Wharf

A space of ground artificially prepared for the reception of merchandise from a ship or vessel, so as to promote the convenient loading and discharging of such vessel. A structure on the margin of navigable waters, alongside of which vessels can be brought for the sake of being conveniently loaded or unloaded. 62 Conn. 138; 93 N. Y. 151.

A space of ground artificially prepared for the reception of merchandise from a ship or vessel, so as to promote the convenient loading and discharge of such vessel. A wharf occupied by a ferry company, to which access can only be had through a gate wharf; Malloy v. R. Co., 78 Hun 166, 28 N. Y, Supp. 979; but a public quay in a city, dedicated to public use, does not cease to be locus publicus and become private property because it is leased by the public authorities for a purpose subservient to the public use; New Orleans v. Const. Co., 140 U. S. 654, 11 Sup. Ct. 968, 35 L. Ed. 556. At common law, the soil or all tide-waters below high-water mark being vested in the crown, the erection of a wharf thereon without the consent of the crown is an encroachment upon the royal domain of that kind which has been denominated a purpresture, and, as such, may be either abated, or, if more beneficial to the crown, the party arrested, unless it be a public nuisance; 10 Price, 350, 378; 18 Ves. 214; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 920. But if it obstruct navigation to such a degree as to be a public nuisance, neither the crown nor its grantee has authority to erect or maintain it without the sanction of an act of parliament; 8 Ad. & E. 330; 5 M. & W. 327; Phear, Rights of Water 54. It is not every wharf erected in navigable water which is a nuisance, for it may be a benefit rather than an injury to the navigation; and it is for the jury to determine, in each particular case, whether such a wharf is a nuisance or not; 1 C. & M. 496; 4 Ad. & E. 384; 15 Q. B. 276. In this country, the several states, being the owners of the soil of the tide waters witliin their respective territories, may by law authorize and regulate the erection of wharves thereon, at least until the general government shall have legislated upon the subject; Savannah v. State, 4 Ga. 26; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Wilson’s Lessee v. Inloes, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 351; and may grant to a municipal corporation the exclusive right to make and control wharves on the banks of a navigable river; Keokuk N. L. P. Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, 24 L. Ed. 377. The riparian proprietor is entitled to make a landing, wharf, or pier for his own use or for the use of the public, subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature may prescribe; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 445, 13 Sup. Ct 110, 36 L. Ed. 1018; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 504, 19 L. Ed. 9S4. In Massachusetts and Maine, by a colonial ordinance, the provisions of which are still recognized as the law of those states, the property of the shores and flats between high and low water mark, for one hundred rods, subject to the rights of the public, was transferred to the owners of the upland, who may, therefore, build wharfs out to that distance, If by so doing they do not unreasonably interrupt navigation; Drake v. Curtis, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 395; Partridge v. Luce, 36 Me. 16. If without legislative sanction they extend a wharf beyond that distance, such extension is prima detriment to navigation; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 186, 32 Am. Deo. 208; Thornton v. Grant, 10 R. I. 477, 14 Am. Rep. 701. It Is said that a wharf may extend to the point of navigability; Clifford v. IT. S., 34 Ct Cl. 223. In Connecticut, and probably in other states, by the law of the state founded upon immemorial usage, the proprietor of the upland has the right to wharf out to the channel, — subject to the rights of the public; Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38, 21 Am. Dec. 707; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 369, 10 L. ICd. 997; State v. Jersey City, 1 N. J. L. 525; Rippe v. R. Co., 23 Minn. 18; Paine L. Co. v. U. S., 55 Fed. 854. In Pennsylvania, the riparian proprietor is held to be the owner of the soil between high and low water mark, and to be entitled to erect wharves thereon; Hart v. Hill, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 131; but not without express authority from the state; Tinicum F. Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 100 Am. Dec. 597. In the same state it has been held that wharves are not the private property of him who erects them, and persons who go upon and fasten vessels to them are not ‘trespassers; Degan v. Dunlap, 15 Phil a. (Pa.) 69. Riparian owners have the right, among others, to build private wharves out so as to reach the navigable waters of the stream; Weems Steamboat Co. v. Steamboat Co., 214 U. S. 345, 29 Sup. Ct. 661, 53 L. Ed. 1024, 16 Ann. Cas. 1222. The owner of a wharf is liable for damages caused to a vessel by concealed obstructions which he might have ascertained by reasonable diligence; Manhattan Transp. Co. v. New York, 37 Fed. 160. A railroad company which maintained a wharf was held hound to know whether obstructions existed thereat which would endanger a vessel assigned by it to berth at such wharf; Verdon v. R. Co., 157 Fed. 481. A wharfinger is bound to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the condition of the berths at his wharf and remove dangerous obstructions thereat, or to give notice thereof to vessels about to dock; and the master is bound to use ordinary care; Smith v. Burnett, 173 U. S. 430, 19 Sup. Ct. 442, 43 L. Ed. 756; [1891] App. Cas. 11; Carleton v. Steel Co., 99 Mass 216. The master is not bound to take soundings before going into the berth; and in an action for injuries sustained in grounding on a rock in the bottom of the dock, it is sufficient to show that the owner of the dock could have discovered the rock by reasonable diligence; Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. Lime Co., 184 Mass. 60. 67 N. E. 863, 61 L. R. A. 946, 100 Am. St. Rep. 543. Such claims are within the jurisdiction of admiralty; and a libel in personam will lie; Ball v. Trenholm, 45 Fed. 588. The wharfinger was also held liable for damages to vessels caused by the insufficiency of the Owners of land abutting on a lake, the title to which is in the state, have the right to build wharves in aid of navigation, but not obstructing it, far enough to reach water navigable for such boats as are in use; Madison v. Mayers, 97 Wis. 399, 73 N. W. 43, 65 Am. St. Rep. 127, 40 L. R. A. 635, with an extended note on the right of the riparian owner to erect wharves. Where abutters on a navigable stream have grants from the state conveying land under water, conditioned upon their erecting docks and promoting commerce, the public has the incidental right to pass over the abutting lines to reach the docks; Thousand Island Steamboat Co. v. Visger, 179 N. Y. 206, 71 N. E. 764. A wharf built by a railroad company by municipal authority on what might be the extension of a street is not a public wharf; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Naval Stores Co., 198 U. S. 483, 25 Sup. Ct. 745, 49 L. Ed. 1135; but one built on a navigable stream at the terminus of public highways in the country, which is the only means of reaching the river and was built for that purpose, and is being so used, is impressed with a public interest; Weems Steamboat Co. v. Steamboat Co., 214 U. S. 345, 29 Sup. Ct. 661, 53 L. Ed. 1024, 10 Ann. Cas. 1222. Long continued use of a wharf by the public at large, without objection on the part of the town, will support a verdict finding it to be a public landing place; Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 504. The title to a wharf may be obtained by prescription as against the commonwealth; Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 132. See Riparian Proprietors; Water-Course; Rivers; Wajers; 40 L. R. A. 635; 16 L. It. A. (N. S.) 506, for valuable notes.

A perpendicular bank or mound of timber, or stone and earth, raised on the shore of a harbor, river, canal, &c., or extending some distance into the water, for the convenience of lading and unlading ships and other vessels. Webster. A broad, plain place near a river, canal, or other water, to lay wares on that are brought to or from the water. Cowel. There are two kinds of wharves, — legal quays and sufferance wharves. The former are established by act of parliament, or exist as such by immemorial usage. The latter are places where goods may be landed and shipped by special permission of the crown. Tomlins. By the customs clauses consolidation act, 1853 (Stat. 16 & 17 Vict. ch. 107), § 13, the commissioners of customs may from time to time, by order under their hands, appoint places to be sufferance wharves for the lading and unlading of goods by sufferance, in such cases, under such restrictions and in such manner as they shall see fit. Mozley & W. A wharf is a structure erected on a shore below high-water mark, and sometimes extending into the channel, for the laying vessels alongside to load or unload, and on which stores are often erected for the reception of cargoes. Doane v. Broad Street Assoc, 6 Mass. 332. Wharfage. Money paid for landing wares at a wharf, or for shipping or taking goods into a boat or barge from thence. Cowel. Strictly speaking, wharfage is money due, or money actually paid, for the privilege of landing goods upon, or loading a vessel while moored from, a wharf. The Gem, 1 Brown Adm. 37. On the distinction between wharfage and harborage, see Hays v. Briggs, 74 Pa. St. 373. Wharfinger. One who owns or keeps a wharf, or has the oversight or management of it. Cowel. A wharfinger is one who keeps a wharf for receiving goods for hire; and his responsibility begins when the goods are delivered at, or rather on, the wharf, and he has, either expressly or by implication, so received them. Rodgers v. Stophel, 32 Pa. St. 111.

is a space of ground artificially prepared for the reception of merchandise from a ship or vessel, so as to promote the convenient loading and discharge of such vessel.