' 1 Bl. Com. 90. it; for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary. But there must be a positive repugnancy betvpeen the provisions of the new law, and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repugnancy. ' Statutes which apparently conflict with each other are to be reconciled as far as may be, on any f^ir, hypothesis, and effect given to each if it can be, and especially if necessary to preserve titles to property.'' Where there are two acts on the same subject the rule is to give effect to both, if possible. But if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first; and even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that jit was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act" That, undoubtedly, is a sound exposition of the law. The doctrine asserts no more than that the former statute is impliedly repealed, so far as the provisions of the subsequent statute are repugnant to it, or so far as the latter statute, making new provisions, is plainly intended as a substitute. Where the powers or directions under several acts are such as may well subsist together, an implication of repeal cannot be allowed,* i A special or local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the- intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.^ The same rule applies as between a treaty and an act of Congress; as, for example, between the Chinese Immigration Treaty of May 9, 1881, and the Eestriction Act of May 6, 1888,' as amended July 5, 1884. Since the purpose avowed in the act was to faithfully execute the treaty, any interpretation of its provisions would be rejected which imputed to Congress an intention to disregard the plighted faith of the government; consequently, the court ought, if possible, to adopt that construction which recognized and saved rights secured by the treaty." 1 Wood V. United States, 16 Pet. 862 (1842), Story, J. To the same effect, Adams Express Co. v. Lexington, 88 Ky. 661 (1886); The Gulf, &c. E. Co. u. Eambolt, 07 Tex, 657 (1887), cases. 2 Beals V. Hale, 4 How. 51 (1846), Woodbury, J. ' United States v. Tyne Uj 11 Wall. 92 (1870), eases. Field, J. < Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall. 657(1870), Strong, J. See also King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 396 (1882). <• Mc Kenna v. Edmundstone, 91 N, Y, 233 (1883), eases. That repeals are not presumed, see Eyan v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 387 (1886). But clauses of a statute which have been repealed may still be considered in construing the provisions which remain in force.' See Revised, Statute; Eight, 2 (2), Tested.

The redress of an injury; amends for a tort inflicted; vide Remedy; Redress.