reward

reward implies something given in return for good or evil done or received

An offer of recompense by the government, or by a private person, to whoever will perform some special act. A reward is an offer, revocable at any time before performance. When accepted by performance, it becomes a contract. 92 U. S. 73. REWME (Old Bng.; from Law Fr. reawme). In old records. Realm; kingdom. "In the name of Fader, Son, and Holy Ghost, I, Henry of Lancaster, challenge this rewme of Ynglonde and the croun, with all the members and the appurtenances, als I that am.descendit be right line of the blode comyng fro the gude Lord King Henry therde, and thorgho that right that God, of his grace, hath sent mee, with helpe of my kyn and of my frendes to recover it; the which rewme was in poynt to be ondone for def aut of governance and undoyng of the gude laws." Claim of Henry, Duke of Lancaster (afterwards Henry IV.), to the crown of England. 1 How. St. Tr. 152. REX (Lat.)

In old English law. King; a king; the king. REX DEBET ESSE SUB LEGE QUIA lex facit regem. The king ought to be under the law, because the law makes the king. 1 Bl. Comm. 239.

The offer of recompense given by authority of law for the performance of some act for the public good, which, when the act has been performed, is to be paid. The recompense actually so paid. The offer may be made to an individual; Franklin v. Heiser, 6 Blatcbf. 426, Fed. Cas. No. 5,054; or by public, oral statement, poster, or newspaper; Ilayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 46, 26 Am. Hep. 1; Symmes v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344, 4 Am. Dec. 142; its acceptance and performance create a valid contract; Poll. Contr. 11; Ans. Contr. 31; Pierson v. Morch, 82 N. Y. 503; Ivasling v. Morris, 71 Tex. 584, 9 S. \V. 739, 10 Am. St Rep. 797; Cummings v. Gann, 52 Pa. 484; such performance being sufficient consideration; Ryer v. Stock well, 73 Am. Dec. 634; 4 B. & Ad. 621. The offer, not being a contract until performance, may be withdrawn prior thereto; Harson v. Pike, 16 Ind. 140; Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S. E. 193; Freeman v. Boston, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 57; Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 137, 73 Am. Dec. 634; that the claimant was ignorant of the withdrawal, where the offer and withdrawal were by public advertisement, is immaterial; Shuey v. U. S., 92 U. S. 75, 23 L. Ed. 697. See Revocation. The offer of a reward may contain such terms as the party sees fit to prescribe; Amis v. Conner, 43 Ark. 337; provided they are lawful; Bish. Contr. § 467; Smith v. Arnold, 106 Mass. 269; and substantial performance is usually sufficient; Besse v. Dyer, 9 Allen (Mass.) 152, 85 Am. Dec. 747. Where a reward was for an “arrest,” furnishing information that led to an arrest was not enough; M’Claughry v. King, 147 Fed. 465, 79 C. C. A. 91, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 216, 8 Ann. Cas. 856; Kinn v. Bank, 118 Wis. 537, 95 N. W. 969, 99 Am. St. Rep. 1012; Williams v. R. Co., 191 111. 610, 61 N. E. 456, 85 Am. St Rep. 278; the arrest must be legal; Moore v. Peace (Ky.) 97 S. W. 762; Morris v. Kasling, 79 Tex. 141, 15 S. W. 226, 11 L. R. A. 389. A reward may be offered by the government or by a private person; Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 310; by a railroad company; Central R. & B. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292, 4 South. 828, 7 Am. St. Rep. 48; but not by the District of Columbia; Baker Butler y. Mc Lean, 32 111. App. 397; Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 367, 1 N. W. 952; Gale v. South Berwick, 51 'Me. 174; Hawk v. Marion Co., 48 la. 472; Board of Com’rs of Grant Co. v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455, 37 Am. Rep. 174; contra, York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. 391. But where the selectmen of a town offered a reward in excess of that authorized by statute, it was held good for the lawful amount; In re Kelly, 39 Conn. 159; and such officials are personally liable for the excess; Lee v. Trustees of Flemingsburg, 7 Dana (Ky.) 29; contra, Iluthsing v. Bousquet, 2 Mc Crary 152, 7 Fed. 833. Any one who complies with the terms of the offer, if not guilty of fraud, may recover the reward; Hassan v. Doe, 3S Me. 45; Blain v. Exp. Co., 69 Tex. 74, 6 S. W. 679; Means v. Hendershott, 24 la. 78; although not embraced in the description of the persons to whom it was originally proposed; First Nat. Bk. v. Hart, 55 111. 62; 64 L. T. 594; but not for apprehending a person who has been admitted to bail; Marking v. Needy, 8 Bush (Ky.) 22; nor one discharged from arrest by the committing magistrate; Board of Sup’rs of Itawamba Co. v. Candler, 62 Miss. 193. The owners of a proprietary medicine offered a reward to any one who used it and then contracted influenza; held a contract with one who met the conditions; [1893] 1 Q. B. 256. Where a prize is offered in a county competition, one who meets the conditions may recover; 39 Wash. L. R. 18. One may recover a reward offered by his employers; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Sebring, 16 111. App. 181; but not if he is morally ^ bound to furnish the information; Burke v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 50 Cal. 218; or it is his official duty to do so; Morris v. Kasling, 79 Tex. 141, 15 S. W. 226, 11 L. R. A. 398; Smith v. Whildin, 10 Pa. 39, 49 Am. Dec. 572. And a reward offered by the state for the capture of a criminal cannot be claimed by an officer whose official duty it is to make the arrest; the rule being founded on public policy, it is opposed to opening the door to any inducement for public officers to delay arrests until rewards are offered; Smitha v. Gentry (Ky.) 45 S. W. 515, 42 L. R. A. 302, where it was held that no one could have any property right in a reward until it was earned by making the arrest, so that where, by sharp practice in making use of information derived over the telephone, one person secured the reward and prevented another, who really gave the information, from obtaining the benefit of it, the latter had no right of action. But it is held that a promise to pay a reward to a police constable is binding because there might be some information which he was not bound, in the discharge of his ordinary duty, to give; 11 A. & E. 856. A reward was offered by the defendant for the arrest of a criminal. A police officer the plaintiff. The defendant voluntarily paid the reward to the officer. Plaintiff on a suit for a share of the reward was held not entitled to any part of it; Stair v. Heska Amone Congregation (Tenn.) 159 S. W. 840. An offer of a reward is not void as against public policy, because made for conviction of offences afterwards to be committed; Wilmoth v. Hensel, 151 Pa. 200, 25 Atl. 86, 31 Am. St. Rep. 738. It is held to be necessary that the person performing the service should know of the offer when he did so; Howland v. Rounds, 51 N. Y. 604, 10 Am. Rep. 654; Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375, 99 S. W. 1111, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1057; Williams v. R. Co., 191 111. 610, 61 N. E. 456, 85 Am. St. Rep. 278; contra, Everman v. Hyman, 3 Ind. App. 459, 29 N. E. 1140; Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170; 12 C. B. N. S. 740; 104 E. C. L. 740; Drummond v. U. S., 35 Ct. Cl. 356; Eagle v. Smith, 4 Houst. (Del.) 293; but if the reward was offered by statute the party need not allege knowledge; Board of Com’rs of Clinton County v. Davis, 162 Ind. 60, 69 N. E. 6S0, 64

Compare Pbemium; Prize. 1. WTiere a liberal reward was offered for information leading to the apprehension of a fugitive from j ustice, and a specific smn for his apprehension, it was held that a party giving the information which led to the arrest was entitled to the " reward," but not to the specific sum, imlesshe, in fact, apprehended the fugitive, or the arrest was made by his agents.* Where an offer of a reward is made by public proclamation, before rights have accrued under it, it may be withdrawn through the channel in which it was made. No contract arises under such an offer until its terms are complied with. That the claimant was ignorant of its withdrawal is immaterial.* Compare

is an offer of recompense given by authority of law for the performance of some act for the public good; which, when the act has been performed, is to be paid; or it is the recompense actually paid. A reward may be offered by the government, or by a private person. In criminal prosecutions, a person may be a competent witness although he expects, on conviction of the prisoner, to receive a reward. 1 Leach, 314, (n.); 9 Barn. & Cresw. 556; S. C. Eng. C. L. R. 441; 1 Leach, 134; 1 Hayw. Rep. 3; 1 Root, R. 249; Stark. Ev. pt. 4, p. 772, 3; Roscoe’s Cr. Ev. 104; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 881; Hawk. B. 2, c. 12, s. 21 to 38; 4 Bl. Com. 294; Burn’s Just. Felony, iv. By the common law, informers, who are entitled under penal statutes to part of the penalty, are not in general competent witceive no execution, unless a party interested be a witness, then it seems proper to admit him, for the statute must not be rendered ineffectual for want of proof. Gilb.114. In many acts of the legislature there is a provision that the informer shall be a witness, notwithstanding the reward. 1 Phil. Ev. 92, 99.