usage

Parties who contract on a subject-matter concerning which known usages prevail, by implication incorporate them into their agreements, if nothing is said to the contrary.

Long and uniform practice.

In its most extensive meaning, this term includes "custom" and "prescription," though it differs from them.

In the narrower sense, it is applied to the habits, modes, and course of dealing which are observed in trade generally, as to all mercantile transactions, or to some particular branches of trade. See 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 349. A usage must be generally known and established, and so well settled and so uniformly acted upon, as to raise a fair preto and in conformity with it. 207 111. App. 325.

Uniform practice. Usage and custom are now used interchangeably, though custom seems to have been originally confined to local usages immemorially existing; Browne, Us. & Cust 13. A usage must be established; that is, it must be known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to lawj but it may be of terg y. R. Co., 69 Pa. 374, 8 Am. Rep. 264; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464, 10 Am. Rep. 407; Power v. Bowdle, 3 N. Dak. 107, 54 N. W. 404, 21 L. R. A. 328, 44 Am. St. Rep. 511; and no usage is good which conflicts with an established principle of law; East B. L. Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565, 5 South. 317, 2 L. R. A. 836, 7 Am. St. Rep. 73; Pickering v. Weld, 159 Mass. 522, 34 N. E. 1081. Parties who contract on a subject-matter concerning which known usages prevail incorporate such usages by implication into their agreements, if nothing is said to the contrary; Hostetter v. Park, 137 U. 6. 30, 11 Sup. Ct. 1, 34 L. Ed. 568. The usages of trade afford ground upon which a proper construction may be given to contracts. By their aid the indeterminate intention of parties and the nature and extent of their contracts arising from mere implications or presumptions, and acts of an equivocal character may be ascertained; and the meaning of words and doubtful expressions may become known; Mc Comber v. Parker, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 182; 2 C. & P. 525; Mechanics’ Bank v. Bank, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 326, 5 L. Ed. 100; Nordaas v. Hubbard, 48 Fed. 921. Among commercial and business men in a locality, it need not be so ancient “that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,” nor that it should contain all the other elements of a common-law custom, as defined in the books; Lane v. Bank, 3 Ind. App. 299, 29 N. E. 613. One seeking to avoid the effect of a notorious and uniform usage of trade must show that he was ignorant of it: Robertson v. S. S. Co., 139 N. Y. 416, 34 N. E. 1053. General usage may be proved in proper cases to remove ambiguities and uncertainties in a contract, or to annex incidents, but it cannot destroy, contradict or modify what is otherwise manifest. It cannot make a contract where there is one, nor prevent the effect of settled rules of law; First N. Bk. v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 686, 25 L. Ed. 766, followed in Moore v. U. S., 196 U. S. 166, 25 Sup. Ct. 202, 49 L. Ed. 428; Adams v. Goddard, 48 Me. 212; Home Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 180 N. Y. 389, 73 N. E. 65, 105 Am. St. Rep. 772; evidence of an established custom among men in the same line of work is not admissible to justify negligence per se; Larson v. Ring, 43 Minn. 88, 44 N. W. 1078; evidence is admissible in a suit on a fire policy to show whether the parties intended standard or solar time, as fixing the expiration of the policy; Globe & Rutgers F. Ins. Co. v. David Moffat Co., 154 Fed. 13, 83 C. C. A. 91. A local usage must be one known to both contracting parties; Chateaugay O. & I. Co. v. Blake, 144 U. S. 476, 12 Sup. Ct. 731, 36 L. Ed. 510. See East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596, 51 Am. Rep. 489; Van Hoesen v. Cameron, 54 Mich. 609, 20 N. W. 609; Park v. Viernow, 16 Mo. App. 383. the authorities vary greatly; Lawson, Us. & Oust. 25; 7 E. & B. 266; Van Horn v. Gilbough, 10 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 347. See Custom; Lawson; Browne, Us. & Cust.

Usage is a reasonable and lawful public custom concerning transactions of the same nature as those which are to be effected thereby, existing at the place where the obligation is to be performed, and either known to the parties or se well established, general, and uniform that they must be presumed to have acted with reference thereto. Civ. Code Dak. § 2119. And see Milroy v. Railway Co., 98 Iowa, 188, 67 N. W. 276; Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 388, 19 L. Ed. 987; Wilcocks v. Phillips, 29 Fed Cas. 1203 ; McCarthy v. McArthur, 69 Ark. 313, 63 S. W. 56; Lincoln & K. Bank v. Page, 9 Mass. 156, 6 Am. Dec. 52; Lane v. Bank, 3 Ind. App. 299, 29 N. E. 613; Mornlngstar v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328, 11 N. E. 593, 59 Am. Rep. 211. This word, as used in English law, differs from "custom" and "prescription," in that no man may claim a rent common or other inheritance by usage, though he may by prescription. Moveover. a usage is local in all cases, and must be proved; whereas, a custom is frequently general, and as such is noticed without proof. "Usage," in French law, is the "usus" of Roman law, and corresponds very nearly to the tenancy at will or on sufferance of English law. Brown. "Usage," in its most extensive meaning, includes both custom and prescription; but, in its narrower signification, the term refers to a general habit, mode, or course of procedure. A usage differs from a custom, in that it does not require that the usage should be immemorial to establish it; but the usage must be known. certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law. Lowry v. Read, 3 Brewst. (Pat) 452. "Usage" is also called a "custom," though the latter word has also another signification ; it la a long and uniform practice, applied to habits, modes, and courses of dealing. It relates to modes of action, and does not comprehend the mere adoption of certain peculiar doctrines or rules of law. Dickinson v. Gay, 7 Allen (Mass.) 29, 83 Am. Dec. 656.

— General nsage. One which prevails generally throughout the country, or is followed generally by a given profession or trade, and is not local in its nature or observance.

— Usage of trade. A course of dealing; a mode of conducting transactions of a particular kind, proved by witnesses testifying of its existence and uniformity from their knowledge obtained by observation of what is practiced by themselves and others in the trade to which it relates. Haskins v. Warren. 115 Mass. 535.

The custom of a trade, either general or in a particular branchof business.

The custom of a locality or trade.

A general and* uniform practice, recognized as a proper guide of individual conduct. Usage is also called a custom, though the latter word has also another signification, is a long and uniform practice, applied to habits, modes, and courses of dea Ung. It relates to modes of action, and does not comprehend the mere adoption of certain peculiar doctrines or rules of law. Dickinson V, Gay, 7 Allen, 29. Usage, in its most extensive meaning, includes both custom and prescription; but, in its narrower signification, the term refers to a general habit, mode, or course of procedure. A usage differs from a custom, in that it does not require that the usage should be immemorial to establish it; but the usage must be known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law. Lowry V. Head, 3 Brews. 452. The word usage, in English law, differs from custom and prescription, in that no man may claim a rent, common, or other inheritance by usage, though he may by prescription. Moreover, a usage is local, in all cases, and must be proved; whereas a custom is frequently general, and as such is noticed without proof. Usage, in French law, is the usus of Eoman law, and corresponds very nearly to the tenancy at will or on sufferance of English law. Brown.

Long and uniferm practice. Evidence of a few instances that a certain thing has been done, does not establish a usage. The usage of trade affords ground upon which a proper construction may be given to contracts. Park on Ins. 30; 1 Marsh. Ins. 186, n. (20). Usage differs from custom, (q. v.) or rescription, (q- v-) Vide Wesk. nst. h. t.; 3 Chit. Pr. 55; Story, Confl. of Laws, § 270; 1 Dall.178; Vaugh. 169, 383.