Volume 1 — District of Hawaii

<p>1. Chinese in the Hawaiian Islands on June 14, 1900, when the “Act to provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii” went into effect, were by Section 101 thereof, compelled to procure the certificate ¡of residence required by the Act of Congress approved May 5, 1892, as amended by the Act of Congress approved November 3, 1893,' entitled “An Act to amend an Act entitled ‘An Act to prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States, approved May 5, 1892,’ ” within one year from the said 14th day of June, 1900, or in default thereof be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States.</p> <p>2. There is no provision in the Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, providing a government for the Territory of Hawaii, permitting the return to Hawaii of Chinese laborers who. had voluntarily 'left the Hawaiian islands after annexation and before said Act went into 'effect, but with intent to return. Congress must be presumed to have known that .there might he many such Chinese, and having made no provision for their return (and registry after June 14, 1900, -or the issuance of a 'certificate of residence to- them, it is clear -that they should be excluded.</p> <p>3. Where a Chinese laborer left the Hawaiian Islands in October, 1899, after .annexation-, but before the Act for the government of the Territory went into effect, and did not return within the year mentioned in the certificate entitling him to return, hut returned twenty-one months after his departure, and claimed admission under said certificate, Held, that he does not come within the provisions of Section 101 of the Act of April 30, 1900, as he was not “in the Hawaiian Islands” when the Act for the government of the Territory went into effect, and he is not entitled to* come into the Territory to register as a Chinese laborer.</p>

<p>1. A hearing will be had upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a Chinese held for deportation under a decision adverse to his landing rendered by the proper immigration officers, where me hearing is claimed upon the ground that petitioner is an American citizen by reason of his birth in the Hawaiian Islands, and entitled as such American citizen to return to the Islands after a temporary sojourn in China.</p> <p>2. Evidence, consisting only of the hearsay testimony of Chinese persons, and there being no white witnesses, considered inadequate to satisfy the Court of the truth of the allegations of petitioner as to birth in the Hawaiian Islands.</p>

<p>1. A citizen, of a State cannot sue a citizen of a Territory in the Courts of the United States where diverse • citizenship: is the only ground of jurisdiction relied upon.</p> <p>2. A demurrer to the jurisdiction sustained and the action dismissed where it appeared upon the face of the complaint that the only ■ ground for bringing an action for damages in the Federal Court were the facts that the plaintiff was “a citizen of th© United States-of America, aonud that his permanent place of abode is- in the city and county of San Francisco, State of California,” and that the defendant is a citizen of the Territory of Hawaii.</p>

<p>1. A Chinaman already domiciled in the United States -and shipping on board an American vessel as a seaman in an. American port, and arriving at am American port on hoard such vessel, in. the usual course of commerce on the sea from such American port, is not a Chinese immigrant under the Chinese Exclusion laws.</p> <p>2. There is no provision in the Act of Congress, approved April 30bh, 1900, entitled an “Act to provide a government for the Territory ■of Hawaii,” authorizing the Collector of Customs at Honolulu to prohibit from landing at the port of Honolulu, a Chinese séamun 'arriving on hoard an American vessel sailing from an American port, New York, to said port of Honolulu.</p>

<p>1. A steel sailing ship (haying a registered tonnage of 1447 tons net, Ifound by the Court to be of the value of $65,000 before being damaged, and having a valuable cargo, went astor re upon a coral reef encircling Diamond Head about six miles fiom the port of Honolulu, on the 8th day of August, 1900, at ‘about 9:40 a. m., and remained on said reef until 4:10 p. m. iof the 9th day of August, 1900, when, through the combined efforts of the steam tugs Fearless and Eleu and the United States Government cutter Iroquois, she was pulled off the reef, after sustaining damages rendering necessary repairs estimated to coot $25,000, and a loss of cargo jettisoned, of the value of $1,259.40. $12,000 salvage awarded for the services of the three vessels in saving the ship valued at $40,000 after cost of repairs and on $54,366.59 value of cargo and freight saved.</p> <p>2. Where valuable services were rendered by a United States Government cutter the Iroquois, in conjunction with two steam tugs, in rescuing a steel sailing vessel of 1447 tons net, together with her cargo, from a position of great peril on a coral reef, and an award of $12,000 in full of all salvage in the case is decreed the salvors,</p> <p>Sold, that the said Government cutter Iroquois would have been entitled to $3,000 of the said award, had it made any claim for salvage services, but not having done so, said $3,000 inured to the salved vessel and her cargo.</p> <p>3. Whore it was shown that one of the salving tugs, the Eleu, had (rendered services to the wrecked vessel on the 8th of August, while- in command of her regular Captain (Hilibus), he agreeing that the same would be charged for at towage rates, but that the spring of the Eleu broke on that day, and she left for Honolulu; and where it was further shown that on the next afternoon, the . 9th of August, the Eleu was detailed by the Harbor Master to take out a ship which was going to sea, and owing to the illness of (her regular Oaptain, Captain Macauley was placed in, command, and after towing out the ship,, went over to the Dunreggan, and being asked by the Captain of the Dunreggan if the Eleu was the same boat that he had much the agreement with the day before, answered “yes,” whereupon the Oaptain of the Dunreggan said, “Give us your hawser, then,” which the Eleu proceeded to do, and worked for some three-quarters of an hour in conjunction with the Fearless and the Iroquois, when the Dunreggan came off the reef; and where it appeared that the Bleu made no demand for salvage services, hut settled with, the Dunreggan upon a tow-age basis of $157.70 for the services rendered, and Captain Macauley intervened and claimed an award for his individual efforts in the matter, and where it was claimed by the Captain of the Dunreggan that he had an agreement with Macauley to work upon towage rates;</p> <p>Held, that it is not clear that the Captain of the Dunreggan and Macauley understood each other, or that there was any meeting of minds between them on the 9th day of August in the nature of • an agreement; that Captain Macauley was a volunteer when his .services were accepted by the Captain of the Dunreggan, and that simply responding “yes” when asked if it was the same boat that the Captain of the Dunreggan had made the agreement with the day before, was not a confirmation of that agreement; that Captain Macauley unider the circumstances of this case was entitled to some compensation for the salvage services rendered by him personally as Master of the Elen, notwithstanding the settlement of the Elau.</p> <p>4. Where the evidence showed that upon an examination made by a diver after the Dunreggan was taken -off the reef and brought into Honolulu, that “eight of 'her frames were injured and bent entirely away from the plates... .the bottom of the ship was bent in i____and those frames were bent sidewise, the keel forward was slightly to the port side, the rivets in the plates were all spit out and the rudder injured,” and that she was. entirely unfit to go to sea without extensive repairs; and where it appeared that while the vessel was on the reef there was no immediate danger to life unless a storm had arisen, in which event the testimony bears out the presumption that the ship would have been pressed back upon the reef; and even without the 'possibility of a storm, the testimony showed that tha ship was in hourly danger of swinging round broadside upon the reef and thereby becoming a perfect wreck;</p> <p>Held, that for the saving of life there is no. salvage, and that it was not necessary in order to entitle; libellant to salvage that some one should lose his life or be in imminent peril of doing so; that if the salvors did all they could to save the ship, and at the same time avoid the danger which a loss of the ship would cause to the men on board, they were entitled to fair and liberal compensation in the event of success.</p> <p>5. In determining the award to salvors, each case depends largely Ion its own merits; but it is clear in determining the award, several elements are to be considered; among them are, the enterprise and risk of the salvors and value of the property risked; the time occupied in the rescue of the wrecked vessel; the danger and .distress from. which tlie property is rescued; the success of the efforts of the salvors and the valué of the property saved.</p> <p>6. No subsequent opinions of the officers of a wrecked vessel, looking backward as to what they might possibly have done to save thie vessel, but which they did not do, can in anywise disparage or ■undervalue what was done by the salvors.</p>

<p>1. Upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus on tbe ground ■that the petitioner is deprived of bis liberty contrary to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, in that 'he had been convicted of an infamous crime without the indictment or presentment of a Grand Just and by a verdict of less than twelve jurors, where it appeared that after the annexation of Hawaii to the United States and before the 14th day of •June, 1900 (when the Aot of Congress for the government of the Territory of Hawaii went into effect), the petitioner was con•victed in the Circuit Court of the Territory of the offense of publishing a lib.el in the first degree by the verdict of nine out of twelve jurors, under Section 1345 of the, Civil Laws of Hawaii and sentenced to hard labor for six months under Section 305 of the Penal Laws of Hawaii; and where by Chapter 1, p. 52, Section 3 of the said Penal Laws it is provided that “felonies or crimes mean such offenses as are punishable with death or imprisonment •for a longer period than two years or by the forfeiture of any civil or political right * * and Where it is further provided by Section 304 of the said Penal Law® of Hawaii that the degree cf the libel shall be found by the jury, the court or “the magistrate authorized to decide on the facts,” Section 584 of the said Penal Laws giving the District Magistrate jurisdiction for the “prosecution, trial and sentence of any person charged with * * * any misdemeanors * * * ,”</p> <p>Held, that the offense whereof the petitioner was convicted and sentenced was a misdemeanor under the laws of Hawaii, and was not an infamous crime within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>2. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies only to trials of offenses which are triable by what is known as a common law jury, and are above the grade of misdemeanors, which latter offenses are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of magistrates sitting alone, and do not necessarily require a jury.</p> <p>3. The petitioner not having been accused of an infamous crime, had no constitutional right to a presentment or indictment by a Grand .Jury under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>4. A verdict of a jury of nine out of twelve jurors was authorized by the law of Hawaii, which law in respect to this class of cases was not repealed until June 14, 1900, and after the proceedings1 institute! in this matter.</p> <p>5. While the United States District Court has discretion to summarily discharge 'on habeas eorpus any person restrained of his liberty under a judgment of a territorial court, yet it is only in extreme cases that the District Court will exercise such, discretion; but will generally leave the petitioner to his remedy by writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States.</p> <p>0. Where no Federal question is presented for the consideration of the United States Court on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, said Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ.</p>

<p>*1. The Territory of Hawaii is a part of the United States, and subject to the so-called “ Chinese Exclusion Laws” passed by Congress.</p> <p>2. Where a Chinese person claims admission into the United States on the ground that he is a citizen thereof, the burden of proof is on him, to prove such, contention.</p> <p>3. Application for a writ of habeas corpus applied for alleging detention by the Collector of Customs of the port of Honolulu with intent to return petitioner to China, heard by the Court, where the petition alleged that petit5 oner was a citizen of the United States, having been bom in the Hawaiian Islands.</p> <p>4. The uncorroborated testimony of Chinese witnesses will not be accepted as sufficient to identify a Chinese person claiming the right to enter the United States on. the ground, that he was born in this country, where, as in this case, he left the Hawaiian Islands, the alleged place of birth, when he was seven years of age, and did not return until after the lapse of twelve years; and specially where the testimony of the person claiming admission shows not the slightest recollection of the place where he claims to have been born or of its people; and there being noi direct testimony that he was born in the Islands given even by the Chinese witnesses.</p>

<p>1. In an action against a steamer for a collision with a barkentine in the night time in which the barkentine was sunk with all her cargo, where it appeared from the weight of the evidence that the barkentine had all her lights burning properly, and was sailing •in a southwest course when the steamer sighted her, and continued on that course, as was her duty under the regulations; and where it appeared from the testimony of the officer of the deck fon the steamer that he had seen the lights of the barkentine some fifteen or twenty minutes before the collision occurred, hut was in 'doubt as to the direction in which they were moving, and who, after watchng the same without making any attempt to change his course of slacken the steamer’s speed, which was then at the rate ■(of 10 knots an hour, finally left the deck and went down to the cabin to find the Captain, leaving no one on the deck, excepting ■the man at the helm, and not finding the Captain, returned to the •deck and blew the whistle once to call the attention of the Captain, and within one minute thereafter the collision took place; • .-and where it further appeared that no regular lookout was kept on said steamer, as reauired by Rule 29 of the Regulations for •preventing collisions at sea (Vol. 26, U. S. Stat., P. 320) and Article 24 of the Sailing Regulations (Penal Laws of Hawaii for ’1897, P. 540); Held, that the collision was due to, the negligence ■and unskillfui navigation of the steamship, for which the steamship and her owners are liable.</p> <p>2. All vessels should have a competent lookout stationed in such a . position that he can descry approaching vessels at the earliest possible moment; and the want of an adequate lookout on board a vessel at sea is culpable neglect on her part, wihich will prima faeie render her responsible for injuries received from her while in that condition.</p> <p>3. The fact that no lookout was kept on the steamer Claudine was unpardonable negligence, for which there can be no excuse; and by reason of which omission to keep a proper lookout, aside from other reasons, the Claudine and its owners, under the circumstances of this case, must be held responsible for the collision.</p> <p>4. The failure to produce vital evidence which is under the exclusive control of one of the parties, to the- action if not properly explained, is taken strongly against said party especially where it attempts to introduce exhibits which seem to unfairly represent the devices not produced.</p>

<p>1. Where a decision, of the Collector of Customs is adverse to tne landing of a Chinese woman claiming admission to the Territory of Hawaii on the ground that her husband is a domiciled merchant therein, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear an application for a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>2. Where the decision of the Collector of Customs is adverse to the landing of a Chinese woman claiming admission to the Territory of Hawaii on the ground that her husband is a domiciled merchant therein, her only remedy is an appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, from the decision of the Collector.</p>

<p>1. The United States District Court of Hawaii possesses no power on habeas corpus to overrule the judgments of the Territorial Courts of Hawaii unless it clearly appears that the constitutional rights of the citizen are being violated.</p> <p>2. Upon an application to this Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that petitioner was in custody in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that he was suffering “cruel and unusual punishment,” where it ■ appeared that petitioner had been sentenced to ten days’ imprisonment by’ the Judge of the First Judicial Circuit Court of the Territory of Hawaii for contempt of court, and at the time of the application for the writ was confined in the Oahu Jail; and where it appeared that the Oahu Jail or Prison has three sections, one for persons serving terms for felonies, another for persons serving terms for misdemeanors, and the third set apart for persons held for trial or detained by the order of court; and it appearing that the petitioner was detained in this third section; and there being nothing to show that petitioner is made to* suffer any other or different punishment than the other misdemeanor prisoners; Meld, that no “cruel or unusual punishment,” as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, has been inflicted upon the prisoner. The writ denied.</p>

<p>1. In the presence of great and unforeseen danger, no man is ex-'PQcted to act with, deliberation.</p> <p>2. Negligence need not be intentional; inattention may be, and often is, the strongest evidence .of negligence.</p> <p>3. Ordinary care has relation to the situation of the parties and the business in which they are engaged, and varies according to the exigencies which require vigilance and attention.</p> <p>4. The degree of carei toi be used is proportioned to the danger to be apprehended of inflicting an injury upon others.</p> <p>5. Under the Hawaiian Statute CSection 1109, Ballou’s Compiled Civil Laws of Hawaii, 1897), providing that the “common law of England, as ascertained by English and. American decisions, is ¡hereby declared to be the common law of the Hawaiian Islands ■in all cases .except as otherwise expressly provided by the Hawaiian Constitution or laws, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage,” and, as decided by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in 1846 in the case of Kake v. Horton (2 Haw. 211), the common law rule that an action would not lie for damages for th© wrongful killing of a human- being is rejected, ■and “damages in this class of cases may be assessed on the principle of compensation or reparation.”</p> <p>'6. Under Section 1109 of the¡ Compiled Civil Laws of Hawaii of 1897, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii, jurisdiction in admiralty sustained in an action in personam instituted by a widow to recover damages for the wrongful killing of her husband, a drayman, by reason of the breaking of a chain used in lowering a bed' plate weighing some 25,000 pounds from the schooner Robert Lewers, owned by the libellee, where it was shown that the officers and- men of the schooner had entire charge and control of the appliances used in the lowering of the said bed plate, and negligence was proven.</p> <p>7. The husband of libellant, a drayman, while assisting in the unloading of a heavy bed plate weighing some 25,000 pounds from the schooner Robert Lewers, owhed by the libellee, was killed. While the bed plate was being unloaded from the vessel, and was suspended in the air by means’ of a block and tackle under the exclusive control of the officers and men of the schooner, a small iron chain broke, which caused the bed' plate to swing round to the sid© of th© vessel, up which, the libellant’s husband was endeavoring to climb in order to avoid the swinging plate, when it caught and killed him. Held, that his death was due to the breaking of the small iron chain, and was the result of the negligence of the officers and men of the vessel.</p> <p>8. Where a five-eighths of an inch chain broke in lowering a piece of casting weighing 25,000 pounds, and no explanation is offered for the breaking of the chain, and it isi in testimony that it is more dangerous to use a chain than a rope in this class of cases, Held, that it was the duty of the officers and men of the schooner, under the circumstances of this case, to have .used the very best and strongest appliances known to the business-, and it was negligence to have used any doubtful or [uncertain appliances or any rope or -chain of doubtful strength.</p> <p>9. The unexplained breaking of the chain in this case is one of the proofs of negligence.</p>

<p>1. The Territorial Stamp Act, passed by the Legislature of' the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1876, and now known as Chapter 64 of the Civil Laws of Hawaii (1897), was not repealed by the Act of Congress passed for the government of the Territory of Hawaii, and its provisions are now in full force and effect.</p> <p>2. 'The Organic Act passed by Congress for the government of a territory, and under which the territorial government is organized, must be taken as the fundamental law of the territory; and all territorial legislative assemblies derive their force and validity from such Organic Acts.</p> <p>3. A territorial legislature has the power to levy taxes for all legal purposes and upon property subject to taxation within its jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. The presumption of law is always in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and whenever a court entertains a reasonable doubt, concerning its constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of' the statute.</p> <p>5. Chapter 64 of the Civil Laws of Hawaii, 189Y, relates toi taxation, for local and municipal purposes only, and its provisions’ are not. ■contrary to Subdivision 1, Section 8, of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>6. The provisions of Subdivision 1, Section 8, of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, that all taxation “shall be uniform:, throughout the United States,” relates solely to taxation for national purposes, and has no reference to local or municipal taxation in states or territories.</p> <p>Y. A bill was filed to compel the defendant to’ specifically perform in-contract to deliver a good and lawful deed to complainant of certain property, by ’affixing thereto’ the stamps required by the provisions of Chapter 64 of the Civil Laws of Hawaii (189Y), whic'hi defendant had refused to do. Upon demurrer filed to said bill om the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute-a cause of action against defendant, in that the said Chapter 64 was contrary to the Constitution of the United States, thei same was overruled, and defendant given ten days in which to answer-</p>

<p>1. Where it appeared that while the sailing vessel “Consuelo” was; moored in the roadstead of Mahukoua, on the island, of Hawaii, a “kona,” or southwesterly storm arose during the night of the 14th of November, 1901, and about two o’clock in the morning one of the owners of the vessel on shore sent out some natives in a boat “to see if the ‘Consuelo’ neede.d anything; ” whereupon the Captain of the “Consuelo,” with his mate, steward and crew including every man aboard, left the vessel and went ashore with the natives in the boat which had been sent out, some life preservers being in the boat and some of the men carrying bundles; and where it appeared further that this part owner, while the Captain of the ^vessel was ashore, telephoned to libellant, as the owner of the steamer “Upolu,” to. send the “Upolu” “to tow out the ‘Consuelo’ ......as she 'had a very valuable cargo on board, and we hate to lose it,” and the “Upolu” reached there about 9 o’clock and fasrtene l her lines to the “Consuelo” and towed her out, it nowhere appearing that any agreement had been made in, relation to payment for the services to be rendered by the “Upolu;”</p> <p>Held, that the services rendered by the “Upolu” were in the nature of salvage, as the “Consuelo” was in danger of slipping 'her moorings, going upon the shore, or being swamped in the heavy seas, /when the “Upolu” took her in hand and put her in, a position of safety. The “Consuelo” was of the value of $6,000, and her cargo was valued at about the same amount; salvage awarded in the sum of $750.</p> <p>2. The fact that the “Consuelo” suffered no damage is not material. If she were in danger of loss or deterioration at the time th© services were rendered, then it is a case for the award of salvage.</p>

<p>1. In a proceeding to deport a Chinese person found in the Territory of Hawaii without the certificate of residence required by the Act ■of Congress of May 5, 1892 (as- amended by the Act of Congress of November 3, 1893), and the Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, providing a government for the Territory of Hawaii, the burden of proof is on said Chinese person to prove her right to remain.</p> <p>2. The policy of the law of the United States in relation to Chinese is the exclusion of all save ihe few privileged classes.</p> <p>3. The wife partakes of the husband’s status as a laborer.</p> <p>4. In a proceeding to deport a Chinese woman found in the Territoiy of Hawaii without the certificate of residence required by the Act of Congress of May 5, 1892 (as amended by the Act of Congress of November 3, 1893), and tbe Act of Congress of April 30, 1900, providing a government for the Territory of Hawaii;</p> <p>Held, that in order to entitle said Chinese woman to remain, she must show to the satifaction of the court either that she was born in the Hawaiian Islands, and therefore an American citizen under the provisions of the aforesaid Act of Congress of April 30, 1900; or is the wife of a Chinese merchant domiciled in the Territory; or that she is the wife of an American citizen.</p> <p>5. Unless the Court is fully satisfied of the truth of Chinese testimony, the presumption is that a Chinese person coming from China and seeking to land in this country is an alien, and not a native born citizen; following In re Jew Wong Loy, 91 Fed. 243.</p> <p><3. Where ,a Chinese is acting :as manager of, and who worked on, a rice plantation belonging to an unincorporated company, in which he claims ian interest, but which company had no articles of incorporation or articles of copartnership in which his name appeared as a partner, Held, that under the most favorable construction to be placed upon his occupation, he is nothing but an employe of the company, and is therefore not within the merchant class, but is a laborer.</p>

<p>1. The fact that a marriage ceremony according to American or Christian customs is performed after the arrival of a Chinese woman in United States territory does not alter her status so far as her right to enter the country is concerned under the Chinese Exclusion. Laws; her status when she reached the Islands is the status which the Court must alone take into consideration in deciding upon her right to remain.</p> <p>2. General trend of decisions -upon question >of evidence of hirth in the United States of persons of Chinese descent is stringent.</p> <p>3. Long absence in China of person of Chinese descent claiming to* have been horn in the United States is prejudicial to- right to reenter.</p> <p>4. Where a claim of marriage is made, the woman, Kam You, being-in China and the alleged husband in the Hawaiian Islands at the-time of the performance of the alleged ceremony according to Chinese custom, Held, that it was impossible for the necessary ceremonies of a Chinese marriage -of the character indicated to he-, completed until the alleged bride had reached the home of the-bridegroom under the Chinese customs; and where a year elapsed', before the bride attempted to join her alleged husband, the marriage is in an inchoate and incomplete condition, and was not completed before the entrance of the woman into the Territory/ of Hawaii.</p>

<p>1. The framers of Article 17, Section 1, of the Constitution, of the Republic of Hawaii and of the Act of Congress' providing a government for the Territory of Hawaii (Section 4 thereof), approved April 30, 1900, intended to refer to the geographical limits of the Hawaiian Islands rather than to any political conditions existing therein; and that Hawaiian and American citizenship was. to be extended to all persons born in the Islands, excepting only those “born of persons engaged in the diplomatic- service of foreign governments-, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence by a fiction of public law is regarded as part of their own country.”</p> <p>2. The fact that two- Chinese persons were born in the Hawaiian Islands while the same was a monarchy known as the Kingdom of Hawaii, does not deprive them of their status as American citizens,, it being proven that they were born in the Hawaiian Islands, sons'of a domiciled Chines© laborer, in view of the provisions of Article? 17, Section 1, of the Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii, “that all persons born or naturalized in the Islands and subject to the-jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Republic;” and of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of Congress, approved April 30,. 1900, to “provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii,” that “all persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United! States and citizens of the Territory of Hawaii.”</p>

<p>1. Where it was shown that the bark C. D. Bryant, when it left its ■home port, San, Francisco, California, was in perfect seaworthy condition, well equipped, manned and provisioned for her voyage to Honolulu, but when moored to the wharf at Honolulu took fire in the night time, and it was found necessary to scuttle the vessel and allow her to partially fill with water in order to extinguish the said fire, by reason of which facts the cargo, including the merchandise of the libellant, consisting of clothing and shoes, was seriously damaged to the injury of libellant; and where it was shown that the fire arose through the negligence of the ship’s officers in leaving an open hatch leading to the hold, wherein was stored liquors covered with baled hay, which latter formed a very combustible portion of the cargo, and no watch being kept on said ship while in port and while her cargo was being unloaded; and where there was no evidence of any “design or neglect” upon the •part of the owners of said vessel by reason of which, said fire might have been caused; Held, that under the provisions of Section 4282 of the R. S. II. S. continued in force by the Act of Congress of February 13, 1893, commonly called the “Harter” Act (Yol. 27 U. S. Stats., p. 445), the owners of said vessel cannot be held co answer for the loss or damage to libellant arising from said fire, decided to be the proximate cause of the injury to his merchandise.</p> <p>2. The words, “management of the vessel,” in Section 3 of the “Harter” Act, cannot refer to the navigation of the ship while at sea, because there is an especial clause as to that. It applies rather to a “fault or error” resulting from the management of the business ¡of the ship or the discipline thereof; as in this case, the failure to ¡have a watch while in port, which concerned both the safety of the ship and its cargo, .or the failure to do some thing which does not belong to the navigation or movement of the ship, but which affects in some degree both the ship and the cargo.</p> <p>3. The keeping of a watch is a “part of the management of the vessel” for the mistakes in which the owner and the vessel are both exempt under the provisions of the third Section of the “Harter” Act so-called.</p> <p>4. While the case at bar is a proceeding in rem against the vessel, a decision in favor of libellants against the vessel and decreeing its sale for the payment of the amount of the judgment found due, would be simply a decree against the owner of the vessel; for if the vessel is sold, it is the property of the owner which is- sold, and he would in that case be punished for something of which the '(Statute (Section 3, “Harter” Act) says- he shall be exempt.</p> <p>5. After the loss has been shown to> have arisen by fire, the burden of proof is on those asserting the fire was caused by the “neglect or design” of the ship owner.</p>

<p>1. The .provisions of Subdivision “f.” of Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 apply equally to voluntary as well as to involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy.</p> <p>2. Subdivisions “c.” and “f.” of Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act are* hopelessly in conflict, but the weight of authority and the better r'asoning sustain Subdivision “f.” where there is any question as. to which shall prevail in. a proceeding relative to liens upon the property ¡o£ a bankrupt obtained through legal proceedings within four months prior to the filing of a petition, in bankruptcy.</p> <p>3. On the .hearing of an order of Court directed to the Sheriff of the Territory of Hawaii, upon application ¡of the Trustee of the estate of a voluntary bankrupt, to show cause why he should not turn over to said Trustee a certain, stock of merchandise in his possession belonging to the bankrupt, and levied upon and held by said Sheriff under an execution issued in pursuance of certain judgments rendered against the bankrupt by the District Court of the city of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and in favor of a creditor of the said bankrupt, where it appeared that the said -judgments were rendered on the third day of July, 1901, and the adjudication in bankruptcy was made on the 17th day of July, 1901; Held, that under the provisions of Subdivision “f.” of Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which controls in this proceeding, said judgments having been obtained “within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,” are null and void; the execution thereunder ordered released, and the Sheriff directed to turn over the property in his possession to the Trustee of the Bankrupt’s estate to be administered by said Trustee as a part of the assets of said estate.</p>

<p>1. In the absence of any law of the Territory of Hawaii, or of any rule either of the courts of the Territory or of this Court declaring that in an action of eminent domain, that the answers shall be unverified, it is within the power of the Court to require that verified ■answers shall be filed to the verified petition or complaint, in conformity to the usual and uniform rule of pleading that when a complaint or petition is by law required to be verified, a verified answer shall be. mad© thereto.</p> <p>2. The oath of defendant to the allegations of his answer is. quite as much in the interest of the enforcement of public justice as the oath of the plaintiff to his petition.</p> <p>3. Sections 914 and 918 of the Revised Statutes of the United States should be considered together. A discretion is left with both the Circuit and District Courts, of the United States to so arrange their practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding as “may be necessary for the advancement of justice and the prevention of delays in proceedings.”</p> <p>4. Where a motion to strike out certain portions of the answers of defendants was granted, and certain defendants, instead of striking out the objectionable, matters and filing the original answers as amended, filed new and different answers consisting of a general denial unverified, with a notice of what the defense would be forming a part of said answers, a motion to strike said amended answers, so-called, from, the files granted, with, leave to defendants to file the original answers, re-engrossed and verified, to conform to the original order of the Court.</p>

<p>1. By Section 3242 of t'iie Revised Statutes of tlie United States a special tax is required for the privilege of carrying on the business of a retail dealer in liquors.</p> <p>2. Retail dealer in liquors defined by Section 3244 (4th Subdv.) R. fc>. U. S.</p> <p>3. The words, “otherwise than as hereinafter provided,” found in Subdivision fourth of Section 3244 of the R. S. U. S„ have been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to refer to wholesale liquor dealers in distilled spirits, wholesale and retail dealers in malt liquors, brewers and others who are. either exempt from taxation or pay a different tax.</p> <p>4. When a person obtains spirituous or malt liquors which he intends to sell again in small quantities to anyone who wishesi to purchase the same, or who, having spirituous or malt liquors on hand, intends to sell the same to any person who may apply for them in small quantities, or, in the language of the statute, “in quantities ¡of less than five gallons,” he must pay the special tax required by the government, and any failure to do so is a violation of the law.</p>

<p>1 A contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade under thie Act of Congress of July 2nd, 1890, is one •wherein two or more parties agree, either in writing or verbally, either as individuals or as .members of an association, not to sell to or purchase of, or •employ or accept employment from, any person not a member of such .association, combination or conspiracy, -or a party to such contract, with the intent to exclude and'prevent from purchasing Ifrom, selling to, making contracts for work with, or hiring as workers, any and all persons not a member of such association, combination or conspiracy, or a party to .such contract.</p> <p>2. The fundamental principle -of the law of damages is that the person injured in .his personal or property rights shall receive compensation therefor. ■</p> <p>3. Elements of damage: Actual losses which can be specifically stated and proven, such as loss of profits from inability to accept contracts; actual losses which can be specifically stated and proven from increased expenditures incurred in filling contracts already taken; loss and iniury toi an established, business.</p> <p>i. Damages must be reasonable and ascertainable from the facts presented in 'evidence.</p> <p>5. Burden of proof on plaintiff to show actual damage to business.</p> <p>6. Damages must be specifically stated and must he the direct, proximate and natural consequence of the contract, combination or conspiracy complained of.</p>

<p>1. Eight hours in any calendar day, limit of service of laborers or mechanics on any of the public works' of United States ¡or District of Columbia, except in case of “extraordinary emergency.”</p> <p>2. Intent shown by commission of prohibited- act.</p> <p>3. Ignorance of law no excuse; foreigner must obey the laws-, which -he is presumed -to know.</p> <p>4. “To require” — construction of as used in Statute under which defendant is prosecuted; “to permit” — ditto.</p> <p>5. Hearsay evidence; number of witnesses..</p> <p>6. Asiatic nationality of defendant not to be considered; entitled to same rights: in this class of cases as American citizen.</p> <p>7. Asiatic witnesses.</p> <p>8. Defendant not relieved from responsibility by showing some one else equally culpable with him-.</p> <p>9. Act need not be proven to have been committed on day named in indictment to warrant conviction.</p>

<p>1. The decision of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii 'construing the. charters granted hy the Legislature of Hawaii to two certain street railway corporations and deciding their respective rights thereunder to lay tracks in certain of the streets of the city of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, held to he binding upon the United States District Court upon an application for an injunction hy one of said corporations to restrain the other from laying tracks in said streets of Honolulu, and said Court to he without jurisdiction, in the absence of any showing that a Federal question was involved. Th'e injunction denied.</p> <p>2. It is always presumed that an attorney appearing and acting for a party to a cause has authority to do so, and to do all other acts, necessary or incidental to the proper conduct of the case, and the burden of proof rests on the party denying such authority to sustain his denial by a clear preponderance of the evidence.</p>

! Action brought to condemn certain lands under the provisions of an Act of Congress dated August 1, 1888, entitled “An Act to authorize the condemnation of land for sites of public buildings and for other purposes.”

<p>1. Either one of three conditions must exist to give the United States District Court jurisdiction to adjudge a person a bankrupt, namely: (1) He must either have had his principal place of business, resided or had his domicile within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court for the preceding six months or the greater portion thereof; or (2) while not having had his principal place of business or had his domicile within the United States, have property iwithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Court; or (3) have been adjudged a bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction without the United States and have property within the jurisdiction of the Court.</p> <p>2. The law presumes the domicile of origin to still exist in the absence of any proof of change of domicile.</p> <p>3. The burden of procf is on the party alleging the change of domicile.</p> <p>4. The Territorial Courts and the District Courts of the United States do not have co-ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings.</p> <p>5. A bankruptcy proceeding is in the nature of a proceeding in .rein.</p> <p>6. The province of the bankruptcy court is to marshal the assets of the bankrupt wherever they may be, so- that there may be a proper administration upon Ids estate, and also that there may be a fair and just distribution thereof to his creditors entitled thereto ; and in ,soi marshalling said assets, the Court has full power to- restrain any State or Territorial Court or officer from disposing of any of said assets until the 'adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt or the dismissal of the petition.</p> <p>7. It was the intention of Congress in passing Subdivision f of Section 67 to prevent my creditor of an insolvent debtor from obtaining any advantage over other creditors by legal proceedings during a period of four months prior to the filing of the petition in ■bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary; and all liens so obtained are dissolved by the adjudication in bankruptcy.</p> <p>8. Where it appeared that while the alleged bankrupt had formerly resided in the Territory of Hawaii, he had not had his principal ■place of business nor resided therein for the greater portion of six months preceding the filing of the petition in bankrutcy, having left the Territory three years before while a warrant was> out for his arrest as a leper, and where it further appeared that the wife and children of the alleged bankrupt are still residing in the Territory, and that he owns certain real property in the city of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and no proof having been adduced on the hearing that the said alleged bankrupt had acquired a domicile beyond this Territory; upon objections filed to the making of an order of adjudication in bankruptcy on the ground that the Court had not obtained jurisdiction under Section 2, Subdivision 1, Chapter 3 of the Bankruptcy Act, Held, that no proof of change of domicile having been made, the law presumes the domicile of origin to still exist; but assuming that the domicile of origin no longer exists, the debtor has been shown to have real property within the territory owned by him, which is sufficient to enable this Court to assume jurisdiction, as a bankruptcy proceeding is a proceeding in rein, and this Court has jurisdiction of the situs.</p> <p>9. On November 9, 1901, a petition was filed by certain creditors of one Voeller to adjudicate him, a bankrupt. The act of bankruptcy complained of was a preference by legal proceedings obtained by a judgment against said Voeller in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Territory, on the 14th of October, 1901. Execution issued on said judgment, and the real property of said Voeller was levied upon by the Sheriff of the Territory of Hawaii and advertised for sale on the 20th day of November, 1901. Upon application of petitioning creditors, a restraining order was issued out of this Court, directed to the Sheriff of Hawaii, enjoining him from selling said property until the further order of the Court, and directing him to appear before the Court on the 22nd day of November to show cause why the said property should not be turned over to the United States Marshal, and also to show cause why he should not be restrained from selling said property until after the hearing of the petition in bankruptcy. The day set for the hearing of this order to show cause was continued until the 3rd day of January, 1902, when both the petition in bankruptcy and said -arder were heard. Upon objections interposed to- the jurisdiction of this Court to issue said restraining order, made on behalf of the judgment creditor and the Sheriff of the Territory of Hawaii; Held: The United States District Court .has power to issue the restraining order complained of in this case under Section 2, Subdivision 15 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, giving courts of bankruptcy, in addition to the jurisdictional powers specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Act, “the power to make such orders, issue such process and enter such judgments * * * as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act.”</p>

<p>1. In an action to condemn the leasehold interest of the defendant in 561.2 acres of certain lands desired by the United States for the purposes of a Naval Station, where the jury returned a verdict allowing as damages the sum of $105,000 as the value of the leasehold interest and improvements of defendant placed on said lands, upon a motion for a new trial made by plaintiff on the ground of an excessive valuation of said leasehold interest, Held, that the verdict was excessive and not in conformity with the weight of the evidence, the motion allowed and a new trial granted, unless the defendant elects to remit from the verdict the sum of $30,000 and accept the sum of $75,000 in full compensation for all damages.</p> <p>2. Neither the Court nor the jury is bound by the opinions of expert witnesses unless they are in harmony with the weight of the testimony, but may consider them in connection with all the other f lets in evidence.</p>

<p>X. The Circuit Court will assume jurisdiction in equity originally and •consider an application for an injunction where the bill of complainants alleges both the statutory amount of pecuniary injuty and the fact that the Act -of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii complained of is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and no plea to the jurisdiction being raised on the part of the defendant.</p> <p>2. Chapter 46 of the Session Laws of 1888, now known as Part V. of Chapter 41 of the Penal Laws of the Hawaiian Islands, 1897, entitled “Sale of Malt Liquors,” i® unconstitutional and void, and in violation of Subdivisions 1 and 3 of Section 8 of Article 1, and Subdivision i, Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>3. Nothing is better settled than that the Legislature of a State or a Territory cannot constitutionally enact laws discriminating in favor of its own citizens and against the citizens of another State or Territory of the United States;'and where a territorial statute provides for the issuance of a license for the brewing of malted liquors in the District of Honolulu, Island of Oahu, and a license was issued and malted liquors brewed thereunder; and where said statute provided for the issuance of licenses to individuals to sell “by the glass, or in any other quantity less than five gallons,” beers manufactured in Honolulu, upon the payment of an annual tax of $250, but with the proviso that such individual will not sell or dispose of on the premises for which he is licensed “any....... malt liquors or spirits of any description whatever........and also that he will not store, or allow to be stored, on the premises for which he is licensed, any.........malt liquors.........save such beers manufactured in Honolulu;” and where a number of licenses were issued to different individuals under said Act; and-where it further appeared that under the provisions of Sections 434, 5 and 6 of the Penal Laws of Hawaii, 1897, one of the complainants is obliged to pay an annual license tax of $1,000 for the privilege of selling and disposing of “any spirituous liquors by the glass or bottle” on his premises, under which one of the complainants is selling foreign malted liquors and beers; and where it appeared that while all of the complainants did not establish a clear pecuniary loss, but that two of said complainants showed such a falling off of sales since the issuance of the licenses to sell the home brewed beer as to meet the requirements of the. statute in relation to the amount of damage required to give a Circuit Court jurisdiction in this class of cases; upon an application for an injunction to restrain the Treasurer of the Territory from issuing any further licenses under said Act relative to home-manufactured beer,</p> <p>Held, (1) that the injury sustained by complainants is a continuing one that cannot be estimated at the time of the hearing in dollars and cents; (2) that the injunction should issue on the ground that the Act providing for the levying of an annual tax of $250 for the privilege of selling home-manufactured beer, to the exclusion of all other spirituous or malted liquors, under said license, is a discrimination in favor of the citizens of the Territory of Hawaii, and against the manufacturers of foreign-brew.ed beers, in violation of the provisions of Subdivisions 1 and 3 of Section 8 of Article 1, and Subdivision i of Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, and is therefore unconstitutional and void.</p>

<p>1. Under the provisions of Section 7, Subdivision “e.” of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provides that “claims of secured creditors may be allowed to enable such creditors to participate in the proceedings it creditors’ meetings held prior to the determination of the value of t'heir securities, * * * but shall be allowed for such sums only as to the courts seem to be owing over and above ■the value of their securities,” the Referee in Bankruptcy has power to decide as to the value of the securities of any such creditor for the purpose of allowing the claim and permitting the creditor to vote at the first meeting of the creditors of the bankrupt.</p> <p>2. The valuation placed by a Referee on claims: held by a secured creditor of the bankrupt, in order to■ ascertain the amount for which said secured creditor may be allowed to vote at a first meeting of the creditors of a bankrupt, is not final.</p> <p>3. Under General Order No. 21 of the General Orders in Bankruptcy of the Supreme Court of the United States, claims upon open accounts should contain an allegation to the effect that “no note has been received for such account, nor any judgment rendered thereon,’ if it is a fact that no note has been received.</p> <p>4. Where the United States District Court made an order of reference after an adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt, ordering him to attend before the Referee on the 24th day of December, 1901, at 10 o’clock a. m., at his office in Hilo, and the Referee issued a subpoena before said day to the bankrupt ordering 'him to attend before him, and thereafter vacated the said subpoena before the day set for the bankrupt to attend before him; Held, that the Referee had no jurisdiction to issue the subpoena to the bankrupt before the said 24th day of December, 1901; the issuance of the same was unnecessary under the order of reference of the United States District Court, and the act of the Referee in afterwards vacating the same was proper.</p>

Eminent Domain. Action brought to condemn certain lands under the provisions of an Act of Congress dated August 1, 1888, entitled “An Act to authorize the condemnation of laud for sites of public buildings and for other purposes.”

<p>1. Application for a writ of Habeas Corpus applied for alleging detention by Collector of tbe Customs of tbe :port of Honolulu with intent to return petitioner to China, heard by the Court, the petitioner claiming that he was a citizen of the United States; and evidence held insufficient to satisfy the Court of the birth of petitioner in the Hawaiian Islands.</p> <p>2. The means of showing that he does not come within the restricted classes is presumably under the control of petitioner; and where, at the time of his alleged birth in the Islands, there was a law making it a penal offense for any parent not to report the birth of a child for registry, and no proof of compliance with such law is introduced on behalf of petitioner, it is a very significant fact against 'his contention.</p>

<p>1. In an action in admiralty in rem, based on Section 4568 of the R. 8. U. S. as amended by the Act of December 21, 1898, where it was shown that a schooner bound on a voyage from New York to- the Island of Mauritius, and from, thence to Port Townsend in the State of Washington as her port of destination, put into the port of Honolulu with two members of the crew suffering from an illness in the nature of scurvy, or beri-beri, and where it is claimed that such illness was the result of a lack of proper provisions and of the usual anti-scorbutics which the statute requires to be provided for each member of the, crew daily; and where it was shown that forty days out from Mauritius the members of the crew were compelled, in order to supply themselves with fresh drinking water, to gather rain water from the deck of the vessel; and it being further shown that it was the intention of the Captain when he left the Island of Mauritius to sail directly to Port Townsend; Held, that the fact that immediately after reaching the port of Honolulu, the Captain of the schooner mad© a large requisition for supplies, including bo’-h food, water and anti-scorbutics was strong proof that the ship had been, insufficiently provisioned for her voyage, and that there had been a shortage in the rations of the men.</p> <p>2. The master’s order for supplies is sufficient proof of their necessity.</p> <p>3. The burden of proof is on the.ship to show that it was fitted out with all the needed articles of food and medicine, and it is not alone what provisions and medicine are aboard, in cases of this character, but what the seamen ar© supplied with, and how they are supplied with it, that controls.</p> <p>4. Under Section 4612 of the R. S. U. S., as amended by the Act of Congress of December 21, 1898, certain daily rations are to be served to the members of the cnew; and the mere furnishing of the ¡amount of food required by law to be given to the men, if the same is not edible, is not a compliance v/ith the terms of the statute.</p> <p>5. Where it was shown that there were no weights or measures on board the schooner, as required by Section 4571 of the R. S. U. S., but that the cook guessed at the amount of the food that the men received, Held, that neither the master nor the cook has a right to issue to the men provisions according to a method of his own, unless the men agree to such method, and even then the action is doubtful. When the statute regulates what the rations shall be, the statute must be followed, except only in cases of great sea peril, those statutory rations must be supplied, and must be reasonably well cooked.</p>

<p>1. It is not necessary to prove motive for the commission of a crime. 2^ Abusive words cannot justify an assault.</p> <p>3. An. assault has been defined to be an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury upon the person of another.</p> <p>4. The word “maliciously” do.es not involve anything more than a wanton or wilful disregard of right.</p>

<p>1. Distiller; distilled spirits; okolehao.</p> <p>2. Burden of proof primarily on government; when cast on defendant</p> <p>3. When presumption will arise that defendant was engaged in distilling.</p> <p>4. Actual distilling not necessary to he shown; sufficient if possession, custody and control of still or distilling apparatus set up is shown.</p> <p>5 Sale of spirits not necessary to he proven to warrant conviction. 6. Informers; credibility of testimony of.</p>

<p>.1. Where no rule of law has been violated, a new trial will not be .granted after two concurring verdicts, if the questions to be tried 'depend wholly on matters of fact, although the verdict is, in the judgment of the Court, against the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>12. Where a verdict of $105,000 damages was set aside and a new trial granted in an action to condemn the leasehold interest of defendant in 561.2 acres of land desired by the United States for the purposes of a Naval Station, upon the failure of the defendant, in pursuance of the order of the Court, to elect to remit $30,000 from "the amount of the said verdict; and upon the second trial of said ¡action the jury rendered a verdict assessing the damages of defendant in the sum of $102,523, which verdict was for practically 'the same amount assessed by the verdict on the former trial, a ‘ motion for a new trial on the part of the plaintiff denied, although the Court held that it was discretionary with it to again set aside the verdict under the circumstances of this case, and grant a new trial upon the same terms as in the first trial of the action.</p>

<p>y vessel ' States. Libel of Information under Sec-m 3450 D. S. U. S. to- condemn ssel as forfeited toi the United</p>

<p>1. Where, in the process of transferring sugar from the hold of one ship into the hold of another ship, with me usual and customary appliances, a sling containing some 1,250 pounds of sugar was lowered unexpectedly by an employe of the defendant on to the deck of the ship into whose hold the sugar was being loaded, severely injuring the mate of said ship, who made ineffectual attempts to get out of the way of the descending sugar, and some evidence was introduced as to the giving of warnings of the coming of the sugar by the officers of the defendant; Held, that these warnings were not shown to have been brought home to the injured person. And further 'held, that “even if the warnings had been heard by him and disregarded, thus showing a degree of negligence on .his part, that would not have relieved the defendant from the results of its negligence, if by the exercise of reasonable care it could have avoided the consequences of libellant’s negligence.”</p> <p>2. While the theory that every man must look out for himself prevails, in so far that he shall not place himself deliberately in the way of injury, yet the law contemplates that every man, In ;his relation towards others, shall conduct himself with reasonable care and prudence, no matter what the imprudence of others may be; and if, by so conducting himself, he can avoid injury to the person or property of another, he is liable for any injury resulting from a neglect to exercise such reasonable care and prudence.</p> <p>3. Where an attempt was made to show that libellant contributed to his injury by walking in the direction of the sling load of sugar as it was swinging rapidly towards him, Held-. While it is true that in moments of great personal .peril .a man may, under the excitement of the moment, fail to act with the cool, deliberate judgment that may characterize him in the ordinary occurrences of life, but under the stress of excitement may do exactly the reverse of that which is best for his safety, yet courts do not as a rule treat such conduct as contributory negligence.</p> <p>4. Where it was shown that after the sling load of sugar was hoisted out of the hold of the ship and suspended from the donkey fall, that the strain was then transferred from the donkey fall to the burden line, and the duty of the burden man was to lower away slowly to the deck of the ship into whose hold the sugar was being loaded, and that in order to control the line, the burden man w.as obliged to take sufficient turns of this line round a post, the evidence that (as was shown by the libellee’s own witniesses), at the time of the accident, he took but three turns, thereafter taking four, when no further difficulty was experienced in controlling the line, Held, to be a very significant fact in considering the cause of ■the injury.</p> <p>5. The fact that the officers and crew of the defendant’s ship had exclusive control of the appliances and gear being used in transferring the sugar from one ship to the other, is an important element in considering this class of cases.</p>

<p>1. By the Act of February 18, 1895, Yol. 28, O'. S. Stats, at Large, p. 667, the provisions of Section 45ó6, R. S. U. S., which exempt the wages due or accruing to any seaman “from attachment or arrestment in any court,” are made applicable to all seamen engaged in the “coastwise trade” who ship before .a United States Shipping Commissioner.</p> <p>2. In an action brought by the engineer of the steamship Helene, admitted to be a vessel engaged in tbe “coastwise trade,” which action is based on Section 4546 of the R. S. II. S., and where it appeared that in an action before the District Magistrate of Honolulu, a judgment was rendered against libellant, and his wages in the hands of the Wilder Steamship Company had been garnisheed, which company had thereupon refused to pay libellant the same; and it being shown that libellant had signed before a 'Shipping Commissioner at San Francisco, when entering the ser-, vice of the Wilder Steamship Company;</p> <p>Held, that under the provisions of the Act of February 18, 1895, Vol. 28, U. S. Stats, at Large, p. 667, the wages of said libellant were exempt from garnishment, and the Wilder Steamship Company ordered to pay to the libellant the wages sued for.</p> <p>3. The wages of libellant are furrner exempt from garnishment under the provisions of Section 8 of an Act of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, entitled “An Act to provide for the exemption of certain personal property from attachment, execution, distress and forced sale of every description......” passed April 2% 1901; it being admitted that he is the head of a family, -earning less than ;p200 a month.</p>

<p>1 Under Section 11, Subdivision A, of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the United States District Court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, 'has full power, pending a hearing upon a petition in bankruptcy, •to stay by summary process all proceedings in a territorial court affecting the .property of the alleged bankrupt, where it appears that such proceedings .are founded upon claims from which a discharge would be a release.</p> <p>2. Pending the hearing upon a petition in an involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy, restraining orders will issue out of the bankruptcy court, directed to the Sheriff of the Territory, .enjoining him from selling or disposing of the property of the alleged bankrupt levied upon by him under executions issued upon judgments obtained in the territorial courts within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.</p> <p>3. On July 26, 1902, a petition was filed by certain creditors of an alleged bankrupt, to adjudicate him a bankrupt. The acts of bankruptcy complained of were preferences by legal proceedings to two creditors, who obtained judgments against said alleged bankrupt on the 20th day of June, 1902, in the District Court of the city of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.. Executions issued on both judgments, and the property of the alleged bankrupt was levied upon by the Sheriff of the Territory of Hawaii, .and the same was advertised for sale on the 28th day of June, 1902. Upon application of one of the petitioning creditors, two restraining orders were issued out of this court on July 28, 1902, the day of the sale, enjoining and restraining the said Sheriff from disposing of tor selling any of the property levied upon until hearing was had upon the petition in bankruptcy. A motion to dissolve said restraining orders was made and denied, said orders being continued in force under the powers granted the bankruptcy courts by Section 11, Subdivision A, and also by Section 2, Subdivision 15,. of ihe Bankruptcy Act of 1898, giving the court “power to make-such orders, issue such process and enter such judgments as maybe necessary for the -enforcement of the provisions of this Act.”</p>

<p>1. The Legislature of Hawaii has th© general power to legislate upon all questions of taxation in relation to providing a local system of revenue to carry on the government of the Territory of Hawaii, the only limitation being that such legislation shall not he “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this United States, loyally applicable,” and where said Legislature has enacted a local Income Tax Law, the United States District Court will not interfere by injunction to restrain the collection of taxes assessed under said law, where complainants have an adequate remedy at law.</p> <p>2. The Organic Act passed by Congress for the government of the Territory is the fundamental law of the Territory of Hawaii; and by the, provisions of that Act the legislative power of the Territory is extended to “all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, locally applicable.”</p> <p>3. 'A territorial' legislature 'has all the powers of a State legislature, except as limited by the Organic Act of the Territory, the Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress, and. ■these powers include the power to tax for local purposes, which is inherent in all governments.</p> <p>4. The avoidance of a multiplicity of suits given a» a ground of equitable jurisdiction, is not such a multiplicity of suits as is contemplated in equity, where it appears that no one of the eomplanants would be subjected in any event to more than one action, either to recover from him the amount of an assessment found' due under a. territorial income -tax law, or to recover back 'any moneys paid by him under ©otar of legal process.</p> <p>5. Where a bill in equity was filed by a number of complainants im the United States District Court against the Assessor and Tax Collector of the Territory of Hawaii, praying for an injunctions, against the said Assessor and Tax Collector, enjoining and restraining him from collecting from the complainants, or any one' of them, the assessments claimed to be due under an Act of the-Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, known as the Income Tax Law (Act 20 Session Laws 1901, page 31) on the ground, that tlhe said law is unconstitutional land void; and alleging a general and common interest in the subject matter of the-action by the complainants, and that they join in the ’action, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits; upon a demurrer filed to-said bill upon the ground that the same does not state such facts as to entitle the complainants to the relief prayed for, and that' they and each of them have an adequate remedy at law, the demurrer was sustained and the case dismissed, the Court holdmgr (1) That no equitable jurisdiction was shown to exist in. the court to entertain the bill; (2) that each of the complainants had a. ■complete and adequate remedy at law in an action to recover from the Assessor and Tax Collector of the Territory of Hawaii! any moneys that may be paid by them, or any of them, to said’ Tax Collector under the compulsion of legal process; (3) that the’ Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii was acting within the general powers conferred upon it by Congress in the enactment of the' said Income Tax Law, and this Court will not entertain a bill to enjoin the collection of the tax.</p>

<p>1. Section. 616 of the Penal Lawn of the Republic of Hawaii, compiled in 1897, provides that ‘‘the necessary bills of indictment shall be prepared by a legal prosecuting officer and be duly presented to the presiding- judge of a cour-t before the arraignment of the accused, and such judge shall, after examination, certify upon each bill of indictment whether he finds the same a true bill or not.” Section 1345 of the Civil Laws of the Republic of Hawaii, Icompiled in 1897, provides that “no jury for the trial of any case, ■civil or criminal, shall be less than twelve in number, but when nine of such jury shall agree upon a verdict, they may render the ■same, and such verdict shall be as valid and binding upon the parties as if rendered by all twelve.” Under these two provisions of the laws of Hawaii, and after the passage of the Joint Resolution of Annexation of both Houses of Congress, dated July 7, 1898, prescribing that “The Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies..........are hereby annexed as a part of the territory of the United States, and are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof,” a Japanese was, indicted in the Hawaiian Islands without the intervention of a Grand Jury, tried for the crime of murder, and convicted by a verdict of nine jurors of the crime of manslaughter, and sentenced to, imprisonment at hard labor for twenty years. Upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus made to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii by the said Japanese, on the ground that he was in custody contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, Held: That the conviction of petitioner was illegal and void under the provisions of Articles V, VI and VII of the Constitution! of the United States, which -became the supreme law of the Islands immediately after the passage of the Joint Resolution of Annexation. The writ allowed and petitioner ordered discharged, the Court having jurisdiction to issuei the writ when justice demands it, or when a -person isi in custody “in violation of the Constitution.” (Sec. 753, R. S. U. S.)</p> <p>2. Congress provided by a Joint Resolution of both Houses, dated July 7th, 1898, that the “municipal legislation of the Hawaiian 'Islands........not contrary to the Constitution of the United States........shall remain in force'until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.” By this joint Resolution, Congress in t'he plenary power conferred upon it, provided that all municipal legislation, of the Republic of Hawaii contrary to the Constitution of tbe¡ United States should bo repealed, leaving in force all that was not in conflict with it. No language could be plainer.</p> <p>3. No reservation was made in the Joint Resolution of Annexation of Articles V., VI. and VII. of the Amendments to the Constitution relating to indictments or trial by jury in common law or criminal cases. This showed that American sovereignty not only prevailed here, as elsewhere in t'he Territories of the United States, but that nothing could be done or permitted here contrary to the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>4. This annexation was not in a "transition or inchoate” state, but was complete, and the Constitution came with annexation and ■became, and ever since has been, the supreme law of this Territory.</p> <p>5. The finding of a true bill by a Circuit Judge of the Territory, or in any other manner than by the indictment of a Grand .Jury properly empowered to act in the premises, is in direct violation of the provisions of Article V of the 'Constitution of -the United States, and any person found guilty of an infamous crime without such indictment by a Grand Jury is illegally convicted, and should be released on rabeas corpus.</p>

<p>1. Policy of Government of United States to protect all people therein from illegal or improper handling of the mails.</p> <p>2. A letter carrier is hound to deliver letters or mail in the condition in which he received the same, without any delay or detention, save that necessarily incident to his employment.</p> <p>3. Circumstantial evidence; crime rarely committed in presence of witnesses.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Exceptions to. Libel.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. Indictment eor Murder on High Seas Under Section 5339 R. S. U. S.</p>

Criminal Law. Informations based upon Section 10 of an Act of Congress of date March. 3, 1891, entitled “An, Act in amendment of the various Acts relative to immigrants and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor.”

<p>1. Where the allegations of the petition relate to matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, he cannot deny the same upon the ground of lack of information or belief upon the subject; and if he does so, such denials will be stricken out of the answer on motion.</p> <p>2. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion to strike out parts of an answer,</p> <p>3. A defendant cannot in his answer deny knowledge of his own acts; on the contrary he is presumed to know what he doesi .</p> <p>4. In a proceeding brought by the Government of the United States under Sections 4142, 4143, of the R. S. U. S., to recover the value of a certain vessel, where the allegations of the petition show that the said vessel was unlawfully registered by the defendant under the lavs of the United States, in that he took oath before the Spe■cial Deputy Collector of Customs at the port of Honolulu for the District of Hawaii that 'he was a citizen of the United States at the time of the application' for the American registry; that he was the sole owner of said vessel, and. that no citizen or subject of a foreign power was interested in the same, when in truth and in xact he was not the sole owner of said vessel, and was not a citizen of the United States at the time of making said application; where the answer filed to said petition by the defendant denied that at the time of making said oath that it was within his knowledge, “although it was within his supposition,” that he was not a citizen of the United States; and asi to whether or not he took the oath mentioned in the petition, he had no information or belief upon ithe subject sufficient to enable him -to answer the averment, and therefore, and upon that ground, denies that he took the oath ini the petition .averred; and where the answer alleged further that the legal interest in said vessel was only temporarily in the defendant, the beneficial interest being in an American corporation at the time of the application for an American register, and that defendant believed the said application to bo a purely formal affair, and signed the papers submitted to him without reading them, having no knowledge that the said documents signed before the Special Deputy Collector of Customs represented the defendant to be a citizen of the United States, or that no subject or citizen of any foreign power was interested in the said vessel; upon a motion to strike out all of said parts of said answer, Held: That the same should be stricken out as sham, evasive, irrelevant and immaterial. That every man is presumed to know of what country he is a citizen, and he cannot rest a denial to a material fact upon the ground thiat he did not know of what nation, he was a citizen.</p>

<p>U. Upon an appeal to this court under Section 15 of the Customs Administrative Aot of June 10, 1890 (26 U. S. Stats. 137), by an importer of certain articles of merchandise known as Japanese shoes or slippers, where it appeared that the only ground of protest Stated by the protestant in his notice of protest to the Collector ( under the provisions of Section 14 of the said Customs Administrative Act, and on the hearing had by the Board of General Appraisers at New York, upon appeal from the decision of the said Collector, was error in the classification and assessment of the said articles by the Collector, in t'hait the saime should have been classified as ‘“boots and shoes made of leather,” under Paragraph 438 of the Tariff .Act of 1897 (Vol. 30, U. S. Stats. 193), instead of “manufactures of leather,” under Paragraph 450 of said Act; and where the decision ■of the Board of General Appraisers overruled the protest, but classified the said merchandise as dutiable under Paragraph 93 of said ‘Tariff Act, Held, that protestant cannot on appeal to this court from the decision of the Board of General Appraisers at New York, ■allege as error on the part of said Board the fact that it disregarded the provisions of Section 7 of the Tariff Act, the so-called “‘similitude clause.” It wtas not possible under the language of the «original protest to do this. The protestant is confined to the allegations of his protest made to the Collector of the Customs and upon which the Board of General Appraisers acted.</p> <p>.'2. An importer must stand on the objections raised in the original protest, and cannot vary from nor enlarge them in his petition for review or on the trial.</p> <p>‘.3. It is prescribed by Section 14 of the Customs Administrative Act, that the person dissatisfied with the decision of the Collector ot Customs, shall give notice to the Collector setting forth therein •“specifically and distinctly........the reasons for his objections thereto.” That was done by the importer in this case; and that must stand as the alleged error appealed from.</p> <p>4. While a protest is not required to be made with technical precision, yet it must show that the objections afterwards made at the trial were in the mind of the party, and were brought to the knowledge of the Collector at the time of making them.</p> <p>5. Where no evidence was offered on the part of protestant at the hearing before the Board of General Appraisers, the said protestant not appearing at said 'hearing, although due notice had been given him thereof,- and the only finding of fact by said Board is as- to the materials of which the articles of -merchandise -are composed, based upon an analysis made by the analyst in charge of the analysis of textile fabrics in the Appraisers’ office, the component material of chief value being found to be, not leather, but rawhide; and where said analysis showed that one of the -component parts of the said merchandise was iron, Held, that as manufactures of rawhide are nowhere provided for in the Tariff Act of 1897, and there is no other component part of chief value, that the classification of the Board of General Appraisers as “articles or wares not specially provided for, composed wholly or in part of iron” (Par. 93, Tariff ’Act), is the correct one, and the decision of the said Board is affirmed.</p> <p>C The Board of General Appraisers was established to determine controversies in relation to the proper classification of articles under the Tariff Act of 1897, and the decision of such Board should not be overruled, unless clearly against the weight of the evidence.</p>

<p>1. The United States District Court lor the Territory of Hawaii is a court of Federal jurisdiction only, made so by Section 86 of the Act of Congress of April 30, entitled "An Act to provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii” (Yol. 31, U. S. Stats., P. 141).</p> <p>:2. Act 45 of the Session Laws of the Legislature of Hawaii (1898) requiring ¡all foreign corporations to file in ithe office of the Treasurer of the Territory a certified copy of the charter or act of incorporation of such ¡corporation or company, names ¡of the officers thereof, the mame; of some person upon whom legal notice and process from the courts of the Territory may he served and a certified copy of the by-laws of such corporation “under penalty of being deprived of the right to sue in any •court of the Territory for any cause of action whatever, while such refusal or neglect continues, does not apply to actions in admiralty instituted in the United States District Court of Hawaii.</p> <p>3. In an action in admiralty where the libellant was shown to be a 'corporation organized under the laws of the State of California, upon a motion to dismiss the libel made during the progress of the trial, based upon the fact that libellant had not complied with the provisions of Act 45 of the Session Laws of 1898 of the Republic ¡of Hawaii, continued in force by the Act of Congress passed for the government of the Territory; Held, that the provisions 'of such law related only to the territorial courts, and that in no event could a law of that character affect the jurisdiction of the United States District Court- of Hawaii in relation to admiralty cases. The motion denied.</p>

<p>1. Where a large freight steamer, the Nevadan, is stranded -on a coral reef in the channel of Honolulu ’harbor for tw-o hours and a half, and is finally relieved from lier peril through the efforts of a steam tug, the Fearless, and said steamer Nevadan slips off the reef into deep water and starts out to sea dragging the tug (which is still attached to her by the hawser), stern foremost; Held, that this was a part of the res gestae, and was a danger incurred by the salving tug which should be considered in estimating the character of the salvage services rendered.</p> <p>2. No vessel lying on a reef is in a position of safety; and it is not necessary to constitute a salvage service that the distress in which a vessel is in should he immediate or the danger absolute. It is sufficient, if at the time the assistance is rendered, the vessel has encountered any misfortune or danger which might possibly expose her to serious injury.</p>

<p>1. The legal custody of alien immigrants is in the ship bringing them to this country until the final completion of the examination of such alien immigrants by the proper inspection 'officers, notwithstanding they may have been removed from the ship for the purposes of such examination.</p> <p>2. The temporary removal for purposes of inspection provided for by the statute is simply for the convenience of the shipping people, and to prevent delay in the completion of the voyage of the vessel to its terminal point; and in the language of the statute, such “temporary removal shall not be considered a landing pending such examination.”</p> <p>3. Alien immigrants áre treated as being still on board the vessel, and until they are declared to be lawfully entitled to enter the United States, the responsibility for their safe-keeping is with the vessel or its agent.</p> <p>4. The vessel or its agent cannot avoid responsibility by claiming or proving that any officer or employe of the United States assumed to look after these alien immigrants.</p> <p>5. If, pending an examination and inspection by the proper officers, any alien immigrant escapes into United States territory, such escape is “a negligent landing........at a time and place other than that designated by the inspection officers,” within the meaning of 'Section 8 of the Act of March 3, 1891, relative to alien immigrants, etc.</p> <p>6. After alien immigrants have been examined by the proper inspection officers and a decision adverse to their landing has been arrived at, the custody of such immigrants continues in the ship or its agent; and it is the duty of the ship or its agent, after notice of the rejection of such alien immigrants, to deport them to the country from whence they came.</p> <p>7. If, after rejection by the proper inspection officers and pending deportation, any alien immigrant escapes into United States territory, then the said ship or its agent is liable under Section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1891, relative to alien immigrants, etc.</p> <p>8. Due care on the part of the steamship company or its agent to prevent the escape of alien immigrants is no excuse under the law, and cannot be proven.</p> <p>9. Nothing will excuse the steamship company or its agent, but wliat is known in law as vis major, or inevitable accident.</p> <p>10. When the government has proven to the satisfaction of the jury, the inspection and rejection of alien immigrants, with due notice thereof to the steamship company or its agent, the burden of proof is cast on the defendant to show that the said alien immigrants were returned to the country from whence they came.</p>

<p>1. The master of a ship and a seaman thereon are fellow servants- engaged in a common employment both in the navigation of said ship and while engaged in the loading and unloading of her cargo; and each assumes the risk of the other’s negligence in the discharge of the duties incident to this common employment.</p> <p>2. The owner of a steam vessel is not responsible in damages for personal injuries sustained by a seaman through the negligent giving of an unauthorized signal by the master of the ship, whereby a sling load of sugar was allowed to prematurely descend into a boat without warning to .the seaman, thus injuring him; where no •allegation is made in the libel of neglect on the part of the owner of the vessel in the selection of a proper person as master of the ■ship, or of any other breach of positive personal duty from which the injury might have resulted.</p>

<p>1. Where -the method used in transferring sugar from a wharf to a boat sustained in position only by its oars in the open sea, was shown to be the following: The man in charge of the derrick and winch on the landing first suspends the sling load of sugar out oyer the boat, and there holds it to await a signal from the men in the boat when they are ready 'to have it lowered into the boat; and it was shown in the special instance complained of, that no. signal was given for him to lower the sling load, containing some 1,250 pounds of sugar, into the boat, but that he did so without warning to the men in the boat, thereby severely injuring one of the crew thereof, and the man in charge of the winch claimed that the boat was lifted up on a big wave and struck the under side of the sling of sugar, and that the injury to the member of the crew resulted from that fact, without any negligence on the part of the winch man; Held, that if the boat had risen upon the big wave as claimed, and the sailor had been lifted up with the boat and injured, yet the same wave would have- carried the boat past the sling load of sugar, which, if held in position by the winehman, would have remained suspended even after its impact with the boat; and the fact that the sling load of sugar did toot remain suspended, but remained in the boat on top of the unconscious sailor, shows conclusively to the mind of the court that the winehman had negligently let go his hold of the sling load of sugar.</p> <p>2. Where it was shown that the winehman had entire control of the winch on the wharf, and was subject to no orders from any one in relation to the lowering of the sling loads of sugar save the sigmals from the men in the boat when they were ready to receive the same; and where it appeared that the winehman either saw, or, if he looked, could have seen, the incoming waves; Held, that by the mere raising or lowering of a lever he could control the position of the sling load, and if the conditions of the accident were such as .are claimed by him, it would still have been but the work of a mo-meat for him to have raised the sling load out of th© way of the wave and the boat, and thus have avoided the accident, if he had exercised such vigilance as was- incumbent upon him.</p> <p>3. The greater the danger, the greater the care required, of the winch-man in the exercise of his control over the machinery in his charge.</p> <p>4. A person ,of ordinary intelligence- will not purposely expose himseif to danger.</p> <p>5. The winchman was an employe of the Paau'hau Sugar Plantation Company, engaged in the prosecution of its work, and the said company is charged with responsibility for his careless and negligent acts done in the course of his employment and resulting in injury to libellant.</p>

<p>1. The port of Honolulu is a port of the United States, and the importation of women therein for purposes of prostitution is an importation “into the United States.”</p> <p>2. Not necessary to prove date of offense set up- in indictment; if proven to 'have been committed within three years prior to finding ■of indictment, the law is satisfied.</p> <p>3. Where law makes a crime a felony, any attempt to violate the law in that respect is an attempt to “feloniously” commit the specified crime. “Knowingly” to commit a crime is to go about its commission with a knowledge of what one intends to do.</p> <p>4. A man is presumed to know the result of his acts.</p> <p>5. A wilful doing, when used in the language of the penal statutes, is the doing with an evil intent, without a reasonable belief that the doing of the act is lawful.</p> <p>6. In order to sustain a charge of importation of a woman for purposes of prostitution, it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the importation by the defendant it was his purpose that the woman should engage in prostitution in this country.</p> <p>7. In considering question of intent, jury has right to take into consideration kind of place the woman was taken to on arrival in the country, character of practices engaged in by her, and whether such practices were with knowledge and consent of defendant.</p> <p>8. Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence; must be acted upon in the same manner as if direct.</p> <p>9. In attempting to prove that a certain house is a house of prostitution, it is permissible to show that it is located among houses having a general reputation of that character; or that it is known in the community as a house of ill fame.</p> <p>10. Confessions freely and voluntarily made are evidence of the most satisfactory character.</p> <p>11. The government in a criminal case ia not bound by the testimony of a witness produced in its behalf, where such testimony is contrary to statements made by such witness out of court to the prosecuting officers of the government, and which statements resulted in the bringing of the charges against the defendant.</p> <p>12. While such prior statements cannot be taken as proof of the facts stated, yet it is proper to admit such statements on the trial.</p>

<p>1. The decision of the Board of Special Inquiry provided for by the Act of March 3, 1903, giving certain alien immigrants the right to land in the Territory of Hawaii, is not a bar to an action to recover the penalty for the unlawful bringing of said alien imnm grants into the country, under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of March 3, 1903, regulating the immigration of aliens into the United States (Vol. 32, Part 1, U. S. Stats., 1213).</p> <p>2. Review of immigration laws of the United States supplementary to Sections 2158-2164, R. S. U. S.</p> <p>3. The provisions of Section 914, R. S. U. S., are not mandatory upon this court; on the contrary, a discretion is left in the court as to whether it will follow technically the forms,.pleadings' and modes of procedure of the courts of the territory.</p> <p>4. In an action at law based upon the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1903, entitled “An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States” (Vol. 32, Part 1, ;p. 1213, U. S. Stats.), where defendant pleaded as a bar to the action the, decision of a board of special inquiry provided for by Section 25 of the Act, admitting the alien claimed to have been ■ brought into the country in violation of Sections 4 and 5 thereof, Held, that Congress provided a tribunal for the recovery of the penalty sued for in “the courts of the United States,” and further provided that “both the Circuit and District Courts should be invested with full and concurrent jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of this Act” (Section 29). No restraint was placed upon the judgment of the courts by reason of the previous action of the administrative branch of the government. The question at issue between the alien and the government in that special inquiry was simply one of the alien’s right to land.</p> <p>5. A plea in .estoppel does no more than deny the plaintiff’s legal right to bring the action without denying or admitting the allegations of the complaint.</p> <p>6. The plea in bar, so-called, in this case held to be a plea in estoppel, which is overruled and defendant given 5 days in which to plead further.</p>

<p>1. In an action in admiralty in rem for damages for injuries sustained by a seaman on board tire barkentine “James Tuft,” where it appears that said seaman was thrown down on the deck by heavy seas and caught under a spar lashed amidships, which spar rose and fell upon the seaman, breaking his thigh bone; it being claimed by him that the injury was due to the improper placing of said spar on said ship and in the insecure lashing of the same, and where it was shown to be customary to place such spars on board sailing vessels to be used in case of emergencies; Held, that while there was some doubt as to whether this spar was properly placed or securely lash'ed to the deck, yet in the absence of any allegation or proof of either incompetency among the officers, or of neglect in providing the usual number of men required to man the vessei, or of unseaworthinéss in any particular, the accident was the result of the perils of navigation, and resulted from the risks inci'dent to libellant’s employment, for which, the vessel is not liable.</p> <p>2. The fact that the master of the vessel was a part owner therein, held not material in the absence of any evidence of such negligence as would entitle the libellant to damages for the injury primarily done him.</p> <p>3. The maritime law is sensitive as to the rights of seamen and rigorous in providing for their protection. When injured in the service of the ship, or disabled by illness while in such service, they arc entitled to be dared for, and cured if possible, at the expense of the vessel; and where that duty is not performed, and a seaman suffers from the neglect, the ship is liable in consequential damages for the suffering and pain caused by such failure.</p> <p>4. Where on a voyage from Newcastle, in the Colony of Australia, to Honolulu, in the Territory of Hawaii, a seaman on hoard the “James Tuft” was seriously injured by haying his thigh broken, and on the twelfth day after such accident the vessel was withm sixty miles- of Papeete, on the Island of Tahiti, a well-known and settled French colony, where it was reasonable to suppose medical and surgical aid were obtainable for the injured man, but the Captain of the vessel failed to put into such port, proceeding instead on his voyage to Honolulu, which he reached nearly three weeks thereafter, and where he placed the injured man in the U. S. Marine Division of the Queen’s Hospital, the seaman being confined in said hospital since that -time for a period of nine and one-halt months, -undergoing two severe surgical operations on the injured leg, and being shown at -the trial to be a cripple unable 1.0 walk without the aid of a cane, which condition is due, according to the testimony of a leading physician, to the bone being allowed to gb without proper surgical treatment;</p> <p>Held, that the master -of the vessel was guilty of gross negligence in failing to take libellant to the nearest port, which in this instance was Papeete, on the Island of Tahiti, for surgical aid after he had been wounded in the service of the ship, for which negligence libellant has an additional and different cause of action against the vessel, which is liable in consequential, damages.</p> <p>5. Where an injured seaman was left at a hospital in the city of Honolulu, the vessel -on which he was injured proceeding on her voyage and not returning to the port of Honolulu -until nine and a half months thereafter, the seaman during all of that time being confined in the hospital undergoing treatment for his injuries, Held, that an action instituted by him immediately upon the return of said vessel was in sufficient -time and no laches is shown.</p>

<p>1. Upon the trial of a libel in personam against the owner of a steam vessel for wages due libellants and for damages for breach of contract, where it appeared that libellants had been engaged by one Baker, acting as the agent of the defendant for this transaction alone, to go from Honolulu to Hilo to take charge of the steam vessel “Counselman” and bring her down to Hilo as c'aptain and first officer respectively, but upon arriving at Hilo, where the vessel lay, one Guard, the agent of the defendant in charge of the vessel there, refused to recognize the employment of the libellants in the capacities indicated, or at all; Held, that under the facts as shown in this case, the employment of the libellants was within the scope of the authority of Baker; that the contract was for libellants to go to Hilo and bring the “Counselman” to Honolulu; and upon the failure of the defendant to carry out its part of the contract through the action of its agent at Hilo, a right of action accrued to libellants to recover damages for such breach.</p> <p>2. It is a well-known principle of the admiralty law that when a seaman is discharged before the commencement of the voyage, he is entitled not alone to his wages, but to a reasonable measure of damages, for which the owners of the ship are liable.</p> <p>3. Claims for wages are very highly favored by courts of admiralty; and discharges, unless for more serious reasons than appear from the facts in this case, are not to be justified.</p>

<p>1. In an application for a -writ of habeas corpus -made and signed by a Chinese person on behalf of a Chinese woman, where the allegations of the petition show that the woman is forcibly detained in a house belonging to the respondent, and restrained therein through fear -of him, and compelled by him to lead a life of prostitution; Field, that -the allegations of the petition are sufficient to give the court jurisdiction under Subdivision 3 of Section 753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, “or in custody in violation of the Constitution," in that such allegations show'that she is held in involuntary servitude contrary to the Thirteenth Article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>2. Where the petition in an -application for a writ of habeas corpus was not signed by the party “for whose relief it was intended,” hut ■by a third person in her behalf, Had, that while it .is -true United States Courts are controlled by th-e provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act which confers the power to issue the writ upon such courts, yet this court will not give such a narrow construction to the Act as would prevent any person like the woman claimed to be restrained of her liberty in this case, from enjoying the benefits of the . ■ Act, wbo is by the very circumstances of her restraint deprived of the opportunity of signing the application in her own behalf.</p> <p>3. Section 760 of the Revised Statutes of t'he United States contemplates the .possibility .that some third party might make the application for the writ on behalf of the person restrained or deprived of his or her liberty; and said Section must he considered in connection with Section 754.</p> <p>4. Every person under the Constitution and laws of the United States is entitled to the enjoyment of personal liberty; of t'he right of free locomotion to go when and where one pleases, and to do all that is necessary in the conduct of one’s affairs, restrained only so far as one infringes upon the rights or the welfare of others.</p> <p>5. No form of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, can, under Article Thirteen of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, be lawfully permitted to exist in this territory.</p> <p>6. A Chinese woman shown to have been purchased of her mother' in China for $200, and afterwards brought to Hawaii and compelled by the respondent to lead the life of a prostitute, turning all the earn! ings of such vocation over to him, and who was (while not nhysically restrained by respondent, in such fear of him by reason of threats against her life should she go out freely) unable to leave the house where he detained her, found by the court to he restrained of her liberty and held in a condition of slavery repugnant to the Thirteenth Article of the Amendments to the Constitution of t'he United States, >anid released on. habeas corpus.</p> <p>7. Even if a marriage had existed between the respondent and the woman held under restraint by him, which does not appear to he proven from the facts as shown in this case, still such marriage would give respondent no right to deprive the woman of her personal liberty, and if so deprived, she could have recourse to the writ of habeas corpus for release.</p> <p>8. It Is settled law that a husband cannot detain his wife against her will.</p> <p>3. Liberty may be restrained by threats as well as by forcible action, if the power exists to enforce the threats.</p>

<p>1. A seaman who is injured while in the service of the ship is entitled to medical care and nursing and to a cure, if possible, at the expense of the ship, and all reasonable measures must be taken to that end.</p> <p>2. Where a seaman in the performance of his duty, and without fault on his part is injured in the service of the ship and there is no one aboard the ship competent to treat the injury, it is the positive duty of the master of the ship to take him to the nearest port where proper medical or surgical treatment can be obtained, and the failure of the master to do so is negligence for which the ship and its owners are liable.</p> <p>3. Where a seaman is incapacitated for work through injuries received while in the service of the ship, he is entitled to his full wages to the termination of the voyage.</p> <p>4. Where a seaman was shown to have fallen and broken his leg on board a vessel while said vessel was navigating Cape Horn during a storm, and there was no one on board the vessel who had surgical knowledge, the leg being rudely set by the first officer; and where it appeared that at the time of the accident the vessel was 484 miles from Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands, and over seven thousand miles from her port of destination, Honolulu, in the Territory of Hawaii, and the winds and currents were favorable to making the Falkland Islands in . less than two days, where surgical treatment could have been obtained for the injured seaman, and where it was further shown that within eleven days after the accident, the vessel was less than goo miles from Valparaiso and less than 800 miles from Valdivia, both on the coast of Chili, where surgical aid also could have been obtained, and where it appeared that the master of the vessel made no attempt to make any of these ports, but continued his voyage to Honolulu, reaching that port two months after, the injury occurred, the injured man having hurt the leg again in the interval through another fall, and being unable to walk without crutches or canes, and the leg being deformed and shorter than the other by reason of the overlapping of the bones due to the imperfect setting of the same, Held, that the master of the vessel was guilty of negligence in failing to put into the nearest port, as soon as possible after the accident happened, for surgical aid for the injured man, for which negligence the ship and its owners are liable, and damages awarded in the sum of $1,800.</p>