stranding

In maritime law. The run- Accidental stranding takes place where the ship is driven on shore by the winds and waves. Voluntary stranding takes place where the ship is run on shore either to preserve her from a worse fate, or for some fraudulent purpose. Marsh. Ins. bk. 1, c. 12, § 1. In a Marine Insurance, "a touch and go" is not a stranding; in order to constitute a stranding, the ship must be stationary. 1 Starkie, 130; 4 M. & S. 503.

In Maritime Law. The run- E. 455. ning of a ship or other vessel on shore; it When a man undertakes to do a thing, is either accidental or voluntary. and a stranger interrupts him, this is no Accidental stranding takes place where excuse; Com. Dig. Condition (L 14). When the ship is driven on shore by the winds and a party undertakes that a stranger shall do waves and remains stationary for some time. a certain thing, he becomes liable as soon as Voluntary stranding takes place where the stranger refuses to perform it; Bac. Abr. the ship is run on shore either to preserve Conditions (Q 4). her from a worse fate or for some fraudulent purpose. Marsh. Ins. b. 1, c. 12, s. 1. STRATAGEM. A deception either by It is of great consequence to define accu- words or actions, in times of war, in order rately what shall be deemed a stranding; to obtain an advantage over an enemy. but this is no easy matter. In one case, a Stratagems, though contrary to morality, ship having run on some wooden piles, four have been justified unless they have been feet under water, erected in Wisbeach river, accompanied by perfidy, injurious to the about nine yards from shore, which were rights of humanity, as in the example given placed there to keep up the banks of the by Vattel of an English frigate, which durriver, and having remained on these piles ing a war between France and England apuntil they were cut away, was considered peared off Calais and made signals of disby Lord Kenyon to have been stranded; tress in order to allure some vessel to come Marsh. Ins. b. 7, s. 3. In another case, a to its relief, and seized a shallop and its crew ship arrived in the river Thames, and upon who had generously gone out to render it coming up to the pool, which was full of assistance. Vattel, Droit des Gens f liv. 3, c. vessels, one brig ran foul of her bow and 9, § 178. another vessel of her stern, in consequence STRATOCRACY. A military government; of which she was driven aground, and con- government by military chiefs. tinued in that situation an hour, during STRAW BAIL. See Bail. which period several other vessels ran foul of her. As to this, Lord Kenyon told the STRAW MEN. See Men of Stba w. jury that, unskilled as he was in nautical af- STRAW SHOES. See Men of Stbaw. fairs, he thought he could safely pronounce to be no stranding; 1 Camp. 131; 3 id. 431; STREAM. A current of water. A body 4 Maule & S. 503; 5 B. & Aid. 225; 4 B. & C. of water having a continuous flow in one 736. See Pebils of the Sea. direction. 34 L. R. Sc. 174. The right to a When a vessel takes the ground in the or- water-course is not a right in the fluid itself, dinary course of navigation, from a natural so much as a right in the current of the deficiency of water, or from the ebb of the stream. 2 Bouvier, Inst. n. 1612. tide, it is not a stranding; 11 C. B. 876; Pot- See Riveb; Wateb-Coubse; Ice. country highway; In re Road from Fitzwater St., 4 S. & R. (Pa.) 106. It means the whole surface and so much of the depth as is or can be used, not unfairly, for the ordinary purposes of a street. L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 121. A street 'is not an easement, but a dedication to the public of the occupation of the surface for passing and repassing; L. R. 3 Ch. 300; 1 Q. B. D. 703. See Highway. A practical rule as to vehicles and pedestrians is that the rights of the latter are primary at crossings and secondary between crossings. This rule has been applied by Judge Sulzberger both in civil and criminal cases in the Philadelphia Common Pleas. A street, besides its use as a highway for travel, may be used for the accommodation of drains, sewers, aqueducts, water, and gaspipes, lines of telegraph, and for other purposes conducive to the general police, sanitary, and business interests of a city; Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 435; Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15, 55 Am. Dec. 621; Cummins v. Seymour, 70 Ind. 491, 41 Am. Rep. 018. Its use belongs, from side to side and end to end, to the public; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 193, 38 Am. Rep. 117. Unless there be some special restrictions when the same are acquired, streets and squares are for the public use at large as distinguished from the municipality; 2 Dillon, Mun. Cor. 650. To enable a city lawfully to permit the use of its streets for poles, wires, etc., for telephone purposes, the power to do so must be expressly delegated to it; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 79; Texarkana v. Tel. Co., 48 Tex. Civ. App. 1G, 10G S. W. 915; Logansport It. Co. v. Logansport, 114 Fed. 688; Birmingham & P. M. St. It. Co. v. It. Co., 79 Ala. 4G5, 58 Am. Rep. 615; Curry v. Dist. of Columbia, 14 App. D. C. 423; Bischof v. Bank, 75 Neb. 838, 106 N. W. 99G, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 48G. It was held not within the power of a municipal corporation to grant any exclusive privilege in its streets to any corporation so as to deprive itself of the right to revoke the same and grant like privileges to another; Montgomery L. & W. P. Co. v. Power Co., 142 Ala. 464, 38 South. 1026. It is held that a municipal corporation cannot, without legislative authority, grant a franchise to lay gas pipes in its streets; Elizabeth City v. Banks, 150 N. C. 407, G4 S. E. 189, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 925; East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Russellville, 10G Ivy. GG7, 51 S. W. 308; Russell v. R. Co., 205 111. 155, 68 N. E. 727; Morristown, Tenn., v. Tel. Co., 115 Fed. 304, 53 C. C. A. 132; nor can it grant the exclusive privilege of the use of streets for mains, pipes and hydrants for water works; Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 22 N. E. 381, 5 L. R. A. 546; Illinois T. & S. Bk. v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 22 C. C. A. 171, 34 L. Turner v. Com’rs, 127 N. C. 153, 37 S. E. 191.' The charter of a city, giving to a city supervision and control of all public highways and public grounds, does not authorize an ordinance for the leasing of space on the streets or sidewalks in front of business houses for use by produce dealers or other merchants; such use of the streets will constitute a nuisance; Chapman v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 534, 121 N. W. 596, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400. A street may be used by individuals for the lading and unlading of carriages, for the temporary deposit of movables or of materials and scaffoldings for building or repairing, provided such use shall not unreasonably abridge or incommode its primary use for travel; 3 Camp. 230; 4 Ad. & E. 405; Com. v. Passmore, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 219; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 3G0, 14 N. E. 264, 1 Am. St. Rep. 831; Sikes v. Manchester, 59 la. 65, 12 N. W. 755; Mathews v. Kelsey, 58 Me. 56, 4 Am. Rep. 248. A municipal corporation cannot make an ordinance for the lease to produce dealers of space on a sidewalk; Chapman v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 534, 121 N. W. 596, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400; and cannot erect or authorize market buildings; Curry v. Dist. of Columbia, 14 App. D. C. 423; Costello v. State, 108 Ala. 45, 18 South. 820, 35 L. R. A. 303; or a market pound or jail; Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 Fla. 30G; cannot authorize hucksters stands; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131, 22 S. W. 898, 20 L. R. A. 783; licensed vendors; In re Fiegle, 36 Misc. Rep. 27, 72 N. Y. Supp. 438; except when the rights of the public at large or of abutting property owners are not materially interrupted; Londonderry Tp. v. Berger, 2 Pears. (Pa.) 230. But it has been held that a municipality may authorize the use of streets for market purposes; Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249, 13 N. W. 611, 43 Am. Rep. 464. The same prohibition has been extended to fruit or lunch stands and booths, if public transit is materially interfered with; People v. Keating, 1G8 N. Y. 390, 61 N. E. 637; Chicago v. Pooley, 112 111. App. 343; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, 38 Am. Rep. 117; also to hack stands; Odell v. Bretney, 38 Misc. Rep. 603, 78 N. Y. Supp. 67; Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 1S1 111. 2S9, 54 N. E. 825, 53

The striking of a vessel upon a rock, bank, reef, or the like.s To constitute a " voluntary " stranding it is not necessary that there should have been a previous intention to injure the vessel, nor is that supposed to exist. It is sufficient that the vessel was selected to suffer the common peril instead of the whole of the associated risks, in order that the rest might be saved. A stranding is voluntary whenever the will of man in some degree contributes thereto, though existence of the particular reef or bank was not before known to the master, and though he did not intend to strand the vessel thereon; provided it sufficiently appears that in 1 See Life of Story; 13 Alb. Law J. 90-92 (1876); Am erican Cyclopaedia; 6 Am. Law Mag. 841; 1 U. S. Jur. 90, 102. » [Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N. Y. 95 (1880), Finch, J. s Strong V. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. 106 (1865), Denio, C. J.; 13 Ohio, 60; 4 M. & S. 505: 1 Camp. 131; exposing the vessel he was aware that stranding was the chief I'isk incurred, and that it was not wholly unexpected by him. I