Voir Dire

A preliminary examination of a witness or venireman to ascertain whether he is competent.

A preliminary examination of a witness to ascertain whether he is competent. When a witness was supposed to have an interest in the cause, and was thereby excluded from testifying, the party against whom he was called had the choice to prove such interest by calling another witness to that fact, or he might require the witness produced to be sworn on his voir dire as to whether he had an interest in the cause or not; but the party against whom he was called was not allowed to have recourse to both methods to prove the witness’s interest. If the witness answered that he had no interest, he was competent, his oath being conclusive; if he swore he had an interest, he was rejected. The witness was sworn on his voir dire to ascertain whether he had an interest which would disqualify him, because he would be tempted to perjure himself if he testified wfien interested. But when he was asked whether he had such an interest, if he was and his answer being conclusive, he was admitted as competent; If, on the contrary, he swore truly he had an interest, when he knew that would exclude him, he was told that for being thus honest he must be rejected. A suitable Inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether a juror has any bias, and this must be conducted under the supervision of the court and be largely left to its sound discretion. There Is no objection in not allowing a juror to be asked as to his political affiliations and whether they would bias his judgment, in the absence of any statement tending to show a special reason for asking; Connors v. U. S., 158 U. S. 408, 15 Sup. Ct. 051, 39 L. Ed. 1033; a juror may be asked whether he is a member of certain N secret societies; Burgess v. Mfg. Co. (Tex.) 30 S. W. 1110; or has ever belonged to “the committee of 100”; Connors v. U. S., 158 U. S. 408, 15 Sup. Ct. 931, 39 L. Ed. 1033. The court may assume an exclusive examination of jurors, though it is the better practice to allow counsel to examine; Jones v. State, 35 Fla. 289, 17 South. 284. See Interest: Jury.

To speak the truth. This law-French phrase is used to denote a preliminary oath administered to a proposed witness, for the purpose of an examination to ascertain whether he is qualified, he being sworn to say the truth touching the matters inquired of. The examination is also termed an examination on voir dire. This phrase is applied to denote that preliminary examination which the judge makes of one presented as a witness, where the witness's competency is objected to. Thus, if the witness is a child of very tensacreduess of an oath. The examination on the voir dire may be made at any stage of the trial, whenever the occasion for it arises. Broum. Volenti non fit injuria. To the consenting no injury is done. A person who consents to a thing cannot complain of it as an injury. The law regards such person as doing the act himself, and will hold him responsible for the consequences equally with others directly concerned. Thus a trespasser, having knowledge that there are springguns in a wood, although he may be ignorant of the particular spots where they are placed, cannot maintain an action for an injury received in consequence of his accidentally treading on the latent wire communicating with the gun, and thereby letting it off. Uott V. Wilkes, 3 Barn. §■ Aid. 304. This maxim applies principally to those cases where a man suffers an injury for which he has a claim for compensation, but which claim he is considered as waiving, by acquiescing in, or not objecting to, the injury committed; as when a husband connives at or condones the adultery of his wife, he cannot obtain damages from the seducer, nor sustain a petition for divorce. The rule also covers those cases where any one receives an injury through his own want of prudence or foresight, instances of which are of frequent occurrence. Whart. Max. The import of the maxim is, that that which, unauthorized, would amount to wrongful injury, subjecting the doer of it to an action for damages by the person injured, loses such character if the person suffering the disadvantage or injury consents to the act. The peculiar signification of the word injuria — implying a wrong — should be borne in mind in considering the application of the maxim. On this subject, see Damnum ABSQUE INJURIA. A man cannot complain of an injury which he has received through his own want of prudence and foresight. He cannot recover damages for an injury which but for his own negligence or wrongful act would not have happened. Therefore damages cannot be recovered against a railway company for injuries to persons trespassing ment of the train. Nor can a man recover damages for injuries sustained by him in committing a trespass, — as by climbing up to get into a cart, or by tumbling into a hole in his neighbor's field; nor for injuries sustained by him in running against an obstruction negligently placed in the road by the defendant, if he were riding at an improper rate, or was intoxicated, or could have avoided the injury by riding with ordinary and proper care. So it is as to any right of action or defence to an action which a man has, and which he chooses' to relinquish; as, a right of action for a debt for which a creditor chooses to accept a composition; a right of action by a tenant for an illegal distress; a right of action for trespass or other injury; a defence under the statute of limitations; a right of way; or an easement of air, light, or other like privilege, — the benefit of all of which rights a man may, if he will, waive or relinquish, though to his own injury. Whart. Max. Voluit, sed non di^t. He willed, but he did not say; he may have intended it, but he did not say it. This maxim is frequently used in the construction of wills, in answer to arguments based upon the supposed intention of a testator. It is applied also in the construction of statutes. Judges frequently observe, in answer to the remark that the legislature meant so.and so, that they, in that case, have not so expressed themselves; and therefore the maxim applies, quod voluit non dixit.