Resulting

Has a technical use in the following phrases: Resulting trust. At the present day, this term seems used some what vaguely: sometimes as equivalent to implied, as distinguished from both express and constructive trusts; and sometimes for either implied or constructive trusts, as distinguished from express. Story {Eq. Jur. § 1195) seems to approve the first the term is often met where there is no apparent intent to confine it to implied trusts. BurriU criticises the common use of the phrase, on the ground that the term "resulting," in strictness, imports a going back or reverting of an estate to the party from whom it proceeded (citing 2 Crabb R. P. 571, § 1796); and that the term resulting trust ought to be confined to trusts which arise in the nature of an equitable return of an estate to a grantor; as in a case where the legal estate in land is conveyed to A, upon such trusts as the grantor shall thereafter appoint; here, as the trusts intended cannot, prior to appointment, take effect, and as it is clear that A is not intended to hold the land for his own benefit, there arises by necessary implication, until the appointment be made, a trust for the grantor, which is in the nature of a return of the estate to him. Now, it seems altogether probable, especially when the old definitions of the parallel phrase "resulting use" are noticed, that resulting was originally introduced as conveying the idea of a return. But these etymological reasons are very delusive, since they tend to restrict the student from following out the changes in language which practical wants and convenience are all the time introducing. "Resulting trust," however it may have come into the law, seems to have been laid hold of and used in the view that it was an apt name for a trust not expressed, but decreed as the equitable result of all the facts attending a transaction, and without particularly considering whether probable intention of parties was one of these. In other words, while little need exists at the present day for any distinct name for a trust involving a return to a grantor, there is much use of a division of trusts into three kinds: express, which are declared in terms; implied, which are impressed on the transaction in view of the probable intent of parties; and constructive, which' are impressed from reasons of equity and justice, independent of intent. A familchase - money. for buying lands, but directs the deed to be made to a third person as grantee, the intent, however, being that the one who advances the money is the real buyer and owner. Here the deed is intended by all parties to operate in favor of the payer of the money. But if a scrivener employed to draught a will should coi Tuptly insert his own name to take a legacy, instead of that of the legatee named in his instructions, and should, by misreading the will, procure its execution, and after testator's death should claim the legacy, he might probably be decreed in equity to hold the money in trust for the legatee designed, although there would be no pretence to say that either he or testator intended any trust. The trust could not be implied in a strict sense, but might be adjudged as constructive. Yet " implied " and " constructive " are often used as interchangeable. We think it is convenient, and accords with veiy general usage, to employ "resulting trust" for either class of trusts which, not being declared in words, result from the character and circumstances of the transaction, when one does not care to indicate whether intent is one of the circumstances relied upon or not. If intent is the ground of raising a trust, it is well called an implied trust; and if intent is excluded, the trust is, in strictness, constructive. It should be borne in mind that the importance of these distinctions has been much diminished of late years in New York and many other states, by statutes restricting all non-expressed trusts. Resulting use. Whenever the use limited by a deed expires or cannot vest, it returns back to him who raised it, after such expiration, or during such impossibility, and is styled a resulting use. As if a man makes a feoffment to the use of his intended wife for life, with remainder to the use of the first-born son in tail: here, till he marries, the use results back to himself; after marriage, it is executed in the wife for life; and if she dies without issue, the whole results back to him in fee. Jacob. A resulting use arises where the legal seisin is transferred, and no use is expressly declared, nor any consideration nor evidence of intent exists, to direct the use. The use remains in the original grantor, for it cantransfers the legal estate to such resulting use. But if an intent of the parties that the use should not result is plainly manifested, it will remain in the persons to whom the legal estate is limited. And the doctrine of resulting uses extends only to those cases where an estate in fee-simple passes: it is not applicable where an estatetail, an estate for life, or an estate for years is granted; for a consideration or declaration of the use prevents its resulting, and a tenure is a consideration, in consequence of the rent or service, which it includes. A use, therefore, cannot result on the conveyance of a particular estate; i.e., an estate less than fee-simple. And when any particular uses are declared, which do not exhaust the whole estate, so much of the use as the owner of the lands does not dispose of remains in him. Neither resulting uses nor uses by implication can ever arise to any person other than the original owner of the estate. And, where a use is expressly limited to the owner of the estate, he will not be allowed to take any resulting or implied use inconsistent with the use limited to him. Wharton. /^X^^,C - 9 "74 P(