use

the same thing as to both, and surely the 1986 addition of "drug trafficking crime" would have been a peculiar way to expand its meaning (beyond "use as a weapon") for crimes of violence.

Use Is not the thing itself or any part thereof, but is that which the thing will produce, 163 Mich. 353; that which the user is to enjoy, hold, occupy, and have the fruit thereof. 163 Mich. 556, 562. In Lands. A confidence reposed in another, who was made tenant of the land, or terre tenant, that he would dispose of the land according to the intention of the cestui que use, or him to whose use it was granted, and suffer him to take the profits. Plowd. 352; Gilb. Uses, 1; Bac. Law Tr. 150, 306; Cornish, Uses, 13; 1 Fonbl. Eq. 363; 2 Fonbl. Eq. 7; Saunders, Uses, 2; Co. Litt. 272b; 1 Coke, 121; 2 Bl. Comm. 328; 2 Bouv. Inst, note 1885 et seq. A right in one person, called the cestui que use, to take the profits of land which another has the legal title and possession, together with the duty of defending the same, and of making estates thereof according to the direction of the cestui que itse. Uses were derived from the fidei commissa of the Roman law. It was the duty of a Roman magistrate, the praetor fidei commissarius, whom Bacon terms the particular chancellor for uses, to enforce the observance of this confidence. Inst. 2. 23. 2. They were introduced into England by the ecclesiastics in the reign of Edward

A confidence reposed in another, who was made tenant of the land, or terretenant, that he would dispose of the land according to the intention of the cestui que use, or him to whose use it was granted, and suffer him to take the profits. Plowd. 352; Gilb. Uses 1; Saund. Uses 2; 2 Bla. Com. 328. A right in one person, called the cestui que use, to take the profits of land of which another has the legal title and possession, together with the duty of defending the same and of making estates thereof according to the direction of the cestui que use. Uses have been said to have been derived from the fidei commissa of the Roman law; but see Trust. It was the duty of a Roman magistrate, the prastor fidei commissarius, whom Bacon terms the particular chancellor for uses, to enforce the observance of this confidence. Inst 2. 23. 2. They were introduced into England by the ecclesiastics in the reign of Edward III., before 1377, for the purpose of avoiding the statutes of mortmain; and the clerical chancellors of those times held them to be fidei commissa, and binding in conscience. To obviate many inconveniences and difficulties which had arisen out of the doctrine and introduction of uses, the Statute of 27 Henry VIII. c. 10, commonly called the Statute of Uses, or, in conveyances and pleadings, the statute for transferring uses into possession, was passed, it enacts that “when any person shall be seised of lands, etc., to the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or body politic, the person or corporation entitled ter the use in feesimple, fee-tail, for life, or years, or otherwise, shall from thenceforth stand and be seised or possessed of the land, etc., of and in the like estate as they have in the use, trust, or confidence; and that the estates of the persons so seised to the uses shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the use, in such quality, manner, form, and condition as they had before in the use." The statute thus executes the use, —that is, it conveys the possession to the use, and transfers the use to the possession, and, in A modern use is an estate of right which Is acquired through the operation of the statute of 27 Henry VIII. c. 10; and which, when it may take effect according to the rules of the common law, Is called the legal estate, and when it may not is denominated a use, with a term descriptive of its modification; Corni'sb, Uses 35. The common-law Judges decided, in the construction of this statute, that a use could not be raised upon a use; Dy. 155 (A); and that on a feoffment to A and his heirs to the use of D and his heirs in trust for C and his heirs, the statute executed only the first use, and that the second was a mere nullity. The judges also held that as the statute mentioned only such persons as were seised to the use of others, it did not extend to a term of years, or other chattel interests, of which a termer is not seised but only possessed; 2 Bla. Com. 336. The rigid literal construction of the statute by the courts of law again opened the doors of the chancery courts; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 448. Uses and trusts are often spoken of together by the older and some modern writers, the distinction being those trusts which were of a permanent nature and required no active duty of the trustee being called uses; those in which the trustee had an active duty to perform, as, the payment of debts, raising portions, and the like, being called special or active trusts, or simply trusts; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 448. For the creation of a use, a consideration either valuable, as, money, or good, as relationship in certain degrees, was necessary; 3 Swanst. 591; 7 Co. 40; Shephard v. Little, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 210. See Resulting Use. The property must have been in case, and such that seisin could be given; Cro. Eliz. 401. Uses were alienable, although in many respects resembling choses in action, which were not assignable at common law; 2 Bla. Com. 331; when once raised, it might be granted or devised in fee, in tail, for life, or for years; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 455. The effect of the statues of uses was much restricted by the construction adopted by the courts: it practically resulted, it has been said, in the addition of these words, to the use, to every conveyance; Will. R. P. 133. The intention of the statute was to destroy the estate of the feoffee to use, and to transfer it by the very act which created it to the cestui que use, as if the seisin or estate of the feoffee, together with the use, had, uno flatu, passed from the feoffor to the cestui que use. A very full and clear account of the history and present condition of the law of uses is given in 2 Wash. R. P. 91, 156. See, as to a use upon a use, Tud. L. Cas. R. Pr. 335. Consult Spence, Eq. Jur.; Bisph. Eq. The statute executed the use and vested the title in the cestui que use when the feoffee to use had no active duty to perform; if he had he was a feoffee to trusts and not to uses; and this might occur even if the word “use” were employed. The employment of the word “use” is not essential to bring the limitation within the statute; it. is a question of the intent of the parties; Jenks, Mod. Land L. 127; [1897] A. C. 658. It was said in Symson v. Turner, 1 Eq. Cas. 1. By limiting it upon a term of years; 2. By limiting it to A to the use of or in trust for B to the use of or in trust for C; 3. By limiting it to trustees with active duties. A corporation cannot be seised to a use; see Jenks, Mod. Land L. 127. They are bound by equitable interests, at least when those interests are limited in favor of charities; id., citing 10 Rep. 23. It is said that the word used is not derived from the Latin usus but comes from the Latin opus; through an Anglo-French form oeps. Pollock, Contracts 5; 3 L. Quart. Rev. 115. See Charitable Uses; Trusts; The Origin of Uses, by James Barr Ames, Lect. on Leg. Hist. 233.

In its un technical sense, the word use has been variously constructed; Heaston v. Randolph Co., 20 Ind. 398; Cannell v. Ins. Co., 59 Me. 582; Stockbridge I. Co. v. Iron Co., 107 Mass. 324; thus, “to use a port” means to enter it, so as to derive advantage from its protection; Snow v. Ins. Co., 48 N. Y. 624, 8 Am. Rep. 578. The “use of liquors to excess” in a life insurance application means habitual, and not occasional, use to excess; Provident S. L. A. Soc. v. Bank, 126 Fed. 360, 61 C. C. A. 310. In Civil Law. A right of receiving so much of the natural profits of a thing as is necessary to daily sustenance. It differs from usufruct, which is a right not only to use, but to enjoy. 1 Bro. Civ. Law 184.

A confidence reposed in another, who was made tenant of the land or terre-tenant, that he would dispose of the land according to the intention of the cestui que use or him to whose use it was granted, and suffer him to take the profits. 2 Bl. Co.min. 328. A right in one person, called the "cestui que use," to take the profits of land of which another has the legal title and possession, together with the duty of defending the same, and of making estates thereof acoord-ing to the direction of the cestui que use. Bouvier. Use is the right given to any one to make a gratuitous use of a thing belonging to another, or to exact such a portion of the fruit it produces as is necessary for his personal wants and those of his family. Civ. Code La. art. 626. Uses and trusts are not so much different things as different aspects of the same subject. A use regards principally the beneficial interest ; a trust regards principally the nominal ownership. The usage of the two terms is, however, widely different. The word "use" is employed to denote either an estate vested since the stafute of uses, and by force of that statute, or to denote such an estate created before that stafute as, had it been created since, would have become a legal estate by force of the statute. The word "trust" is employed since that statute to denote the relation between the party invested with the legal estate (whether by force of that statute or independently of it) and the party beneficially entitled, who has hitherto been said to have the equitable estate. Mozley & Whitley. In conveyancing, "use" literally means "benefit;" thus, in an an ordinary assignment of chattels, the assignor transfers the property to the assignee for his "absolute use and benefit" In the expressions "separate use," "superstitious use," and "charitable use," "use" has the same meaning. Sweet.

In the civil law. A right of receiving so much of the natural profits of a thing as ls necessary to ddily sustenance. It differs from "usufruct," which is a right not only to use, but to enjoy. 1 Browne, Civil & Adm. Law, 184.

— Cestui que use. A person for whose use and banefit lands or tenements are held by another. The latter, before the statute of uses, was called the "feoffee to use," and held the nominal or legal title.

— Charitable use. See Charitable.

— Contingent use. A use limited to take effect upon the happening of some future contingent event; as where lands are conveyed to the use of A. and B., after a marriage shall be had between them. 2 Bl. Comm. 334; Haywood v. Shreve, 44 N. J. Caw, 94; Jemison v. Blowers, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 692.

— Executed use. The first use in a conveyance upon which the statute of uses operates by bringing the possession to it, the combination of which, i. e., the use and the possession, form the legal estate, and thus the statute is said to execute the use. Wharton.

— Executory uses. These are springing uses, which confer a legal title answering to an executory devise; as when a limitation to the use of A. in fee is defeasible by a limitation to the use of B., to arise at a future period, or on a given event.

— Feoffee to uses. A person to whom (before the statute of uses) land was conveyed "for the use" of a third person. He held the nominal or legal title, while the third person, called the "cestui que use," was entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the estate.

— Official use. An active nse before the stafute of uses, which imposed some duty on the legal owner or feoffee to uses; as a conveyance to A. with directions for him to sell the estate and distribute the proceeds among B., C., and D. To enable A. to perform this duty, he bad the degal possession of the estate to be sold. Wharton.

— Passive use. A permissive use, (q. v.) --Permissive use. A passive use which was resorted to before the statute of uses, in order to avoid a harsh law ; as that of mortmain or a feudal forfeiture. It was a mere invention in order to evade the law by secrecy ; as a conveyance to A. to the use or B. A. simply held the possession, and B. enjoyed the profits of the estate. Wharton.

— Resulting nse. A use raised by equity for the banefit of a feoffor who has made a voluntary conveyance to uses without any declaration of the use. 2 Washb. Real Prop. lOO. A resulting use arises where the legal seisin is transferred, and no use ls expressly declared, nor any consideration nor evidence of intent to direct the use. The use then remains in the original grantor, for it cannot be supposed that the estate was intended to be given away, and the stafute immediately transfers the legal estate to such resulting use. Wharton.

— Secondary use. A use limited to take effect in derogation of a preceding estate, otherwise called a "shifting use," as a conveyance to the use of A. and his heirs, with a proviso that, when B. returns from India, then to the use of C. and his heirs. 1 Steph. Comm. 546.

— Shifting use. A use which is so limited that it will be made to shift or transfer itself, from one beneficiary to another, upon the occurrence of a certain event after its creation. For example, an estate is limited to the use of A. and his heirs, provided that, upon the return of B. from Rome, it shall be to the use of C. and his heirs; this is a shifting use, which transfers itself to C. when the event happens. 1 Steph. Comm. 503 ; 2 Bl. Comm. 335. These shifting uses are common in all settlements ; and, in marriage settlements, the first use is always to the owner in fee till the marriage, and then to other uses. The fee remains with the owner until the marriage, and then it shifts as uses arise. 4 Kent, Comin. 207.

— Springing nse. A use limited to arise on a future event where no preceding use is limited, and which does not take effect in derogation of any other interest than that which resnlts to the grantor, or remains In him in the mean time. 2 Washb. Real Prop. 281; Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 288.

— Statute of uses. An English stafute enacted in 1536, (27 Hen. VIII. c. 10,) directed against the practice of creating uses in lands, and which converted the purely equitable title of persons entitled to a use into a legal title or absolute ownership with right of possession. The statute is said to "execute the use," that is, it abolishes the intervening estate of the feoffee to uses, and makes the beneficial interest of the cestui que use aa absolute legal title.

— Superstitious uses. See that title.

— Use and occupation. This is the name of an action, being a variety of assumpsit, to be maintained by a landlord against one who has had the occupation and enjoyment of an estate, under a contract to pay therefor, express or implied, bnt not under such a lease as would support an action specifically for rent

— Use plaintiff. One for whbse use (benefit) an action is brought in the name of another. Thus, where the assignee of a chose in action is not allowed to sue in his own name, the action would be entitled "A. B. (the assignor) for the Use of C. D. (the assignee) against B. F." In this case, C. D. is called the "use plaintiff."

Employment; application; profit, enjoyment; the right inequity to have the profit or benefit of lands or tenements, — originally a beneficial estate like a trust, but converted by the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII., c. 10, into the legal estate, v. Charitable use; Contingent use; Residting use; Shifting use; Springing use. Use npon a nse: the second use upon a conveyance, e. g. to A. to the use of B. to the use of C, which was regarded as invalid, the legal estate passing upon such a conveyance to B. v. Tyrrell's case.

In the civil law. The bare use of a thing for necessary purposes.

Originally a beneficial estate, like a trust; the terre-tenant or feoffees to uses having the legal title, and the cestui que use the beneficial interest. The Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII. 0. 10, converted the use into the legal estate, and gave rise to many new kinds of conveyances without livery of seisin. A use upon a use, as if land be conveyed to A to the use of B to the use of C, is not good, and B will have the legal estate; V. Tyrrell's Case. Uses are present {executed), which vest immediately, or future {executory), which vest at some future time. Executory uses may be either springing (primary), which are to arise at some future time, there being no previous use; or shifting (secondary), which take effect in derogation of some preceding use. A contingent use is one which may never take effect. Uses are also express, by act of the parties; or implied; which latter may be either resulting or constructive; V. Trust. Thus, an estate is granted by A (without consideration) to B and his heirs to the use of C and his heirs on A's death; but if C die without issue at his death, then to the use of D. Here B has the legal estate, A a resulting use, C a springing use, and D a shifting use, which is also contingent. A's use is executed; all the others are executory. A constructive use: one raised by the law in modification or extension of an express use; as if a superstitious use were diverted to a charitable use. A charitable use: such a use as is authorized by the 43 Eliz. c. 4, and other statutes, in spite of the mortmain acts and the rule against perpetuities; such as uses for the maintenance of schools, hospitals, pubhc works, and other charities.

n. 1. The term a use, in its original legal application, denoted simply the benefit or beneficial enjoyment of land. After the enactment of the rectly to religious, houses, the ecclesiastics obtained grants to persons to the use of religious houses, which the clerical chancellors of those days declared to be binding. This device, in some measure, evaded the operation of the statutes of mortmain; and under it a use came to consist in the equits Jble right to receive the profit or benefit of lands and taiements, which was, in cases of lands conveyed to uses, diverted from the legal ownership thereof. The system of uses was attended with numerous advantages to the true owners of the land, — uses not being subject to escheat or to forfeiture, and being devisable by will, and transferable without livery of seisin; but, like other Systems, it was made the channel of numerous abuses; lands being conveyed by means of it to persons and in tvays forbidden by the words — or, at all events, by the policy — of the statute law. Then came the statute of uses (27 Hem. VIIL ch> 10), otherwise called the statute for tra-ttsfei-ring uses into possession. It enacted that, '" When any person shall be seised of lands^ &c., to the use, confi'dence, or trust of any other person or body politic, the person or corporation entitled to the Use in feesimple, fee-tail, for life or years, or otherwise, shall from thenceforth stand and be seised or possessed of the land, &c., of and in the like estate as they have in the uise, trust, of confidence; and that the estates of the persons so seised to the uses shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the use, in such (quality, manner, form, and condition as they had before in the use." The operation of this statute is to execute the use; that is, it Conveys the possession to the use, and transfers the use to the possession, and in this manner makes the cestui que me complete owner of the lands and tenements, as well at law as in equity. In other words, it has, in effect, en-acted that the use should be the land, and that where the Use was there the laud or legal estate should be, and should be deemed to be. Hence, since the statute, the use involves the legal ownership; and the Woi-d use has lost But by the decision in Tyrrell's Case (4 & 5 Ph. ir M.) the courts of law held that the statute of uses intended the first use only, and that as soon as it had executed that Use and made it the legal estate, it was exhausted. The courts of chancery, however, went further, and gate the benefit or beneficial enjoyment, as before, to the person intended to benefit, — calling the first usee the legal estate man, or trustee merely; and the proper beneficiary, being the second or last usee, the cestui que trust and true owner in equity. By the joint opera^ tloli of the statute of uses and the decision in Tyrrell's Case two lines of estate became well established in law; namely, the legal estate in the tiustee, which retains aU, or nearly all, its ancient incidents; and the equitable estate in the cestui que trust, which has received incidents analogous to those of the legal estate, upon the maxim, equity follows the law. See Trust. What is signified by the two words, " Use " and " trust," is really much the same thing, regarded from two dif Eerent points of view: a use regards principally the beneficial interest; a tmst regards principally the nominal owners ship. The usage of the two terms is, however, widely dif Eerent. The word use is employed to denote either an estate vested since the statute of uses, and by force of that statute, or to denote such an estate created before that statute, as, had it been created since, would have become a legal estate by force of the statute. The word trust is employed since that statute to denote the relation between the party invested with the legal estate (whether by force of that statute or independently of it) and the party beneficially entitled, who has hitherto been said to have the equitable estate. See Brown; Modey if W. As to charitable uses, or superstitious uses, see those titles. If the beneficial interest which one person has in land, which in the eye of the common la\* belongs to another, is a permanent enjoyment of the benefits or profits of the land, it is a use; if the interest is for a temporary purpose, it is a trust. Hutchins V. Hey\vood, 50 N. H. 491. which have come before the courts for construction. Use maj' be synonymous with benefit. Heaston v. Commissioners of Eandolph County, 20 Ind. 398. The expression change in use, in a policy of insurance, includes a change from occupancy to disuse. Cannell v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 69 Me. 682. In conveyancing, the phrase "for the use of " is expressive of the right of appropriation or enjoyment, rather than descriptive of the purposes or mode of the use. Stock-, bridge Iron Go. v. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290i 324. Riding a stray horse about, in the endeavor to discover his owner, is not making use of him, within the. rule that one who keeps an estray and uses him becomes liac ble in trover. Henry v. Bichardson, 7 Watts, 557. A grant of "the use of the timber " con- \ey,s only an ijicorppreaj right to use it, and not the timber itself, nor the soil, the invasion of which cannot support an action of trespass 511. cl. ft. Clark v. Way, 11 Bich. 621. TSae ancl occupation, The name of an action (one species of the action of assumpsit) which is maintainable where one person has had the enjoyment of; real property belonging to aijother, under an express or implied contract to pay therefor, but cannot maintain an action techjiically for rent, fpi; wajit of a lease, or agreement to pay a, speciiic sum. The owner recovers the reasonable value of the use of' the premises, upon the ground that it is just and right the. occupant should make payment.. But the action will not lie where the occupation was tortious, as that forbids the implied promjjie.

estates, is defined to be a confidence reposed in another, who was made tenant of the land or terretenant, that he should dispose of the land according to the intention of the cestus que use, or him to whose use it was granted, and suffer him to take the profits. Plowd. 352; Gilb. on Uses, 1; Bac. Tr. 306; Cornish - on Uses, 13; 1 Fonb. Eq. 363; 2 Ib. 7; Sanders on Uses, 2; Co. Litt. 272, bs; 1 Co. 121; 2 Bl. Com. 828. Uses were borrowed from the fedet commissum (q. v.) of the civil law; it was the duty of a Roman magistrate, the pretor fidet commts- -gartus, whom Bacon terms the particular chancellor for uses, to enforce the observance of this confidence. Inst. 2, 23, 2. Uses were introduced into England by the ecclesiastics in the reign of Edward III. or Richard II., for the purpose of avoiding the statutes of mortmain, and the clerical chancellors of those times held them to be fidet commissa, and binding in conscience. To obviate many inconveniences and difficulties, which had arisen out of the doctrine and introduction of uses, the statute of Henry and pleadings, the statute for transferring uses into possession, was passed. it enacts that “when any person shall be seised of lands, &c. to the use, confidence or trust of any other person or body politic, the person or corporation entitled to the use in fee simple, fee tail, for life, or years, or otherwise, shall from thenceforth stand and be seised or possessed of the land, &c. of and in the like estate as they have in the use, trust or confidence; and that the estates of the persons so seised to the uses, shall be deemed to be in him or them that have the use, in such quality, manner, form and condition, as they had before in the use.” The statute thus executes the use; that is, it conveys the possession to the use, and transfers the use to the possession; and, in this manner, making the cestui que use complete owner of the lands and tenements, as well at law as in equity. 2 Bl. Com. 333; 1 Saund. 254, note (6). A modern use has been defined to be an estate of right, which is acquired through the operation of the statute of 27 Hen. &, c. 10; and which, when it may take effect according to the rules of the common law, is called the legal estate; and when it may not, is denominated a use, with a term descriptive of its modification. Cornish on Uses, 35. The common law judges decided, in the construction of this statute, that a use could not be raised upon a use, Dyer, 155 A; and that ona feoffment to A and his heirs, to the use of B and his heirs, in trust for C and his heirs, the statute executed only the first use, and that the second was a mere nullity. ‘Fhe judges also held that, as the statute mentioned only such persons as were setsed to the use of others, it did not extend to a term of years, or sessed. Bac. Tr. 335; Poph. 76; Dyer, 369; 2 Bl. Com. 336. The rigid literal construction of the statute by the courts of law again opened the doors of the chancery courts. 1 Madd. Ch. 448, 450.