threat

the creation of an appearance of an intent to inflict injury even without a design to carry it out; and that 'dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment' includes contributions effectively assessed even if not actually required for employment or union membership.

A menace brought to the knowledge of the one sought to be affected thereby. 84 Iowa 473; 51 N. W. 25. It may aflfect the life, character, or property of the person against whom it is made. It need not be in any particular form or phrase, but must be directly made. Any language which conveys with sufficient clearness to be understood the proposition that a charge will be made is enough. The threat may be bluntly spoken, or it may be thinly veiled in suggestive terms. 69 111. App. 399. Threats in themselves are not indictable or actionable, but if a threat is accompanied by appearance of present ability and intention to carry out the threat, it is an assault (1 Ired. [N. C] 125); and, if made with the purpose of extorting money it is a misdemeanor at common law (1 Hawk. [P. C] c. 53, § 1). If business is interrupted, or freedom of locomotion is restrained, it is actionable. 27 Mich. 267.

A menace of destruction or injury to the person, character, or property of those against whom it is made. A declaration of an intention or determination to injure another by the commission of some unlawful act. If the act intended to be done is not unlawful, then the declaration is not a threat in law, and the effect thereof is not intimidation in a legal sense; Payne v. R. Co., 13 Lea (Tenn.) 507, 49 Am. Rep. 660. To extort money under threat of charging the prosecutor with an unnatural crime has been held to be robbery; People v. McDaniels, 1 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 199; but to extort money or other valuable thing by threat of prosecution for passing counterfeit money, or any prosecution except that for an unnatural crime, is not robbery; Britt v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 45; though it is a criminal offense; 11 Mod. 137; United States v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 299, n., 1 L. Ed. 388. It must come to the knowledge of the one whom it is expected to influence. The meaning of the word implies that it is a menace of some kind, which in some manner comes to the knowledge of the one sought to be affected; State v. Brownlee, 84 Ia. 473, 51 N. W. 25. See Threatening Letter. Threats to commit suicide are not admissible unless part of the res gestae, in a case where one is on trial for murder of the person who made the threats; State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113; but they were admitted in such a case when made the day before the death; Com. v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 901, 24 L. R. A. 235; or where there were successive declarations more or less contemporaneous with the taking of a life insurance policy, and efforts to borrow money on it, which tended to show a concerted scheme of fraud; Smith v. Benefit Soc., 123 N. Y. 85, 25 N. E. 197, 9 L. R. A. 616; but not when made two years before the issuing of the policy; Hale v. Inv. Co., 65 Minn. 518, 68 N. W. 182. In Evidence. Menace. See Confession.

A threat or menace of bodily hurt, through fear of which a man's business is interrupted, is inchoate violence.' A menace of destruction or injury to one's life, reputation, or property. A person (a tramp) who has entered a, house against the will of the occupant, may "threaten" to injure another by acts a3 well as by words. The test in such,case is as to what the occupant had reasonable ground to believe were the intruder's intentions from his conduct." On a trial for homicide when the question whether the prisoner or the deceased commenced the encounter is in doubt, the accused may prove threats of violence made against him by the deceased, though not brought to the knowledge of the prisoner.* A person whose life (or whose family) has been threatened by another, whom he knows or has reason to believe has armed himself with a deadly weapon for the avowed purpose of taking his life or inflicting great personal injury upon him, may reasonably infer, when a hostile meeting occurs, that his adversary intends to carry the threat into execution. A previous threat alone, however, unless coupled at the time with an apparent design then and there to carry it into effect, will not justify a deadly assault; there must be such a demonstration of an immediate intention to execute the threat as to induce a reasonable belief that the party threatened will lose his life or suffer serious bodily injury unless he immediately defends himself against the attack. But a previous threat alone is not enough; the party may have relented or abandoned 1 2 Bl. Com. 38t. ' Martin v. Central Iowa E. Co., 59 Iowa, 414 (1882). ' Russell V. Kennedy, 66 Pa. 2.51 (1870). > 3 Bl. Com. 120. 'People V. Deacons, 109 N. Y. 381 (1888): N. Y. Laws his purpose, or his courage may have failed, or the threat may have been idle gasconade, made without any purpose to execute it. Generally speaking, the threat must have been communicated to the accused — to influence his action. ^ The remoteness of the threat from the time of the homicide is a circumstance for the jury to consider, even where the threat was made thirty y«ars prior.to the killing.' a' threat to commit a crime, by another than the person on trial, is not admissible on the part of the accused, unless part of the res gesfce, or a link in a chain of evidence connecting with the crime itself.^ See Defense, 1; CpNFESsioN, 2; Consent; Duress. Threatened injury. See Injunction. Threatening letter. A letter sent to a person threatening to accuse him of a crime, with a view to extort money, chattels, or other property.'' Such letter may also threaten to libel or to kill the person addressed. When the -threat is to accuse of a crime the indictment need not specify the particular crime: for the prisoner may intentionally leave that in doubt. No/ need the threat be to accuse before a judicial tri- ' bunal.* See Blackmail.

A threat has been defined to be any menace of such a nature and extent as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and to take away from his acts that free, voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. But it is not every threat in this broad sense that is distinctly cognizable by legal remedies. The employment of threats is, upon principle, a tort at common law; and when threats are employed successfully to induce a party to make a contract or conveyance, they may, under circumstances, afford ground for equitable relief. But the criminal jurisdiction of threats, as a punishable offence, is chiefly statutory; and whether given threats are punishable must be determined by recourse to the statute of the jurisdiction. By the Stat. 4 Geo. IV. ch. 54, § 3, knowingly sending any letter or writing without a name or signature subscribed thereto, or with a fictitious name or signature, threatening to kill or murder any of the king's subjects, or to burn or destroy their houses, out-houses, barns, stacks of corn or grain, hay or straw, was made felony, and punishable with penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than three years, or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for any term not more than seven years; and, by subsequent enactments, the principle was much extended. It has also been widely adopted in the various states of the Union. Thus, in New York, the sending a letter threatening to accuse a person of crime, or to do an injury to person or property, with intent to extort or gain any money or property of another, is made punishable by imprisonment not exceeding five years. 2 Rev. Stat. 678, § 58. Threatening letters. Sending threatening letters is the name of the offence of sending letters containing threats of the kinds recognized by the statute as criminal. These are such as threatening to libel a person, or to charge him with a crime, or to kill him, or perhaps any demanding of property with threats. Sending such letters has been made punishable, irrespective of any intention or attempt to do the thing threatened. Threatening letters, as cognizable in criminal courts, are of various kinds: 1. Letters threatening to publish a libel, with a view to extort money. This is punishable, under Stat. 6 & 7 Vict. ch. 96, § 3, with imprisonment not exceeding three years, with or without hard labor. 2. Demanding money or other property with menaces, with intent to steal the same. This offence is felony, and punishable, under the larceny act of 1861 (Stat. 24 & 25 Vict. ch. 96), with two years' imprisonment, with or without hard labor. 3. Letters demanding of any person, with menaces and without reasonable and probable cause, any property, chattel, money, valuable security, or other valuable thing. Any person sending such a letter, or causing the same to be received, knowing its contents, is liable, under the same statute, to penal servitude for life, or to imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor. 4. Letters threatening to accuse any person of a heinous or infamous crime. Any person sending such a letter, knowing its contents, with a view to extort money, &c., is liable to penal servitude for life, as in the former case. 5. Letters threatening to kill or murder any person. The punishment for this offence is, by Stat. 24 & 25 Vict. ch. 100, § 16, penal servitude for five years, or imprisonment for two years, with or without hard labor. Mozley & W. A false statement, that a warrant is issued to arrest a person for a crime, and that it will be served unless money is paid to stay the process, is a threat to accuse a person of a crime. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 12 Allen, 449. To constitute the offence created by the New York statute against sending threatening letters, the letter must be sent with a view or intent to obtain that which belongs to another. A letter demanding the payment of a debt due to the writer, and threatening, on refusal, to burn the debtor's property, is not embraced. People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427.

evidence, menace. When a confession is obtained from a person accused of crime, in consequence of a threat, evidence of such confession cannot be received, because, being obtained by the torture of fear, it comes in so questionable shape, that no credit ought to be given to it; 1 Leach, 263; this is general principle, but what amounts to a threat is not so easily defined. Vide Confession, and the ‘cases there cited.