§ 15.15 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability\n requirements.\n 1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some\nelement of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such\nmental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the\noffense by use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly"\nor "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to\ndefraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of\nintent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a\nstatute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of\nthe offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.\n 2. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a\nstatute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be\nrequired for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or\nall of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct\nnecessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a\ncrime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict\nliability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental\nculpability. This subdivision applies to offenses defined both in and\noutside this chapter.\n
N.Y. Penal Law § 15.15
Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements
Applied in 8 court decisions — leading case The People v. Elliot Parrilla (2016)
Most recently applied in People v. Abdullah (June 2022)
2014-09-22
How often courts cite this section
Court decisions citing this, by year. The dip in the last several years is a data-coverage gap, not a real trend — our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so recent citations are undercounted.
Official source: NYS Open Legislation (New York State Senate). Reproduced from public-domain New York statutes; confirm against the official source for the current text. Not legal advice.