Slander

The sense in which words are received by the world, is the sense which Courts of Justice ought to ascribe to them, on the trial of actions for slander. Slander imports an injury; and the injury must arise from the manner in which the slanderous language is understood.

In torts. Words maliciously spoken or written of another, imputing to. him some crime, or tending to exclude him from society, and cause him to be avoided (see 87 N. C. 300), or which tend to his prejudice in his profession, trade, or business (36 Wis. 515). See "Slut."

In torts. Oral defamation; the speaking of false and malicious words concerning another, whereby injury results to his reputation. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 In S. 227, 23 It. Ed. 308; Fredrickson v. Johnson. 60 Minn. 337, 62 N. W. 388; Ross v. Ward, 14 S. D. 240, 85 N. W. 182, 86 Am. St. Rep. 746; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 AU. 730, 52 In R. A. 87, 86 Am. St. Rep. 414; Republican Pub. Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399, 24 Pan. 1051; Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 3837.

— Slander of title. This is a statement of something tending to cat down the extent of title to some estate vested in the plaintiff. Such statement, in order to be actionable, must be false and malicious; i. e., both untrue and done on purpose to injure the plaintiff. Damage must also bave resulted from the statement. Brown. See Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532, 27 Pac. 527, 13 L. It. A. 707, 25 Am. St. Rep. 151; Carbondale Inv. Co., v. Burdick, 07 Kan. 329, 72 Pac. 781; Butts v. Long, 94 Mo. App. 687, 68 S. W. 754.

Defamation by words spoken. Slander of title: defamation of one's property, real or personal, or of one's interest therein.

2 1. Injuries affecting a man's reputation and good name are, first, by malicious, scandalous, and slanderous words, tending to his damage and derogation; and, second, by printed or written libels, pictures, signs, etc., which set him in an odious and i-idiculous light, and thereby diminish his reputation.3 The former is sometimes called oral or verbal slander, the latter written slander or libel. False defamatory words when spokea.* (As, if a man maliciously and falsely utters any false tale of another, which may endanger him in law by impeaching him of some heinous crime, as, to say that a man has poisoned another oris pei-jured: or which may exclude him from society, as, to charge him with having an infectious disease; or which may impair or hurt his trade or livelihood, as, to call a tradesman a bankrupt, a physician a quack, a lawyer a knave. Words spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other great officer of the realm, and words _, tending to scandalize a magistrate or person in a public trust, are reputed more highly injurious than when, spoken of a private person. For such scandalous J words an action on the case may be had, without prov-# ing any particular damage to have happened, butf merely upon the probability that it might happen! But with regard to words that do not thus upon the face of them import such defamation as will of course be injurious, it is necessary that the plaintiff aver some particular damage to have happened.* Oral slanders, as a cause of action, are: (1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which, if the charge is true, he may be indicted and punished. (2) Words falsely spoken which impute that he is infected with some contagiousi disease, and which, if true, would exclude him from society. (8) Defamatory words falsely spoken, which impute unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, or the want of integ- 1 Story, Confl. Laws, § 379. 2 F. esclaiidre, scandal, 2* i*i'3Bl. Com, 123, 125. rity in the discbarge of the duties thereof. (4) Defamatory words falsely spoken, which prejudice the person in his profession or trade. (5) Defamatory words falsely spoken, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the person special damage. The ordinary meaning is to be affixed to the words, i Mere scurrility, or opprobrious words which neither import nor are attended with injurious effects, will not support an action. Words of heat and passion, as, to call a man a rogue and rascal, it provocative of no ill consequence, and not being of the dangerous species mentioned, are not actionable; neither are words spoken in a friendly manner, as, by way of advice, admonition, or concern, without any tincture or circumstance of ill will: for. In both cases, they are not spoken maliciously; nor are words used in a legal proceeding, pertinent to the cause... If the defendant is able to justify- and prove the words true, no action will lie, though special damage en^ue: if the fact be true, any damage is damnum absque injuria.^ The words must be "published," that is, be communicated to a third person in a language he understands. See Publication. A party to a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding may say anything concerning the case that is pertinent and material, and cannot be held to answer for scandalous words, unless, under pretense of pleading the cause, he designedly wanders from the question, and slanders another person. The rule is the same as to a witness, and counsel. Public policy dictates that a man should not be hampered in prosecuting or defending a right by fear of an action for defamation. It is only when he abuses his right by using it as a cloak for malice that he will be held responsible.* Evidence of the truth of language is madmissible unless a justification is pleaded.* Under the plea of " not guilty," the defendant cannot, in mitigation, in •effect prove guilt." To establish a justification, the proof must be as broad as the charge; the plea, unsupported, is evidence of actual malice and augments the damages." Where the wordsareprjma/ocze privileged, express malice must be proved.^ After proof that the words were spoken, the plaintiff, to show malice, may give > Pollard V. Lyon, 91 U. S. 226 (1875), Clifford, J. Approved, Page V. Merwin, 54 Conn. 434 (1886). As to injury to business, see Singer v. Bender, 64 Wis. 172 0885). !3B1. Com. 1S4-35. s Stewart v. Hall, 83 Ky. 380-381, 363 (1885), cases. Holt, J. Uttered by witness, see Shodden v. Mc Elwee, «6 Tenn. 149 (1887), cases; in legal proceedings, 26 Cent. law J. 2-8 (1888), cases. ■" Odgers, Lib. & SI. 304, cases. s Smith V. Smith, 39 Pa. 442 (1861), cases; Porter v. Botkins, 59 id. 484 (1869), • Burford v. Wible, 32 Pa. 96 (1858), oases; Gorman v. Sutton, ib. 248 (1858); Howard v. Thompson, 1 Am. L. C. evidence of other words of the same nature (not actionable pe7- se) spoken at different times.' Evidence of the plaintiff 's reputation must relate to. the time before the speaking of the words; since bad reputation, after the utterance, may result from the publication." In the absence of malice, the motive of the speaker may be considered in mitigation of damages. The ■ plaintiff is entitled to reasonable compensation for the injury suffered, but it the injury was unintentional, or committed under a sense of duty, or through an honest mistake, no vindictive damages should be given. ^ Mental suffering is an element of damage.* Evidence of the defendant's pecuniary resources is admissible, to enhance the exemplary damages."* See Attorney; Bad, 1; Colloquium; Communication, Privileged, 2; Damages, Exemplary; Defamatory; Innuendo; Libel, 5; Rumor; Scandal; Sensus, Mitiori; Translation, 3. 2. Defamation of one's interest in real or personal property, or of the property itself objectively considered. Slander of another's title, by spreading such injurious reports, as, if true, would deprive him of his estate, is actionable, provided special damage accrues to the proprietor; as, if he loses an opportunity to sell the land. « w The title is personified, and na Sae subject to some of the rules applicable to personal slander when the words are not actionable per se. The language must be false, be uttered maliciously, and be followed, naturally, by pecun1ai*y damage, which must be specially alleged and substantially proved.' That rule " applies not only to actions for slander of title, strictly and properly so called, that is, with reference to real estate, but also to cases in which personalty is involved, or personal rights and privileges." *

Defamation by words spoken, v. Colloquium, Privileged commtnication, Libel.

Aspersion by word of mouth; oral defamation; words uttered falsely and maliciously, by which the reputation of another is injured. The kinds of slander which may be the subject of an action for damages are the following: 1. Words falsely spoken of a person, which impute to him the commission of some criminal oilence involving moral turpitude, for which the party, it the charge is true, may be indicted and punished. 2. Words falsely spoken of a person, which impute that he is infected with some contagious disease, where, it the charge were true, it would exclude the party from society. 3. Words falsely spoken of a person, which impute to him unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an office or employment. 4. Words falsely spoken of a person, which prejudice him in his profession or trade. 5. Defamatoiy words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion him special damage. Po Uard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225. Slander of title. This is a statement of something tending to cut down the extent of title to some estate vested in the plaintiff. Such statement, in order to be actionable, must be false and malicious; i.e., both untrue and done on purpose to injure the plaintiff. Damage must also have resulted from the statement. Brown.