¶1(dissenting) — I am unable to concur in the *660position taken by the majority and by the Court of Appeals. I would hold that, where criminal liability for armed robbery is premised upon accomplice liability, the State must prove that the accomplice at least knew the principal was armed. This has been the law in Washington. See State v. Papadopoulos, 34 Wn. App. 397, 662 P.2d 59 (1983); State v. Plakke, 31 Wn. App. 262, 639 P.2d 796 (1982). I see no persuasive reason to change now.
¶2I
¶3The majority bases its holding on State v. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982) and State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). The majority errs in this regard, however, as the holdings in these cases have, at best, limited relevance for purposes of the case at bench.
¶4In Carothers, the question of whether the State has to prove that an accomplice knew his partner was armed was not raised. The issue in that case was whether, when evidence is presented to a jury as to a defendant's participation in a crime both as a principal and as an accomplice, it is necessary that the jurors be unanimous as to the manner of the defendant's participation. This court held that such unanimity was not required so long as all the jurors agreed that the defendant did participate in the crime. The portion of the Carothersopinion quoted by the majority must, then, be read in this context. When this is done, it becomes readily apparent that the court in Carotherswas not concerned with the issue before this court: whether an accomplice must share the principal's guilty knowledge.
¶5In McKim, we held that RCW 9.95.015 and RCW 9.95-.040 require the State to prove that the defendant was either actually or constructively armed with a deadly weapon. McKim, at 117. Defendant in McKimhad challenged the special deadly weapon finding against him; he had not, however, challenged his conviction for first degree robbery. Thus, the issue now before us was not presented in McKim.
¶6The majority points to language in McKimwhich it says *661indicates that accomplice liability for substantive crimes is to be treated differently than accomplice liability for enhancement statutes. I would point out, however, that this language from McKimis nothing more than dictum, as the treatment of accomplice liability for substantive crimes was not before the court. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the court in McKimrelied on Plakke, the very case we are now overruling, in concluding that proof of knowledge is required under the deadly weapon statute.
While Plakkeis a case involving derivative liability for a substantive crime, we believe a similar proof is required under RCW 9.95.040 as to the constructive possession of a deadly weapon. We recognize that in most crimes involving the use of deadly weapons, the coparticipants are aware that one or more of them is armed. That is no reason, however, for imposing strict liability on all copar-ticipants without regard to each participant's knowledge that another is so armed.
¶7McKim, at 117.
¶8Division One took a view contrary to Division Two regarding the effect of McKimon this issue. In State v. Papadopoulos, supra,that court concluded that the combined reasoning of Plakke, State v. Van Pilon, 32 Wn. App. 944, 651 P.2d 234 (1982), and McKim
compels the conclusion that an unarmed defendant cannot be punished for possession or use of a firearm or deadly weapon in the commission of a crime unless the trier of fact enters a special finding of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the unarmed defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that a coparticipant in the crime possessed such a weapon.
¶9Papadopoulos, 34 Wn. App. at 404.
¶10This would certainly seem to be the sensible approach. We have held, in McKim, that it is improper to enhance a defendant's sentence under the deadly weapon statute absent a showing that the defendant either had a weapon or knew that a coparticipant had a weapon. I see no reason why a different rule should apply to substantive offenses. The majority's rule allows the State to do indirectly what *662McKimsays it may not do directly, namely, impose upon a defendant an enhanced sentence (by convicting the defendant of first degree robbery instead of second degree robbery) because of a deadly weapon which the defendant knew nothing about. I am opposed to such a result.
¶11II
¶12It is clear from the plain meaning of the language in the accomplice liability statute, RCW 9A.08.020, that an accomplice to an armed robbery must know that a weapon is involved in order to be convicted as an accomplice to first degree robbery. RCW 9A.08.020(3) provides, in pertinent part:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:
(a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he
(i) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it[.]
¶13(Italics mine.) The italicized portions of the statute are critical. The Legislature has, in effect, said that a person is an accomplice to a crime (first degree robbery) only if he acts with the knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime for which he is charged (first degree robbery). The phrase "the crime" is modified by the phrase "a crime". The Legislature did not say that an accomplice need only possess the knowledge that his conduct would promote the commission of "any crime"; it chose to require a more specific mental state, by using the phrase "the crime".
¶14I realize that this argument raises the question of what the Legislature intended to designate by use of the word "crime". Is first degree robbery a separate "crime" from second degree robbery, or are they both subsumed within the single "crime" of robbery? I favor the former interpretation. RCW 9A.04.040(1) defines "crime" as "[a]n offense defined by this title or by any other statute of this state, for *663which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized ..." Thus, offenses which are defined in separate statutes, and for which separate penalties are imposed, should be deemed separate crimes. First degree robbery is defined in RCW 9A.56.200, and is designated a class A felony. Second degree robbery is defined in RCW 9A.56.210, and is designated a class B felony. Thus, the two are separate crimes.
¶15The majority has not demonstrated to me how an accomplice can act with the requisite knowledge that his conduct will facilitate or promote the crime of first degree robbery, as opposed to second degree robbery, when he does not realize his coparticipant is armed.
¶16Ill
¶17The requirement that the State prove that an accomplice to armed robbery at least knew of the presence of a weapon has been consistently applied in the federal courts. See United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Medina, 709 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ferreira, 625 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1974). Several states require that an accomplice's degree of complicity be determined by his own mental state. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 Mass. 536, 447 N.E.2d 1182 (1983); State v. Holmes, 388 So. 2d 722 (La. 1980); State v. Harrison, 178 Conn. 689, 425 A.2d 111 (1979); State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977); People v. Triplett, 105 Mich. App. 182, 306 N.W.2d 442 (1981); State v. Bush, 547 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
¶18Finally, the rule of State v. Plakke, 31 Wn. App. 262, 639 P.2d 796 (1982) is consistent with the constitutional requirement that the State prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); State v. Kroll, 87 Wn.2d 829, 558 P.2d 173 (1976). The rule *664adopted by the majority allows a defendant to be convicted for first degree robbery even though an element of that crime, possession of a deadly weapon, has not been proved.
¶19I would, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals.
¶20Williams, C.J., and Utter and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Pearson, J.
¶21Reconsideration denied September 4, 1984.