Volume 10 — North Carolina Reports

I From Ncw-Hanovcr. This was an action on the case, and the. declaration contained two counts : the first charged that the Plaintiff recovered, in Ncw-Ilanover County Court, a judg-i'.ient against… Held: that the bond taken by the Defendant from Benjamin Smith, was pro-pcrly made returnable to Brunswick County Court, and. the Plaintiff was non-suited. The case stood before this Court on a rule for a new trial, and was submitted with-ouj. al.gliment.

From Northampton. J The Plaintiff, as guardian, brought her action against -the Defendant on his obligation, in Northampton County Court, and there obtained judgment for the principal money, with compound interest; Defendant appealed to the Superior Court, and at the time of trial did not appear either in person or by attorney ; a judgment was rendered in the Superior Court, for the principal money with compound interest, and four per cent, additional interest, on the…

l J- From Craven. J > Debt on the following instrument: “ Six months after date, we promise to pay Moses Jarvis, or order, one hundred and eighty-one dollars and ninety-eight cents, for value received. Witness our hands and seals, Newbern, February 4th, 1823. “ J. A. McMAIN, [L. S.] “JOHN SIMMONS,” [L. S.] The writ was issued on the 5th day of August, 1823. Plea, the general issue.

j- From Pitt. Ejectment for a lot of ground, tried before Paxton, Judge. The lessor of the Plaintiff and the Defendant both claimed title to the land in dispute, under deeds from the Sheriff of the County of Edgecomb, on the same execution. The Defendant’s deed bore date July 27-th, 1821, and that of Plaintiff’s lessor, on thé 27th of November, 1821.

1 > From Rockingham. Trespass for taking a quantity of tobacco. Patterson was indebted, and to secure his creditors, on the 2d of September, 1819, executed an instrument, by which he conveyed to the Plaintiff the property in ques-íion, in trust, to sell the same, satisfy the creditors, and deliver up the sum remaining to him, (Patterson.) This instrument was proved and registered at November Term, 1821, of Rockingham County Court.

Slade, ~} !:Be ~. £jectrnemt tried before Badger, Judge.-On the trial, the Plaintiff produced a grant to his lessors, dated November,… Held: and so instructed the Jury, that the call to lloanokc river, terminated when the line readied the margin or bank of the river, and that the party could not extend it beyond, but that the distance was to bo disregarded, and the intersection with the river was to be considered the termination of the line from which the next line was to…

<p>PRACTICE — COSTS.</p> <p>i- Petition for distributive shares. J</p>

From Carteret. The negro belonged to George Bell, who died in 1794, after duly'making his will by which lie bequeathed the negro in dispute to his infant grandchildren ; the executors of the will assented to the legacy, and the negro was delivered to the guardian of the infants.

> From Bertie. This was a qui tarn action on the statute of usury, tried before Badger, Judge.

V Administrator of Dyson. Scire Facias to revive a judgment. The Defendant was sued in Iredell County Court, in an action of debt founded in the obligation of his intestate for the payment of $170, made in 1812, and pleaded thereto the general issue, and retainer to the amount of $873 66J cents, and confessed assets in hand to the amount of $1789 20s cents, and no assets beyond.

<p>In a petition for partition, the first judgment to be rendered is for the appointment of Commissioners, and final judgment is to be rendered on their return; an appeal taken from any interlocutory judgment will be dismissed.</p>

>From Lincoln. Ejectment, in which Plaintiff’s lessor claimed under a Sheriff’s deed for the disputed premises. Held: to shew them to be distinct tracts, and also proved, that if all the negroes levied on had been sold, they would have paid the debt, supposing them to sell as well as those which were sold. who presided, charged the Jury, that in an action of ejectment, brought by a purchaser at Sheriff’s sale, against the Defendant in the execution,…

<p>A mortgage deed not registered in time, when registered, has no re. lation back to its date, but operates-only from the time of registration j it shall not, therefore, avail any tiling- against an execution levied after its date, and before its registration.</p>

1 From Burke. The Plaintiff, by warrant, obtained a judgment, on 23d October, 1819, against one Brack, for 835 18f debt, and 50 cents costs, and the Defendant became bail to the officer for Brack’s appearance.

I From Iredell. This was an action of covenant upon a warranty in a hill of sale of negroes, brought to recover the value of one of the negroes, Peggy. The bill of sale was as follows. “ Received of David B. Ayres, seventeen hundred and fifty dollars, “in full satisfaction for three negro girls, namely, Swkey, Peggy and “Jane.

~1 I From Rowan. j The words spoken charged the Plaintiff with the crime of perjury. — Pleas, the general issue, justification and the statute of limitations. Held: that it should be such as would convict if the Plaintiif were on trial for the offence.

<p>> From Rowan. J</p> <p>Case. The declaration contained two counts, the first for slanderous words spoken, in charging the Plaintiff with having committed a perjury; the second count was for a malicious prosecution.'</p> <p>The words were proved to have been spoken 5 and in support of the second count, the Plaintiff gave in evidence a State’s warrant, which had been issued against him for perjury, upon the oath of the Defendant, and the record shewing that a hill of indictment, for perjury, had been preferred against the Plaintiff, in Rowan Superior Court, on which the Defendant was marked as prosecutor, and the return of the Grand Jury thereto, “nota true bill,” and that the Plaintiff had, thereupon, been discharged.</p> <p>The Defendant relied upon the plea of justification, and there was much conflicting testimony; which, (as far as is necessary,) is brought into view, in the opinion of his honor the Chief Justice: the Defendant prayed the Court, to instruct the Jury, that if the witnesses were to be believed, probable cause was made out. On this part of the case, the Court (Donnell. Judge, presiding,) explained to the Jury, its view of the meaning of probable cause; that it was by no means necessary that it should he a good cause; that if the Plaintiff had taken the oath, in which the perjury was charged, in such a manner and under such circumstances as to warrant a reasonable suspicion in the mind of the Defendant that he had perjured himself, it was sufficient: that, all hough probable cause was partly a question of law, yet it was so dependant on facts and circumstances, of which the Jury were the only judges, on the various circumstances attending the transaction, and the knowledge the prosecutor had of\ those circumstances, on the conduct-of witnesses, and the inferences that might he drawn from their testimony; that in a ease like, this, in which the parties had gone into evidence of the whole transaction, and in which there was such contradiction in the testimony of many of ¡he witnesses, the court deemed it most proper to leave to the Jury, on this count in the declaration, to say w hether the Defendant had not this probable ground for suspicion, amounting to probable cause; and that if they should think so, they must find for him, on this count. Thai if they found for Plaintiff, the verdict might be general on both counts, or it might {,e 011 0„e only.</p> <p>The verdict was general for the Plaintiff; an unsuccessful application for a new trial was made by Defendant, and from the judgment rendered, ho appealed: and now, Ruffin, for the Defendant, said, that probable cause was a question of law; Johnson v. Sutton,(i Term, R. 544;) and therefore, the Judge should uot have left it to the Jury to say, whether reasonable suspicion was probable cause, which is not an inference of fact, but of law. This distinction is of common occurrence; it exists in the law' of murder and manslaughter; each of which, the law defines, and does not leave to the Jury; so of reasonable time.</p> <p>It is error in the Court below, to refuse to charge the Jury upon a point of law plainly arising in the cause; and the method taken by appellant’s counsel below, has the sanction of this Court. — Lcgget v. Blount. (yY. Ca. Term, R. 123.)</p> <p>The whole matter, both of law and fact, was laid on the Jury; this deprives the party, under a general verdict, of the advahtage of bringing the matter of law in review ; because, it is impossible to say whether the Jury believed the witnesses, or w hether their verdict was founded on their opinion of the want of probable cause.</p>

1 From Nash. Defendant appeared by his guardian and pleaded the general issue, payment, set off, that Defendant was an idiot, and non compos mentis, at the time of executing the bond,' and so found, by the inquest of a Jury, that the bond was obtained by fraud, and the consideration thereof fraudulent; to which pleas there was a replication and issue.

T I From Currituck. J This was a petition for partition of lands described in the petition, of which Matthias Tolar died seised, and which the petitioners alleged descended upon them and the Defendants, as tenants in common, as the heirs at law of Matthias Tolar.

*1 > From Lincoln, J Petition heard before Nash, Judge. The Petitioner set forth, that William Wilson died in 1817, leaving a widow and children, of whom the Petitioner was one, and leaving, also, a last will and testament, by which he appointed Hightower his executor, who qualified as such j that William Wilson, one of the Defendants, son of William, deceased, had received from his father, in his life-time, an estate of 350 acres of land, by settlement •, and the other…

} i From Tyrrel. J Ejectment. — James McCabe was in his life-time seised in fee-simple of the premises described in Plaintiff’s declaration, and being so seised, judgment was obtained against him at January Session, 1820, of Tyrrel County Court; on this judgment execution issued, bearing teste of that term, and was levied by the Sheriff upon the premises on the 20th of January in the same year: In February following, James McCabe died intestate, and on the 29th of March the…

T > From Cumberland. J Action for goods, wares and merchandize, sold and delivered.—A witness proved the sale of the articles, and that there remained due, on such sale, one thousand dollars. The Defendant offered, in evidence, a deed of bargain and sale, made by him to the Plaintiffs, for a house and lot, in consideration of the sum of one thousand dollars.

J-From Warren. This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the name of John V. Wilcox, Arthur Johnson and Major Drunkard, merchants, under the firm of «John Y. Wilcox, and Co.” and the Plaintiffs declared, 1st, as assignees, upon a special promise of Defendant, at the time of his assignment of a bond, drawn by one Banks, for $ 1050. 2nd.

From Robeson. This was an action of debt for $100, upon the following instrument: “Lumberton, 13tb June, 1830. Received of John Nichols, a deed for four hundred acres of land, which he purchased at Sheriff’s sale, as the property of Benjamin Blount, for which I am to pay him fifty dollars, if he thinks proper to take that sum, before any decision respecting the right takes place.

> From Cumberland. This was an action of trespass quare clausum f regit, tried before Norwood, Judge. 'The Plaintiff proved himseif in possession of the land in dispute, represented on the anuexed diagram by the letter H. and that the Defendant entered upon it, and pulled down If s fence.

From Warren. Case. — The declaration contained two counts; the first charged, that whereas, Francis Inge bargained with John Bond, to buy of him a certain negro man slave, named Harry; “ and the said John Bond and Ebeiezer Slaughter well knowing the said negro man si ave Harry, to be' infirm, unsound, and afflicted with a disease of the liver, by then and there wrongfully, falsely, and ieccitfully affirming the said negro slave Harry to be smnd and free from any disease…

From Person. ~ssvan~psit for services as a Physibian.-Defendant ca1Ie~ a witness, a I'Iiysician, to prove the general character of the Plaintiff as a Physician; the Court rejected the testimony, but permitted Defendant to show, that the Plaintiff had not been regularly educated as a Physician. The imp~opei~ rejection of evidence, formed the ground of a motion for a new trial below, and was one question presented to this Coert, on the appeal of the Defendant.

1 J- From Surry. J This was an action of trespass vi et armis, alleging an assault and false imprisonment, brought by the Plaintiff, a man of colour, against the Defendant, to recover his freedom: the Defendant pleaded that Plaintiff was a slave; to which, there was a replication and issue.

1 > From Cumberland. J This was a scire facias against the Defendants, as hail for one Mitchell, to which they pleaded “ payment — death of principal — that Mitchell, their principal, had regularly taken the benefit of the act for the relief of insolvent debtors, and was, thereupon, duly discharged to which the Plaintiff replied, “ nul iiel record” On the trial of the cause below, the Defendants produced, as evidence of Mitchell’s discharge as an insolvent, the copy of a…

1 From Burke.* Ejectment. — The lessor of the Plaintiff claimed the land in dispute, by virtue of a grant from the State, bearing date 11th of October, 1814.

V From Stokes. Case. — The declaration was for a deceit, in the sale of a negro. The defence set up was, that the real situation of the negro, who was consumptive, was as well known to the Plaintiff as to the Defendant, and even better.

From Wake. Ejectment, tried before Paxton, Judge. — On tbe trial of this cause, it appeared, that on the 18th day of November, 1820,Robert Parsley, of Wake County, was seised in fee-simple, in possession of the lot of ground and improvements in the declaration mentioned ; and on that day, he executed a deed to the lessor of the Plaintiff in fee, in trust, to secure and pay certain debts therein mentioned, as due to third persons, who were parties to the deed; which deed, was…

From Granville. Ejectment for house and lot, tried before Donnell, Judge. — On the trial, the Defendants admitted themselves in… Held: with the said g 300, yet he had a right to apply the said money to his own debt, and then to purchase the premises at the Sheriff’s sale, without imputation of fraud ; and the Plaintiff’s counsel further contended, that although the said Cooke had not applied the said sum to the satisfaction of the said executions, yet his purchase…

>-From Buncombe. Ejectment. — The Plaintiff’s lessor, a Cherokee Indian, claimed title to the land in dispute, under treaties between the United States of America and the Cherokee Nation, made in 1817 and 1819.* The Plaintiff’s lessor, to bring- himself within the provisions of the treaties, gave in evidence the following documents: 1st. A Commission from James Monroe, President of the United States, to Coi.

[ From Buncombe. J This case was in all respects similar to the last, except that in this case, Plain!iff, at the time of ihe ratification of the treaty of 1819, was living on the land contained within the lines of his survey. An objection was taken, on the trial below, to the cer-tifícate?, of R. J. Meigs and Col. Houston, because there was no in-oof that they wore executed by the persons whose seis ¡key purported to be; but the objection was overruled.

From Columbus. Indictment for murder. — The words of the. indictment which it is material to state, were, as follows, “The Jurors for the Slate upon their oath present, that Alexan-yja,nonj jape 0p J31a.dcn County, labourer, not having ■ the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the Devil, on the twenty-ninth day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, with force and arms, in the county…

1 vFrom Cumberland. J On the 23d of September, 1822, a warrant issued to apprehend the Defendant, who was charged with having committed an assault and battery; on the 5th of October, 1822, he entered into recognizance before a Justice of the Peace, to appear at December Term, 1822, of Cumberland County Court, and at that Term a bill of indictment was found, on which a nolle prosequi was entered at the same Term.

1 V From Northampton. J Indictment for an assault with intent to kill, tried before Paxton, Judge. — The bill was found in March Term, 1824, and charged the offence to have been committed on the 19th day of August, 1824. The Defendant was put upon his trial at the same Term in which the bill was found, and after the Jury was impanelled, the prosecuting officer moved the Court to amend the indictment as to the day on which the offence is charged to have been committed.

~i V From New-IIanover. J The Prisoner was indicted for grand larceny, found guilty and prayed the benefit of clergy; to the prayer of clergy, the State, by its Solicitor, objected, on the ground that the Prisoner had, before, been allowed his clergy, on a conviction of grand larceny in Duplin county, and produced a paper purporting to be a transcript of the proceedings on the trial in Duplin, the certificate bn which stated it to be a true copy from the records, “ given…

From Northampton. Indictment tried before Paxton, Judge. — The bill charged the Defendant with wilfully and maliciously killing two mares, and concluded “ contrary to an act of the General Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.” The indictment was quashed below for want of jurisdiction, and the State, by its prosecuting officer, appealed.

y {■ From Lincoln. J The indictment charged, that the Defendant, “ on the 1st day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, witli force and arms in the county aforesaid, one pair of dies, upon which then and'there were made and impressed, the likeness, similitude, figure and resemblance of the sides of a lawful, Spanish milled dollar, without, any lawful authority, then and there feloniously had in possession,” &c. “ for the purpose of…

1 From Cumberland, Indictment for not repairing a bridge. — A special verdict was returned, in substance as follows: The Defendants are the proprietors of a toll-bridge, called Clarendon Bridge, erected on the river Cape-Fear, at Fayetteville, by an act of the Legislature passed in 1818.

From ’Wayne. The bill stated, that Joseph Bennet was seised of a tract of land, which he purchased of Jesse Grantham, and on the llfli of December 1.792, conveyed to Complainant twenty acres thereof, describing it by metes and bounds; afterwards Complainant came to an agreement with Bennet, for the purchase of the residue, 137 acres, at the rate of one dollar per acre, and on the 10th of May, 1794, Bennet executed to Complainant, a deed for the same, describing i1 by metes…

<p>IN EQUITY.</p> <p>From Greene.</p>

IN EQUITY. } V From New-Hanover. J Richardson bound himself by an obligation, dated February 12, 1812, to pay to Burgwin $1621, on the 12th of August, 1814; and to secure such payment by deed of bargain and sale, of even date with the bond, conveyed to Burgwin certain slaves and land, with a proviso in the deed, that it should be void if the obligation was paid.

<p>A deposition shall not be rejected, because it is certified simply that the witness was sworn to the truth of the deposition, without stating that he was sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but (he truth.</p> <p>A new trial will sometimes be granted on the ground of surprise is matter of law.</p>

i I From Washington, J This was an action of debt, on an obligation under seal, to which the defendant pleaded payment, set off, fully administered, the acts of 1715 and 1789 in favour of executors, debts of higher dignity, no assets ultra, and retainer.

I From Bertie. J This was an action of debt against the sheriff of Bertie, for permitting one Ryan, a debtor in his custody on execution at the suit of the plaintiff, to escape. . The facts were, that Slaughter, being sheriff of Bertie, by virtue of a ca. sa. at the suit of the plaintiff, arrested Ryan on the 15th of June 1822, and conveyed him to the common jail.

} From Buncombe. This was an action on the casé, for a deceit in the sale of a negro, tried before Badger, Judge.

T t From Craven. J . This was an action of debt, against the representative of a deceased sheriff and his sureties, in which the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following point: A writ, but without the seal of the Court, issued from the Superior Court of Craven to the sheriff of Cumberland, returnable to said Court, on which the sheriff endorsed, “ too late to hand.” The writ did not come too late to hand; and.it is…

<p>When a party plaintiff voluntarily goes into Court and enters on the record that he is nonsuits it is not a nonsuit, but a retraxit, and plaintiff cannot appeal thereon.</p> <p>In proceedings under a statute, in the nature of penal actions, by warrant before a magistrate, e. g. turning a road, the warrant must refer to the statute, in such a manner that defendant may certainly know what he is called to answer.</p>

j. From Iredell. J This ivas an action of assumpsit, for use and occt pation, and money had and received; and the case came on to he heard below before Badger, .Judge, upon the following facts, stated by the parties as a case agreed.

From Wake; Debt on a bond, with condition, as follows: ,e State of North Carolina,?

I I From Randolph; J The defendant had been appointed guardian to an infant of Randolph, by the County Court, and failed to renew his guardian bond pursuant to act of assembly; whereupon a notice issued to him to appear and show cause wherefore he had not done so. On the return of this notice, the County Court dismissed the proceedings at the defendant’s cost, and in the bill of costs a- fee of four dollars was taxed for the county attorney.

~i t From Wilkes*. J This was an action of detinue for a slave, tided before-Badger, Judge. On the trial it appeared that the slave in question ber longed to one Gordon, who died in 1806 intestate; administration on his estate was granted to the plaintiff, his widow, and Wesley Gordon, his son, and one of his dis-tributees.

T I From Franklin. J This was a sd. fa. to charge the defendant as special bail of one Freeman Downs. At the time of the service of the writ, which the plaintiff issed against Downs, the defendant was sheriff of Franklin. The writ was returned by the defendant to Franklin County Court, September term, 1819, endorsedExecuted, and broke custody before got to jail;” signed by the defendant as sheriff.

<p>I From Franklin. J</p>

<p>When a slave is hired, and is killed during the period for which he was hired, case for damages against the person killing is the propet remedy for the owner.</p>

I I From Northampton, j Trespass vi et armis, in which the jury below found a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court on a point reserved, which is as follows: This was an action to recover damages of the defendant for the burning a tavern house and the furniture therein, privately in the night, which belonged to the plaintiff, and which stood a short distance from the house in which the plaintiff and Ms wife lodged. Doctor.

From Rutherford. This was a special verdict in ejectment, the facts of Which were as follows: James Rutherford, of Scotland, a native born subject of the king of Great Britain, removed to the United States in the year 1781, and continued to reside therein until the year 1819, when he died, seised in fee simple of the lands described in plaintiff’s declaration, intestate, without issue and without having ever been married, leaving, him surviving, brothers and sisters residing…

1 From Wilkes. Ejectment, tried before Badger, judge. The wife of the lessor of the plaintiff claimed under the original grantee of the land, William Price, and regularly deduced title.

) I From Rutherford? J E/ectment, tried below before Badger, Judge. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff) subject to the opinion of the Court on the following case. The land mentioned in the plaintiff’s declaration (of which the defendants are in possession,) was granted to Mary FranhIfy, the elder, about the year 1780.

■From Cumberland This was an action of debt, on the following bond: Know all men, &c. that we, John M‘Rea, Robert Campbell. &c. all of Cumberland county, are held and firmly bound unto John Dickson, esq. chairman of the County Court of Cumberland, in the sum of five thousand pounds currency, payable to the said chairman, or his successors in office; to which payment well and truly to be made, &c. The condition of the bond was in these words, viz: The condition of the above…

t From Rutherford.* J On the trial below, before Badger, Judge, tbe case •appeared to be this: Tbe plaintiff, on tbe 19tb of September, 1820, bought certain slaves of one Mley for value, and bona fide, and took them into possession; and afterwards, on the 7th of October, 1820, the defendant (who was coroner of the county,) levied on the slaves by virtue of an execution issuing from September, 1820, returnable March, 1821,, at the instance of the State Rank against Mley, took…

T From Randolph. This was an action of trover, brought to recover the Value of a mare, and the facts on the trial below appeared to be. these: The plaintiff purchased the mare of on© Dockery, on the 2d or 3d of October, 1822, and the defendant who was a constable, afterwards levied on and sold the mare by virtue of an execution from a justice of the peace against Dockery, dated October 1, 1822, which came to his hands before the sale by Dockery to the plaintiff.

~\ I From Tyrrd. J This was an issue, will or no will, and on the appeal of the defendants stood before the Court on a rule to show cause wherefore, a new trial should not he granted.

<p>It is altogether discretionary with a judge below to receive farther testimony after the argument of a case to the jury, and this Court will not, in general, disturb the exercise of such discretion: but in a case in which the rejection of farther testimony below produced peculiar hardship, and was founded on the authority of a prior case similar in its facts, in which the rule as to discretion was not correctly laid down, and in which it had been held imperative on the judge to reject the testimony; this Court granted a new trial, because the prior case had prevented the exercise of any judicial discretion in this instance.</p>

j. From Randolph. This was an appeal from the decision of Norwood, judge, giving costs against the defendant under the following circumstances. Harris and others were petitioners to the County Court of Randolph, to grant to them the privilege of making and keeping up a road as a public highway in the county; a jury was directed to view and lay off the road as prayed for, and assess the damages which might accrue to the owners of land over which it might pass, and to report.

~) V J From Randolph. Sci. fa. against bail — The only question involved in this case arose upon a plea by the bail, and demurrer thereto.

<p>1 j. From Cumberland. J</p>

I From Rutherford. Petition to vacate a grant. The petitioners set forth, that on the .5th of June, 1817, they entered a tract of land in Rutherford county, and on the 18th of November, 1818, obtained a grant for the same; but that one David Miller, late entry taker of Rutherford, made an entry in his own office for the land, or a part thereof, without having made any entry before a justice of the peace for the county, and without any justice of the peace making a return to…

~t t From Mecklenburg. J Petition to vacate a grant. The petitioners set forth, that in the year 1806 the defendant obtained a grant for seventy acres of land, which before the war of the revolution had been granted to their father, who lived and died possessed of the same, and that the title thereto descended to the petitioners, who were his heirs at law: that these facts were well known to the defendant when he obtained his grant, and therefore the petitioners charged that…

> From Hertford. rI his was an action of debt on a sheriff’s bond, against tho defendant Carter and his sureties; The breach assigned was, that on the-26th of November, 1818, lisp plaintiffs issued their writ off. fa. to the defendant Carter, then sheriff of Hertford, tested on the same day and \ , ** year and delivered on that day, whereby he was commanded of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of Howell Jones, he should 'cause to be made the sum of g 1879 20 with…

¡>From New Hanover, J Ejectment for a tract of land of five acres, on the island opposite the town of Wilmington. The plaintiff gave in evidence a mortgage from Hanson, Kelly for the land in dispute, executed to the State Bank of North Carolina, dated August 1, 1818, to secure the sum of $16,000. Also, a deed from the State Bank to T. P. Devereux, lessor of tlie plaintiff, purporting to convey its interest in the aforesaid five acres, dated March 18, 1822.

~j v From Duplin. J This was an action of debt, on the following bond: Know all men by these presents, that we Michael Boney and Charles Hooks, are held and firmly bound unto Thomas Molton, Clerk of the Superior Court of the county of Duplin, in the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, to the payment of which well and truly to be made, We bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, &c. The condition of this bond was in these words: The condition of the above obligation is…

Appxication having been made to the Court by Mr. Thompson and Mr. Strange, who were foreigners not naturalized, for licence to practice as attornies in North-Carolina, the Court doubted the propriety of granting them the license asked, and having expressed a wish to hear a discussion of the subject, the point was argued by Messrs. Gaston and Ruffin for the applicants, and by the Mlorney General and Mr. Seawell, contra.

} From Halifax. The plaintiffs offered for probate a paper writing as the last will and testament of Edward Crowell, deceased; there was a caveat in the County Court, and after trial there, it was carried by appeal to the Superior Court.

<p>When it appears from the certificate of the Judge, that a case was intended to be made by bim, but none comes up with the record, this Court grants a new trial.</p>

1 From Sun’y. This was an indictment for an assault upon one Sally Fowler, tried before Badger, Judge.

-j t From Rockingham. J The defendant was indicted for selling unwholesome provisions, in the following words: The grand jurors for the state upon their oath present, that Samuel Smith, junior, late of the county of Rockingham, farmer, on the eighth day of November, A. D. 1823,-at Leaksviile, in the county aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, falsely, maliciously, mischievously and deceitfully sell and dispose of to one David Campbell and others, certain unwholesome and…

From Grairville. Indictment in the following words: The jurors for the state upon their oath present, that Robert Thomp? son and Jonathan Langford, late of the county of Granville, aforesaid, farmers, on the sixteenth day of August, A. D. 1823, with force and arms, at the house of one Sarah RofHe, an aged widow woman, situ» ate in the county aforesaid, did then and there wickedly, mischie? vously and maliciously, and to the terror and dismay of the said Sarah Roffle, fire…

<p>From Northampton.</p>

T t From Edgecombe» J This was an indictment in the following words: The jurors for the state upon their oath present, that a certain negro man slave named Tom, the property of George W. Woodman, late of the county of Edgecombe, merchant, on the first day of November in the year aforesaid, at and in the county aforesaid, and on divers other times in the county aforesaid, both before and since the taking of this inquisition, has been permitted by his master the said George W.…

\ i From Mecklenburg. J This was an indictment against the defendant, and several others, for an assault and battery on one King, a constable, while in the execution of Ms office, tried before Badger.

J i From Buncombe. J IvniCTMEN’!' for forgery- in the following words: The jurors for die state upon thcr oath present, that Zachariah Candler and Elias Jones, both of the county of Buncombe, being evil disposed persons, and designing felonioush to cheat and defraud some person to the jurors unknown, on t.h-.- first dav of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, with force and arms, in the county of Buncombe aforesaid, feloniously did…

T (. From 'Rutherford. j The defendant was indicted for attempting to pass t® one William M. Smith a forged note of one hundred dol-jars on the bank of South Carolina, with intent to defraud Smith, and knowing the same to be forged.

~l t From Warren. J This was an indictment for murder, originally found in Wake Superior Court, removed on affidavit .of the de-> fendant from Wake to Franklin, and again removed by defendant to Warren, under the acts of 1821 and 1822.

IN EQUITY. 1 I From Martin. J This was a bill filed to set aside a conveyance absolute on its face, on the ground that it had been fraudulently obtained by misrepresentation, and it was alleged that the intention and agreement, on the part of the grantor, was to execute a mortgage deed. The answer, denying the allegations of the bill, insisted that it was the agreement of the parties that an absolute conveyance in fee simple should be made.

<p>There can be no appeal from an interlocutory decree making no final disposition of the cause.</p>

IN EQUITY. ) v From Halifax. J The bill which was filed in April, 1820, set forth that M‘ Gowen and Owen Collins, copartners, entered into partnership with John Collins of Halifax, the defendant, in 1818, under the firm of John Collins Sf Co.; that it carried on a profitable business for two years, and that during the copartnership complainants furnished goods to a large amount; that the affairs of the firm became deranged by reason of debts against it to a large amount, and…

IN EQUITY. ~i C From Wake. . J The hill stated, that in the year 1799 the defendant advanced to the complainant on loan, the sum of % 800;… Held: that the consideration of a deed is part of it, and is not subject to be contradicted by parol, and yet in Robbins and Savage v. Love, (3 Hawks,) they allowed an averment by parol that a deed of bargain and sale, reciting that it was made in consideration of $ 1000 cash, was in fact executed in satisfaction of a precedent debt for…

<p>The rule, that notice to a distant indorser should be sent to the posf office nearest to his residence, was founded on the presumption that the information would most speedily be given in such way; but the rule is subject to modification; and the true inquiry is, was the notice directed to that post office which was most likely to impart to the indorser the earliest intelligence, though it may not be the nearest; if it was, it is sufficient.</p>

v I From Rowan. J This was a petition, filed in the Court below against the defendants as executors of the last will of William Erwin, deceased. The petition stated, that the petitioners were the daughters of the testator, who having made a last will and testament, died, and that the defendants proved the will and assumed the execution thereof.

Y L From Granville. J This was an action of debt, brought on a bond in the words and figures following, viz: Against the 25th December, 1819, or when the house John May-field has undertaken to build for me is completed, I promise to pay to John Mayfield, or order, the just and full sum of eight hundred and eighteen dollars 23J cents, for value received, as witness my hand and seal this 21st February, 1818.

I i From Halifax. J Debt on bond. After the jury was impannclled below to try this cause, on motion of the plaintiff’s counsel' the name of Thomas Cox was expunged.

From Halifax. This was an action of debt, on the official bond executed by Judge and his securities upon his appointment to be a constable of Halifax county. The action was originally brought in the County Court, and the breach of the condition was, in not paying over to the real plaintiff, Armstrong, a sum of money alleged to have been collected by Judge as constable for bis use.

<p>A sealed note is not entitled to days of grace, as between indorsee and indorser.</p> <p>When the maker of such a note was a physician, having a shop Snd a dwelling house in different parts of the town; and when the note became due, the indorser informed the holder that the maker was fifty miles out of town, and would pay on his return; it was held; that under such circumstances an application at the shop was all that the law required, and that an application at the dwelling house of the maker was unnecessary.</p>

j t From Northampton. j Tiie plaintiff declared in assumpsit on the common counts, and also that the plaintiff, on the 3d day of J anua-ry, 1823, sold to defendant’s testator a tract of land called Mush Island, for the sum of @38,000, payable in bonds; that in estimating the amount of said bonds at the time °*'maki”S payment, a mistake in adding up the different sums was committed against the plaintiff, amounting to @3071 88, of which due notice was given to the testator,…

L From Stokes. J Case for words spoken, charging the plaintiff with having committed perjury in a deposition which he had made.

From Wake. Tras action of ejectment was tried in the court below before Norwood, Judge. Held: that where the party enters into the consent rule, and pleads- n-ot guilty as to all the premises in his possession,-it would be a surprise upon him to claim' a- verdict-for any other-lands, because the defendant «never intended to «controvert the title of any, farther than his possession. -And this is all that the rule means when it…

<p>An action of ejectment was brought against the ancestor, pending which he died, and his infant heirs were made parties by scire facias to their guardian, who, in their names, came forward and defended the suit for the infants, and for their benefit took possession of and received the rents and profits of the land during the pendency of the suit; after a recovery by plaintiff in the ejectment, he brought an action for mesne profits against the irtfants, who had never had any possession except that of their guardian before mentioned: held, that plaintiff might sustain the action against them.</p>

y I From Jones. J This was an action of trespass, brought to recover of the defendant, the profits of a tract of land, received by Mary Mumford, the defendant’s intestate, in her lifetime, and was tried below before Badger, Judge. On the trial, the plaintiff produced in evidence the record of a former action of ejectment, brought in this court in the name of John Doe on the demise of the present plaintiff, against Richard Roe as the casual ejector.

T I From Craven. J This was an action of assumpsit, in which the plaintiff declared in two counts; the first, against the defendant as indorser of a promissory note: the second, upon the… Held: that a bare acknowledgment, without a promise, will be suf-ci ent. Again, it is said the plea of non assumpsit infra sex annos, admits a cause of action before the six years, and plaintiff need only show a promise within the six years, without proving any consideration. (Bull. JV.

T 5- From Franklin. J This was a proceeding commenced by warrant before ariTusticc of the Peace, to recover from the defendant as a corporator, the first instalment declared by the president and directors of the company upon the shares standing in his name on the company books. By appeal, the case was carried, first to the County and then to the Superior Court, where it wras tried at the last spring term before Norwood, Judge.

<p>") I From Carteret. J</p> <p>This was an action of detinue to recover a negro slave Tom, and came on to be tried below before Badger, Judge, when a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court on a case stated and reserved; and if the opinion of the Court be for the plaintiff, then judgment to be rendered for him; if for the defendant, then the verdict to be set aside and a nonsuit entered. The case reserved is as iollows:</p> <p>The negro slave belonged to Simon Foscue the cider, who died in possession of the said slave, having first made and published his last will and testament, of which he appointed the plaintiff executor. After testator’s death, the plaintiff proved the will and took the negro into his possession; afterwards, and before the bringing of this suit, the defendant obtained possession of the slave, claiming under a deed executed by the testator in his life time, and retained that possession up to the present time: the deed' was in these words:</p> <p>This indenture, made this 20th day of April, in the year of our Lord 1809, between Simon Foscue, Sen. of the county of Jones and state of North-Oarolina, of the one part, and Lewis Foscue and Sarah Foscue, son and daughter of the said Simon, oí the other part, witnessed), that the said Simon Foscue, for and in consideration of the. natural love and affection which he has and beareth unto the said Lewis and Sarah Foscue, also for their better maintainance and preferment. have given, granted, conveyed and comfirmed, unto the said Lewis and Sarah Foscue the lands and negroes herein after mentioned in manner and form following, to wit: (o Lewis Foscue two negroes named Martin and Tom, a’so one half of that tract of land whereon I now live on the upper part of said tract, reserving to my wife Betsy Foscue her dower right during her life or widowhood; to Sarah Fos-' cue, four negroes named Nero, Charles, Peter and Lucy; which said land and negroes above mentioned, the said Simon Foscue, sen, doth hereby give, grant, alien, enfeoff, convey and confirm unto the said Lew is and Sarah Foscue, to them, their heirs, and assigns for ever, immediately after the death of the said Simon Foscue, sen. the said Simon reserving to himself the use and profits arising from the said land and negroes aforesaid for and during his natural life, and after my death, unto the said Lewis and Sarah Foscue, to them, their heirs and ass signs for ever. In witness whereof, &c.</p> <p>(Signed) Simon Foscue, sen. [i. s.]</p> <p>By the will this negro was bequeathed to one Stephen Foscue, who, before the action brought, released to the plaintiff all his interest under the bequest. Upon these facts the Court below was of opinion, that as by the terms of the deed nothing was to vest in the defendant until the death of the donor; and as by the policy of the law, there could not be a life estate in a personal chattel in one, and a remainder limited thereon to another; therefore the deed operated nothing, but left the property in the donor as it was before.</p> <p>The defendant’s counsel then moved to arrest the judgment for a variance between the writ or leading process and the declaration: tiie writ being, to take the body of the defendant to answer “Simon Foscue-, executor of Simon Foscue deceased,” and the declaration upon the plaintiff’s own possession, in the usual form. The motion was ovei'-ruled, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, whereupon defendant appealed to this Court. 1 x</p> <p>I. This deed may operates© as to carry into effect the full intent of the parties. On an examination it will be found to intend to convey to the son the property in the things given, but so as that during the father’s life he may have the profits. Lei it be examined in detail, and in con-nexion, this intent is apparent.</p> <p>It is evidently a conveyance made without legal aid, and emphatically requires a favorable exposition. {Bacon, “Lease,” K. 3 Mk. 136. 1 Mk. 8.)</p> <p>It is an intent perfectly consistent with every maxim of law, violating no principle of justice, infringing on no rule of public policy. Though donor gives, he may secure for life the profits of the thing given. He may an - nex a condition to every disposition which he makes of his own, whether real or personal. {Shep. Touch. Condition, 115, 116.) He may give money on condition, and if it be broken he may have accompt. {Ibid, Grant, 240.)</p> <p>Gifts of chattels on condition, the donor to have all the profits, were good at common law. {See Slat. 3 H. 7. ch. 4.) There may be found a precedent of a deed of gift, donor to have profits during life. (5 Woods Conv. Gifts, 3.)</p> <p>The whole objection is founded on the solitary clause, “ which S give after my death.” Even unexplained these may mean give now, to take effect in possession after my death. Doe v. Folgrean, (1 M. Bl. 536, 540.) But an explanation is immediately subjoined, showing in express terms this to be the design of the words.</p> <p>Every rule of good sense and of positive law, forbids the interpretation alleged, and supports that for which appellant contends. The construction should be made on the entire deed. {Shep. T. 87.) It should give the whole deed effect if possible. {Ibid.) If words will fiear two in-tendments, that consistent with law shall be taken {Ibid.)</p> <p>There are various instances given of the astutia of the judges so to expound deeds as to prevent illegality or failure. (Ibid 83, 84. 1 Go. Inst. 183 &.) The ordinary cases of powers; words giving lands or goods will not be construed an execution of the powers, unless it appear by reference to the subject matter, or because otherwise unavailing, they were so intended.</p> <p>The subject matter of this deed urges on the Court the necessity of a liberal interpretation. Law, though inflexible in principle, should be accommodated in practice to the exigencies of society. This case is entirely distinguishable from Graham v. Graham, (2 Hawks 322.) The only words of grant there are, “ give at my death;” there is no explanation from the context. It was impossible there to say he gave property and reserved use. There the Court were obliged to choose between reason and established law; here we can reconcile both.</p> <p>2. If this deed cannot have entire effect, it is had os to the life estate reserved. “ Verba fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem.” Better that it should operate in part, than be wholly null. There is no more reason that one phrase, favorable to grantor, should be relied on, than there is that the other favorable to grantee should. It is apparent that the only stipulation for donor was a reservation for life. See Duncan v. Self, (1 Murph. 466.) Vass v. Hicks, (3 Ibid 493.)</p> <p>The bill of sale from old Foscue to the defendant is inoperative and void.</p> <p>Whenever by the terms of a deed the whole estate in a thing is limited to one, any limitation over must of course he void; for it is a limitation in remainder where (in legal estimation) nothing remains. So where a grant is made to one to take effect after the whole estate of which the thing is capable is expended, nothing can pass to the grantee, hut the whole remains as before in the grantor. So, if the whole estate be granted to one pr.e-á'ently, ahdtheii the whole estate.be reserved to the gran* tor, such reservation is void, because the whole interest. passing to the grantee, the reservation oí the whole is repUgnant.</p> <p>The validity of this deed is tó he settled by the application of principles well known and long established in another department of the law.</p> <p>If land be given by deed operating under the statute Of uses to A and his heirs from and after the death of the grantor and his heirs, nothing passes to A, for nothing is given presently, and what is given hereafter cannot take effect till in judgment of law the whole estate is given; and it makes no difference, that in fact the grantor may die without heirs, living the grantee or sotne of his heirs.</p> <p>If land be given to A and his heirs, remainder to B and his heirs, B takes nothing, because A has all the estate of which in law the land is capable.</p> <p>If land be given to A and his hairs presently, reserving the same land to the grantor and his heirs, such reservation is void and A has the whole.</p> <p>But a life estate in a personal chattel is in law the whole estate in that chattel; and the existence of the chattel after the death of the tenant for life is such a mere contingency that no limitation can be made upon it by any act inter vivos.</p> <p>This bilí of sale is, therefore, void; because, it gives the slave to the defendant from and after the death of the donor, that is after the whole estate is expended.</p> <p>But it is contended on the other side that the deed does give a present interest; and that if it does not, yet it may be supported upon what’seems to me to be a singular construction.</p> <p>The counsel has cited Bacon’s Abridgment, 1 Atkins, and Shep. Touch, to show that a construction is to be ma le on the entire deed; that deeds will be construed to advance the intent of the parties; that in general a man who has a thing may condition with it as he will, and that a man may grant op give away his money. And ho has cited Co. Litt. 183 6. to show that a feoffment to two men, and the heirs of their two bodies begotten, shall give them a joint estate, for life with several ran antlers in tail. These simple propositions, well known and esr tablished, I certainly shall not attempt tp dispute. They have, I think, nothing to do with the question presented to the Court. It is only necessary to read this deed' attentively to see, that in every part of it, the estate is limited to take effect, in interest as well as possession, after the death of the donor, and that nothing passes by the terms of the deed until that, event, The skill of the counsel has been exhausted to no effect in endeavoring to make any other construction tenable-. I infer, therefore, that no other construction can be made.</p> <p>The case, therefore, is precisely the case of Graham and Graham, decided in this Court. That case is not ip the least effected by the caséis of Vass and wife v. Hicks, in 3 Mnrphey, nor the case in 1 Mnrphey 466i. The case, of Hoe v. Folgrean, was the limitation of a term for years,. The precedent in Woods’ Conveyancing, is a conveyance to trustees, and at all events does not appear to havo been supported by any adjudged case, and shows only the opinion of the writer. But if all these cases were opposed to the construction and legal effect of such a deed now contended for by us, it is sufficient for me to say, thist Graham v. Graham is a decision upon the very point, made in this Court after argument and upon reviewing the authorities. If that case is erroneously decided and the Court think fit to disregard it, it will be overruled; if the Court shall adhere to that case, it will not be a reluctant adherance, leaving us to suppose that the case will furnish no authority, except upon the construction of deeds which are exact transcripts of the deed then expounded by the Court.</p> <p>Upon the authority of Graham v. Graham, stfimorted as it is by principles and decisions, and indirectly fortified by an expression of legislative opinion in the act of 1823, that the law was as decided in that case, we rely. The case of Graham v. Graham, not frittered away by any nice and verbal distinctions, but acknowledged as an authority for the principle it determines, is decisive of the present case.</p> <p>was then about to argue the motion in arrest of judgment made in the Court below, when the counsel for the appellant said the reasons in arrest were given up.</p>

} From Burke. C.t'ir J-‘or unlawfully .suing out an original attachment before n Justice of the Peace. Th Plaintiff returned in June. Defendant’s counsel moved the Court to instruct the jury, that if they believed that the defendant sued out the attachment honestly, and that he had reasonable grounds to do so, plaintiff ought not to recover.

V I From Guilford. J The plaintiffs declared in two counts against the defendant as sheriff of Guilford; 1st, for a false return on a fi. fa. issued at the instance of tbe plaintiffs against one Brown; 2nd, for negligence in his office by failing to levy the execution within reasonable time; and it appeared on the trial below, that the plaintiffs’ execution tested 3rd Monday in August, 1820, was issued 25th September, and was returned by the sheriff, who is the present…

From “Warren. This was an action of assumpsit, brought upon the defendant’s promissory note made payable to the intestate of the plaintiff in his life time, and was tried before Norwood, Judge. On the trial the question was, whether the defendant (who is a son of the intestateJ had been discharged from the payment of the money due on the note.

<p>} From Rutherford.</p> <p>This was an action of trover for a steer, and upon the trial tlic-re was contradictory testimony as to title. It appeared, however, that the plaintiff purchased the steer in December, 1821, of his brother Elijah, who had turned it out to graze in the fall preceding; it farther appeared, also, that the defendant was in possession of the steer, claiming him as his own, and had been for some time before the sale. Demand and refusal to deliver up the steer were proved by the plaintiff, the defendant at the time contending that the property of the steer was in him. And upon these facts the defendant, by his counsel, moved before Paxton, Judge, for a nonsuit upon the ground that the plaintiff could not sue in' his own name by reason of the adverse possession of defendant at the time of his purchase; which motion was overruled, and the jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant obtained a rule for new trial upon the same grounds, which, being discharged, there was judgment against him and he appealed to this Court.</p>

I From Davidson. J DEr/.YUy- for negro slave Tom. The plaintiff claimed title to the said slave under a deed of gift made to his testator by Mary Buckhart, on the 11th of May, 1816, duly proved and registered.

> From Johnston. Dr: nr upon a judgment quando, suggesting & devasta-vit in John Sanders as thp executor of Ellick Sanders} tried before Daniel, Judge. The suit was originally brought against John Sanders, and after his death, the present defendant, Ms administrator, was brought in by sci.fa.

I From Warren. J Action for money had and received. — The plaintiff alleged that lie had exchanged one hundred dollars in notes of the banks of this state for a note of one hundred dollars of the bank of Pennsylvania, and that the note so received by him was a counterfeit; and he gave evidence that he, by his agent, received the note of the defendant. The note had endorsed on it the name, J). Matthews.

Fi’om Cabarrus. Wilson, at a former term, read an affidavit made by the defendant, setting forth that a verdict had been rendered against him, and that he had intended to move fora new trial, but was prevented by the following facts. Court adjourned on Friday of the term to meet on the morning of the next day at the hour of eight, but the Judge left the county on Saturday morning at six for his next court, and consequently defendant could not move for a new trial.

From Cumberlandb This was an action of ejectment, in which title to tbe premises in question was regularly deduced to David Hay. Held: that there was nothing on the face of the deed to authorize it to pronounce it fraudulent, and gave judgment for the plaintiff, from w'hich defendant appealed.

l I From Craven. J This was an action of covenant, brought upon a chatty party of affreightment, tried before Badger, Judge. Held: that this was an accord with satisfaction to support the plea, and directed the jury to find for the defendant, which they did. A new tidal was moved for. because of error in the judge; 1st, in rejecting the deposition of Rew; and 2d, in instructing the jury that there was a sufficient satisfaction to support the plea.

} v From Nash. J Case for slander, in which the jury found a special verdict, as follows: “ that the defendant maliciously and falsely spoke these words of the plaintiff, viz: that he (meaning the plaintiff,) had forged and sent to Wm. Tis-dale the following letter, to wit: State of North Carolina, Nash county, February 13,1821.

i I From Halifax. J This was a suit originally commenced by warrant on a note for twenty-five dollars, and the only question presented on the appeal of the defendant, was on the constitutionality of acts of the General Assembly which give to a single individual the right to decide “a controversy at law.” The case was argued at considerable length by R. Potter on behalf of the appellant, who took the following grounds.

} From Anson. This was an appeal from the decision of Judge Nor-wood, dismissing an appeal taken by the defendant from the decision of Anson County Court in the matter of a road.

j v From Cumberland. ) This was a suit commenced by warrant for money had and received by defendant to plaintiff’s use. The evidence in the Court below was as follows The defendant, who is an attorney practising law in ¡he courts of tiiis state, was applied to by the plaintiff residing in Johnson county to bring suit in Cumberland County Court on a note for g 467.

From Lincoln. This was a petition filed to obtain partition of certain lands described in the petition, which came on for hearing before Badger, Judge, at the fall term of the year 1824, in the Court below. The object of the parties was to procure the opinion of the Court upon the construction of a devise in the will of Nathan Ford, deceased.

} t From Carteret. J This was all action of detinue for a negro slave named Sarah, tried before Badger, Judge. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, with leave to the defendant to move to sot it aside and enter a nonsuit on the question presented by the following case. The negro slave in question was the property of George Bell, who by his will bequeathed the same to his widow for life, with remainder to the plaintiffs Keturah, Clorin-da or Che and Mary Bawl.

From Wake. The defendant was indicted for permitting his negro slave to hire his own time, and when the cause was regularly called for trial before Norwood, Judge, the defendant was ready and urged for a trial; the Attorney Genera) directed a nolle prosequi to be entered in the case without assigning any reason therefor; and after the nol. pros, was entered, the Attorney General moved for a capias against the defendant, returnable to the next term of this Court, which was…

From Wayne. At the spring term last of Wayne Superior Court, Badger, Judge, presiding, the prisoner was indicted at common law for a grand larceny in stealing a steer, and was thereof found guilty by the jury. After his conviction, the prisoner, being brought to the bar for judgment, prayed the benefit of his clergy.

<p>When slaves are charged with a simple grand larceny at the common law, to give the Superior Courts jurisdiction, it should be stated in the indictment that it is the second offence, because otherwise it is not punishable with death.</p>

i C From Buncombe. J This was an indictment for grand larceny, charging the defendant with having stolen “ one twenty .dollar bank note on the State Bank of North Carolina, of the value of twenty dollars, of the goods and chattels of 011c,” &c., and the only question before this Court was, as to the sufficiency of the description of the note in the bill of indictment.

I From Carteret. J Indictment in the following words, viz. The jurors for the state upon their oath present, that Absalom Simpson, late of the county of Carteret and state of North Carolina, on the sixth day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-four, with force and arms, in the county and state aforesaid, Unlawfully, knowingly and designedly, did falsely pretend to one Mitchell W. Finer, that the said Absalom wished to see a certain judgment which he…

T I From Edgecombe. J The defendant was charged with being the father of a bastard child, begotten on the body of one J.Ivy Perry, and pleaded thereto that he was not the father, and that Jlvy Perry was a married woman. The warrant for his apprehension issued the 13th of March, 1824.

'i 1 From Rutherford. j The bill set forth, that about ten years prior to the filing thereof, the complainant contracted with the defendant for the purchase of a tract of land at the price of two dollars per acre, to be conveyed when the complainant should pay for the same.