Volume 2 — District of Hawaii

<p>Criminal Law. — Indictment.—Several Felonies Charged in Separate-Counts: It was objected that the indictment charged the commission of two separate and distinct felonies in two counts. Held: the point is covered by Section 1024 R S., the two offenses, peonage and slavery, being; of the same class of crimes and involving involuntary servitude as their main feature, which is the status the statutes punishing these' offenses» were intended to cure.</p> <p>Same. — Indictment.—Description of Offense: The second count was-objected to on the ground that it does not state sufficient facts to constitute: a crime under the U. S. laws. Held, that where the statute in purely statutory offenses sets forth all the necessary elements of the crime, it may be sufficiently charged in the words of the statute; the count in question;, describing the offense in the words of the statute and alleging facts of time and place and the name of the person alleged to have been held in involuntary servitude, held sufficient. Bill of particulars allowed.</p>

<p>Jury Trial. — Practice.—Instructions.—Motion to Set Aside Verdict and Grant a New Trial: The court read a portion of the evidence to the jury and instructed them if they believed it, they should find against defendant, whose counsel after verdict of guilty, made such instructions a ground of a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Held, an insufficient ground for such a motion, the jury having been also instructed to consider all the evidence and all the surrounding circumstances in reference 'to the offense charged.</p> <p>Same. — Use of Papers, etc., of Defendant as Evidence: While seizures of papers and property under the process of the court may not be used as evidence against the owner in criminal proceedings, they may be so used when they have been obtained outside of such process, even though illegally.</p> <p>Same. — Seizure of Papers and Property of Defendant to be Used as Evidence: Papers and property unlawfully in one’s possession, or unlawfully used in the accomplishment of a criminal offense, should be seized by those arresting him to be used as evidence against him.</p>

<p>Admiralty. — Lieu: Contracts and torts of the master and owner, including freighting contracts, create a lien on the vessel.</p> <p>Same. — Pleading.—Torts-. Words of a libel charging assault on a passenger will not neutralize words clearly bringing the case within the class of maritime torts.</p> <p>Same. — Joinder of Causes of Action: Causes of action arising ex contractu and ex delicto may be joined in one libel, where the causes are so connected that the same evidence will apply to all.</p> <p>Same. — Ship's Liability for Acts of Subordinate Officers: Acts of subordinate officers which are not in the line of their regular duties, should be connected by proper averments with the master’s authority to make the ship liable. *</p> <p>Same. — Pleading: Allegations that the vessel entered into a contract and failed to perform it, not fatal, though unusual.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. — Accessories before the Fact to Adultery and Fornication : There may be accessories before the fact to the offenses of adul-</p> <p>tery and fornication in spite of Section 5323 R S., which defines accessories to certain crimes on the seas not including these; and Section 5533 R. S., providing for punishment of accessories after the fact to certain offenses, not including these.</p> <p>Same. — Liability of Aider, Procurer and Abettor: A person who cannot be convicted as a principal maj' be convicted as an aider, procurer and abettor.</p> <p>Same. — Liability of Conspirators: A conspiracy to procure the accomplishment of a criminal or unlawful purpose through others, will render the conspirators liable.</p> <p>Same. — Indictment Charging Several Offenses: An indictment may charge both adultery and fornication, and the jury may find the defendant guilty of either.</p> <p>Same. — Indictment for Conspiracy. — Description of Offense the Object of the Conspiracy: In an indictment for conspiracy the conspiracy is the</p> <p>gist of the indictment, and the offense which was the object of the conspiracy need not be described with the same strictness that is required in an indictment for the commission of the offense itself.</p> <p>Same. — Indictment.—Description of Overt Act: Under the indictment it was charged that defendants collected and contributed funds in furtherance of the conspiracy, and to “foster, maintain, carry on and conduct” the crimes, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. This is a sufficient description of the overt act charged.</p>

<p>Construction of Statute. — What is an Officer Under Sec. 5408 R. .S'. U. S.? The clerk of the House of Representatives of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii is an “officer” within the meaning of Section 5408, Revised Statutes, U. S., certain of his duties being regulated by the Organic Act creating the Territory.</p> <p>Same. — What is a Public Record? A voucher calling for the disbursement of public funds for the House expenses of the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii, delivered to the clerk of the House, is a “record filed or deposited in any public office” within the meaning of Section 5403, Revised Statutes, U. S.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. — Practice in Jury Trials. — Proof of Corpus Delicti: The defendant contended that the corpus delicti should be proved independently of any admission by defendant, and that evidence of the relation of defendant to the corpus delicti could not be taken until the corpus delicti was proved. Held, that evidence of defendant’s admissions relating to the corpus delicti was properly allowed to go to the jury, so far as this ■objection was concerned, there being other evidence tending to corroborate and strengthen the proof thereof, and that full proof of the corpus ■delicti independently of confessions is not required, and the time cf the introduction of the different classes of evidence is not of consequence.</p> <p>Evidence. — Proof of Status of Alleged Officer: Evidence that defendant acted as clerk of the House of Representatives, performed the duties ■of such office and was recognized by others as such officer, is sufficient that he was such officer.</p> <p>Practice. — Consideration of New Point at Close of Argument on Motion: After argument on the motion, the court suggested to counsel the ■question of the admissibility of evidence of defendant’s testimony before the federal Grand Jury, the point not having been raised during the trial, and allowed argument thereon. Held, that it was not too late to consider the question, the defendant, through the oversight of his counsel, not liaving had the benefit of the consideration thereof during the trial.</p> <p>Criminal Law. — Practice.—Jury Trial. — Question of Use of Evidence of Defendant’s Testimony before Grand Jury: The introduction of evidence of defendant’s testimony before the Grand Jury was improper under the provisions of Section 86o R. S. and he is entitled to a new trial free from such evidence.</p>

<p>Admiralty. — Right of ■a Pilot to Salvage in Hawaii'. Under the principles of maritime law applicable to the Territory of Hawaii, a pilot may-become a salvor and be entitled to salvage under circumstances that do not call for his services as a pilot.</p> <p>Saule. — Bill for Salvage. — Estoppel: After performance, the libellant presented a bill “to expert pilot services rendered in getting the steamship ‘Clavering’ off the reef, . . . one hundred dollars,” which the master, in the libellant’s presence; agreed to pay. The libellant afterwards withdrew the bill from libellee’s agents and libelled the ship for “salvage services” for a larger amount. Held, that the bill was for “salvage services,” and that the amount claimed in the bill may be taken as a reasonable appraisement of the value thereof.</p> <p>Construction of Word. — Meaning of "Respondent” : The word respondent is not a technical one, and may properly be used for defendant in a suit in personam or claimant in a suit in rent. A respondent is one who responds to a suit.</p>

<p>Admiralty. — Non-liability of Ship for Injuries to Sailor Due to His Fellow Servants and the Perils of the Sea: The libellant was seriously injured while asssisting in lowering the foresail of the schooner while on a voyage on the high seas; the injury being due partly to the negligence of others of the crew and partly to the perils of the sea, the vessel was not liable in damages, it not appearing that she was unseaworthy or that the rigging or appliances were out of order, or that the officers and crew or any of them were incompetent.</p> <p>Same. — Liability of Ship for Medical Treatment of One of its Crew Injured in its Service: Upon the arrival of the vessel in port, the master neglected to procure for libellant proper medical treatment, leaving him to seek the same at his own expense. Held, that the vessel was liable in damages to libellant for such neglect.</p>

<p>Naturalisation. — Service of Alien on American Merchant Vessels as Condition for Naturalisation: An alien, after declaration of intention to become a citizen, served over three years on merchant vessels, one of such vessels being under a foreign register, leaving a period of service of two years and six months in American merchant vessels:— naturalization refused under Section 2174, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>Same. — Intervening Service on a Foreign Vessel: Quaere whether three years’ service on American vessels with six mouths’ service intervening on a foreign vessel would be sufficient under the statute.</p> <p>Same. — Requirement of Certificates of Discharge and Good Conduct: Certificates' of discharge and good conduct from each engagement on American merchant vessels during such three years’ service, necessary to naturalization.</p>

<p>At the request of an attorney of this court, charges were preferred against him, charging him with professional misconduct in the terrd torial courts and praying for such action as might be proper under the pleadings and proofs. Issue was joined and the case was tried.</p> <p>Disbarment Proceedings. — Question of Animus of a Court: There is no presumption of animus against the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii, because it referred a question of unprofessional conduct of attorneys of such court to the Attorney-General of such Territory for investigation and such action as the facts called for; especially when the attorneys under consideration requested an investigation.</p> <p>Same. — Question of Disqualification of a Judge: Because a judge of an appellate court would have been disqualified from sitting in a cause begun in a lower court, if it had reached his court on appeal, he is not thereby disqualified from sitting in a disbarment case in which the professional conduct of an attorney in connection with such other case, is under consideration.</p> <p>Same. — Question of Animus of a Member of the Court: The fact that a judge punishes an attorney several times for contempt is not by itself evidence of animus.</p> <p>Same. — Qzieslion of Disqualification of a Member of the Courtr Quaere whether a judge who had previously found a person to be non-compos mentis and in need of a guardian, is disqualified from sitting in a disbarment case in which the professional conduct of an attorney in. proceedings for a decree that the same person is non compos mentis and in need of a guardian, is under consideration.</p> <p>Same. — Instigation.—Unprofessional Conduct: Evidence showing that, an attorney, after instituting a case for his client, opposes and threatens, to prevent a compromise settlement desired by his client, unless he should, be paid a certain large amount of $5,000 as counsel fees, and thereafter personally conducts the negotiations for compromise, demanding and obtaining for his client an additional amount sufficient to cover his fees,, does not, standing alone, tend to prove that the proceedings were originally instigated by him. Such conduct was, however, improper and unprofessional and the charge of $5,000 was an exorbitant one for the services rendered.</p> <p>Same. — Improper Agreement Betzueen Client and Counsel. — Public Policy. — Agreement for Part of the Realizations of Litigation in Cases zvhere there Could Be no Judgment Awarding Property: A written agreement was made between clients and counsel to the effect that the latter should have one-third of all realizations of certain pending actions, and one-third of all property or benefits that such clients might receive from a certain relative during his life or after his death; and that such clients would not settle such litigation without the written consent of counsel. Held, that the agreement was objectionable, 1st, because the relation of client and attorney already existing between the parties, the attorney could not take advantage of such relation to obtain from his clients an unreasonable contract; 2nd, because of the stipulation that no settlement should be made by the clients of the matters in litigation without the written consent of counsel, which is against public policy, and 3rd, because it did not appear how any money or property could be realized by the clients as the logical result of such actions.</p> <p>Same. — Conduct of Attorneys. — Abuse of Process: Such agreement shows an intention on the part of counsel to misuse the process of the court to compel a relative of their clients to recognize them in the division of his estate, to the end that the attorneys might receive one-third of the share coming to the clients. The fact that there was no complaint on the part of the clients does not relieve the attorneys. The court will protect litigants, especially those who, like native Hawaiians, have naturally a conciliatory nature which tends to submissiveness toward foreigners.</p> <p>Same. — Conduct of Attorneys. — Right to Szie Client. — Threats: Counsel held his client’s note for $3,000 given under an engagement for future legal services. After these services were performed, resulting in a favorable judgment for the client, the counsel demanded $2,500 for his services and threatened to sue the client for the full amount of the note if his demand was not paid. The client offered $1,500 and they compromised the matter on $2,000. The information charged that the respondent -was guilty of gross impropriety in his conduct in this matter. Held, that an attorney has the right to sue his client for his fees and that respondent did not go beyond his rights in threatening to sue him under the circumstances.</p> <p>Same. — Indorsement of Integrity of Attorney: An indorsement of respondent’s business integrity by responsible citizens, is of significance and value in disbarment proceedings in which an attorney’s character is attacked.</p> <p>Same. — Allowance for Attorney's Excitable Nature: Allowance made in the consideration of the case, for respondent’s impetuous nature and •excitable temper, which tend, under some circVunstances, to give his words and actions less significance than might be the case with a person of a •different temperament.</p> <p>Same. — Object of Disbarment Proceedings: The end to be sought in disbarment proceedings is to uphold a high standard of honor in the relations that exist between courts and those whose interests they adjudicate, and to require such a standard of those who take part, as officers of .the court, in such relations.</p> <p>Same. — Expression of Such Object by Decision: ■ Disbarment not •called for in this case, it being sufficient that the court express by a j udgment not unreasonably severe, its definite policy in regard to the responsibility of its officers.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in Bern for Damages for Cruel Treatment.</p>

<p>Motion of Official Reporter for Execution against Libellee and Interven or and Claimant for his Eees for transcribing Evidence.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy Law. — Sufficiency of Order for Writ of Ne Exeat: The order for process to issue was made on a separate piece of paper; it recited “In the above case let the writ issue, etc.” This was sufficient, it being filed with the papers in the case and there being no unceitainty about its connection with the case.</p> <p>Same. — Time Allowance for Filing Bond in Issue of Process'. The plaintiff was allowed 24 hours in which to file the bond required by the order for .process, and it was filed during such limit. This was sufficient.</p> <p>Same. — Writ of Ne Exeat. — Affidavit by Whom: Permission for a writ of ne exeat is sufficiently supported by a sworn affidavit by one holding the positions of secretary, treasurer and manager of the plaintiff corporation, containing the allegations of respondent’s indebtedness in a fixed amount for goods sold and delivered, of respondent’s action in securing passage for himself and family on a steamer about to depart for a foreign land and that such departure would prejudice plaintiff’s interest in such indebtedness.</p> <p>Same. — Construction.—-Distinction between “Farming" and “Tillage of the Soil" in Bankrupt Act:</p> <p>One whose principal occupation is raising live stock and producing fodder for feeding them by cultivation of the soil, is “chiefly engaged in farming” but not chiefly engaged in “the tillage of the soil”: citing Brandenburg on Bankruptcy, 87, and In re Rugsdale,- Fed. Cas. No 12,123.</p> <p>Same. — Allegations as to Principal Place of Business and Balance Due: Allegation of principal place of business for preceding six months, sufficient as to time and place of accruing of debt;~and allegation of debt as ■“balance due upon goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered to respondent by petitioner at respondent’s request” sufficient as to nature of petitioner’s claim.</p> <p>Same. — Allegation as to Exemptions: It is not necessary to allege that property to be seized is not exempt from seizure.</p>

<p>Bankrupt Act. — Supplementary Petition by Additional Creditors for Ajudication: Petition by one creditor for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy, alleging the number of creditors to be less than twelve; answer alleged existence of more than twelve creditors. At the hearing two additional creditors appeared by petition asking permission to join in the petition for adjudication of bankruptcy. Permission granted under the authority of divisions d and f of Section 59 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy. — Involuntary Proceedings. — Practice.—Averment not Denied: The averment in a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy that respondent is not a wage-earner, not being denied in the answer, may be taken as admitted.</p> <p>Same. — Burden of Proof as to Farming and Tillage of the Soil: The petitioner for adjudication of bankruptcy having introduced evidence tending to prove the negative averment of his petition, that respondent is not chiefly engaged in farming or the tillage of the soil, the burden of proof is upon the respondent, he being, in the nature of things, in full possession of evidence to disprove such averment if it is not true.</p> <p>Same. — Pi*bof of Debt. — Application of Payments: The third ground of the motion was that petitioner failed to prove a debt due it from respondent at date of petition. During the existence of business relations between respondent and the firm of Ed. Hoifschlaeger & Co., the latter incorporated as Hoifschlaeger Company, Limited, — the petitioner, and the Rooks of the partnership became the books of the corporation and continued as such, there being no break in the business relations of the respondent as to his account with the partnership and its successor, — the corporation. The respondent had made payments on account, both before and after the incorporation, and by his letters, shortly after the incorporation, treated his debts to the former and the latter as one account, and impliedly approved of the application of his payments on account, to the oldest account. Held, that the letters showed debtor’s application of payments first to settlement of the partnership account, but if not, then, there being no evidence of his application of these payments, the creditor had the right to apply them to the partnership account, such account having been transferred to the corporation by the partnership at the time of the incorporation. Such application of payments to the partnership accounts first left a debt owing petitioner by respondent at the date of petition.</p> <p>Same. — Removal of Property by Alleged Bankrupt. — Question of Fraud. — Burden of Proof: The removal, by respondent, of his property to a vessel about to leave for a foreign country, while he is owing more than $1,000, is, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, a fraud on his creditors, and the burden of proof is on him to disprove the implication of fraud.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy. — Involuntary Proceedings. — Farming.—Farm Leased to Third Person Before Proceedings Begun: Respondent having been engaged in farming, terminated such occupation, and permitted the farm on which he had carried on farming operations and which belonged to his wife; to be leased to a third party previous to the beginning of proceedings against him for adjudication in bankruptcy. Held, that he was not engaged in farming or the tillage of the soil under the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and was liable to be adjudged a bankrupt.</p> <p>Same. — Preparations to Letave Country. — Fraudulent Intent: Respondent being indebted to his creditors in an amount exceeding one thousand dollars, and making preparations to go out of the country with his family, had in his possession a draft for about four hundred dollars in favor of his wife, which was accounted for both by him and his wife as having been raised by a sale of certain shares in a rice plantation belonging to her, which shares were originally purchased with money raised by her mortgaging her real estate, and there being no evidence to the contrary, and the petitioner having, in another branch of the case, contested his ability to have made enough money by farming for his family expenses, and there being no satisfactory testimony of his having acquired money in any other way, held, that there was nothing in the case to show fraudulent intent toward his creditors in relation to this draft.</p> <p>Same. — Amount of Baggage on Leaving Country. — Fraud: Under the same circumstances of preparing to leave the country, the accumulation in his baggage of a quantity of clothing and provisions, some few items of which were obviously presents to his family and a few of the others being evidently parcels intrusted to him to convey to friends in China, and the balance being a not unreasonable quantity of goods for a mail in his position to carry for his family use, was not suspicious of an intent to carry away property in fraud of creditors.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy. — Involuntary Proceedings. — Costs.—Witness’ Fees. — Tf. S. R. S. Sec. 983. — ■Affidavit: Under Section 983 of the Revised Statutes, allowing amounts paid witnesses to be taxed as costs, the affidavit must show that they have been actually paid.</p> <p>Same. Fees of Witnesses not Subpoenaed: Fees paid witnesses attending without being subpoenaed allowed as costs.</p> <p>Same — Counsel Fees: Counsel fees in a case of seizure of alleged bankrupt’s property in connection with proceedings in bankruptcy are allowed by the statute — such seizure being a distinct matter.</p> <p>Same. — Damages for Detention: -Consideration of damages suffered on account of detention caused by seizure of property.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy. — Assignments for Benefit of Creditors: There being no insolvent laws in the Territory of Hawaii, assignments for the benefit of creditors are good under the common law for all purposes except against proceedings in bankruptcy instituted under the Bankrupt Act within four months of their execution.</p> <p>Same. — Effect of Adjudication: If under such proceedings, the re-respondent is declared bankrupt, the assignment becomes void and the bankrupt’s property is thereby transferred to the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy.</p> <p>Same.' — •Assignment.—Estoppel: Creditors assenting to an assignment for the benefit of creditors and acting under it to the extent of filing claims, are not thereby estopped from petitioning for a decree of bankruptcy against the assignor.</p>

<p>Contract for Hiring. — Breach.—Damages: A breach of a contract for hiring, which contains no stipulation for a definite period of employment, .is not a ground for damages.</p> <p>Same. — Construction: Where such a contract contains a stipulation ■by the employer for “steady employment with chance of promotion,” there is no guaranty as to the term thereof; such a stipulation being merely a •promise which is a part of the contract so long as it continues.</p> <p>Same. — Valuable Consideration at Inception: Where a contract for hiring is based, at its inception, upon a valuable consideration coming from the employe, the employer will be liable in damages to the employe upon hir •refusal to carry out the same.</p>

<p>Contract of Hiring.- — Breach of. — Damages: A person who gives up a lucrative engagement and travels 2,000 miles at the request of another to enter his employment, and -engages in a contract of hiring with him, by which contract the latter, besides satisfactory wages, &c., promises steady employment with chance of promotion, has no claim for damages against the employer upon being discharged after two and a half years, during which time he received steady employment, and within about a month after his engagement was promoted with a large increase of pay.</p>

<p>Evidence. — Admissibility of: Evidence explaining the meaning of an award of the Fire Claims Commission, whose appointment and powers were authorized and created by the Hawaiian Legislature, inadmissible in proceedings based upon such award.</p> <p>Same: Evidence which takes issue with the findings of the Fire Claims Commission, inadmissible in such proceedings.</p> <p>Siame: Pencil memorandum made by the Fire Claims Commission on the back of a claim filed with it, and initialed by a majority of the members of the Commission, together with testimony of one of such Commissioners explaining the practice of the Commission in reference to such memorandum and the methods used and the principles adopted by the Commission in the consideration of the claims submitted to it, — admissible.</p> <p>Same: Subrogation clauses in a policy of fire insurance and instruments which “assign, set over, transfer and subrogate” to insurers the “right, claims, interest, dioses or things in action” to the extent of insurance paid, which the insured may have against other parties, with power of attorney to sue and compromise, admissible.</p> <p>Such Assignments Construed: Such assignments held to be agreements for carrying out the principle of subrogation, against the contention of the insurers that they were absolute assignments.</p> <p>Equity of Subrogation: Fire and maritime insurance policies are contracts of indemnity under which the insurer, after payment of loss, is entitled to recover from the insured, such amount as he may collect from third parties liable to him for such loss as is in excess of the actual loss sustained.</p> <p>Same.' — No Fund Existing Subject to Such Equity: .The award of the Fire Claims Commission allowed the insured claimant the excess only of their ascertained losses, over the amounts received'by it from the insurers. Held, there was no fund placed in the hands of the insured which is subject to the insurers’ equity of subrogation. The case of Burnand v. Rodocanachi, 7 L. R. App, Cas. 333, compared.</p>

<p>Liability of Vessels for Injuries Causing Death Under Code of California: Section 813— Code of Civil Procedure of California, making vessels liable in damages for injuries caused by them, to persons and property in that State, does not make them liable to the personal representatives of such persons for injuries causing death.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of a State of the Union Over Its Vessels on the High Seas: A vessel of a citizen of a State of the Federal Union and enrolled therein, is, when on the high, seas, the territory of such State, as to questions arising under the State laws which do not conflict with the civil and maritime authority of the United States.</p> <p>Negligence. — Hidden Defect of Gear. — Safe Place to Work: The fact that a defective condition of a wire rope is not noticeable from an outside inspection, is no defense to a libel for damages on the ground of negilgence, it being the duty of the employers to provide employes with a reasonably safe place in which to work.</p> <p>Suit for'Damages for Death. — Proof of Damages: The fact that the right to sue for damages is given to the personal representative of a person who loses his life by the negligence or wrongful act of another bj 'Sec. 377 — Code of Civil Procedure of California, does not relieve them from the necessity of proving pecuniary damages by reason of such death.</p> <p>Nominal Damages: Nominal damages not allowed in admiralty for personal torts.</p>

<p>Immigration Act. — Habeas Corpus: An alien immigrant prevented from landing in the United States by an immigration officer, is. entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>Id. — jurisdiction: The federal courts are without jurisdiction to review on their merits the decisions of immigration officers under the statutes affecting the right of aliens to enter the country. They may, however, examine such proceedings as to their conformity to law, and interfere upon a proper showing.</p> <p>Id. — Construction of Rules: Rule 7 of the Rules and Regulations for ■carrying out the provisions of such statute, requiring the examination of such alien to be “in the presence of government officials and such witness or witnesses only as the examining officer shall designate,” confers no authority on such officer to exclude such two non-Chinese witnesses as the alien may desire to produce, and as required by the statute, or to ■deprive him of a reasonable opportunity of procuring them.</p> <p>Id. — Rules.—Abuse of Discretion: It is an abuse of discretion given in Rule 10 to the examining officer to allow “additional time for the preparation of cases” where in his judgment it is necessary to prevent injustice, if a reasonable extension of time sufficient to enable the alien to produce the evidence made essential by the statute is refused.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.■—Proof of Claim by Alien that He Is ia Merchant: A merchant in the meaning of the Immigration Act is one whose interest in a mercantile business carried ón in a fixed place, is real and appears in the business or the partnership articles in his own name.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy. — Involuntary Proceedings:</p> <p>Partnership. — Creditors of Individual Partner: Creditors of a partnership are creditors of each partner thereof and may petition for adjudication of bankruptcy against a partner.</p> <p>Same. — Proceedings Against Individual Partner: The doctrine of the entity of a partnership, which requires a petition specifically directed against it in proceedings for adjudication, in which the partnership estaféis involved, does not apply to proceedings in bankruptcy against a partner.</p> <p>Same. — Adjudication.—Right of Creditor to: Creditors may not be deprived of their right to adjudication on the ground that it will not benefit them.</p>

<p>Contract. — Implication: A lease of a house-boat reciting its location at date of lease and containing a stipulation to return it in good order,, etc., at termination of lease and without stating the place of delivery, is. an implied agreement to return it at the location it was in at inception, of lease.</p> <p>Measure of Care and Skill: Measure of care and skill avoiding responsibility for accident is that which one of ordinary prudence would, use in his own case.</p> <p>Same: Care and skill required in an enterprise involving danger is. such as is reasonable considering the conditions and the peculiar circumstances and emergencies of the case.</p> <p>Negligence. — Towage Contract. — Tort: One undertaking to tow does, not incur liabilities of insurer or common carrier, but is liable for negligence in not exercising such care and skill as the weather and condition of the tow reasonably require for safety; such liability not dependent on. towage contract, but may be founded on tort.</p> <p>Same. — Towage: Procceeding to tow when the weather renders the-enterprise unsafe is negligence.</p> <p>Same. — Accident: An accident is sometimes evidence of negligence..</p> <p>Same. — Gratuitous Bailment: Want of necessary skill and care is. negligence if mandatary so undertakes the service as to be bound to. finish it.</p> <p>Liability — Unavoidable Accident: No responsibility for injuries resulting from unavoidable accident received in conduct of lawful business..</p> <p>Damages. — Rule of Maritime Insurance: The rule of maritime insurance as to damages probably not applicable to a libel for damages for loss of vessel by negligence.</p> <p>Same. — Measure of: Damages limited to the injury at the time of the accident.</p>

<p>Dangerous Boat Landing. — Special Care: A boat landing is dangerous to the extent of requiring special care when the condition of the sea is such that it is necessary to wat’ch for a favorable opportunity for a boat to leave the slip.</p> <p>Negligence: Under such conditions it was negligence not to send a responsible officer of the vessel with the boat, unless the boat steerer was competent.</p> <p>Same: To so load the boat with bulky freight that only two out of the boat’s four oars could be used upon leaving the slip, and to delay in getting the second oar into operation for from 47 to 71 seconds.</p> <p>Whether taking the boat out stern first under the circumstances was negligence, quaere.</p> <p>Vis Major. — Act of God,. — Peril of the Sea: Reducible to the term inevitable or unpreventable accident.</p> <p>Common Carrier. — Burden of Proof: The burden of proof, on failure to deliver the goods in good order, is on the carrier to show loss resulted from inevitable accident or other cause for which he was not responsible.</p> <p>Damages. — Limitation of: Printed notices placed on walls of stateroom and office for sale of tickets to the effect that carrier will not be-liable for injury or loss of baggage for over $100 are not a part of the-contract for carrying the passenger, and do not bind him unless he has. read them or his attention has been called to them by the carrier.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in Personam for Seamen’s Wages:</p>

<p>Immigration. Jurisdiction. The federal courts have no authority to review the decisions of immigration officers acting under the statute relating to the admission of aliens.</p> <p>Such courts 'may, however, investigate the action of such officers and may interfere therein if such action is inconsistent with law and constitutional principles.</p>

<p>Liability of Surety on Trustee’s Bond: Liability of surety extends to such expenditures of the funds of the bankrupt estate as become necessary as the immediate result of embezzlement by the trustee of funds of such estate, but not including the premium on the bond of the new trustee.</p> <p>Life of Trustee’s Bond: Trustee’s bond does not become void on the first recovery, but continues in force for two years after the estate is closed, unless the amount thereof is previously exhausted.</p>

<p>Injunction. — Jurisdiction: If a board of health interrupts private Tights, the authority of a court to interfere by injunction does not depend on the question whether the board acted in bad faith, but on the question whether it has overstepped its authority.</p> <p>Same. — Political Candidacy. — Business Interest: Running for election to a salaried official position is a lawful business enterprise, involving ¡a business interest, which may he protected by injunction.</p> <p>Board of Health. — Deprivation of Liberty: The authority of the Ha■waiian Board of Health to restrain the liberty of the inmates of the leper settlement and the freedom of intercourse of others with them, is limited to the necessity of protecting the rest of the community from contagion, and of providing for the well-being of such inmates.</p> <p>The Voting Franchise.' — Rights to Political Instruction: The grant of the franchise to the inmates of the leper settlement, involves a reasonable opportunity on their part of receiving instruction on political issues.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. — Distiller.—Sufficiency of Count: A count of an indictment, charging that defendants unlawfully carried on the business of a distiller without having given bond as required by law, contrary to the form of the statute, etc., is a sufficient description of the offense slated in Sec. 3260 R. S. U. S., the word “distiller” being defined in Sec. 3247 R. S. U. S.</p> <p>Same. — Still.—Sufficiency of Count: A count of an indictment charging that defendants unlawfully had in their possession and custody and under their control a still and distilling apparatus set up without having the same registered as required by law, contrary to the form of the statute, etc., is a sufficient description of the offense stated in R. S. U. S. Sec. 3258, as the offense is complete upon the setting up of a distilling apparatus for distilling any substances whatever, without registering the same.</p>

<p>Partnership. — Execution Against Partner. — Sale:</p> <p>Execution of a judgment against a partner is properly levied on the partnership property, and a sale under such execution must be the sale of the undivided interest of the judgment debtor in the partnership prop■erly, to be realized only upon an accounting and settlement of the partnership, and does not transfer any specific or component part of the partnership property to the purchaser.</p> <p>United States Marshal. — Execution:</p> <p>Responsibility and duties of United States Marshal in levying execution of judgment against a partner, stated-</p>

<p>Claims.- — Judgment for Salary. — Assignment to Attorney for Services. ■ — -Attorney’s Lien:</p> <p>Attorneys brought proceedings for mandamus for their client’s restoration to an office of which he had been deprived, in which a writ was issued but was ineffective for various reasons; they afterwards brought proceedings for his official salary for the time he was deprived of the administration of the office in question, which resulted in a judgment for such salary. The client agreed with his counsel that they should receive their compensation for all of the litigation out of whatever judgment should be obtained, but there was no understanding as to the amount of such pay. Pending the proceedings in bankruptcy, the client assigned to his counsel his interest in his said claim for salary.</p> <p>On these grounds, the attorneys claim a lien on the judgment but not insisting on the assignment as a bafeis of their claim Held, that there being no law of the Territory or practice of its courts recognizing an attorney’s lien, such claim has no standing before this court.</p> <p>In any case, there being no agreement for a specific amount, which would create a lien by the New York practice, there is no lien, and the court may not attempt to apportion or fix the amount earned.</p> <p>The proceedings for the salary being solely effective in obtaining the judgment, the compensation for the mandamus proceedings, could not be included in a charging lien, if such a lien exists.</p> <p>The assignment being made pending proceedings in bankruptcy and being in the nature of a preferment of one set of creditors over other's, was invalid.</p> <p>Claimants left to their rights as general creditors.</p>

<p>Habeas Gorpus: Demurrer to Return.</p>

<p>Construction of a Statute: The Hawaiian statute authorizing the Board of Health to segregate leprous patients who are “deemed capable of spreading the disease of leprosy,” does not require that such capability shall be absolutely demonstrated.</p> <p>In such proceedings the opinion of the Board of Health, based on medical advice, that such person is capable of spreading the disease, is sufficient.</p>

<p>"Civil Suit” under Sec. 739 R. S. U. .S' — Stdt in Admiralty: A suit in admiralty is not a “civil suit” within the meaning of Sec. 739 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.</p> <p>Sidts in Personam. — Attachment Under Admiralty Rule 2. — Tort: Provision of Admiralty Rule 2, for attachment of goods of defendant in suits in personam, when he cannot be found, applies to actions of tort as well as contract and affects the property of foreign corporations lying within the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>Same. — Owners of Cargo: Process of attachment against a vessel under Admiralty Rule 2, will not be stayed because the interests of the owners of cargo already placed on board would thereby be prejudiced.</p>

<p>Negligence of Employe and his Fellow Servants Resulting in Injttry to Him. — Contributory Negligence of Employer: Where an employe is killed in consequence of his own carelessness and that of his fellow servants, and their disobedience of the orders of the employer, his representatives are not' entitled to damages unless the employer might have avoided the consequences of such negligence and disobedience of orders, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence.</p> <p>Reasonable Care on the Part of the Employer: Where, in such a case, the agents of the employer gave positive and repeated instructions to the employes which, if followed, would have avoided the accident which resulted in the death of one of them, reasonable care was exercised which relieved the employer from liability.</p> <p>Safe Place in which to Work: The breaking of one of the strong-backs supporting the hatch coverings, in consequence of the action of employes in landing slings of sugar upon such hatch coverings contrary to the orders and instructions of the agents of the employer, is no proof that the employer did not provide them with a safe place to work, if such strongback was sufficient for the purposes for which it was intended, to-wit, the protection of the hold from the elements, including sea water, and such pressures as it might receive in the management of the ship from the crew standing on it or throwing coils of rope upon it.</p> <p>Credibility of Witness: The credibility of a witness may be affected by his proved hostility to the party against whom he testifies, together with the unlikely character of his testimony.</p>

<p>Injury ' to Servant. — Negligence of Master. — Burden of Proof: Where there is evidence of negligence of the employer in relation to an accident resulting in injury to the employe, the burden of proof is on the employer to show injury was not due to negligence.</p> <p>Same. — Condition of Tackle as Evidence. — Latent Defect. — Inevitable Accident: Unsatisfactory condition of piece of rope introduced in evidence, together with the fact of the breakage of the rope whereby libellant received injury, and evidence of some negligence as to its care, places on the ship the burden of accounting for the breakage from latent defect or some cause beyond its control, though using ordinary care and diligence in its preservation.</p> <p>Proximate Cause. — Latent Tendency: If personal injuries are the direct cause of a diseased condition, they may be regarded as the proximate cause thereof, even though there was a pre-existing or latent tendency in the system of the injured person toward such diseased condition.</p> <p>Predisposition to Disease. — Damages for Injury Causing such Predisposition to Develop: A predisposition to a certain disease in the system of a person who receives an injury which causes such disease to break out, does not deprive him of his right to damages for such injury.</p> <p>Reasonable Inference: -Where disease develops in an injured part of the body shortly after the happening of the injury, and which is of such a nature that it might develop from such injury, it is a reasonable inference that it was induced by such injury.</p>

<p>Partnerships as Petitioning Creditors: Whether under the Bankruptcy Act', Section i, division 19, defining partnerships as persons, partnerships may petition for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy without stating the names of the partners,' — quaere?</p> <p>Proof of Authority of Agent to Bring Proceedings: The authority of an agent to act for his principal in petitioning for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy, is material and’should, be set forth in the affidavit or otherwise established.</p> <p>Agent. — Verification: An authorized agent is qualified to verify such a petition when his principals are at a distance and he is acquainted with the facts.</p> <p>Wage-earner; farmer, etc.: Averment in petition for involuntary bankruptcy that alleged bankrupt is not a wage-earner nor engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, necessary unless the other averments, sufficiently exclude the fact of such occupations.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy Act. — Practice.—Subpoena: Section 18 a. of the Bankruptcy Act, in providing that service of a petition for involuntary bankruptcy “with a writ of subpoena shall be made upon the person therein named as defendant in the same manner that service of such process is now had upon the commencement of a suit in equity in the courts of the United States,” does not require that' the writ of subpoena shall contain the special memorandum mentioned in Equity Rule 12.</p>

<p>Partnership. — Partnership and Individual Assets of Partners: Although a partnership may be adjudged bankrupt without adjudging the-partners bankrupt, yet' in such case both the partnership assets and the individual assets of the partners are administered by the trustee and: marshalled to prevent preferences and secure the equitable distribution of the property of the several estates.</p> <p>Same. — Insolvency.—Allegation of: A partnership is not insolvent because of inability to pay its debts out of the partnership estate, but only because of its inability to pay its debts out of partnership and individual assets of the partners. It is therefore necessary, in a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against a partnership in which the act of bankruptcy charged is a preference through legal proceedings, to allege in sufficient language, such actual insolvency which may be covered by the words “the partners owe debts which they are unable to pay in full,” according to form 2. The words of the petition, “that said copartners, doing business as Wing Yick Co., are insolvent,” are sufficient.</p> <p>Same. — Pnatyer for Adjudication: The prayer of the petition in such case, “that said copartners may be adjudged by this court to be bankrupt,” is a prayer solely for the adjudication of the partnership-</p> <p>Same. — Claims of Creditors Receiving Preferences: Claims of creditors who have received preferences voidable under section 6o, subdivision b, not to be allowed unless such preferences are surrendered.</p>

<p>Piartnership — Assumpsit—Judgment: Where, in an action of assumpsit on a promissory note, signed by a firm by its partnership name, the pleadings, process and title of the case in the minutes of the court, showing that the proceedings were brought against the partnership, the judgment is entered against the individuals composing the partnership without reference to the partnership, it is a judgment against the partnership.</p>

<p>Admiralty. — Jurisdiction.—Test of Locality: The test of jurisdiction in admiralty is a test of locality whether the matter in issue is a contract or tort.</p> <p>Same: A tort taking place on land is not within the admiralty jurisdiction, even though it may have relation to a contract within such jurisdiction.</p> <p>Practice. — Amendments.—Want of Jurisdiction: Exceptions to the libel for want of jurisdiction, being allowed, the court is without authority to allow amendments to the pleadings.</p> <p>Same. — Want of Jurisdiction — Costs: In such a case the libel being ■dismissed for want of jurisdiction, costs may not be awarded against the losing party.</p>

<p> Attorney’s Fees: </p> <p>Fees not allowed involuntary bankrupt’s attorney for services pertaining to bankrupt’s admission of inability to pay debts, hearing for adjudication, trustee’s suit to set aside bankrupt’s conveyance of real estate and negotiations for compromise thereof, proceedings for order of sale of real estate and hearing on question of bankrupt’s ownership of personal property.</p>

<p> Promissory Note made payable to Officer of the United States: </p> <p>The United States may be plaintiff in an action to collect a promissory note made payable to one of its officers, if it appears on the face of the note or from other evidence that it is for the benefit of such government.</p> <p>Same• — Consideration of Delay — Liability of Sureties on Official Bond: The principal on an official bond embezzled, a certain amount. Demand was made on his sureties for such amount. They agreed to pay it in ninety days if allowed such delay, and gave their note for it. Failing to pay at the end of the time, they were sued, but the amount of their bond was not stated in the declaration. PI eld, that the delay of ninety' days could only be a consideration for such amount as they were liable for on their bond, and there being no statement of that they could not be held, in this proceeding, for any part of the note, — the demand being entire.</p>

<p>Forbearance to Bring Action as Consideration for Promissory Note: Forbearance to sue on a disputed claim, even though it is an invalid one, is a good consideration for a new promise or a compromise, where the party forbearing is acting in good faith. But if he knows the claim to be unfounded and gains an advantage by it through a compromise, his action is fraudulent, and no consideration arises.</p> <p>Acknowledgment of Obligation by Mistake: “Where one, through a mistake oí the law, acknowledges himself under an obligation which the law will not impose on him, he shall not be bound thereby.” Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass.,' 449, 452. (Syllabus).</p>

<p>Involuntary Servitude. — Selling into. — Holding in, a Person Previously Sold into Involuntary Servitude: The defendant was charged by the indictment with holding in involuntary servitude a person previously sold into involuntary servitude, and with selling and causing to be sold into a condition of involuntary servitude, a certain person.</p> <p>Trial. — Indictment for Same. — Time of Commission of Offense: In such a case time is not' the essence of the charge.</p> <p>Same. — Presumption of Innocence — Reasonable Doubt: Indictment is not evidence against defendant. He is presumed to be innocent until proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, by competent and sufficient evidence which excludes every reasonable hypothesis except the one of guilt.</p> <p>Same. — Evil Intent: Evil intent sufficient if there was an unlawful intent to do the thing which was done, and that thing was a violation of the law. Deliberate commission of an unlawful act generally carries with it an unlawful intent.</p> <p>Same. — Motive: Evidence of motive for unlawful act unnecessary.</p> <p>Same. — Consideration of Evidence: All competent evidence to be considered by jury.</p> <p>Same. — Hearsay Evidence: Hearsay evidence to be excluded from consideration.</p> <p>Same__Evidence of Defendant. — Personal Interest: The defendant’s testimony is to be weighed by jury and his personal interest in the result of the trial may be considered as to credibility.</p> <p>Same. — Involuntary Servitude. — Force.—Constraining Influence: In the absence of evidence of the use of force or constraint, either physical or through constraining influences addressed to the understanding of the person alleged to be sold and held to involuntary servitude, defendant entitled to acquittal.</p>

<p>Indictment for obtaining or attempting to obtain from another a valuable thing by the false pretense of being an officer or employe acting under the authority of a Collector of Internal Revenue of the United States. 23 Stat. L., n.</p> <p>Proof Necessary for Conviction: To convict, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant pretended to be an officer or employe acting under the authority of a Collector of Internal Revenue of the United States; — that such pretense was false; — that' such false pretense was made with intent to defraud another; — that defendant, in such assumed character, defrauded or attempted to defraud another; — that such other person, relying on such pretense, gave to defendant a valuable thing.</p> <p>Presumption of Innocence and Good Character: The fact that defendant is charged with this offense is not evidence against him, he being presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty by competent and sufficient evidence, nor does it raise any presumption against his character as one of ordinary fairness.</p> <p>Preponderance of Evidence: To convict, more than a preponderance of evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence.</p> <p>Opportunity. — Probability.—Suspicion: Evidence showing opportunity or probability or raising suspicion, insufficient.</p> <p>Circumstantial Evidence: Circumstantial Evidence not inherently less reliable than other evidence.</p> <p>Consideration of the Evidence: Due consideration to be given to all ■ of the evidence.</p> <p>Previous Decree of Divorce Showing Cruelty: Decree óf divorce against defendant on the ground of extreme cruelty, introducéd to attack his character and credibility, to be weighed with discretion, such decree having been rendered in an ex parte trial.</p>

<p>Practice. — Judicial Notice. — Official Forms:</p> <p>A United States court may take judicial notice of the practice before United States Shipping Commissioners, as evidenced by the official forms furnished by the Bureau of Navigation for carrying out the provisions of Section 24 of “An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to American Seamen,” &c., 30 Stat. L. 764.</p> <p>Indictment. — Pleading.—Statement of Claim against Seaman: It is unnecessary to allege in an indictment for unlawfully making a false statement of the nature and amount of a 'debt claimed of a seaman, (Sec. lor Div. e of “An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to American Seamen,” &c., 30 Stat. L. 763), that such statement was addressed to any one in particular.</p> <p>Same. — Shipping Commissioner: Tt is unnecessary to allege in such indictment that an allotment note of a seaman, therein referred to, was approved by a Shipping Commissioner of the United States, or that he examined such allotment and the parties to the same.</p> <p>Same. — Allegation of Delivery of Allotment Note:</p> <p>It is unnecessary in such indictment to allege that an allotment note of a seaman therein referred to, was issued to or delivered to defendant or any other person.</p> <p>Same.' — Allegation of Delivery of Allotment Note or Money or other Valuable by Reason of False Statement:</p> <p>It is unnecessary to allege in such indictment that defendant, by such false statement, procured the delivery of the allotment note or the payment of money or other valuable thing to himself.</p> <p>Construction. — Title of Statute — American Seamen: Title of a statute is not a part thereof, and cannot be used to set aside its obvious meaning. “An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to American Seamen for the Protection of such Seamen and to Promote Commerce” (30 Stat. L. 755) applies also to alien seamen shipped in American ports for interstate or foreign voyages.</p> <p>Indictment. — Pleading.— Scienter: It is unnecessary to allege defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of alleged statements where the alleged act presumes knowledge on his part.</p> <p>Same. — Sufficiency of Statutory Description of Offense Charged: Statutory description of an offense charged in an indictment is sufficient if defendant is thereby apprised with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation and if conviction thereunder would be a bar -to subsequent proceedings for the same offense.</p>

<p>Foreign Corporations. — Service of Process: Where the laws of a State or Territory require a foreign corporation desiring to carry on business in such State or Territory, to file a copy of its charter and the name of some person upon whom legal notices and process may be served, if such foreign corporation engages in such business though failing to comply with such requirement, it is still subject to the laws of such State or Territory and amenable to its process, the person transacting its business therein as managing agent being subject to the service of process as representing such foreign corporation.</p> <p>Section 2625 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, as amended by Act 98 of the Session Laws of 1905, providing that “no license shall be necessary “for any corporation engaged solely in business of foreign or interstate “commerce,” does not relieve such corporation from compliance with the above requirement.</p>

<p>Passenger Contract. — Performance: A passenger contract for “Passage. San Francisco to Honolulu,” is not performed upon the anchorage of the vessel in the open roadstead outside of the port or harbor of the latter place.</p> <p>Same.- — Stipulating Limited Liability. — Injury Arising from Carrier's Negligence: Carrier liable for injury to passenger’s baggage outside of the limitations of the contract, where such injury is due to its own negligence.</p> <p>Presumption as to Condition of Passenger’s Baggage: No presumption that passenger’s baggage is in good order and condition at beginning of voyage or just prior to accident causing damage.</p> <p>Burden of Proof tas to Condition of Baggage. — Nominal Damages: In action for damages against carrier for injury to baggage, burden on libellant to show the previous good order and condition,- — failing which, but some injury being shown due to carrier’s negligence, libellant is entitled to nominal damages only.</p>

<p>Practice. — Rehearing.—Grounds: Rehearing allowed when a “question decisive of the case and duly submitted by counsel, has been overlooked by the court; or that the decision is in conflict with an express statute or with a controlling decision, either overlooked by the court or to which attention was not drawn, through the neglect or inadvertence of counsel.”</p> <p>Saíne. — Disagreement Between Court and Counsel as to Conclusions of Fact: A difference of opinion between counsel and the court as to conclusions of fact no ground for a reargument.</p> <p>Same. — New Testimony: A reopening of a case after judgment for the purpose of introducing new testimony, within reach of counsel at the time, not favored in the United States.</p> <p>Same. — Negligence or Inadvertence of Counsel: Negligence or inadvertence of counsel no ground for rehearing, except as above.</p>

<p>Damages. — Costs: Costs denied to both parties in a cause of action which was justified by the negligence of the libellee and which did not show tne exact amount of the damages, but where there was evident inj ury.</p>

<p>Board, of General Appraisers. — Discretion: When a protest is made to the Board of General Appraisers against the ruling of a collector fixing a rate of duty on imported articles, such Board has discretion to decide the questions raised upon an examination of the papers and a sample of the articles under consideration alone, or upon these and the testimony of witnesses as it may consider necessary.</p> <p>Sonne.- — Appellate Court: A conclusion of fact of a Board of General Appraisers based upon its examination of such papers and articles is not binding upon an appellate court, though it is entitled to respectful consideration.</p> <p>Necklace — Jewelry: A Necklace is not necessarily jewelry.</p> <p>Evidence — Usage—"Commonly Known”: Evidence of description o£ articles in one or two Custom House entries not proof of general usage of names by which such articles are commonly known.</p> <p>Common Usage — Judicial Notice: Courts may take judicial notice of common usage.</p> <p>Evidence — Letter of Instructions to Official: A letter of instructions from the Treasury Department to a collector in relation to the classification under the Tariff Act of a certain description of articles, has no bearing in the trial of an issue arising from the collector’s classification.</p>

<p>Construction of Will — “Dispose of”: In a power in a will to “sell and dispose of,” the words “dispose of” are not surplusage but must be given due effect.</p> <p>Same — "Sell and Dispose of”: In the phrase “sell and dispose of” in a will, the words “dispose of” having a broader signification than the word “sell,” amplify the latter and include other dispositions of property ■such as an exchange.</p> <p>Same — Power to Sell — Exchange: It being settled law that a power to exchange authorizes a partition as being a species of exchange, quaere if a power to sell does not authorize an exchange as being a species of sale.</p> <p>Same — Intention of Testator: Construction must conform to the intention of the testator as ascertained from the words of the will.</p> <p>Practice — Estoppel: Defendants claim title by prescription. Plaintiff and its predecessors in the possession are and were governments. The doctrine of estoppel may be used, where the facts justify it, to ascertain the nature of such possession, as affected by the defendant’s claim.</p> <p>Same — Claim of Title by Adverse Possession Against a Government: 'Claim of title through adverse possession, ineffective against a government, whose possession was sufficient under the doctrine of estoppels, to defend against its grantor by an invalid deed, or whose possession was under mere color of title.</p>

<p>Charter-Party or Contract of Affreightment. — MuUtality of Interest: The owners of a vessel entered into a contract or charter with another company to proceed to a certain port and receive such passengers as should be furnished by the latter company, and transport them to another port at so much per head without any guarantee by the charterers as to. the number of passengers to be furnished or stipulation for demurrage or for damages for delay in the delivery of such passengers. Held, that this was a mutual enterprise, the owners being interested in the work of procuring a sufficient number of passengers to fill the vessel.</p> <p>Agency. — Circumstances Tending to Show: A person soliciting passengers for such enterprise and furnishing information as to the passenger fare and collecting money and notes for such fare and issuing receipts therefor in the nature of passenger tickets, and assuming to act with authority in providing such vessel for the purpose, may be regarded as holding himself out to be the agent of such vessel and consequently of those controlling it.</p> <p>Same. — For Seveml Parties in Matters in which they have a Mtutual Interest: A person acting as agent for the owners of such vessel and also acting ostensibly as the agent of the charterers in carrying, out the work ■of the one soliciting passengers, by inspecting them for the purpose of accepting or rejecting them as well1 or fit for the voyage, is in the view of the mutual character of the enterprise, acting for the owrfers as well as for the charterers.</p> <p>Same. — Ratification: . The action of such agent in inspecting the passengers procured by the soliciting agent, and receiving from him a part of the passage money on account of each passenger for the ship owner, and issuing tickets therefor to such passengerd, though unknown to them, for a different voyage than the one. they had contracted for with the soliciting agent, was a ratification of such previous contract, if he was fully informed of the nature thereof and the 'material facts relating thereto, a ratification of an agency in part being a ratification of it as a whole.</p> <p>Passenger Contract. — Mistake.■—Foreign Language. — Right of Withdrawal: Intending passengers receiving tickets in a language they do not understand, which are not explained or interpreted to them, and having good reason to suppose that they are for a different voyage from the one named in such tickets, are not bound by them, but upon learning of their real character, may, before the vessel sails, repudiate them and abandon the voyage.</p> <p>Same. — Dissolution of, by Change of Destination of Voyage: Intending passengers who have purchased tickets for a certain destination, not bound if the destination of the voyage is changed without their consent.</p> <p>Same. — Admiralty Jurisdiction: When purchasers of passenger tickets go aboard the vessel designated, with, their belongings, for the purpose and with the expectation of departure with such vessel, the jurisdiction of the Admiralty attaches.</p>

<p>Construction. — Confectionery: Confectionery or a confection, is usually a combination of substances like fruits, roots or nuts with sugar or syrup, or the result of a special treatment or manipulation of sugar or syrup by which forms of candy are produced.</p> <p>Mizuame. — Confectionery: Mizuame as a product of a certain treatment of malt, millet and rice, compared with cane sugar as the product of sugar cane or beets, and held not to be confectionery.</p> <p>Statutes Providing for Ditties on Imports. — Construction of: Statutes providing for duties on imports are liberally construed in favor of importers.</p>

<p>Sake.- — Description: Sake not “wine, liquor, cordial or distilled spirits” within the proviso of paragraph 296 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, relating to leakage.</p> <p>Same.- — Leakage.—Duties: When liquids subject to duty are shipped for importation into the United States, but leak out of their containers leaving them empty before arriving, no one is liable for duty on them unless they are within the descriptions of such proviso.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. — Indictment.—Duplicity: Under the Act of April 18, 1884 (23 Stat. L., 11), providing a punishment for falsely personating an officer or employe of the United States, and acting as such, or demanding or obtaining'money under such pretended character^ it is not duplicity to allege in each count of the indictment such false personation and that in such pretended character the defendant received a valuable thing front another, as but one offense is described.</p> <p>Same. — Same: This act is constructed in U. S. v. Curtain, 43 Fed. Rep. 433, and U. S. v. Taylor, 108 Id., 621, as setting forth two offenses,- — the first being where one falsely personates an officer or employe of the United States and takes upon himself to act as such, and the second being where one under such false personation, demands or obtains from any person or the United States or a department or officer thereof, a valuable thing: the description of such offenses being connected in the statute by the disjunctive “or.” Held, that if both offenses are set forth in each count, there is not thereby any ground for demurrer or motion to quash.</p> <p>Same. — Description of the Offense: Both counts were objected to as not describing an offense under the United States laws. Held, that where the statute in purely statutory offenses sets forth the necessary elements of the crime, it may be sufficiently charged in the words of the statute, with description of the act done sufficient to identify it.</p> <p>Same — Description of Office or Employment Falsely Personated: The law is aimed against the false personation of “an officer or employe acting under the authority of the United Slates or any Department or any officer of the Government thereof.” Held, that an allegation that defendant did “falseiy assume and pretend to be an officer and employe acting under the authority of the Government of the United States,” is sufficient without further words of description.</p>

<p>Practice — General and Specific Exceptions to Charge to Jury: Rule 4 of the Supreme Court of the United States and Rule 10 of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, denying the validity of a general exception to a charge to a jury and requiring specific exceptions to the several matters of law objected to, although applying to the allowance of bills of exceptions, yet they are important in any case, that the presiding judge may then and there consider them and give new and different instructions if he should deem it proper to do so.</p> <p>Same — Cross-examination: The defendant introduced evidence to show that interviews with witnesses tending to show a false assumption of authority by him as an official or employe of the United States, and that as such he obtained money from them, were limited to conversations relative to the work of canvassing for names and advertisements for a directory, and the prosecution was permitted in the cross-examination, against the defendant’s objections, to ask questions as to defendant’s dealings with other persons in regard to his alleged directory enterprise. Field, that such cross-examination was allowable.</p> <p>Construction of Statute: Under the statute against the false assumption of authority as an officer or employe of the United States, and obtaining a thing of value as such, the false assumption of being a policeman of the United States is yvithin the statute.</p> <p>Same: Under such statute it is sufficient if defendant is shown to have falsely assumed to be an employe of the United States and as such obtained money from another, the object of the statute being to prevent the false assumption of official or government authority and thereby fraudulently to obtain a valuable thing from another.</p> <p>Testimony — Admissibility of: Testimony was introduced by the prosecution that defendant said to witness, “I come America, Washington, Government House policeman,” and “I come Washington Government America.” Held, sufficient to go to the jury on the question whether he assumed to be acting under the authority of the Government of the United States.</p> <p>Jtiry — Dratving Talesmen in Open Court — Authority: The clerk in open court drew the names of talesmen from the jury box. This was objected to as without the order of the court and as therefore illegal. Held', that such drawing was under the authority of the court.</p> <p>Court Interpreter — Requirements as to Citizenship: Court interpreter need not be a citizen of the United States.</p> <p>Same — Question of Disqualification of: Court interpreter who had assisted in the prosecution of previous cases against defendant and had assisted in working up the present case, not disqualified in the judgment of the court in view of its confidence in him.</p> <p>Error — Absence of Defendant when Demurrer and Motion to Quash were Overruled: The court overruled a demurrer and motion to quash the indictment during the absence of defendant from the court room, — his counsel being present. Held, not error.</p> <p>Smne — Use by Counsel of Unfavorable Remarks to the Opposite Side Pending Trial: The occasional use by the 'prosecuting attorney of such words as “pretence and sham, an!d- a scheme”, referring to defendant’s theory of defense on the ground of his alleged directory enterprise, without reproof by the court, not error in view of the evidence.</p>

<p>Sale. — Payment.—Delivery: In a proposition for selling goods, where the understanding is that the goods will be delivered to the proposed purchaser upon his payment' of the price therefor, the failure of the proposed purchaser to pay absolves the proposed seller from any obligation to deliver.</p> <p>Same — Invoices in the Name of Proposed Buyer: The proposed seller invoiced the goods in the name of the proposed buyer, but mailed the invoices to his own agent, and instructed the proposed buyer by mail that if he would pay the price of the goods to the agent he could get the invoices from him. Held, that the fact that the invoices were made out in the -name of the proposed buyer, conferred no title on him under the circumstances.</p>

<p>Costs — Authority of the Courts as to: The federal courts have no authority to award costs other than those allowed by law.</p> <p>Same — "Transporting Criminals”: The sentence “for transporting criminals, ten cents a mile for himself and each prisoner and necessary guard”, in section 829 of the R. S. U. S., construed to include the transportation of persons arrested on a criminal charge from the place of arrest to the place of detention.</p> <p>Same — Same—Charges for Additional Expenses: Under the foregoing provision charges for additional expenses for transportation and subsistence disallowed as costs.</p> <p>Same — Charges for Additional Expenses: Marshal's charges for expenses, in addition to his compensation for service and travel (mileage), while employed' in endeavoring to arrest under process any person charged with or convicted of a crime, limited to two dollars a day.</p>

<p>Pleading. — Requirements of a Bill of Interpleader:</p> <p>A bill of interpleader not specifically setting forth the claims on the fund in possession of plaintiff sufficiently for the court to ascertain whether they were of the same nature and forming a proper subject for a bill of interpleader, demurrable.</p> <p>Interpleading. — Practice:</p> <p>The answer of those defendants standing, to the other defendants, in the relation of plaintiffs, not making a showing under which the case could be properly adjudicated, and praying to be permitted to amend; held, that an issue of title in the fund be formed under new pleadings.</p>

<p>Parties — General Rule — Exceptions: There are exceptions to the general rule in equity that all persons having a beneficial interest in the subject-matter of a suit should be made parties thereto, even though the legal title may be in others. The rule is for the promotion of the equitable settlement of causes. The exceptions to the rule are for the same object. The rule will not be enforced when it would do injustice or cause great inconvenience, but may be modified or dispensed with under such circumstances.</p> <p>Same: Where a bank holds paper for collection belonging to a person out of the jurisdiction, and an assignment by the drawee and acceptor of the paper, of a fund for the payment thereof, it may be a party to a suit of interpleader concerning such fund, without such foreign person being made a party to the proceedings.</p> <p>Pleading — Interpleader: An answer in a suit of interpleader claiming a title to the fund, — the subject of the interpleader proceedings, — by virtue of certain bills of exchange held for collection and a deed of assignment of such fund for the .payment of such bills of exchange, held demurrable for want of sufficient averment of the terms of such deed. (Marshall v. Turnbull, 34 Fed. Rep. 827).</p>

<p>Replication — Failure to Make — Motion to Dismiss: In case of the failure of plaintiff to file replication to the answer within the time allowed by the rule, agreement of counsel setting a day for hearing is, on the part of counsel for defendant, a waiver of his right to have the case dismissed for want of replication.</p> <p>Trial on Bill and Answer — Replication Filed Lata: Under such circumstances, the case must go to trial on bill and answer, unless replication, filed during pending proceedings on motion to dismiss, be allowed to stand as filed in time.</p> <p>Same — Neglect to Take Advantage of the Rule — Allowance of Further Time: Long neglect of defendant to take advantage of the rule, where no replication to answer has been filed, may be regarded as a waiver of his right to a dismissal, and a replication filed during proceedings on motion may be allowed.</p> <p>Same — Condition of such Allowance: Such allowance based upon satisfactory showing by plaintiff that hearing on bill and answer alone would be of prejudice to him.</p>

<p>Dissolution of Partnership — Liability of Retiring Partners after Dissolution for Acts of Continuing Partner in the Absence of Notice of Dissolution: One partner continuing business, under the firm name, after</p> <p>the dissolution of the partnership, may bind the other partners by acts within the powers of a partner, such as accepting drafts drawn on the firm and making assignments of the personal property of the firm for the payment of such drafts, if the owners and holders thereof are not chargeable with notice, express or constructive, of its dissolution.</p> <p>Same — Where Persons Interested in Acts of Continuing Partner are Strangers to the Finn: In such case, the retiring partners would not be liable for the acts of the continuing partner.</p> <p>Assignment of Partnership Property by a Partner as the Property of the Assignor — Intent: Where'a partner continuing business under the old firm name after dissolution, makes an assignment of partnership property describing it as his own property, and afterwards makes another assignment of the same property to the same person in which the assignor is described by the firm name in the body of the instrument, and signs the firm name by his own name as manager and partner, it is apparent that he intended to execute the first instrument as the act of the firm.</p> <p>Assignment of Partnership ■ Property by One Partner — Coercion— Ratification: Where, after such first assignment, such partner executes a second assignment to another party, ostensibly as the act of the firm, which second assignment contains terms of confirmation of the first, his testimony that he was coerced into executing the first is of no avail.</p> <p>Same — Whether the Private Act of the Partner or of the Partnership — Construction by Collateral Conduct Relating to the same Subject-matter: The question whether an instrument signed by a partner is his private act or that of the partnership, may be solved by his collateral -conduct relating to the same subject-matter.</p> <p>Practice — Unindorsed Note — Suit on Assignment to Pay — Evidence: Although an unindorsed draft held by a bank for collection cannot be sued on by such bank, it may be used as evidence in a suit on an assignment of personal property by the acceptor thereof to pay such drafts.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction — Assault on board a British Ship in an American Pori: There being no provision in the treaties between Great Britain and the United States exempting a British ship while in an American port from the jurisdiction of the United Slates courts, such jurisdiction may be assumed, especially in the case of an alleged serious assault on board of a British ship.</p> <p>Desertion — Forfeiture of Wages: Under the “Merchant Shipping Act, 1894,” of England, a seaman of a British ship leaving the ship in a foreign port for “sufficient reasons,” such a chronic rheumatism of a painful character, does not thereby forfeit his wages.</p> <p>Incapacity — Deduction of Wages: Where a seaman on a British ship is incapacitated from performing his duties as a member of the crew on account of illness which has not “been caused by his own wilful act c r default,” he is entitled to his wages for such period of incapacity.</p> <p>Construction — British Shipping Act: The British shipping act, being harsh in its provisions toward seamen and creating a servile condition, should be liberally construed in favor of seamen.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Motion for Behearing.</p>

<p>Eminent Domain — Condemnation Proceedings: Proceedings for the condemnation of real estate in the Territory of Hawaii for the public purposes of the United States, brought in the U. S. District Court of such Territory, shall be prosecuted in accordance with the statutes of such Territory for the condemnation of property for public purposeo.</p> <p>Same- — Same—Registration of Judgment of Condemnation — Writ of Mandamus: Such statutes requiring a judgment of condemnation in such proceedings to be recorded in the office of the Registrar of Conveyances of the Territory in order that the property condemned may vest in the plaintiff, a refusal by the Registrar to record such judgment is ground for the issuance by the court of a writ of mandamus to compel him to do so.</p> <p>Smne — Same—Registration of Deed Made and Delivered in Conformity zvith Judgment of Condemnation — Writ of Mandamus: The refusal of the Registrar of Conveyances of such Territory to record a deed executed and delivered by certain of the defendants in such proceedings in conformity with the judgment of condemnation therein, is no ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus by such court.</p>

<p>Basis of Action: In an alternative petition for mandamus to compel a Registrar of Conveyances to record a judgment, the alleged refusal of the respondent and not the judgment, is the basis of the action.</p> <p>Pleading: In such case the judgment need not be made, by copy, a part of the petition.</p> <p>Same- — Surplusage: An allegation of such petition that a copy of a judgment' was “duly and regularly and properly certified by the clerk of this Court,” has no greater force than- if the words “duly and regularly and properly” were absent, and the petitioner is not required to set forth how such judgment was “duly and regularly and properly” certified.</p> <p>Same — Same: An allegation of such petition which specifies the performance of the requirements of statutes providing for registration of documents, and adds the general averment that plaintiff “did in every respect comply with the said laws,” is sufficient without a further setting forth “wherein or how” the plaintiff “did in every respect comply,” &c.</p> <p>Duty of Registrar of Conveyances to. Record ■Instruments — When: The legal requirements for the registration of an instrument having been alleged as performed, the duty of the Registrar to record, is sufficiently-shown.</p>

<p>At Law: Petition for Writ of Mandamus.</p>

<p>Caption of a Petition in Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction: The caption of a petition in bankruptcy is no part of the petition and is unnecessary. If the body of the petition is sufficient, and the petition is properly served, the court has jurisdiction even though the caption is defective.</p> <p>Judgment by Default: Judgment by default is judgment on the merits and is conclusive upon the rights of parties who, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, might have contested the petition and evidence upon which the same was founded.</p>

<p>Gratuitous Undertaking: If a party undertakes gratuitously to perform a service for another and enters upon its execution, the fact of the gratuitous nature of the undertaking does not relieve such party from liability to the other for the results of his own negligence in its performance.</p>