United States Reports

Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U.S. 40 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a stipulation that a chartered ship was to sail from its current berth to a destination was a condition precedent to the contract, which was broken when the vessel did not sail directly to the destination. In the manner of cases named after ships, this case is also called The Whickham.

Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U.S. 51 (1885), was a fire insurance case regarding two policies of fire insurance, issued March 10, 1883, by the London Assurance Corporation, of London for the property of the firm of Drennen, Starr & Everett, a business in the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota. The loss occurred on July 29, 1883.

Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885), was an American bill regarding alleged infringement on a patent issued to Edward A. Locke for specific improvements in identifying revenue marks. The defendants, Benedict & Burnham Manufacturing Company of Waterbury, were assignees of the patentee, and the plaintiff was the collector of internal revenue for the Second collection district of Connecticut. The court ruled that, while the improvement was useful, it was not novel enough to be a patent.

Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73 (1885), was a Supreme Court case determining whether a probate case from Michigan should be moved to federal court and, if so, which federal court should hear it. The court issued a writ of error on the judgment of the Eastern District of Michigan federal court for remanding a case back to the state court and determined that was indeed the appropriate federal court to hear the case.

Polleys v. Black River Improvement Co., 113 U.S. 81 (1885), was a writ of error in the circuit court of Wisconsin for La Crosse County, and a motion was made to dismiss it. The first ground of the motion was that the writ should have been directed to the supreme court of the state instead of to the circuit court of the county. The circuit court denied the relief and dismissed the bill.

Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Speck, 113 U.S. 84 (1885), was an appeals case from the circuit court for the Northern district of Illinois a case that had been removed from that court. The appeal was on the grounds that while a party who has a case for removal is not put to his election to exercise or abandon the right to remove at the moment of entering his appearance, he is not permitted unreasonably to delay this election during all the period incident to the preparation of the case, until both parties find themselves in condition to go to trial at law. Whether they be statutory or rules of the court's adoption, the cause would stand for trial if the parties had taken the usual steps as to pleading and other preparations.

Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89 (1885), was a suit regarding equity of defendants who were trustees of certain property that the complainant was interested in, and which they received and disposed of. The complainant, Ellis Griffith, and his brother, John Griffith, were partners, engaged in the business of cattle raising, and resided in Kern County, California, where they occupied what is called a stock range, a tract of country on which cattle are permitted to roam and graze. It may be termed the feeding ground-the pasture land of the cattle.

Rowell v. Lindsay, 113 U.S. 97 (1885), was a bill brought by the appellants, John S. Rowell and Ira Rowell, the plaintiffs in the circuit court. The bill was in equity against Edmund J. Lindsay and William Lindsay, the appellees, to restrain the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 2,909, dated March 31, 1868, granted to the plaintiffs for 'a new and improved cultivator. The answer of the defendants, among other defenses, denied infringement of the letters patent. The plaintiffs contended that infringement of their letters patent was made out by the evidence, which tended to show that the defendants constructed and sold seeding-machines made according to the specification of letters patent granted to John H. Thomas and Joseph W.

Findlay v. McAllister, 113 U.S. 104 (1885), was a suit brought against Thomas McAllister and 14 other defendants, to recover damages as follows:

Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case involving a dispute over attorneys' fees that reached the Court on appeal from a federal trial court in a case between parties from different states. The case addressed whether attorneys who secured relief for unsecured creditors in equity proceedings were entitled under state law to an equitable lien on the property recovered in the litigation for reasonable fees. The Court held that such a lien was recognized, but reduced the compensation awarded. The case arose on appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama in favor of the appellee law firms Pettus & Dawson and Watts & Sons.

Steele v. United States, 113 U.S. 128 (1885), was an appeal of a case which held that a private sale of old material that arose from the breaking up of a vessel of war, made by an officer of the Navy Department to a contractor for repairs of a war vessel and machinery, is a violation of law. The allowance of the estimated value of such material in the settlement of such contractor's accounts is a violation of law. A settlement of such accounts at the Navy Department and at the Treasury, in which the contractor was debited with the material at the estimated value, does not preclude the United States from showing that the estimates were far below the real value, and from recovering the difference between the amount allowed and the real value.

Ackley School District v. Hall, 113 U.S. 135 (1885), was a suit to recover principal and interest claimed to be due the defendant on negotiable bonds issued by the plaintiff.

Clawson v. United States, 113 U.S. 143 (1885), was a case regarding a Utah territorial statute which authorized an appeal by a defendant in a criminal action from a final judgment of conviction, which provides that an appeal shall stay execution upon filing with the clerk a certificate of a judge that in his opinion there is probable cause for the appeal, and further provides that after conviction, a defendant who has appealed may be admitted to bail as of right when the judgment is for the payment of a fine only, and as matter of discretion in other cases, does not confer upon a defendant convicted and sentenced to pay a fine and be imprisoned the right, after appeal and filing of certificate of probable cause, to be admitted to bail except within the discretion of the court.

Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U.S. 149 (1885), was an action to recover the cost paid for a tract of land in Iowa and the value of the improvements made by the defendant. The complaint alleged a conveyance by Bicknell to one Bennett, the subsequent transfer to the defendant by sundry mesne conveyances, valuable improvements on the premises made by Bennett and his grantees, and a failure of title in Bicknell, when the deed was made by reason of a superior title in the State of Iowa under a land grant. Judgment below for plaintiff, to reverse which this writ of error was brought.

United States v. Mueller, 113 U.S. 153 (1885), was a contracts case before the United States Supreme Court.

Consolidated Safety-Valve Co. v. Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that novelty sufficient to distinguish a patent from prior art can be suggested by facts demonstrating the practical value of the invention. Here, the fact that known versions of the invention were not used and the fact that the claimed invention was widely adopted quickly suggest that the claimed invention had some modicum of novelty that its contemporaries lacked. Thus, the patent was valid, and the other party was liable for patent infringement. This case determined the validity of patent No. 58,294, granted to George W. Richardson September 25, 1866, for an improvement in steam safety valves.

Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U.S. 179 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, under the treaty providing for the Louisiana Purchase, the United States would recognize property interests granted by the previous sovereign governments prior to the Purchase, even if the grant had been inchoate or incomplete. The case involved a disputed title to land in the U.S. state of Missouri, which had previously been under the control of Spain and France before being acquired by the United States. In the late 1700s, the government of Spain had made a possibly incomplete grant of the land to a U.S. citizen, Moses Austin. Spain then lost control of the land to France in 1800, who in turn sold it to the United States.

Northern Liberty Market Co. v. Kelly, 113 U.S. 199 (1885), was a writ of error to reverse a judgment for the defendant in an action brought on April 4, 1884, by a corporation formed for the purpose of erecting a markethouse in the City of Washington and carrying on a marketing business there, upon twenty promissory notes made by him to the plaintiff, dated January 1, 1875. A twenty-year-old incorporated markethouse company with power to purchase, hold, and convey real or personal estate necessary to enable it to carry on its business, built a markethouse on land owned by it in fee simple, and sold by public auction leases for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, of stalls therein at a specified rent.

Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that, absent congressional legislation, a state has plenary power to obstruct the flow of a navigable river within its territory. The case was about a bridge erected by American Bridge Company over the American River in northern California, downriver from Cardwell's property on that navigable section of the river. Cardwell wanted the bridge removed. The Supreme Court's decision left the bridge in place.

Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 113 U.S. 216 (1885), was a case regarding a Chinese woman who—upon her arrival at a San Francisco port from China—was not permitted to stay in that city by reason of the Acts of Congress of May 6, 1882 (amended 1884). She was forcibly kept on board another vessel scheduled to sail back to China and had to have someone sue out a writ of habeas corpus to obtain her release.

Price v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 113 U.S. 218 (1885), was a case where the plaintiff sued the defendant for the loss of her husband by a death which the jury found, by a special verdict, to be caused by the negligence of the company's servant or servants. The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's application for writ of error because there was no question of federal law presented.

Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a civil settlement extinguishes a controversy and deprives courts of jurisdiction to make further decisions.

Anderson County Commissioners v. Beal, 113 U.S. 227 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case.

Harvey v. United States, 113 U.S. 243 (1885), was a case for labor and materials furnished by the claimants in constructing coffer dams in Davenport, Iowa and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith and preliminary to the mason work for the piers and abutments referred to in the contract. That court proceeded on the view that the claimants had no right to rely on the testimony of experts introduced by them as to the value of the work, but should have kept and produced accounts of its cost and expense, but it gave to the claimants the benefit of the testimony of experts introduced by the United States as to such value in awarding the above amount.

Central R. Co. of N. J. v. Mills, 113 U.S. 249 (1885), involved a case where the Court of Claims had dismissed a petition of the claimants, regarding the rejection of two items sued for: (1) labor done and materials furnished by the claimants in constructing the coffer dams, and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith and preliminary to the masonry work for the piers and abutments, (2) loss and damages resulting to the claimants in consequence of the reduction of the dimensions of the piers and abutments made subsequently to the making of the contract.

Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261 (1885), regarded a suit brought by the United States against a railroad company, Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, to recover monies paid for delivery of United States mail in Tennessee from March 31 to June 8, 1861.

Coon v. Wilson, 113 U.S. 268 (1885), was a suit filed in the United States Supreme Court regarding the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 8, 169, granted to the plaintiff, Washington Wilson, as inventor, April 9, 1878, on an application therefor filed March 11, 1878, for an "improvement in collars," the original patent, No. 197,807, having been granted to him December 4, 1877. The patent was for a "standing collar" resulting in a more comfortable fit.

Spaids v. Cooley, 113 U.S. 278 (1885), was regarding a lawsuit brought to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in the United States on December 13, 1876, by Chauncey D. Spaids against Dennis N. Cooley to recover $593.70, with interest from July 1, 1868. The declaration contained the common money counts and nothing more. There were two pleas, one denying indebtedness and the other averring that the alleged cause of action did not accrue within three years before the suit. The plaintiff's reply joins issue on the first plea and as to the second plea avers that the defendant promised to pay the debt named in the declaration within three years next before the commencement of the suit.

Sully v. Drennan, 113 U.S. 287 (1885), was an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa in the United States remanding to the state court a case which had been removed from the state into the circuit court. The suit was brought originally in the district court of the state by James N. Drennan and others, taxpayers of Prairie Township, in the County of Mahaska.

Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 U.S. 293 (1885), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that title to property confiscated during the American Civil War was properly held by the mortgagor.

Stone v. Chisolm, 113 U.S. 302 (1885), was a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina, which dismissed the complaint in which the plaintiff asked for recovery in the sum of $1,050 with interest from July 1, 1883 Sixty bonds or obligations of the Marine and River Phosphate Mining and Manufacturing Company of South Carolina which became totally insolvent.

Thornley v. United States, 113 U.S. 310 (1885), was a lawsuit brought against the United States to recover the balance due on pay to the appellant who had been an officer of the U.S. Navy.

Baylis v. Travelers' Insurance Company, 113 U.S. 316 (1885), was a case where after close of testimony in a trial, the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict. This motion was denied and the plaintiff asked that the case be submitted to the jury to determine the facts on the evidence. The court refused this, and plaintiff excepted. The court then ordered a verdict for plaintiff, subject to its opinion, whether the facts proved were sufficient to render defendant liable to plaintiff on the cause of action stated. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the verdict, and defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings and minutes of trial.

Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113 U.S. 322 (1885), was a case regarding a decree whereby a director of a corporation can be released by that corporation of all claims, equitable or otherwise, arising out of transactions under a contract between the corporation and the director made in excess of its corporate powers is valid, if made in good faith and without fraud or concealment.

Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885), was an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release the petitioner from imprisonment in the District of Columbia jail where he was held, as he alleges, unlawfully by John S. Crocker, the warden of the jail. He presents with the petition the record of his conviction and sentence in the Supreme Court of the District to imprisonment for five years under an indictment for embezzlement, and this record and the petition of the applicant present all that could be brought before the court on a return to the writ, if one were awarded.

Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U.S. 332 (1885), was a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment by the court below by Jackson, a relator, who recovered a judgment against the City of Quincy, Illinois, for the sum of $9,546.24, with costs of suit.

Town of Santa Anna v. Frank, 113 U.S. 339 (1885), was a case with no special finding of facts, the general finding of the issues for the plaintiff was not open to review by this court. Town of Martinton, Illinois v. Fairbanks, 112 U.S. 670; S. C. ante, 321. Questions were discussed by counsel for the defendant as to the legal authority of the town to issue the bonds referred to, fairly arose upon the first count of the declaration. But their determination could not affect the judgment, for the common counts were sufficient under the statutes of Illinois to support the judgment without reference to any question of the legal authority to issue the bonds described in the first count. Rev. St. Ill. 1870, c. 110, 58; Bond v. Dustin, 112 U.S. 604; S. C. ante, 296. Judgment was affirmed.

McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340 (1885), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, in actions contesting wills, people who were not yet born at the time of the action cannot be bound by the decision if the representative of their interest was antagonistic to them. In other words, the doctrine of virtual representation only applies to a person when there was a fair presentation of the arguments in that person's favor. The case was followed faithfully in federal courts and was also generally accepted by state courts. The case was about a contested will that directed land to be conveyed to or divided among remaindermen at the expiration of a particular estate.

Hyatt v. Vincennes Nat. Bank, 113 U.S. 408 (1885), was a case involving the sale of property conveyed to Hyatt for a term of 50 years for all the mineral coal upon and under a described tract of land, in Knox County, Indiana, with the exclusive right to enter on the land to dig for the coal, and remove it, and to occupy with constructions and buildings as needed to obtain the coal. Hyatt would then have the right to remove all buildings or fixtures placed on the land, when the agreement expired, and to pay a fixed royalty for the coal mined.

United States v. Jordan, 113 U.S. 418 (1885), was a Supreme Court of the United States case regarding an Act of Congress that involved tax refunds. Specifically, it provided for the refunding to the persons therein named of the amount of taxes assessed upon and collected from them contrary to the provisions of the regulations therein mentioned. In other words, pay to each of such persons the sum set opposite his name, each of them is entitled to be paid the whole of that sum, and no discretion is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury or in any court to determine whether the sum specified was or was not the amount of a tax assessed contrary to the provisions of such regulations. On the 29 July 1882, an Act of Congress was passed, 22 Stat. 723, c.

Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. v. Crane, 113 U.S. 424 (1885), was a suit brought by a taxpayer and resident in the Town of Polk City, Iowa, on behalf of himself and all other resident voters, taxpayers and property holders, commenced suit in a state court of Iowa against two companies, praying for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the reconstruction and operation of the old line after the Chicago and North Western Railway, an Illinois corporation. changed the line and made it avoid the city, constructing a branch to the latter.

Prentice v. Stearns, 113 U.S. 435 (1885), was an action to recover possession of real estate and damages for its detention, the plaintiff in error being plaintiff below, and a citizen of Ohio, the defendant being a citizen of Minnesota, specifically recovery of real estate deeded from an Indian chief to A, in 1858, of a tract described by metes and bounds and further as: being the land set off to the Indian Chief Buffalo at the Indian Treaty of September 30, 1854, and was afterwards disposed of by said Buffalo to said A, and is now recorded with the government documents did not convey the equitable interest of the chief in another tract described by different metes and bounds, granted to the said chief by a subsequent patent in 1858 in conformity with the said treaty in such manner that…

Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U.S. 449 (1885), was a bill in equity filed by the appellants, September 3, 1879.

Chase v. Curtis, 113 U.S. 452 (1885), was a suit brought under the provisions of §12 of the Act of the Legislature of New York of February 17, 1848, as amended June 7, 1875, where trustees of corporations formed for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical purposes are made liable for debts of the company on failure to file the reports of capital and of debts required by that section, is penal in its character, and must be construed with strictness as against those sought to be subjected to its liabilities. Suit was brought to recover from the trustees of such a corporation the amount of a judgment against the corporation, the judgment roll is not competent evidence to establish a debt due from the corporation to the plaintiff.

St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Berry, 113 U.S. 465 (1885), was a writ of error to review the action of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in refusing to restrain officers of that state from levying a tax on property of the plaintiff in error.

Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885), was a case involving several judgments of the United States Court of Claims in four cases against the United States for the payment of United States bonds known as "five-twenty bonds."

Provident Institution for Savings v. Mayor of Jersey City, 113 U.S. 506 (1885), was a bill in equity filed in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey by the appellant, to foreclose two mortgages given to it on a certain lot in Jersey City, New Jersey by Michael Nugent and wife, and another person.

Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U.S. 516 (1885), was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wyoming regarding a bill charging that the collection of an illegal tax would involve the plaintiff in a multiplicity of suits as to the title of lots being laid out and sold, which would prevent their sale, and which would cloud the title to all his real estate, states a case for relief in equity.

Richards v. Mackall, 113 U.S. 539 (1885), was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the High Court on whether or not an appeal from that Court to this Court may be allowed by that Court sitting in the special term. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the Court. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia consists of one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices. Rev.Stat.Dist.Col. § 750; 20 Stat. 320, c. 99, § 1. The law provides for both special and general terms of the court, and for an appeal from the special to the general term, but the judgments and decrees, when rendered, are, whether they be at general or special term, the judgments and decrees of the supreme court. Rev.Stat.Dist.Col. §§ 753, 772.

Peugh v. Davis, 113 U.S. 542 (1885), was a suit in equity for redeeming unoccupied and unenclosed city lots from a mortgage, continued from a case brought to the high court during the October 1877 term, (Peugh v. Davis, 96 U. S. 332) the question then was whether certain instruments of writing, made by Peugh to Davis constituted an absolute conveyance of lots in the District of Columbia or were in the nature of a mortgage security for loan of money. The court was of opinion that, on all the facts of the case, the latter was the true construction of the transaction between the parties. Respondent defended against complainant's claim to redeem by setting up that the alleged mortgage was an absolute conveyance.