¶1(dissenting) — I disagree that this case does not present a justiciable controversy. If there is no justicia-bility at the time a woman drafts a directive under the Natural Death Act (NDA), there never will be.
¶2By the majority's reasoning, a woman must be pregnant and terminally ill before the issue is ripe for determination. Whatever the impact of the NDA in that circumstance, the woman whose directive will then be "justiciable" will never benefit from a ruling on the matter. In fact, the case would run a very real danger of being declared moot before a judicial decision could be made. And if, in its discretion, the court chooses to address the issues on mooted facts, would that determination be based on any less speculation than a determination under the circumstances now before us?
¶3Respondent DiNino has a present, existing interest with respect to her right to draft a valid directive under the NDA. The State's concession that a properly worded pregnancy clause would not conflict with the NDA does not alter its position that DiNino's directive is invalid as written. Without judicially determining the directive's validity, DiNino's substantial rights under the NDA and the proper interpretation of the statute will remain clouded. I see no impediment to satisfying the justiciability requirements. See Clallam Cy. Deputy Sheriffs Guild v. Board of Clal-lam Cy. Comm'rs, 92 Wn.2d 844, 601 P.2d 943 (1979).
¶4Further, the majority underrates the public importance of this issue. A major purpose of the NDA is to protect physicians from civil and criminal liability in the event that life-sustaining treatment is withheld at the patient's request. See RCW 70.122.050. Failure to resolve the validity of a directive with a pregnancy clause that varies from the statute's model directive once again puts all physicians *334at risk if the nonconforming directive is followed. And, leaving the issue unresolved impacts the rights of all of this state's women of childbearing age who intend to draft a directive and desire to exercise the right to choose an abortion while terminally ill. Surely this is a matter of "continuing and substantial public interest" that warrants an authoritative determination for future guidance. In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 662 P.2d 828 (1983); Sorenson v. Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 496 P.2d 512 (1972).
¶5Concluding that the issue before us is presently reviewable and that the failure to render a decision obscures rights and obligations of significant public concern, I respectfully dissent.
¶6Williams, C.J., and Dolliver, J., concur with Dimmick, J.