Voluntas

Z. Will; intent; design; purpose; desire; a will. Voluntas donatoris, in charta doni sni manifesto expressa, observetur: the will or intention of a donor, clearly expressed in the deed of his gift, should be observed. Voluntas et propositnm distingunut maleflcia: will and purpose characterize crimes. Voluntas in delictis, non exitns, speetatur: the will, not the issu^ is looked to in crimes. Voluntas reputatnr [reputabitur] pro facto: the will is [shall be] taken for the deed, — a maxim in the English law of treason.- Voluntas testatoris: the will of a testator; — est ambulator! a usque ad mortem [ad extremum vitse exitum]: the will of a testator is ambulatory until death, v. Ambulatoria est, etc.; — habet interpretationem latam et benignam: the will of a testator ' has [should have] a broad and benignant interpretation. Voluntas ■ nltima testatoris est perimplenda secundum veram intentionem Buam: the last will of a testator is to be fulfilled according to his true intention.

Will; intention; volition. Stat pro ratione voluntas. The will stands for the reason. The fact that a testamentary disposition is made, is sufficient reason for its being made.' Voluntas reputatixr pro facto. The will is to be taken for the deed. In cases of treason, the rule at common law was, that the intention to commit treason was sufficient to constitute the crime without an overt act.* Voluntas testatoris ambulatoria est usque ad mortem. The will of a testator is ambulatory up to death. = See further Ambulatory.

I. Will; design; last will. Voluntas dovetur: the- will of the grantor as openly of feoffment should be observed. Voluntas distinguunt maleficia: the intent and different grades of] crimes. Voluntas the will is taken for the deed [in treason]. toris est ambulatoria usque ad testator is revocable until death.

Will; intention; design. Sometimes, a will; a testamentary disposition of property. But in this sense the word is usually followed by iestatoris: voluntas iestatoris, — the will of a testator. Voluntas reputabatur pro facto. The will shall be taken for the deed. This maxim expresses the rule of old common law in regard to criminal responsibility in cases of treason, that the mere compassing or planning of a treasonable act, such as the assassination of the sovereign, without any overt act, may constitute trea Son; which is contrary to the general rule of criminal responsibility, that the guilty intent and the guilty act must concur to constitute a crime. See the maxim. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Under the constitution of the United States, an overt act is absolutely essential to constitute treason. G. F. Wharton explains the application of the maxim, as formerly regarded, to other offences as well as treason, thus: " This is the old maxim with respect to treasonable offences: in criminalibiis voluntas repulabitur pro facto, — in criminal offences the will shall be taken for the deed. To constitute which offence of treason, the intention alone is sufficient. ' ' In treasonable offences, — that is, the compassing or injagining the death of the sovereign, — the law is more strict is, voluntas reputabitur pro facto, and scribere est agere. Between subject and subject, however, the intent must be more manifest, and must be accompanied by undeniable overt acts. " An assault, withintentto rob, without taking money or goods, is not felony, though the contrary was once holden. " An expressed intention to commit murder, without any overt act, is not felony; though with an overt act, under this maxim, it would be. As where a servant, having stolen his master's goods, went to his bedside and attempted to cut his throat, and, thinking he had done so, left him and fled, he was adjudged to be hanged; for this overt act was evidence of the intent, and, in crimes, the intent, and not the consequence, is to be regarded; as, also, where one, knowing there to be a crowd of persons in the street adjoining where he was, threw a stone over the wall amongst them, thinking to frighten them, but without intent to kill, but whereby, nevertheless, one was killed, — this was adjudged to be manslaughter only; for, there was in that case no intent to murder." Whart. Max. Modern statutes defining precisely various crimes and degrees of crime, according to the intent and the circumstances of the act, have greatly modified the application and lessened the importance of this ancient maxim. An infant under the age of seven years, however, is not within the meaning of the maxim, not being considered as having the capacity to intend to commit the crime of felony. A child under fourteen years, indicted for murder, must be proved capable. Whart. Max. 216.