satisfaction

nothing short of satisfaction, or its equivalent, can make good a plea of former judgment in trespass, offered as a bar in an action against another joint trespasser, who was not party to the first judgment

CONTRACTS TO. A term used to express a class of contracts in which one party agrees to perform his promise to the satisfaction of the other. The cases have been classified by Prof. Lawson, in 46 Cent. L. J. 360, as follows: 1. Where the fancy, taste, sensibility, or judgment of the promisor are involved. 2. Where the question is merely one of operative fitness or mechanical utility. In the first class the courts refuse to say that where a man agrees to pay if he is satisfied with the performance, he should be compelled to pay if some one else is satisfied with it. The courts recognize that in matters of taste or opinion there is no absolute standard as to what is good or bad. Hence, where the subject-matter is a suit of clothes; Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136, 18 Am. Rep. 403; a bust of the defendant’s husband; Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 26 Am. Rep. 446; a portrait of the defendant’s daughter; Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, 33 Am. Rep. 351; a cabinet organ; Mc Clure Bros. v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, 2 Atl. 583, 56. Am. Rep. 557; a set of artificial teeth; 7 Pitts. L. J. 140; a carriage; 2 C. B. N. S. 779; a steam-heater for a house; Adams Radiator & B. Works v. Schnader, 155 Pa. 394, 26 Atl. 745, 35 Am. St Rep. 893; a play to be written by an author for an actor; Haven v. Russell, 34 N. Y. Supp. 292; a decourt or jury to decide, but for the promisee alone. So where the contract gives the master a right to discharge a servant if he is satisfied that the servant is incompetent; Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387, 54 Am. Rep. 714; or to employ him so long as he is satisfactory; Spring v. Clock Co., 24 Hun (N. Y.) 175; or to pay for services if they are satisfactory; Johnson v. Bindseil, 8 N. Y. Supp. 485. In the second class of cases, Mr. Lawson maintains that the same principle of law should be applied, and gives a number of cases where it has been applied; where the subject-matter of the agreement was the making of a book-case; Mc Carren v. Mc Nulty, 7 Gray (Mass.) 139; the sale of a harvesting machine; Wood Reap. & M. M. Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565, 15 N. W. 906, 45 Am. St Rep. 57; the sale of a steam fire engine; Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Chico, 24 Fed. 893; of a cord binder; Mc Cormick H. M. Co. v. Chesrown, 33 Minn. 32, 21- N. W. 846; a steamboat; Gray v. R. Co., 11 Hun (N. Y.) 70; an elevator; Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 297, 2 Atl. 230, 56 Am. Rep. 207; steam fans; Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. 343, 57 Am. Rep. 257; a printing press; Campbell Printing-Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414, 1 L. It A. 645; a grain binder; Plano Mfg. Co. v. Ellis, 68 Mich. 101, 35 N. W. 841; a gas machine; Aiken v. Hyde, 99 Mass. 183; a fanning mill; Goodrich v. Van Nortwick, 43 111. 445; the purchase of a saloon; Stuart & Peterson Co. v. Newton, 52 Pa. Super. Ct 158. I The promisee must act in good faith; his dissatisfaction must be actual not feigned; real not merely pretended; Daggett v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345; Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Pa. 297, 2 Atl. 230, 56 Am. Rep. 207. He must not act from caprice; Sidney School Furniture Co. v. School Dist., 130 Pa. 76, 18 Atl. 604. He must, if a test is necessary to determine its fitness, give that test or allow it to be made; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Brydon, 65 Md. 198, 611, 3 Atl. 306, 9 Atl. 126, 57 Am. Rep. 318; Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. R. Co:, 66 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. 343, 57 Am. Rep. 257; Crane Elevator Co. v. Clark, 80 Fed. 705, 26 C. C. A. 100; Adams Radiator & B. Works v. Schnader, 155 Pa. 394, 26 Atl. 745, 35 Am. St. Rep. 893, holding that where the promisor dies before the test is made, the right to reject vests in his executor. So an article to be manufactured cannot be rejected before it is substantially completed, so that the promisor will be able fairly to determine whether it was or would be satisfactory to him; Singerly y. Thayer, 108 Pa. 297, 2 Atl. 230, 56 Am. Rep. 207. In sales of goods where the promisor can Co. v. Smith, 60 Mich. 565, 16 N. W. 906, 45 Am. Hep. 57; Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. E. Co., 66 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. 343, 57 Am. Rep. 257. In contracts for work and labor other than such as are to satisfy a matter of personal taste, where the work and labor would be wholly lost to the promisor if refused, the courts tend to the view that the promisee must be satisfied when he ought to be; Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749, 54 Am. Rep. 709; Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312, 14 Am. St. Rep. 422; Keeler v. Clifford, 165 111. 544, 46 N. E. 248; Boyd v. Hallowell, 60 Minn. 225, 62 N. W. 125. There are a few cases which are apparently discordant, but which will be found, as Prof. Lawson observes, to rest on the difference between executory contracts of sale, and contracts for work and labor which have been done on the house or land of the promisee; Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312, 14 Am. St. Rep. 422; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 22 N. E. 406, 5 L. R. A. 554, 15 Am. St. Rep. 398; Clark v. Rice, 46 Mich. 308, 9 N. W. 427; Mc Neil v. Armstrong, 81 Fed. 943, 27 C. C. A. 16; Electric Lighting Co. of Mobile v. Elder, 115 Ala. 138, 21 South. 983; Pope Iron & Metal Co. v. Best, 14 Mo. App. 503. The cases of Mullally v. Greenwood, 127 Mo. 138, 29 S. W. 1001, 48 Am. St. Rep. 613, Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 395, and Burns v. Munger, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 75, appear to be really discordant In Crawford v. Pub. Co., 163 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. 616, it was held that where one is employed to do work which involves taste, fancy, interest, personal satisfaction and judgment, to the satisfaction of his employer, the employer is the sole judge of whether the work is satisfactory. The rule is held to be otherwise in the case of a complete contract of an ordinary commercial nature. That which the law shall say a contracting party ought in reason to be satisfied with that the law will say he is satisfied with; Brooklyn v. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475, 7 Am. Rep. 469. Referring to this case, Brown, D. J., in Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414, 1 L. R. A. 64£, points out that the differences between the New York decisions and those of other states are more apparent than real, and he cites the rule laid down in Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Chico, 24 Fed. 893, as “an accurate summary of the whole law on the subject:’* Where a fire engine was to be made and delivered which should be satisfactory to the purchaser, it must in fact be satisfactory to him, or he is not bound to take it; but that where the purchaser was in fact satisfied, but fraudulently and in bad faith declared he was not satisfied, the contract had been fully performed by the vendor, and the purchaser tory, they must be returned to the vendor; Campbell Printing Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414, 1 L. R. A. 645; Savage Mfg. Co. v. Armstrong, 19 Me. 147; but it was held in Shupe v. Collender, 56 Conn. 489, 15 Atl. 405, 1 L. R. A. 339, that the dissatisfied buyer may retain the goods and recoup damages in an action for the price. If the dissatisfaction of a third party designated as an arbiter is required, the contractor must show fraudulent collusion between the other party and such arbiter in order to recover; Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Const. Co., 229 Pa. 518, 79 Atl. 147, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 345. Under an agreement to pay commissions for negotiating a “satisfactory lease” the lessor cannot arbitrarily refuse to accept a lease negotiated; Mullally v. Greenwood, 127 Mo. 138, 29 S. W. 1001, 48 Am. St. Rep. 613.

The act of satisfying a party by paying what is due to him, (as on a mortgage, lien or contract,) or what is awarded to him, by the judgment of a court or otherwise. Thus, a judgment is satisfied by the payment of the amount due to the party who has recovered such judgment or by his levying the amount. See Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa, 575, 79 N. W. 344; Rivers v. Blom, 163 Mo. 442, 63 S. W. 812 ; Mazyck v. Coil, 3 Rich. Law (S. C.) 236; Green v. Green, 49 Ind. 423; Bryant v. Fairfield, 51 Me, 152; Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. Addington, 1 Ind. T. 304, 37 S. W. 100.

In practice. An entry made on the record, by which a party in whose favor a judgment was rendered declares that he has bcen satisfied and paid.

In equity. The doctrine of satisfaction in equity is somewhat analogous to performance in equity, but differs from it in this respect; that satisfaction is always something given either in whole or in part as a substitute or equivalent for something else, and not (as in performance) something that may be construed as the identical thing covenanted to be done. Brown.

— Satisfaction piece. In practice. A memorandum in writing, entitled in a cause, staling that satisfaction is acknowledged between the parties, plaintiff and defendant. Upon this being duly acknowledged and filed in the office where the record of the judgment is, the judgment becomes satisfied, and the defendant discharged from it 1 Archb. Pr. 722. Satisfaction shonid he made to that fnnd which has sustained the loss. 4 Bouv. Inst, no 3731.

The making amends for an injury done; the payment of a legal debt or demand; the discharging or canceling of a judgment or mortgage, by paying or by a seizing and selling of property to an equal amount. Satisfaction piece: a memorandum in writing, entitled in a cause, stating that satisfaction is acknowledged between the parties.