Veto

I forbid.

Lat I forbid. The veto-power is a power vested in the executive officer of seme governments to declare his refusal to assent to any bill or measure which has been passed by the legislature. It is either absolute or qualified, according as the effect of its exercise is either to destroy the bill finally or to prevent its becoming law unless again passed by a stated proportion of votes or with other formalities. Or the veto may be merely suspensive. See Pcople v. Board of Councilmen (Super. Buff.) 20 N. Y. Supp. 51.

— Pocket veto. Non-approval of a legislative act by the president or state governor, with the result that it fails to become a law, not by a written disapproval, (a veto in the ordinary form,) but by remaining silent until the adjournment of the legislative body, when that adjournment takes place before the expiration of the period allowed by the constifution for the examination of the bill by the executive.

I forbid. The power reserved by the American constitutions to the president or governor, to refuse that executive assent which is necessai-y to the complete enactment of a bill, and so to nullify the legislative action (unless a two-thirds vote to pass the measure can afterwards be obtained), is called the veto power; his exercise of it is a veto; and the message communicating his refusal to the legislature is a veto Veto is not, however, a term employed in the Federal constitution*, but seems to be of popular use, only. The constitution speaks of returning a bill with objections. VEXATA QU-iESTIO. A moot point; a vexed question. VI. See Vis. Via trita via tuta. The beaten path is the safe path.

In its legal application, this appears to be synonymous with the maxim, cursus curice est lex curice, q. V. If any necessary proceeding in an action be informal, or not done within the prescribed limit of time, or in the manner authorized by the usual practice of the court, it may ofteii be set aside live novelty, without the warrant of any principle, precedent, or authority. Broom Max. Another application of this maxim, however, is to cases of employment of skilled labor. The person employed is under obligation to act according to the rules adopted and recognized in his profession or business; and, if he does so, he is not answerable for any ill consequences. But, should he depart from the settled rule or practice, he is answerable for the consequences of such deviation.