1 Dem. Sur.
Volume 1 — Demarest's Surrogate Reports
103 opinions
- 1 Dem. Sur. 1Cornwell v. Cornwell (1882)
Petition by Jacob Weeks Cornwell, named as executor in decedent’s will, for. his appointment as temporary administrator of her estate; opposed by Andrew S. Corn-well, one of decedent’s next of kin, contestant. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 3In re Sexton (1882)
<p>Application for costs and allowances in a special proceeding instituted by the administrator in November, 1879, for the sale of decedent’s real property. Further facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 9Butler v. Perrott (1882)
This was an application in behalf of Sarah Butler and others, next of kin of decedent, for the revocation of letters of administration issued out of this court to Richard Perrott’ nephew of decedent’s grandmother. Further facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 14Hyatt v. Lunnin (1882)
Lnnnin, named as executor therein; opposed by Washington I. Hyatt, one of the next of kin of decedent. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 21Shaw v. Shaw (1882)
Petition by Robert Shaw, a son of decedent, for revocation of the probate of her will. Opposed by Matthew Shaw and William Shaw, executors, and Helen Shaw, legatee. The facts appear- sufficiently in the-opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 27Mumford v. Coddington (1882)
B. Coddington, surviving executor of decedent’s will, of a legacy to Benjamin C. Mumford, administrator of the estate of decedent’s son and legatee, Frederick A. Mumford. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 29Le Count v. Le Count (1882)
Application by Sarah Le Count, the successor of decedent’s executor, to compel the production of books and papers by Mary H. Le Count, the executrix of such executor. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 32Thompson v. Mott (1882)
Application by Frank G. A. Thompson, one of decedent’s executors, to compel his co-executor, Henry A. Mott, to pay him certain funds of the estate. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 34Smith v. Murray (1882)
<p>The mere gift of a legacy is not a manifestation of testator’s intent to remit a debt due from the legatee.</p> <p>An executor is justified in refusing payment to a legatee indebted to testator in a sum greater than the legacy, and applying the same in part satisfaction of the debt.</p> <p>Upon a proceeding under Code Civ. Pro., §§ 3717,3718, to procure a decree for the payment of a legacy, an answer of the executor that, at the time of testator’s death, the legatee was indebted to him in a sum greater than the legacy, is a sufficient denial of the validity and legality of petitioner’s claim, within the meaning of the latter section, and necessitates a dismissal of the petition.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 36Hauselt v. Gano (1882)
<p>Application by Charles Hauselt for leave to issue execution upon a judgment .recovered against decedent’s executors, James M. Grano and others, in their representative capacity. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 39Scherrer v. Kaufman (1882)
Motion to expunge, as incompetent under Code Civ. Pro., § 829, testimony given in proceedings instituted by Catharine Kaufman for the probate of decedent’s will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 45Greene v. Day (1882)
Motion to confirm referee’s report on accounting of Elizabeth M. Day and R. B. Martine, executrix and executor of the will of decedent. John W. Greene, as administrator of a deceased alleged creditor of said decedent, interposed written exceptions to the report, which, it was claimed, should be ignored. Further facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 52Tooker v. Bell (1882)
Application by Margaret A. Tooker, a devisee under decedent’s will, for an order directing the Union Trust Company to account for and pay to petitioner rents of real property belonging to decedent’s estate, collected by it; opposed by Marshall Bell, an heir at law of decedent, contestant. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 57Brittin v. Phillips (1882)
This was a Hearing of exceptions filed by Helen and William M. B. Brittin, sub-legatees under decedent’s will, to referee’s report on the accounting of William A. Sale and Aaron G. Byram, the executors. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 63Stapler v. Hoffman (1882)
Petition by Henry B. B. Stapler, in behalf of the widow of Jacob Kolb, for the revocation of letters of administration, with the will of decedent annexed, issued to Nicholas Hoffman, legatee thereunder.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 67Forster v. Kane (1882)
<p>The value of the professional services rendered, by counsel to the special guardian of an infant, opposing the prohate of a will, does not furnish the correct standard for the allowance of contestant’s costs.</p> <p>Since September 1st, 1880, the sole source of the authority of a Surrogate’s court to allow compensation to special guardians in probate proceedings has been the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Where probate is opposed in behalf of an infant, and granted, his special guardian is an “unsuccessful contestant of the will,” within the meaning of section 2558 of that act; and 2561 prescribes the narrow limits within which the court may exercise its discretion as to the amount to he awarded—viz.: not exceeding seventy dollars, and ten dollars per day, in addition, for all the days less two, necessarily occupied in the trial.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 71Moyer v. Weil (1882)
Petition of Michael Moyer, ancillary executor of decedent’s will, for the allowance of a claim, of about §15,000, against decedent’s estate. Opposed by Sarah Heyman Weil and others, next of kin of decedent. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 75Rieck v. Fish (1882)
Emeline R. Filor died in 1873, leaving a will by which she gave onehalf of her estate to James D. Fish, as trustee, to apply the income,' rents, issues and profits thereof to the use of her daughter, Martha F. Rieck, and at her death said property, with the accumulations, to go to the issue of said Martha. Mrs. Rieck died in 1881, leaving a daughter, Anna Louise Rieck, about twelve years of age.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 80Dennis v. Jones (1882)
Motion to confirm referee’s report, in a special proceeding instituted by George F. Jones, one of the executors of decedent’s will, for the disposition of decedent’s real property; opposed - by Joseph F. Dennis and others, creditors. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 86Riegelmann v. McCoy (1882)
Petition by Rosina Riegelmann, decedent’s widow and executrix, for payment of a legacy; opposed by Rosina McCoy, decedent’s daughter, and others. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 97Giles v. De Talleyrand (1882)
Application by William 0. Giles, sole acting executor of the will of decedent, who died December 18th, 1879, for a final decree judicially settling his accounts as such executor and determining the persons among whom the moneys in his hands were to be distributed, and the amount or share to which they were severally entitled. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion,
- 1 Dem. Sur. 103Walton v. Howard (1882)
Application by RuthH. Walton, administratrix of decedent’s estate, to set aside an order granting certain costs out of the estate to Bradford Howard, petitioner in a proceeding to compel her to file a new bond, etc., and to her counsel therein. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 114Schmitt v. Kahrs (1882)
Application by Susannah Schmitt, testator’s widow, for an order for the payment to her of certain moneys out of his estate, for the support of his infant children; opposed by Cord Kahrs and Jacob Zahn, executors and trustees. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 118Hoffman v. Pennsylvania Hospital (1882)
Application by Bertha Hoffman and others, general legatees under testator’s will, for allowance of interest on their legacies, in decree of distribution. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 123Melcher v. Stevens (1882)
Application by John L. Melcher and others, executors of, and trustees under decedent’s will, for a reargument of exceptions to referee’s report on the executors’ accounting; opposed by Mrs. Stevens, widow of decedent, and executrix of his will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 132Edwards v. Edwards (1882)
Petition by Frederick S. Edwards, a son of decedent, and. executor of Harriet Edwards, deceased, for an order requiring J. P. Edwards, decedent’s sole acting executor, to render and file an account, and for other relief. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 136Fraenznick v. Miller (1883)
Hearings of objections upon the judicial settlement of personal representatives’ accounts. The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 154Ledwith v. Ledwith (1883)
<p>Code Civ. Pro., § 2836 does not confer upon an infant of fourteen years or upwards, plenary authority to emancipate himself, at pleasure, from. parental control. The provision of that section, that a general guardian of such an infant, appointed upon his application, “must he nominated by the infant, subject to the approval of the Surrogate,” affords no support for the claim that such an infant, having no testamentary or general guardian, has an absolute right, even though his parents are living, to demand from the Surrogate’s court the appointment of a guardian, and of whatever guardian he may be pleased to nominate, provided only that the nominee be, in the Surrogate’s judgment, a proper person to execute the trust. The Surrogate has a discretion to determine whether the interests of the infant will be promoted by the appointment of any guardian.</p> <p>Code Civ. Pro., § 2823, requiring that, if either parent be known to be living, and be not the nominee, “ the petition must set forth the circumstances which make the appointment of another person expedient,” implies that, unless such expediency be proven, no such other person should receive letters.</p> <p>A corporation may receive letters of general guardianship of an infant’s property.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 158Sudlow v. Pinckney (1883)
<p>Petitioner obtained a decree against decedent’s executors, requiring them to deliver certain personal property to her, from which they took and perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court. Thereafter, and without showing service of a certified copy of a decree on the executors, she instituted proceedings to punish them for contempt.—</p> <p>Held, that the latter proceedings were premature, in the absence of proof of service of a copy of the decree, and, at any rate, were stayed by the appeal, being affected by the decree appealed from and embraced in the appeal (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 1310, 2577).</p> <p>The question of the status of an appellant, as such, is a matter for determination by the appellate tribunal.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 160Whitlock v. Whitlock (1883)
<p>The father of an infant has no right, as natural guardian, to receive a legacy bequeathed to the infant.</p> <p>Guardianship in socage, arises only where real property vests in an infant.</p> <p>The provision of the Revised Statutes (part 2, ch. 6, tit. 3, § 46), permitting an infant’s legacy, “ if under the value of fifty dollars,” to be paid to the father, gives no authority to pay to the latter any portion of a legacy exceeding fifty dollars in amount.</p> <p>Decedent, by his will, gave to his nephew, an infant, §500, which the executors paid to the legatee’s father, obtaining credit for the payment by the decree on an accounting before the Surrogate, to which the infant was not a party. On attaining majority, the legatee petitioned for payment of his legacy.—</p> <p>Held, that the executors were not discharged by the payment or decree, and must pay again.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 163Drexel v. Berney (1883)
Petition by Francis A. Drexel and others for the revocation of letters testamentary issued to decedent’s widow, Louisa Berney. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 168Bray v. Smith (1883)
<p>Application by Henry W. Bray, brother and sole surviving next of kin of decedent, for an order restraining James Smith, executor of his will, from interfering with certain funds of the estate. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 171Trask v. Annett (1883)
<p>Objections by Caroline A. Trask, one of the distributees of decedent’s estate, to the sufficiency of the bond of Mary C. B. Annett, a testamentary trustee under his will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion,</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 175Disosway v. Hayward (1883)
Motion by Richard H. Disosway, a creditor of decedent, to set aside execution against his property, issued upon a Surrogate’s decree, rendered October 17th, 1879, directing payment by him, of the sum of $715.60, to J. K. Hayward, executor of decedent’s will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 177Kammerrer v. Ziegler (1883)
Petition of John Kammerrer, a creditor, for a decree directing the disposition of decedent’s real property for the payment of debts. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 180Lyons v. Mahan (1883)
Contest over the construction of decedent’s will, upon executor’s accounting. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 185Campbell v. Mackie (1883)
Exceptions by Robert Campbell, a legatee under decedent’s will, and others, to referee’s report on executor’s accounting. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 191Platt v. Moore (1883)
Construction, on executors’ accounting, of a provision in decedent’s will, bequeathing a legacy to Julia Platt. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 196Scofield v. Adriance (1883)
Petition of Jesse Scofield, one of decedent’s next of kin, and administrator, de bonis non, of decedent, for an order permitting him to bring an action against Margaret E. Adriance, and another, sureties in the official bond of his predecessor, Catharine A. Scofield, as administratrix of decedent’s estate. The facts appear suffi:iently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 202Duffy v. Smith (1883)
<p>The probate court of another state is not a court of competent jurisdiction to make a decree discharging administrators appointed by a Surrogate’s court of this State from their obligation to account to the latter court for property of decedent received by them, and made subject, by the laws of this State, to the Surrogate’s jurisdiction.</p> <p>Administrators appointed, by a court of another state, upon the estate of a resident thereof, after the grant of letters to them here, and after they had taken possession of property here, cannot be allowed to withdraw such property from this State, until they have accounted for it here, especially where the same has been vouched for in the petition for letters, and the inventory, filed here by them.</p> <p>Decedent died intestate in August, 1876, in Connecticut, where letters of administration upon his estate were issued, out of a Probate court, to M., in September of that year. In 1877, letters of administration upon his estate were issued by the Surrogate of New York county, to D. and K., upon D.’s affidavit that decedent left assets in that county. In 1878, M. was removed by the Connecticut court, and D. and K. were appointed in his stead. In 1881, D. and K. filed accounts with the Surrogate here, pursuant to an order obtained by one of the next of kin, showing §7,600 to have been collected and come to their hands in New York county. The account, being contested, was ordered to a reference, pending which the administrators were cited by the Connecticut court to appear before it, on July 3rd, 1882, and account, which they did. On July 6th, they filed their account there, showing a deficiency of over §10,000, and obtained a decree allowing the same, and awarding them and their counsel an allowance of §3,750. A copy of the citation was directed to be posted on a sign post and published in a town newspaper. The Connecticut accounting was not contested. On a motion, before the Surrogate here, to vacate the order of reference, and dismiss all proceedings, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, and of res adjudicata,—</p> <p>Held, that the Surrogate had authority, when he first assumed jurisdiction, to pass upon the administrators’ accounts (Code Civ. Pro., § 2476, subd. 8; § 2785); that, independently of the features of the Connecticut decree, lie was not divested of authority by the proceedings in that state; and that the motion must be denied.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 209Batchelor v. Batchelor (1883)
Petition by Mary A. Batchelor, for a decree granting letters of administration, with the will of decedent annexed, to the public administrator of New York county; opposed by William A. Batchelor, one of decedent’s next of kin. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 212Tilney v. Clendenning (1883)
Application, by Thomas J. Tilney, and another, executors of the will of decedent, for an order vacating an order referring a disputed claim of Terese Clendenning against decedent’s estate. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 217Murray v. Bronson (1883)
Construction of decedent’s will upon the judicial settlement of testamentary trustees’ account. The facts . appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 240Fowler v. Walter (1883)
<p>A claimant, under a contract made with executors, is not a “ creditor,” within the provisions of Code Oiv. Pro., § 2643, subd. 4, authorizing the issuance, to a creditor, of letters of administration, with the will of a decedent annexed.</p> <p>Decedent’s sole surviving executor having died during the pendency of an action brought, in 1880, against him and others, by the assignee of a lease for 21 years executed in 1859 by the executors, to determine the rights of the parties under the lease and under an agreement supplementary thereto, and for other purposes, the plaintiff petitioned the Surrogate’s court for the appointment of the public administrator, as administrator with the will of decedent annexed, in order to enable the action to be continued against the appointee. By the answer to the petition, it appeared that the will had been declared void by a judgment of the Supreme Court in 1868, the executor discharged in 1869, and the personal estate fully administered before the commencement of such action.—Held, that the petition must be denied, on the grounds that</p> <p>1. Petitioner had no standing in court, under Code Civ. Pro., § 2643, being neither “ a person interested in the estate ” nor '• a creditor ” of decedent.</p> <p>2. The petition was defective, in not asking for the appointment of the petitioner therein; and the citation, in not being addressed to the public administrator, who had a prior right.</p> <p>3. The estate having been fully distributed, there was no need of further administration.</p> <p>4. Decedent having been adjudged to have died intestate, there was no will, to be annexed to the administration asked for.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 244In re Gerard (1883)
This was the settlement of the decree upon the judicial settlement of the account of James N. Platt and James W. Gerard, as executors of decedent’s will. Thomas O. T. Buckley, named in the will as an executor, never qualified, and died five months after decedent’s death, James N. Platt asked to have inserted in the decree an allowance of interest upon an annual stipend given to him in lieu of commissions. James W. Gerard asked for commissions, as executor.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 249Schell v. Hewitt (1883)
Application, by Francis Schell, special guardian of decedent’s infant children, on the proceeding to prove his alleged will, for compensation, out of the estate, for services rendered by himself, as such guardian, on appeal from the Surrogate’s decree refusing probate; opposed by Minnie Hewitt, administratrix of decedent’s estate. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 256Dodworth v. Crow (1883)
Application, by Charles A. Crow, assignee of Ida Dodworth, decedent’s granddaughter, for the probate of a paper propounded as a codicil to his will; opposed by Thomas J. Dodworth, a son of decedent. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 260Stokes v. Dale (1883)
Petition, by Anson Phelps Stokes, temporary administrator of decedent’s estate, for an order directing payment of a sum certain to his counsel, for services rendered during the administration; opposed by Dora S. Dale, a daughter of decedent, who also asked an allowance for her counsel. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 264Seiter v. Straub (1883)
<p>The degree of control which is sufficient to invalidate a will depends largely upon the age of the will-maker, influences which might legitimately he exercised upon a person of mature years justly falling under the 'condemnation of the law when brought to bear upon an infant of sixteen.</p> <p>Even the earnest persuasions, of the interested and self-seeking, will not necessarily vitiate a testamentary instrument by which they are largely benefited, if it appears that the testator, in selecting them as the recipients of his bounty, has acted on his own judgment, and not merely given expression to the purposes of others, by whose will his own has been subdued.</p> <p>It seems, that the question whether a guardian has power to compel his ward to dwell in a place of his selection is by no means identical with the question whether he has power to change the legal domicil of the latter; and that the bare fact of a grant of letters of guardianship to one whose domicil differs from that of the ward does not effect such a change.</p> <p>As to whether any guardian, other thati. one by nature, has power to change the domicil of the ward, quosi’e.</p> <p>Decedent, a female orphan, who died at St. Francis’ Hospital, in Jersey city, in September, 1880, executed the paper propounded as her will, at the house of her aunt, the proponent, in that city, about Hovember 1st, 1879. being barely of the age of sixteen years. The instrument gave all to proponent, and nominated her as sole executrix. The attestation clause was subscribed by a female servant of proponent, since deceased, and by one H., whom, it appeared, proponent had declared to be deficient in intelligence, and whose testimony as to the execution contained serious discrepancies. It appeared, that decedent was weak in body, of a gentle and compliant disposition, and with little strength of character, and that, by reason of her illness and docility, her volition could easily have been dominated by one having the motive and opportunity to control it; in the summer of 1877, decedent, while living in Hew York, the domicil of her late parents, becoming seriously ill, was taken by her aunt to the hospital mentioned, where she remained, save for brief absences, till her death; during this interval, proponent’s husband, domiciled in Hew Jersey, was appointed decedent's general guardian bjr the Surrogate of Hew York, but was removed from office by the Supremo Court, shortly before October, 1879: decedent was brought to her aunt’s house, for the jmrpose of executing the paper, and immediately afterwards taken back to the hospital; proponent’s testimony, with respect to the circumstances attending the execution, was confused, self-contradictory, and in some instances palpably false; two of her children, aged twenty-one and seventeen, respectively, who had been present on the occasion, were not called as witnesses; the instrument was drawn by a lawyer, who, for a reason unexplained, retired from the premises just before the execution, and returned soon afterwards. The probate was contested, on the grounds of want of due execution, want of testamentary age under the laws of Hew Jersey, and undue influence.—</p> <p>Meld, that, though the instrument must be deemed to have been subscribed and published in substantial compliance with the requirements of the statutes of this State,—and though decedent’s domicil must be deemed to have remained the city of Hew York, notwithstanding her removal to Hew Jersey, the domicil of her uncle, and his appointment as her guardian, and she, therefore, was of testamentary age,—the same was executed principally by proponent’s procurement, and was the result of undue influence exercised by her over decedent, and that, therefore, probate must be refused.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 277Eisner v. Koehler (1883)
Petition, by Julius H. Eisner, a son of decedent, to compel the executors of the latter’s will to pay the residue of a legacy; opposed by David M. Koehler, and Albeit Freund, executors. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 288Murphy v. Marcellus (1883)
Construction of decedent’s will, upon the judicial settlement of the account of J. L. Marcellus, executor thereof, so far as related to a legacy to William Murphy. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 290Barker v. Smith (1883)
Objections, by James W. Smith, sole acting executor of decedent’s will, to the confirmation of the referee’s report upon his accounting. The account was contested by Charity Barker, residuary legatee. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 294In re Dunn (1882)
James L. Montgomery, in behalf of himself and others claiming to be heirs-at-law and next of kin of the decedent, presented a petition alleging that they were such heirs, etc.; that they were not cited or in any way made parties to the proceeding instituted to prove the will of the decedent; that such will had been admitted to probate, and that, on an appeal, the decree so admitting the same was reversed, and a trial of the issues relating thereto, directed to be had at the…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 296Hall v. Tryon (1882)
The testator left a personal estate inventoried at about $290,000. Among his assets were bonds of various corporations, of the par value of $75,000, which were disposed of as follows: Fifty bonds of $1,000 each were bequeathed to his executors in trust, to collect and pay the income to his wife during her life, and, at her death, “to divide the said bonds” and the accrued income among persons designated in the will.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 299Houghton v. Watson (1882)
The petition presented in this matter showed that William Watson, late of Westchester county, died seized of a large estate, and leaving a widow, and several children, one of whom was the wife of Henry G. Houghton, of London, England; that he left a last will and testament, which was duly proved in 1877, of which his son William and others were executors; that his widow and all his children, with the exception of Mrs. Houghton, who had since died, were still living; that his…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 302Guion v. Underhill (1882)
Pending the judicial settlement of the account of Philip R. Underhill, the executor, etc., of the decedent, applications were made by several of the parties for the revocation of the letters issued to him.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 306Thorne v. Underhill (1882)
The testatrix was a daughter of Deborah Rhinelander, and wife of Isaac Underhill.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 317Du Bois v. Brown (1882)
Deborah Orsor died in 1879, leaving a last will and testament dated September 10th, 1877. By the will, which was prepared by Isaac F. Brown, a nephew, the testatrix, after bequeathing various legacies, gave and bequeathed to said Isaac E. Brown and to Margaret Miller the residue of her estate, real and personal, to be equally divided between them.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 335Bertine v. Hubbell (1882)
A paper, purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased, bearing date February 22d, 1881, was offered for, and, on November 9th, 1881, duly admitted to probate; whereupon letters testamentary were issued to Edwin R. Bertine, the executor therein named, On December 23d, 1881, another paper, bearing date August 30th, 1881, was presented to the coui’t by one Hubbell, named as executor therein, as the last will of the deceased, accompanied by a petition praying for…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 337Arthur v. Nelson (1882)
The testator died in 1869, leaving a last will and testament, in and by which he gave the residue of his estate, after the payment of his debts, some small legacies, etc., as follows: one equal eighth part thereof to his son Thomas; four equal eighth parts thereof to his executors, in trust, each one of the said eighths for the benefit, for life, of one of four daughters; the income, etc., to he received and applied by said executors, with power of appointment to each of…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 349Gillies v. Kreuder (1883)
This matter came before the Surrogate of Westchester county, under the provisions of § 2485 of the Code. The application was made under § 1380, for a decree granting leave to issue execution against the real property of the decedent. All the proper parties were brought in by process, and, after a contest, a decree was made granting the leave prayed for, with costs to be paid by the administratrix.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 353Kilburn v. See (1883)
Ann Witherspoon died many years ago, leaving a last will and. testament, of which William See was executor. By her will she directed the sale of certain real estate, and that the proceeds be invested for the benefit of her son, William, and if the income proved to be insufficient for his comfortable support and maintenance, the executor was authorized to use and apply so much of the principal sum as might be needed for that purpose.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 357Hill v. Nelson (1883)
On the settlement of the decree in this matter, a question arose ■ as to whether the executors were entitled to commissions on a sum amounting to about $80,000, which the beneficiaries under the will had received from the testator in his lifetime, or which he was liable to pay for them, and concerning which he provided in his will as follows: 6£ 14th.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 365Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Rogers (1883)
This was an application made by the Metropolitan Trust Company of New York, as executor, to compel Nelson G. Rogers to make discovery concerning certain property of the estate of the decedent, alleged to be in bis hands.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 368Whelpley v. Loder (1883)
The testatrix died in Westchester County, in 1882, in the eighty-sixth year of her age, leaving an alleged will, dated May 15th, 1877. She was the widow of William Banks, who died several years before her. She had had one child, a son, who died in 1877, leaving no children.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 383Cromwell v. Kirk (1883)
Lewis Perry, of Claremont, ■ New Hampshire, died in 1866, leaving a will dated in 1861, in and by which, among other things, he gave and bequeathed to his adopted daughter, Ada E. P. Richardson, wife of George W. Richardson, the residue of his estate, by the following provision: “I give and bequeath unto Ada E. P. Richardson, wife of G. Vif.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 387Pryer v. Clapp (1883)
The will of the decedent was, after service of a citation upon all parties interested, duly proved and admitted to probate, on November 7th, 1881. Decedent was the wife of George H. Clapp, who was named as executor in her will, and survived her. She died seized of a large estate, both real and personal, and left no descend- . ants.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 392Hood v. Hood (1883)
The will of the decedent directed, among other things, the conversion of his real and other property into a money fund, a portion of which was to be invested for the use of the widow for life, and other portions during the minority of some of the children.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 396Hovey v. McLean (1882)
Objections by Dwight A., Harriet D., Walter and Charles Hovey, infant grandchildren and heirs -at-law of decedent, to the grant of letters testamentary to Harriet E. McLean, decedent’s widow. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 399Kurtz v. Smither (1882)
Judicial settlement of administrator’s account. Charles Smither died intestate January 28th, 1882, unmarried. He left a father, and mother, and a sister.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 404Gilman v. Healy (1881)
Testatob, by the residuary clause of his will, devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate, real, personal and mixed, to his executors in trust to 1 ‘ manage ” and apply the same or the income thereof, or so much of the estate or income as they should see fit, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to the education and support of his three infant children, or such of them as should survive, or of the issue of any who might die, until the two youngest should attain the…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 415Hall v. Campbell (1882)
Testator, by- his will, gave the residue of his estate to his executors and trustees, to have and .to hold the same to themselves and the survivors or survivor of them, and their successors or successor, in trust, to convert the same or such as should not be already invested, into money, as soon as practicable after the decease of the testator; to divide the same into as many parts as he should leave children, with one additional part for his wife, if living; to invest each…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 421In re Malloy (1882)
Application by John Malloy, administrator of decedent’s estate, for further letters of administration. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 425Tickel v. Quinn (1882)
This was a judicial settlement of executors’ accounts. Objections were filed on behalf of Maria Tickel and others, legatees under decedent’s will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 433Ferguson v. Cummings (1882)
Application by Catharine Ferguson, Thomas D„. Luther and Margaret Meakim, legatees under decedent’s; will, to punish Thomas Cummings, executor thereof, for contempt in disobeying a decree. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 436Burke v. Nolan (1882)
Application, for the probate of a paper propounded as decedent’s will, by Richard Nolan, named as executor therein; opposed by Catharine Burke, decedent’s widow. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 444Zahrt v. Zahrt (1882)
This was a petition by Eliza Zahrt, decedent’s widow, and sole executrix of his will, for the distribution of surplus moneys arising upon a sale, under foreclosure, of certain real property of which he died seized. John Zahrt and four other infant children of decedent appeared by guardian. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 448In re Langbein (1882)
Jacob Langbeih and Joseph Braun, residing in the city of Brooklyn, presented a petition alleging that, on March 31st, 1882, decedent’s will and codicil, naming petitioners as executors, were admitted to probate in Pennsylvania, where they were executed, and where testator resided at the time of the execution; that they were recorded in that state, and that no letters testamentary had been granted thereon because testator left no real or personal property in that state, and…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 452Terry v. Bale (1882)
<p>Judicial settlement of executor’s account. Objections were filed by Josephine Terry, Sarah E. Moore, and Adeline Baschold, next of kin of decedent. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 461Freeman v. Mohrman (1882)
<p>This was a petition by George Freeman to procure a judicial settlement of the account of Henry A. Mohrman and Claus Freeman, as his testamentary guardians. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 464Eagan v. Kergill (1882)
<p>Petition by John F. Eagan, a nephew of decedent, for the distribution of the surplus proceeds of a sale of the real property of decedent for the payment of her debts. The claim of petitioner was opposed by Bedelía D. Kergill, sole devisee under decedent’s will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 471Boerum v. Betts (1882)
Petitions for a judicial settlement of the .account of an executor of, and trustee under decedent’s will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 475Speckles v. Public Administrator (1883)
Speckles, general guardian of two infant grandsons, next of kin of decedent; opposed by the public administrator. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 477Brush v. Smith (1883)
Application by John 0. Smith and Henry N. Brush for commissions, upon the settlement of the decree on the judicial settlement of their account, as surviving trustees under decedent’s will; opposed on behalf of Rozabella Brush and other infants, next of lcin of decedent. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 480Goddard v. Public Administrator (1883)
Applications by L. Josephine Goddard and others, and by the public administrator of Kings county, for letters of administration on decedent’s estate. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 484Gugel v. Vollmer (1883)
Petition, for the probate of decedent’s will, by William Vollmer, a legatee therein named; opposed by Ohristena. Gugel, a daughter of decedent. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 486Bullard v. Benson (1883)
This was a judicial settlement of the account of Arthur W. Benson, John R. Bullard and William H. Humphrey, as executors of decedent’s will. Objections were filed by Jane E. Bullard, decedent’s widow.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 496Larabee v. Ballard (1881)
This was a petition by Truman A. Ballard for the probate of an instrument propounded as a codicil to decedent’s will; opposed by Phoebe A. Larabee and others. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 501Ballard v. Charlesworth (1881)
Objections to the issuing of letters testamentary to Samuel Oharlesworth, named as executor in decedent’s will; filed by Truman A. Ballard and another, legatees therein mentioned. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 503Sheldon v. Dow (1882)
Application, for the probate of decedent’s will, by-Albert G. Dow, named as executor therein; opposed by George Sheldon, named as executor in an alleged prior will. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 512Wood v. Bishop (1883)
Petition, by Lemuel P. Bishop and another, for the probate of decedent’s will; opposed by Joel Wood, named as executor in an alleged prior will, and others. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.'
- 1 Dem. Sur. 519Hatch v. Sigman (1883)
Petition, by Armenia Sigman, decedent’s daughter, for the probate of a will alleged to have been lost or destroyed; opposed by Eliza A. Hatch and another. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 533Phillips v. Chater (1882)
Petition, for the probate of decedent’s will, by Richard D. Chater, one of the executors therein named; opposed by Frances 0. Phillips, decedent’s widow. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 547Gilman v. Wilber (1882)
This was a judicial settlement of the account of Francis A. Wilber, as executor of the will of decedent. Objections were filed, and exceptions to the referee’s report were taken, by Anna K. Gilman, a creditor, and others. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 553Hoyt v. Jackson (1883)
This was a petition, presented by decedent’s widow and daughter, within a year after the granting of letters testamentary upon his will, for a decree directing James W. Jackson and others, the executors, to advance to each of petitioners $25,000, “to be charged against them as legatees or heirs, as the case may be, depending on the result of the contest touching said will.” When this petition was presented, no appeal had been taken from the decree admitting the will to…
- 1 Dem. Sur. 559In re Wood (1883)
<p>This was a judicial settlement of the account of Joseph L. R. Wood and Fernando Wood, as executors of decedent’s will. Two questions were raised by the account, viz.:</p> <p>■ 1st. Whether the widow of the testator was entitled to an income out of the personalty of the estate, of $3,000 a year from testator’s death, and until the ascertainment and payment over of one fourth of the residuary estate to the trustee named in the will.</p> <p>2nd. Whether the executors should pay to the trustee of Albinia Baldwin interest on $é, 000 from the date of testator’s death. Portions of the will relevant to these inquiries read as follows:</p> <p>“ First. I give and bequeath unto my son Joseph L. R. Wood, the sum of five thousand dollars, to be paid to him by my executors within thirty days after my decease, to be applied by him in defraying the current expenses of my household and my family as established at the time of my death (including the personal expenses of my wife, Alice M. Wood), the said provision and that hereinafter made for my said wife are to be received by her in lieu of dower and all other interest in my estate.</p> <p>“ Second. I hereby give, devise and bequeath the one undivided fourth part of my residuary estate hereinafter mentioned and referred to, after payment of my debts, including mortgages, taxes and assessments, and the legacies hereinafter contained, to the United States Trust Company of Few York, in trust, upon the trusts following, that is to say: to receive, invest, and reinvest the same, to collect and receive the income thereon and to apply the net income thereof, to the use of my said wife during her natural life, and upon her death to divide and transfer the same among and to such of my children as shall be then living and the issue, etc., etc.</p> <p>1 ‘ And I direct that the said one fourth part of my residuary estate be paid over by my executors to the said' Company as rapidly as may be consistent with the best interest of my estate, and as the same may be from time' to time ascertained and realized; and until the ascertainment and payment over of said one fourth of my residuary estate, I direct my executors to pay over and advance to my said wife a sufficient sum per annum to make' up to her an annual income of three thousand dollars, such advances to be charged against and deducted from the share to be held in trust for her as aforesaid. . . ..</p> <p>“ Third. I hereby give and bequeath to my son Joseph L. R.' Wood the house and lot in the city of New York known as No. 325 West Twenty-seventh street, and the sum of four thousand dollars, in trust, to receive the income and profits thereof, and after paying out of said income and profits the annual taxes, croton water rents, and any assessments that may be imposed upon said premises and the cost of keeping the same in good repair and insured to at least the amount of $12,000, to apply the remainder of said income and profits to the use of my said sister Albinia during her life, and upon her death to sell the said house and lot at public or private sale, and to make and execute a good and sufficient deed therefor, and I hereby direct and provide that the proceeds of said sale and the sum of $4,000 shall fall into and be considered and distributed as part of my residuary estate herein provided for. I hereby direct that my said trustee permit my said sister Albinia to have the actual use and occupation of said house during the continuance of the said trust, if she desires such use and occupation, free of chargé.”</p> <p>By the testimony of one of the executors, which was taken in the course of the proceedings, it appeared that, at the time of the execution of the will, testator’s wife had a separate estate, and that the same yielded some income each year, from that time until testator’s death; that testator’s sister, Albinia, was an aged widow, without independent means of support, and whom testator had for years provided for; that the latter had, on her selection, purchased the house in Twenty-seventh street as a home for her, and had always paid all the charges against the premises, leaving her in undisturbed possession; and that the income of $4,000 was about sufficient to pay all the charges against the premises. It was conceded that an annual income of $3,000 was ample for the wants of the widow, and that more would be of no use to her. The chief reason urged against immediate payment of interest on the $4,000 was that the provision, being a legacy, was not payable until a year after letters granted (2 R. S., 90, § 43).</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 568Slack v. Wiggin (1883)
Judicial settlement of the account of James N. Platt and James W. Gerard, as executors of decedent’s will. A contest arose between Mary D. B. Slack and another, residuary legatees, and F. H. Wiggin, over payments made to the latter on account of a legacy to him, and other questions were raised; the facts as to which appear sufficiently in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 574McClure v. Woolley (1883)
This was a petition for the probate of decedent’s will, which bequeathed personal property, presented by James H. Woolley, the executor therein named.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 577Hassey v. Keller (1883)
Petition by Edward F. Hassey, an executor of decedent’s will, for the revocation of the letters granted to Catharine Keller, as executrix of the same will, and for other relief, on the ground of her alleged misconduct, incompetency, inability to read or write the English language, want of understanding, etc. Further facts are stated in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 581Dixon v. Manning (1883)
<p>Petition, by Emeline Dixon, for a decree compelling John B. Manning, sole acting executor of decedent’s will, to pay her a balance of an annuity. The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.</p>
- 1 Dem. Sur. 584Hagan v. Yates (1883)
Petition, for the probate of decedent’s will, presented by Agnes Sarah Yates, his widow, and another; opposed by his daughters, C. Y. Hagan, and L. M. Dickel. The facts appear in the opinion.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 599Cromwell v. Kirk (1883)
• This was a proceeding by David Cromwell, as general guardian, to compel an accounting by Harford B. Kirk, as executor, etc., of George W. Richardson, who, in his lifetime, was the general guardian of Annie M. and Louis P., his two children by Ada E. P. Richardson, his first wife.
- 1 Dem. Sur. 606Carpenter v. Historical Society (1883)
By a codicil to the will of decedent, he bequeathed “ to the Historical Society of the County of Westchester, of which James Wood is now president, the sum of one hundred dollars, to be used and applied to procuring and placing a suitable monument, to mark the spot where the soldiers, during the Revolution, were buried, at or near St. Mark’s Church, in the town of Newcastle.” The Society was also made a contingent devisee.