silence

what you would expect—that Congress did not affrmatively confer such a right.

The state of a person who does not speak, or of one who refrains from speaking. Mere silence cannot be considered as a consent to a contract, except in cases where the silent person is bound in good faith to explain himself; in which case silence gives consent; Moore v. Smith, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 393; L. R. 6 Q. B. 597; French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 135, 3 Am. Rep. 440. But no assent will be inferred from a man’s silence unless he knows his rights and knows what he is doing, nor unless his silence is voluntary. When any person is accused of a crime or charged with any fact, and he does not deny it, in general, the presumption is very strong that the charge is correct; 5 C. & P. 332; 7 id. 832; Joy, Conf. 77. The rule does not extend to the silence of the prisoner when, on his examination before a magistrate, he is charged by another piisoner with having joined with him in the commission of an offence; Steph. Ev. art 7. Silence is not evidence of an admission unless there are circumstances which render it more reasonably probable that a man would answer the charge made against him than that he would not; 14 C. L. R. 114 (High Ct. Australia); [1891] 12 Q. B. 534. When an oath is administered to a witness, instead of expressly promising to keep it, he gives his assent by his silence and kiss ing the book. The person to be affected by the silence must be one not disqualified to act, as, non compos, an infant, or the like; for even the express promise of such a person would no» bind him to the performance of any contract.

In the law of estoppel, imports knowledge with opportunity to act.* No principle is better established than that a party is not estopped by his silence imless he has misled another to his hurt.' Although silence ag to a material fact is not necessarily, as matter of law, equivalent to a false representation, yet concealment or suppression by either party to a contract of sale, with intent to deceive, of a material fact, which he in good faith is bound to disclose, is evidence of, and equivalent to, a false representation." That s Uence in an instrument is exclusion may be applied to a statute.^ Silent. A contract is sometimes said to be silent £is to a contingency. See Implied. See further Accounx, 1; Acijdiescence; Conceal, 5; Consent; Estoppel, Equitable; Knowledge, 1; Kepresextation, 1; Rescission; Stand By.

state of a person who does not speak, or one who refrains from speaking. Pure and simple silence cannot be considered as a consent to a contract, except in cases when the silent person is bound in good faith to explain himself, in which case, silence gives consent. 6 Toull. liv. 3, t. 3, n. 32, note; 14 Serg. & Rawle, 393; 2 Supp. to Ves. Jr. 442. When any person is accused of a crime, or charged with any fact, and he does not deny it, in general, the presumption is very strong that the charge is correct. The rule does not extend to the silence of a prisoner, when on his examination before a magistrate he is charged by another prisoner with having joined him in the commission of an offence. 3 Stark. C. 33. When an oath is administered to a witness, instead of expressly promising to keep it, he gives his assent by his silence, and kissing the book. The person to be affected by the silence must be one not disqualified to act, as a non compos, an infant, or the like, for even the express promise of such a person would not bind him to the performance of any contract. The rule of the civil law is, that silence is not an acknowledgment or denial in every case, qui tacet, non utique fatetur; sed tamen verum est, eum non negare. Dig. 50, 17, 142.