Volume 104 — United States Reports

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of' the State of Connecticut.</p> <p>The facts are started in the opinion of thei court.'</p>

Held: by leasing and «operating the road of the Virginia corporation under the Virginia charter, the company became, for all the purposes of that business, a citizen of Virginia.

<p>Í. Beal estate purchased with partnership funds for partnership uses, though the title he taken in the name of one partner, is in equity treated as personal- property, ,so far as is necessary to paythe debts of the partnership and adjust the equities of the partners.</p> <p>2. Bor- this purpose, in case of the death of such partner, the survivor can sell the real estate; and, though lie cannot'transfer the legal title which passed to the heirs or the devisees of the deceased, the sale vests the equitable ownership, and the purchaser can, in a court of equity, compel them to convey that title.</p>

Held: that certain municipal bonds, issued to aid in building the road, which are not embraced by such description, do not pass by the use of the general word “ property.” Appeal from' the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado.'</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of' the court.</p>

Held: that the bond is binding- on the parties thereto, but that the declaration is bad on démurrer, inasmuch as it does not aver A.’s appointment to the collectorship of any particular district. 3. Semble, that the bond witli A.’s commission, or thd public record thereof, would be sufficient proof of such appointment', had the fact been averred.

Held: that a petition for the removal of the- cause to the Circuit Court of the United States filed at the same term and'before such rehearing was filed in due season. 2. Where, touching the competency of witnesses, there is a conflict between the law of a State and an act of Congress, the latter must govern the courts of the United States.

' Error to the Circuit Court of the United. States for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The Connecticut Mutual Life Insitrance Company of Hartford, in the year 1861, appointed A. H. Dillon, Jr., its general agent for the territory consisting of the States of Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. He opened an office at No. 8 South Street, Baltimore, conspicuously designated by signs as his place of business as general agent of the. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company.

<p>1. Although differing from proceedings in courts of justice, the general system of procedure for the levy and collection of taxes, which is established in this country, is, within the,meaning of the Constitution, due process of law.</p> <p>2. A State has the power to determine what portions of. her territory, shall, for local purposes, be within the limits of a city and subject to its government, and to prescribe the rate of taxation at which such' portions shall be assessed.</p> <p>3. A party is not deprived'-of his property without due process of. law by the enforced collection of taxes merely, because they, in individual cases, work hardships or impose Unequal burdens.</p>

Held: that the court in banc erred in requiring him to perform the-decree or submit tq tbe dismissal of his bill, as,.by his uneontradicted affidavit,-he had brought himself within the operation of that exception to the rule which, in case of poverty, want of assets, or other inability, dispenses with performance. Appeal from tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts are stated in the

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, The facts are stated in the opinion of the court,

<p>1. The non-joinder of a defendant in an action ex contractu can be taken advantage of only by a plea in abatement.</p> <p>2. Where a party lias been deprived of his right by fraud, accident, or mistake, and has no remedy at law, a court of equity will grant relief.</p> <p>3. Where a person acts merely as agent of another, and as such signs papers, an express disclosure of his principal’s name on their face or in the signature is not essential to protect him from personal liability to a party having full knowledge of the facts.</p>

<p>1. Except so far as they may directly or indirectly affect the fund to which an assignee in bankruptcy is entitled for distribution under the law, he has no interest in the controversies among secured creditors, nor can. he enforce contracts between the bankrupt’s creditors.</p> <p>2. It is not his duty to protect the dower rights of the bankrupt’s wife against the consequences of her own acts prior to the bankruptcy, or to inquire whether homestead rights can be claimed as against incumbrancers whose title is superior to his own.</p> <p>'3. McHenry v. La Societi Frangaise (95 U. S. 58) approved.</p>

This is an action of debt brought by the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company against Henry H. Koon as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, on- a bond in the penal sum of $10,000,' conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties as agent of the company. The defendants pleaded nil debet.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts- are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that it was subject to the tax imposed by sect. 3408 of the Revised Statutes, it not appearing in what manner the investments were made. Error to the Circuit Court of the' United States for the District of California. The facts are stated in the opinion'of the court. . Mr- John E. Ward for the plaintiff in error. No counsel appeared for the defendant in error.

ApPEAL-from the Circuit Court of the,United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On Oct. 2, 1866, letters-patent No. 58,447 were granted to Edward Mellon for an improvement in the mode .of attaching tires tdp the wheels of locomotives. For the purpose of illas-' tration, three figures, numbered respectively 1, 2, and 3, were appended to the specification on which the application for the letters was based.

Held: that 33. is entitled to a decree against the city for the balance remaining unpaid on the vouchee, with interest thereon from the time it became due. 2. A party guilty of unreasonable and vexatious delay in making payment of a just claim cannot be relieved by offering to pay interest from the time when the delay began to be unreasonable and vexatious.

<p>Error to .the Supreme Court of the -District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the satisfaction of the decree caused by the sale was vacated when that sale was set aside. 2. That a judgment should be rendered against A. for only so much of the sum found to be due for such value and damages as exceeds the amount necessary to sa'tisfy the decree. ' . 2.

Held: That B., bj; its agreement with A.,-incurred neither an obligation to carry freight beyond its own road nor a liability for the negligence of either of the other companies. 2. That the arrangement between the railroad companies did not make them partners inter sese or a? to third persons. - Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the. Eastern District of Missouri. The facts are stated, in- the

<p>"1. The rule, requiring, notice by the guarantee of his acceptance of a guaranty and his intention to act under it, applies only where, the instrument being, in legal effect, merely an offer or proposal, such acceptance is necessary to that mutual assent, without which there can be no contract.</p> <p>2. If made-at the request of the guarantee, the guaranty becomes the answer of the guarantor to a proposal, and its delivery to the guarantee or for his use completes the communication between them and constitutes a contract. The same result follows where the agreement to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty and constitutes its consideration. It must be so wherever there is a valuable consideration other than the expected advances to be made to the principal debtor, which, at tlie time the undertaking is given, passes from the guarantee to the guarantor; and equally so where the instrument is in the form of a bilateral contract, which binds the guarantee to make-the contemplated advances, or otherwise creates by its recitals a privity between him and the guarantor. In each of these cases, their mutual assent is either expressed or necessarily implied.</p> <p>3. A guaranty, if expressed to be in consideration of .one dollar paid to the guarantor by the guarantee,, the receipt of which is therein acknowledged, is not an unaccepted proposal, but is, without notice of acceptance, binding on delivery.</p> <p>4. Where a guaranty declares that the guarantor thereby guaranties unto the guarantee, unconditionally at all times, any advances, ‘&c., to a third person, notice of demand of payment and of the default of'the debtor, as well as notice of the amount of the advances when made, is waived, although either or both would otherwise be required.</p> <p>5. But a failure or a delay in giving such notice, if required, is no defence to an action upon the guaranty, unless the guarantor has thereby sustained loss or damage, and' then only to the extent thereof.</p> <p>6, The contract of guaranty, although that of a surety, is to be construed lib-' erally and in furtherance of its spirit, to promote the use and’convenience of commercial intercourse.</p>

Held: that an instruction to the jury that the partnership was conceded was not erroneous. 2. Qucere, Can a party who buys property at a public sale, to perfect his previous private purchase thereof, have the sale vacated on the ground that it was contrary to law and public policy; or, after having received and used the property, can he, when sued for the purchase-money, set up such a defence. 3.

Held: that for the wages due to him he is entitled to the lien conferred by sect. 1221 of the Compiled Laws of that Territory. Ereoe to-the Supreme' Court of the Territory of Utah. The facts are stated in the

<p>Drafts on the owner of a.vessel do not bind her, unless the debt'for which they were given by her master is a lien on her, although they express on their face that they are “ recoverable against the vessel, freight, and cargo.”</p>

<p>Motion for a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of the - United-States for the Northern District of Ohio.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the brig was liable. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. On the night of May- 7, 1869, a collision which occurred in Long Island' Sound between the brig “ Annie Lindsley ” and the schooner “ Sa'llié Smith” resulted in the sinking and total loss of the schooner and her cargo.

Held: That, as incident to the general powers of the company, its board may borrow money for its purposes, and invest certain of its pffieers with authority to negotiate loans, execute notes, and sign checks drawn against its bank account. 2. That the fact that the board lias invested them with such authority may be shown otherwise than by the offieial.record of its proceedings. .2.

Held: That the court properly charged that the jury-might consider that the answer was made by a man ignorant of the language, who did not on that account understand, and consequently did not intend, its literal scope. 2. That the answer must be taken to mean only that A. bad never had any of the enumerated diseases so as to constitute an attack of sickness. ‘ 3.

<p>1. Under the fifth section of the act of-March 3, 1875, c. 137 (18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 470), it is the duty, of the Circuit Court to dismiss a suit when it ap- . pears that the parties thereto have been improperly or collusively made or . joitied'for'the purpose, of creating a case cognizable under that act.</p> <p>2. A., a citizen of Indiana, Sued in the. Circuit Court a township of Michigan ■ upon certain bonds, issued by it and payable to bearer. lie owned some of them, and the others were transferred to him by citizens of Michigan solely for the purpose of collection. Judgment was rendered in favor of . the township on the bonds so transferred, and in his favor, for the resi-. due. This court, on his removing the case here, reverses the judgment, and directs, as the court below should on its own motion have done, that' tiie suit be dismissed at his costs. . '</p> <p>3. Qiuere, Could the defendant, not a party to such collusion, take advantage, for the first time, on appeal or writ of error, of such objection.</p>

Held: that, under the second section of the act of July 14, 1870, c. 272 ( 16 Stat. 279 ), he was entitled to the period of eighteen months from the.time limited for filing his declaratory statement, within which to make payment aud proof.

Held: in Bennett v. Hunter ( 9 Wall. 326 ), that the primary object of the acts of Aug. 6, 1861, and of' June 7, 1862, being the raising of revenue, they must be construed together. In other words, they are to be construed as if passed at the same time, and effect must be given to all the provisions of-the first act not in conflict with the later one.

Held: that the action of the court presented no question upon which a jury could pass, and that no exception thereto having been taken it cannot be reviewed here. 2.

Held: that A. is not liable to B.’s assignee for the wrongful conversion of the goods. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New'York. The facts are stated in the

<p>1. A judgment is satisfied -when, under proceedings ordered by the proper court; . the lands of the defendant are seized, sold, and conveyed by' the sheriff to the plaintiff, he bidding for them the amount of the judgment, interest; and costs.</p> <p>2. 'The assignee of a judgment founded on a contract cannot maintain a suit thereon in a court of the United States, unless such a suit might be there prosecuted had the assignment not been made.</p> <p>S. A bill is subject to demurrer for multifariousness, if one of the two complainants has no standing in court, or where they set up antagonistic causes of action, or the relief for which they respectively pray in regard to a portion of the property sought to be reached involves totally ^istinct* questions, requiring different evidence and leading to different decrees.</p> <p>4. Where real estate is .alleged to have been conveyed in fraud of the grantor’s creditors, and they, after his death, file their bill to subject it to the payment of their debts, — Qumre, Are his heirs or devisees necessary parties.</p>

Held: in the case of Klein v. Insurance Company (supra, p. 88), that sickness or incapacity is no ground for avoiding the forfeiture of a life policy, or for granting relief in equity against forfeiture.

<p>1. A person not notified of an action nor a party thereto, and who had no opportunity or right to control the defence, introduce or cross-examine witnesses, or to prosecute a writ of error, is not bound by the judgment therein rendered.</p> <p>2. Although words of proviso and condition may be construed as words of covenant, if sucli be the apparent intent and meaning of tire parties, covenant will not arise unless it can be collected from the whole instrument that there was on the part of. jfehp person sought to be charged an agreement, or an engagement, to do or not to do some act.</p> <p>3. Certain language in a bill of sale construed to be a condition and not a covenant.</p>

Held: that he was entitled to recover. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Tit is action was brought in the Supreme Court of the State of Now York by Johnson, to recover of the National Bank of Gloversville penalties, alleged to have been. incurred by it under sects. 5197 and 5198 of the Revised Statutes of tbe United States. • These sections are as follows: — “Sect. 5197.

Held: that Ai’s entry and labor did not entitle him to a patent under sect-. 23.32, Rev. Stat., nor prevent B.’s acquisition of title to' the claim, and that the Statute of Limitations of Montana of Jan. 11, 1872, had no application thereto. 4. A matter occurring during the progress of the trial which was not brought to the attention of the court below, nor decided by it, will not be considered here. 5.

Held: that B.’s estate determined on E.’s marriage. Ekrok to the Circuit Court- of the United States for the District of Nebraska. This was an action for the recovery of lot No. 6, in block 54, in the city of Lincoln, Nebraska.

<p>Petition for a writ- of mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated 'in the opinion of the cotirt..</p>

Held: that the. money was received by B. in trust to. apply it pursuant to instructions, and, having refused to conform to them, he cannot set off against it the account, but is liable therefor to A.’s assignee in bankruptcy. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a bill filed by Sage against Wyncoop, Cossitt, and Fowler, to compel the application of a fund in the custody of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, to the payment of .two judgments which he had recovered against Fowler in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, May 19 and June 2, 1875. It appears that executions, forthwith sued out upon the judgments, were by Cossitt, as sheriff, levied upon goods belonging to Fowler.

Held: in view of the provisions of the code of that State (infra, pp. 824, 825, 826), that the facts so found entitle B. to recover, inasmuch as it does not appear therefrom that her title or right of entry, which passed by the conveyance, was barred at the date thereof, or at the commencement of the suit. 2.

Held: that so much of-the land thereby embraced as was not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of, or to which, a pre-emption or a homestead claim had not attached, was subject to the grant, and that no right in conflict therewith could be thereafter acquired. 3. United States v. Burlington $• Missouri River Railroad Go. (98 TJ. S. 334) commented on.

Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that public use of an invention bars the patenting of it. The Court's ruling was colored by its view that the inventor had forfeited his right to patent the invention by "sleeping on his rights" while others commercialized the technology.

<p>1. Letters-patent- No. 181,512, granted Aug. 22, 1876, to Christian 'Worley' and Henry McCabe, for an improvement in manufacturing plug-tobaoco .aro • void, inasmuch as the improvement therein deseribed was, witli the consent of the inventor, in public use for more than two year's prior to his application therefor.</p> <p>2. Egbert v. Lippmann [supra, p. 333) cited and approved.</p> <p>3. An inventor cannot relieve himself of the consequences of such use by ass'gn- , ing td those who used his invention an interest therein, or in the letters-patent granted therefor.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. .</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Although,, in default of payment, a deed of trust authorizes a sale by the trustee, yet where he attempts to sell property which is subject to conflicting liens, and it is doubtful whether a part of it ,is covered by the deed, a court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain the sale, determine the rights of all parties, and administer the fund. •</p>

<p>1. In reissued letters-patent No. 6844, granted, Jan. 11, 1876, to Joshua E. Ambrose, assignor by mesne conveyances to Edward Miller & Co., for an improvement in lamps, the second claim is void, it not being for the invention described and claimed in the original application.</p> <p>2. Where a specific device or combination, is claimed', the non-claim of other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the specification is, in law, so far as the patentee is concerned, a dedication of them to the public, and will so be-enforced, unless he with all due diligence surrenders his patent for reissue, and proves-that liis omission to claim them arose wholly from inadvertence, accident, or mistake.</p> <p>3. Such lapse of time as indicates liis want of due diligence is fatal, and the reissue, if granted, will be void.</p> <p>4. The court condemns the practice of reissuing letters-patent with broader claims than those covered by the original letters.</p>

Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for ■the Southern District of New York. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that his title is not affected by the subsequent discovery and probate of a later will appointing another person executor, and making a different disposition of them. 3. The order of sale is an adjudication that all the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction existed. 4.

<p>1. Under the second section of the act of March 3,1875, c. 137 (18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 470), a suit cannot be removed from a State court to the Circuit Court, unless either all the parties, on one side of the controversy are citizens of different States from those on the other side, or there is in such suit-a separable controversy, wholly between some of the parties who are citizens of different States, which can be fully determined as between them.</p> <p>2. That act repealed the second clause of sect. 639 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. This was a- suit brought in the Court of Common Pleas of • Philadelphia, by the American Exchange National Bank, against John W. Boughton, upon two. promissory notes, whereof he was the maker. His affidavit of defence, alleging usury, having been declared to be insufficient, judgment was rendered against him, which was affirmed by tbe Supreme Court of the State. He then sued out this writ.

<p>1. By the laws of Utah in force in the year 1873 a mortgage of lands which is first recorded, if it be taken without notice of an elder mortgage, is entitled to precedence of lien.</p> <p>2. It is only when the equities are equal that the maxim qui prior est tempore potior estjure applies.</p>

<p>"Where the answer is responsive to the allegations of the complainant’s bill, they must, to entitle him to relief, be sustained by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness corroborated, by circumstances which are equivalent in weight to the testimony of another witness.</p>

Certain sugars imported in the year 1869 and seized for the owner’s alleged violation of the revenue laws, were duly libelled, condemned, and sold. In the District Court, where the proceedings were had, no party appeared praying for an informer’s share of the net proceeds, or for the distribution of them.

Held: that a compromise so made by which he pays all the costs and expenses of the seizure, and gives bond to pay for the timber when its value shall be ascertained, pursuant to the agreement, is binding on the United States. 3. ' This compromise, should, in violation of its terms, the property be seized and sold by such agents, is evidence of his title and right of possession in his action against their vendee for the…

Held: that in such a ease there must be shown: 1. Some action or threatened action of the directors or trusties which is beyond the authority conferred by the charter, or the law under which the company was organized; or, 2.

- Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the' Eastern District of Missouri. This is a bill in equity, filed Sept. 80, 1880, by Rosenblatt, collector'of the city of St. Louis, against Johnston, receiver'of the National Bank of the State of Missouri. The bank was duly incorporated pursuant to the act of Congress of June 3, 1864, c. 106 (13 Stat. p. 99), and the acts amendatory thereof, and had its situs in that city. It suspended payment June 9, 1877.

Held: that the acceptance of the sum is a bar to his suit for the same claim. Appeal from the Court of Claims. ■Murphy entered into a written contract with‘the United States.for excavating a portion of the pit for a dry dock, and was paid-at'the contract price for all the work which he performed.

<p>Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of th® United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>1. Qumre, Are the statutes of a State in violation of the Constitution of the United States if they subject to taxation the capital of her citizens, although, on the day to which the assessment of it relates, it is invested, in products on shipboard in the course of exportation to foreign countries, or in transit from one State to another for purposes of exportation.</p> <p>2. If on that day it consisted of money, subsequent assessments'including it cannot be set aside on the ground that, when they were made, it was employed in tlie purchase of products for exportation.</p>

Held: under the authority of the amendatory act, on the twentieth day of May, 1870, at which Harter Township directed bonds to be issued in payment of its donation previously voted..

<p>1. The court holds that all questions relating to the character of the vessels employed by the Pacific Mail Steamship Company in executing its contracts with the United States and to the performance of the voyages were determined in Steamship Company v. United States (103 U. S. 721), and are no longer open to inquiry.</p> <p>2. The term.s of a stipulation filed in the court below-[infra, p. 482) commented on.</p> <p>3. A communication from the Postmaster-General, informing the Court of Claims that, in the event of its accepting a voyage of one of the. vessels, he had made an order imposing a fine for her delay in starting, was properly disregarded.</p>

Huntington filed this bill against Palmer, tax-collector of the County of Alameda, California, and the Central Pacific Railroad Company, alleging that he is a stockholder of the company, and that, on behalf of himself and such other stockholders as will come in and contribute to its prosecution, he brings the suit to enjoin and restrain the company fro,m wasting and misapplying its funds, as it threatens to do, by paying certain taxes upon its property in that county which,…

' Appeal from the. Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern' District of. Ohio. The bill of complaint alleged that Hamilton and the other defendants were infringing certain letters-patent, No. 143,600, dated Oct. 14, 1873, and granted to John J. Vinton, one of the complainants, for an improvement in. the manufacture of iron from furnace slag, and it prayed for an injunction to restrain them from further infringement, and for. damages, and an account, of profits.

Held: that the immunity from taxation extends only to so much of the building, the use whereof is required by the actual wants of the'bank' in carrying on its business. The remainder of its real estate is subject to'taxation. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of' Tennessee. The facts are stated in the

Subsequently to June 22, 1874, Vietor imported into New York, stockings. Some of them were wholly worsted. The others were composed of cotton and worsted, cotton being the material of chief value. ' They were intended to be worn by men, women, and children, and were made on frames. They were also “knit goods,” this term comprising all goods made on frames,- and also all hand-knit stockings and other knitted articles of various kinds.

Held: that the absence of a seal on the paper does not affect his right to recover. .Error to the Circuit Court of, the United States for the Northern. District of New York. The facts are stated in the

Held: That, as between the, company and the town, the ■ bonds are invalid. 2. That, in an action on coupons detached therefrom, the plaintiff must, to make out his' right to recover against the town, establish his bona fide ownership of them. 3. That upon the question of such ownership a judgment in his favor upon other coupons detached from the same bonds does not estop the town. 8.

Held: that the parties, by referring the matter in controversy to an -arbitrator, with the stipulation that his report should be the basis of a decree, waived the objection that the complainant’s remedy was at law. Appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Strong, in 1873, entered into a contract with the Board of Public Works of the District of Columbia for the construction of a sewer in Washington City.

<p>Petition for a writ of prohibition.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Petition for a writ of prohibition.- James H. Cuddy exhibited his libel against the steamer ‘"‘Garland,” her engines, dec., in the’District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that he was the father of David Cuddy and William H. Cuddy, aged respectively ten and thirteen years, passengers on board a steam yacht bound up .the Detroit River, when she was sunk by the “ Garland,” whereby they were drowned, and he was deprived of their…

<p>Petition for a -writ of prohibition.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the sale, so far as he is concerned, is a license to the vendee to use the machine. Quaere, Are the other part owners estopped by the sale from setting up that by such use the letters-patent are infringed? 3. Under the contract between A. and the other part owners (infra, p. 525) all licenses granted by him were in effect confirmed.

<p>This case involves only disputed questions of fact, and the court, upon a consideration of the proofs, holds that certain decrees against a guardian in favor of his wards, wliereunder his real estate was purchased by them, they being his children and he insolvent, were not procured by him to be rendered with the intent thereby to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Error, tp the. Circuit-Court .of the United States, for the Eastern District of Tennessee. > , ■ . The defendants,,contractors engaged in building a railroad in Tennessee, were sued ..by the widow of Griggs, for herself and his minor - children, for damages caused by his death. He was improperly riding on the pilot or bumper of a locomotive, forming part.of a construction train of the defendants, at the time it. collided with-loaded cars standing on the track.

Eeboe to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida. This was ejectment for .lands in Jacksonville, Florida; brought by John and Mary E. Buckell against Jones and others. Plea, not guilty. There was a verdict for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment was rendered. The defendants sued out this' writ. The bill of exceptions does not contain any of the evidence on the trial, but relates to the charge, which is set out in the opinion of this court.

Held: that although the grounds for dismissal he removed by a further showing, the motion to affirm will he granted, when it is manifest that the writ was sued out for delay only. Motion to dismiss a writ’of error .to the Circuit Court>of the United -States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, with which is united a motion to affirm under -Rule 6, par. 5. Mr. Joseph P. Horndr in support of the motion.

Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557 (1881), was a United States Supreme Court ruling dealing with copyright. At the time, a prerequisite for having a copyright was delivering two copies of the material to the Library of Congress within a time limit. Tice sued Merrell for copyright infringement and the lower courts were sympathetic; he just had to prove that he had observed that prerequisite. As evidence, Tice presented notes purportedly from the Library of Congress that certified that he had sent the book to the Library on time. Appeals of the case eventually landed it in the Supreme Court. The Court determined that the letter was an example of what he would need, but was not sufficient to prove his case.

Held: that the title to the sections inured to and was vested in his alienee. 2. The courts of the United States take judicial notice of the. public statutes of the several States. 3.

Held: that the bill would not lie. Appeal from the Circuit Court of fhe United States for ' the Western District of Tennessee. Friedlander, Stich, &. Co., sued Kaufman, their debtor, in the law court of Memphis, taking out an attachment, which was levied, Nov. 30, 1866, upon-his real estate in that" city.

<p>Petition for a writ of mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: in accordance with the order, of the board of supervisors, and resulted in a majority of votes being .cast in thg county, in favor of -both of -the propositions; that at a special‘meeting Of the board of supervisors, held on the first Monday *of November, 1868, the president' of the board-was instructed*, by ^resolutions duly passed by the board, to make such'donation, and to subscribe said amount upon the books of…

: Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland. Mrs. Elizabeth Patterson, a resident of Baltimore, Md., returned, in accordance with’ the law of that State,- to the proper-board' of assessors, the following property: City of New York stock, six per cent;.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.</p> <p>The facts, are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus■ to procure the discharge of Peter M. Rowland, D. C. Shultze, and R. C. Germany from the custody of the marshal of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama.

<p>The court affirms the decree below, dismissing the complainant’s bill, it appearing that the lands which he seeks to subject to the payment of his claim belong to the wife of his debtor, and that the purchase-money therefor was paid with funds constituting a part of her separate property.</p>

United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that upon the admission of Colorado as a state, there being no reservation to the United States of jurisdiction over the Indian territory within the state limits, that the United States circuit court for the district of Colorado had no jurisdiction over the murder of one white man by another in the Ute reservation in said state.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern, District of Ohio.</p> <p>The action was brought by Caroline A. Moores against the Citizens’ National Bank of Piqua, in March, 1878. The amended petition, filed on the 11th of February, 1S74, and subsequently amended by leave of court in some particulars, after a motion of the defendant to require the plaintiff to make it more specific, alleged that the defendant was a banking corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the United States in 1864, with a capital stock of one thousand shares of one hundred dollars each, of which the whole was paid in, and certificates issued to the stockholders ; that on the 15th of July, 1867, G. Volney Dorsey was president and Robert B. Moores was cashier, and they were charged with the keeping of its transfer - books and the issue of certificates of stock ; that on that day Robert B. Moores represented himself to the plaintiff, "and appeared on the books of the bpnk, to be the ownér of more than ninety-one shares, and she purchased of him ninety-one shares, and paid him therefor the sum of Si),100 in money, qnd he, as cashier and stockholder, 'falsely and fraudulently represented to her that he had, in consideration of such purchase and payment by her, assigned and transferred the ninety-one shares to her on the books of the bank, and thereupon Dorsey as president, and Robert B. Moores as cashier, signed and issued to her a certificate therefor in the usual form, that the plaintiff believed and relied upon the representations of Robert B. Moores, as cashier and stockholder, that the stock had been duly transferred by him to.her on the books of the bank, and that the certificate was duly issued and was valid; that she was recognized as a stockholder for that amount of stock until on or after the 1st of January, 1873, when she first learned that the defendant disputed the validity of the certificate, denied that any transfer had been made to her upon its books, and refused to recognize her as a stockholder; that after the issue of the certificate to .her the defendant fraudulently permitted and procured Robert B. Moores to make on its books transfers of all the stock owned by him, or standing in his name, to Dorsey, its president, for its benefit, and refused, and still refuses, to recognize the plaintiff as owner of the stock, or to recognize the validity of the certificate; that the facts that no transfer had been made to the plaintiff on the books of the .bank at the time of the issue and delivery of the certificate to her,, that the certificate was not authorized by the bank or recognized by it as valid, and that the stock standing in the name, of. Robert B. Moores had been transferred on the books to its president, were'fraudulently concealed by the defendant, through its cashier, Robert. B. Moores, and she was aware of .no circumstances calling lor inquiry on her part until after the 1st of January, 1873; that, by reason of the fraudulent con- • duct and acts aforesaid of the defendant, the certificate was Invalid and worthless in her hands, and she had lost the sum of $9,100 paid by her therefor; and that the defendant had • been requested by the.plaintiff to repay or reimburse that sum to her, or to recognize the validity of the certificate, and had refused so to do.</p> <p>The defendant filed an answer, setting up three grounds of .defence: 1st, Averring that the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action did hot accrue within four years next preceding the commencement of the action; and denying that the plaintiff was ignorant of the facts set forth in her petition, if they existed, or of facts which called upon her to inquire as to the validity of the certificate, until the 1st of January, 1878, or any other date after the 15th of July, 1867. 2d, Averring that, pursuant, to an agreement made by the plaintiff and her husband, with Robert B. Moores and William B. Moores on the 15th of July, 1867, which the .defendant had no knowledge ,of, interest in, or connection with, the sum of $9,10.0 had been •repaid to the plaintiff by William for the paper purporting to be a certificate of stock, and Robert had thereby become entitled to take up the same. 3d, Averring that the paper purporting to be a certificate of stock was executed and delivered by Robert to the plaintiff, in violation of his duty, and without the knowledge or consent of Dorsey or any other officer of the defendant; that, according to the defendant’s rules and usages, no one could procuré a certificate of stock without the contemporaneous surrender of a certificate for an equal amount for cancellation-; and that before the 15th of July, 1867, all the shares previously held by Robert had been transferred by him, and on the books of the bank, to other persons.</p> <p>The plaintiff replied, alleging, as to the first ground of defence, first, that at and before the 15th of July, 1867, and ever sincé, she wras a married woman; and, second, that the cause of action did accrue within four years; and, as to the second ground of defence, denying the agreement and payment therein alleged-; and demurred-to the third ground of defence. And the defendant demurred to both the replies, for the reason that they did not constitute good replies to the first ground of defence.</p> <p>The court ordered that the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s first reply to the first ground of defence be sustained, to which the plaintiff excepted; ordered that the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s second reply to the first ground of defence be overruled, to which the defendant excepted ; ordered that the plaintiff’s demurrer to the third ground of defence be sustained, to which the defendant also-excepted; and gave the parties leave to plead within thirty' days, which did not appear to have been availed of.</p> <p>The defendant afterwards, by leave of court, in lieu of the third ground of defence, filed an amendment of the answer, denying that Dorsey had a.ny connection with the transaction alleged in the petition, or that he issued to the plaintiff the certificate therein set forth, or that Robert B. Moores, as its cashier, or in his official capacity, issued the certificate to her, or that he held any certificate of stock in the bank on the 15th of July, 1867, or at any time thereafter ; alleging that, according to its rules and usages; no one was entitled to receive a certificate of ownership of shares without the surrender of a certificate of corresponding amount for cancellation, all of which., was' well known to the plaintiff; and denying generally all allegations of fraud or negligence contained in the petition. And it was ordered by the court that “the default herein ” (of which there was no previous mention in the record) be set aside, and the plaintiff have leave to reply; and she did reply, joining issue on the denials and denying the allegations of the amended answer.</p> <p>The record stated that the parties afterwards, by their attorneys, filed a written stipulation waiving a jury, and “ submitted the case to the .court upon the issue joined. On consideration whereof Ihe court find the issues to be in favor of the defendant, to which finding the plaintiff by her attorneys excepts.” The bill of exceptions presented by the plaintiff, and allowed by the judge presiding at the trial, stated that the case was submitted to the court upon all the evidence (which -was in writing and annexed to the bill), and “ thereupon the court found for the defendant, to which the plaintiff excepted.”</p> <p>.The- Civil Code of Ohio of 1853, in the chapter concerning the limitation of personal actions, provided that the following actions should be brought within four years next after the cause of action shall have accrued, namely, “ an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated; ” and “ an action for relief on the ground of fraud; the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the .fraud ” (sects. 12, 15) ; and that “ if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter, except for a penalty or forfeiture, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, a married woman, insane or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter, after such disability shall be removed” (sect. 19); and, in' the chapter concerning parties to civil actions, provided that “where a married woman is a party, her husband must be joined with her; except, when the action concerns her separate property, she may sue without her husband, by her next friend; when the action is between herself and her husband, she may sue or be sued alone ; but in every such action other than for .a divoiee or alimony, she shall prosecute and defend by her next friend.” Sect. 28. 2 Rev. Stat. of Ohio (Swan & Critehfield’s ed.), 947, 949, 953. The section last cited has been amended by th.e act of April 15, 1870, sect. 1, by providing that in actions concerning • her separate , property she may sue and be sued alone, and shall in no case be required to promote or defend by her next friend. 67 Ohio Laws, 111.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that he cannot put in evidence the proceedings in the Land Department for the purpose of showing that the' patent was issued upon a single application, including several mining locations, some made after the passage of the act of July 9,-1870, c. 235 ( 10 Stat. 217 ), limiting the location of one person or an association of persons to one hundred and sixty acres, and others made after the passage of the act of May…

Held: that it is not necessary that the bill should relate all the minute circumstances which may be proved to establish its general allegations, and that the defendant should be required to' answer it. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.

This was an action brought by the Union Pacific Railroad Company against the United States to recover compensation alleged to be due for services rendeied from Jan. 1, 1876, to Sept. 30, 1877, in the transportation of the mails over its road, and of the employés accompanying them,.who were charged with sorting, distributing, and deliyering,thóm. The United States traversed the petition of the company, and set up a counterclaim for five per cent upon the amount of the net…

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the-Western District of Wisconsin.</p> <p>• The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that it is entitled to recover the contract price therefor. 2. Those acts apply only to contracts thereafter made, .or to such as did not require the performance of the service for a specific period. Appeal from the Court of Claims.

<p>The provisions of the act of July 12,1876, c 179 (19 Stat. 78), touching a reduction of rates for railway service, do not apply ¡0 a contract then in force which provided for transporting the mails for a tefm of years.</p>

Held: that a legacy tax upon tlie property was, without authority of law, assessed in April, 1873, as no right to the payment thereof had accrued at the date when the act of July 1-1, 1870, c. 255 ( 16 Stat. 256 ), repealing such tax, took effect. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. The facts are stated in the

Held: that, under schedule G, sect; 2504, Rev. Stat,' the sole test of their dutiable quality was their actual color, as graded by the Dutch standard, and that they were subject to the duties prescribed by that schedule, witli twenty-five per cent added tiiereto, pursuant to sect. 3 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 125, 18 Stat. 333 . Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

<p>1. The last clause of sect. 3408 of the Revised Statutes exempts savings hanks of the character there mentioned from taxation on so much of their deposits as they have invested in. securities of the United States, and on all sums not exceeding $2,000 which they iiave on deposit in the name of any one person.</p> <p>2. The act of March 1,1879, c.' 125 (20 Stat. 327), does not change the effect of . that clause.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>Tiie facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Sections 3220 and 3228 of the Revised Statutes are as follows : — “ Sect. 3220.

<p>Books imported in August, 1874, were subject to a duty of twenty-five per cent ad valorem.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that they, are not liable to their correspondent for the manner in which the notary performed his duty. 2. The notary is a public officer; and when he received the note, he, according to the ruling of the Supreme Court of that State, became the agent of the holder, and for failure to discharge his duties he alone is liable. 3.

Held: that the consent so given was a waiver of any error in including that time as a basis of computation. . Appeal from, the Court of Claims. Lawrence S. Babbitt reported at the Military Academy at West Point as a candidate for admission, June 11,1857, and was admitted as a conditional cadet on tbe first day of the following month. He received his warrant as a cadet, Feb. 6,1858.

Held: that the declaration is bad in substance, as it fails to aver that the losses' of the company, or its liabilities, exceed its assets. Quaere, If there was a deficiency of asset*, could sucli an action he maintained to enforce the liability of a stockholder. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. This was an action at law by Blair.

Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of .the State of California. Langford, the substituted plaintiff in an action of ejectment, against Poppe, in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of California, for the County of San Joaquin, recovered judgment for a tract of land in that county.

Held: that the failure of the city to make the stipulated . application of the taxes furnishes no ground for setting, aside tlie contract, and that A. is entitled to no other relief than a provision for paying the balance due upon the judgments out of the taxes levied or to be'levied in that behalf. 3. A party whose appeal has been dismissed cannot be heard in opposition, to the decree.

Held: that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the. firm the moneys so collected with interest thereon, less the sums advanced by the firm. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. Warnock, the plaintiff, is the administrator of the estate of Henry L. Crosser, deceased, and a. resident of Kentucky.

Held: that the lessee was not thereby deprived of his property without, due process of law, as the State, so far from assuming an obligation to maintain the canals to supply water-power, had the right, of which every lessee was bound to-take notice, to discontinue them, whenever the legislature deemed expedient. 2.

Held: in King v. Hubbell ( 42 Mich. 597 ) that although goods mortgaged could be taken under an attachment if in the possession of the mortgagor, the officer must surrender them to the mortgagee on demand, after his inventory and appraisement have been completed, unless the attaching creditors dispute the validity of the mortgage.