Case: 23-40362 Document: 57-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/20/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 23-40362 June 20, 2024
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Randal M. Hall,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Travis Trochessett; City of League City, Texas
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:22-cv-363
______________________________
Before Jones and Douglas, Circuit Judges, and Doughty, Chief
District Judge.*
Doughty, Writing Judge:…
This is a civil rights case brought by Randal Hall against Officer Travis
Trochesset1 and the City of League City, Texas, for alleged constitutional
_____________________
*
Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting
by designation.
1
Appellee Travis Trochesset’s name is misspelled in the caption of the case.
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violations following his arrest for interference with a police investigation. For
the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 2, 2022, Rachael Hall, Randal’s wife, was in a minor
automobile accident in a parking lot. Following the fender bender, she and
the other party exchanged insurance information. Appellant claims that it
was not his wife’s fault; however, when she left the scene, the other driver
called the police and informed them that he had been involved in a hit and
run. An investigation ensued. Only the events following the investigation are
at issue in this matter.
Police Officer Travis Trochesset, Appellee, investigated the car
wreck. On the same day of the wreck, Trochesset arrived at the Halls’ home.
Rachael answered the door, and he asked to see her driver’s license and
insurance information to investigate the wreck. According to Trochesset,
Rachael intended to comply with his instructions, and she went into the
house to retrieve the requested items. At this time, Randal was approximately
90 miles away in El Campo, Texas.
When she came back to the door, she was on the phone with Randal.
Randal wished to speak to Trochesset. According to Randal, he had a
“respectful” conversation with Trochesset about why his wife would not be
providing him the requested information and said he would be willing to
provide the information in an alternative manner. Trochesset’s version of the
conversation is similar. He stated that after disclosing to Randal why he was
there, Randal told Trochesset that he felt his wife and family would be unsafe
if this information were disclosed and that he would instead give the
information to the chief of police.
After the Halls refused to comply with the investigation, Trochesset
left their home. He subsequently went to a Justice of the Peace and obtained
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a Warrant of Arrest for Randal Hall based on the offense of interfering with
public duties. A Complaint and Probable Cause Affidavit are associated with
the Warrant of Arrest. Trochesset and Hall agree that the contents of the
probable cause affidavit are consistent with the allegations in the lawsuit
complaint, but the affidavit provides more specific details.
The Probable Cause Affidavit (“the Affidavit”) states the following.
While Trochesset was performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or
granted by law, here a criminal investigation, Randal Hall, “with criminal
negligence”, interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or interfered with Trochesset
by instructing his wife not to comply with Trochesset’s investigation in
violation of statute TRC 550.023.2 Hall’s actions were in violation of
Interfere with Public Duties 38.15(g)3 Penal Code MB, CJIS-73991084.
Trochesset stated in the Affidavit that after he arrived at the Hall’s home and
asked Rachael for the requested information, she initially complied.
However, she called her husband who wished to speak to Trochesset.
Trochesset explained to Hall why he was there and that it was part of an
investigation. Hall then told Trochesset that Rachael was previously stalked
after an accident when her information was given. Randal informed
Trochesset that he and Rachael would give her information to Chief Ratliff,
but he would not let her give her license to someone with their home address
on it. After Trochesset again explained to Hall that this was part of the
ongoing investigation, Hall reiterated that Rachael would provide the
information to Chief Ratliff but not Trochesset. For the third time,
Trochesset explained the process to the Halls, but Hall again told Trochesset
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2
Duty to Give Information and Render Aid
3
(a) “A person commits an offense if the person with criminal negligence
interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with:(1) a peace officer while the
peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law[.]”
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that his wife was not going to provide the requested information and that he
was going to contact his attorney. After this back and forth, Randal instructed
Rachael to only provide her cell phone number and nothing else to
Trochesset. She then went into the home and locked the door.4
Trochesset asserted in the Affidavit that Randal interfered with his
ability to conduct a proper investigation, which required obtaining Rachael’s
vehicle information and driver’s license information, because he instructed
Rachael to not provide the information to Trochesset. A warrant request was
then completed for Interference with Public Duties.
On September 18, 2022, Appellant Randal Hall was arrested at his
home pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge. The charges were dropped
because the Galveston County District Attorney declined to prosecute the
charge.
On October 3, 2022, Appellant filed suit against Appellees Officer
Trochesset and the City of League City, Texas. The Complaint was amended
one time on November 15, 2022. On December 5, 2022, Appellees jointly
filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
On May 17, 2023, the district court entered a memorandum opinion
and order granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss and dismissed Appellant’s
suit. The district court entered a final judgment in favor of Appellees on that
same day.
On June 13, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.
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4
The contents of this paragraph are cited solely from ROA.141-142.
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II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court's grant of the defendants' motion
to dismiss. McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2017).
A. Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides a private right of action for the deprivation of
certain rights, privileges, and immunities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the district
court properly stated, to prevail under a Section 1983 claim, the movant must
allege that the defendant violated a “right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States,” and he must show that “a person acting under
color of state law committed the alleged violation. Petersen v. Johnson¸
57
F.4th 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2023). The statutory or constitutional deprivation
must also be due to deliberate indifference and not merely negligent acts.
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 826. Claims under Section 1983 may be
brought against government employees in their individual or official
capacities or against a governmental entity. Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan
County v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
Here, Hall argues that Trochesset violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments because he arrested him without probable cause. He also
argues that he was “chilled” from exercising his First Amendment right to
speak with police officers and that the conversation over the phone, which
was a protected activity under the First Amendment, was the only motivation
for the arrest.
In this case, a Probable Cause Affidavit is associated with the arrest
warrant that Trochesset properly acquired from a justice of the peace.
Appellant did not challenge the contents of the Probable Cause Affidavit in
his brief. However, he argued in his reply that the Court should not give
factual deference to Trochesset’s description of events in the Affidavit to the
extent that it contradicts Appellant’s pleadings unless the purported
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contradictions align with favorable inferences to Appellant’s pleadings.
Despite this argument, Appellant stated during oral argument that he did not
contradict the contents of the probable cause affidavit.
“The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be
arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant
acquitted—indeed for every suspect released.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 145 n.3 (1979). “The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be
supported by a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause.” Glenn v.
City of Tyler,
242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001). “Under the prevailing view
in this country a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not
liable for false arrest [even if] the innocence of the suspect is later proved.”
Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
Our cases make clear that an arresting officer's state of mind (except
for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–813 (1996) (reviewing cases);
Arkansas v. Sullivan,
532 U.S. 769, (2001) (per curiam). That is to say, his
subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to
which the known facts provide probable cause. As we have repeatedly
explained, “‘the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’”
Whren, supra, at 813,
(quoting Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). “[T]he Fourth
Amendment's concern with ‘reasonableness' allows certain actions to be
taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”
Whren,
supra, at 814. “[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the
application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.” Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128 (1990).
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Probable cause to arrest “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571
U.S. 320, 338 (2014). It “requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates,
462
U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). And in the qualified immunity context, “[e]ven law
enforcement officials who ‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present’ are entitled to immunity.” Mendenhall v. Riser,
213 F.3d
226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 227
(1991)).
The district court properly found that probable cause existed in this
matter pursuant to the independent intermediary doctrine. Under this
doctrine, “even an officer who acted with malice ... will not be liable if the
facts supporting the warrant or indictment are put before an impartial
intermediary such as a magistrate or a grand jury, for that intermediary's
‘independent’ decision ‘breaks the causal chain’ and insulates the initiating
party.” Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Smith v.
Gonzales,
670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982)). The “chain of causation is
broken only where all the facts are presented to the grand jury, or other
independent intermediary where the malicious motive of the law
enforcement officials does not lead them to withhold any relevant
information from the independent intermediary.” Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813
(quoting Hand,
838 F.2d at 1428). The independent intermediary rule has
one single, narrow exception, which arises “when ‘it is obvious that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should
issue.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender,
565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012) (emphasis
added) (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Further, the
magistrate's mistake in issuing the arrest warrant must be “not just a
reasonable mistake, but an unacceptable error indicating gross incompetence
or neglect of duty.” Malley,
475 U.S. at 346 n.9.
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The independent intermediary doctrine applies here. Trochesset
provided a Probable Cause Affidavit to a justice of the peace, who then issued
an arrest warrant. The facts in the probable cause affidavit align with the facts
presented by Hall. Hall has failed to present any argument showing
Trochesset had malicious motive that led him to withhold any relevant
information from the intermediary, thereby tainting the independent
intermediary.
Nor has he shown that the single and narrow exception applies to the
case here. This single and narrow exception is a high bar. Meeting this bar is
difficult, and there is nothing here showing that no reasonably competent
officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue. Accordingly,
probable cause exists in this case, and Hall has failed to establish that
Trochesset violated the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Hall’s argument that he did not violate the interference statute
because of the speech-only defense is without merit. First, Hall’s actions
violated Texas law when he interfered with Trochesset’s investigation.
Although Hall cited several cases that were not speech-only interference, this
does not vitiate the fact that he interfered with the investigation. Hall also
does not dispute that he interfered. Instead, he argues that his manner of
interference did not give rise to probable cause warranting arrest, and that it
further violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Importantly,
however, this “speech-only” defense is a defense to prosecution under
Texas criminal law (see Tex. Pen. Code § 2.03), which is of no consequence
to the argument that probable cause is lacking. A defense that may be raised
in future proceedings does not vitiate probable cause at the time of arrest.
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Hall has failed to allege that Trochesset violated a “right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States” and has failed to defeat the
independent intermediary doctrine.
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money
damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly
established” at the time of the challenged conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity.
Under existing caselaw, officers are almost always entitled to qualified
immunity when enforcing even an unconstitutional law so long as they have
probable cause. Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979).
(1)
Here, the district court found that there was no violation of a statutory
or constitutional right by Trochesset because of the independent
intermediary doctrine. This Court agrees with that finding. We will now
determine whether there was a clearly established right.
(2)
Thus, even if the arrest were constitutionally infirm, Trochesset is
entitled to qualified immunity unless Hall can identify binding precedent that
“placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” so that
“every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). “That is because qualified immunity is
inappropriate only where the officer had fair notice—in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition—that his particular
conduct was unlawful.” Craig v. Martin,
49 F.4th 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2022)
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “police
officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent squarely
governs the specific facts at issue.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ––––, 138
(2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Hall cites to Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), to assert that there
is a clearly established right here. He argues that even if the independent
intermediary doctrine applies, then his claim is still successful under Malley.
Specifically, Hall asserts that Trochesset was wrong in relying on the arrest
warrant because his affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.” In Malley, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that “the same standard of
objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression
hearing [] defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request
for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest. Only where the
warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence unreasonable the shield of immunity be lost.”
Id., at 344-45. Thus, it must be determined whether a reasonably well-trained
officer in Trochesset’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to
establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for such a
warrant.
Hall argues that a reasonable officer in Trochesset’s position would
have known that probable cause did not exist because of the speech-only
defense. This Court has held that the speech only defense exists pursuant to
§ 38.15. Voss v. Goode. 954 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 2020). This Court has
further held, though, that an arrestee’s command to another to disobey a
police officer’s lawful order does not fall within the speech defense.5
Id. The
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5
And “fail[ing] to comply with an officer's instruction, made within the scope of
the officer's official duty and pertaining to physical conduct rather than speech” can also
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facts show that Hall told Trochesset three times that his wife was not going
to provide the requested information. Hall also instructed his wife not to
comply with the requests of Trochesset, which led to her going inside the
house and shutting the door on Trochesset. Thus, an officer in Trochesset’s
position could reasonably believe that Appellant’s conduct did not fall within
the speech defense.
Accordingly, even if Hall’s actions did fall within the clearly
established law of the speech defense, which the facts indicate they did not,
then Trochesset is still shielded by the independent intermediary doctrine.
Thus, Hall has failed to state plausible claims against Trochesset that
overcome his qualified immunity defense.
C. Municipal Liability
Next, Hall asserts liability on the City of League City, Texas, based
upon Monell liability. In Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the Supreme Court of the United States found that
municipalities can be held liable for the constitutional violations which arise
from enforcement of the municipalities policies and procedures, but the
municipality cannot be held liable for constitutional torts of their employees
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. To hold a municipality liable
under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify (1) an official policy or custom, of
which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive
knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that
of policy or custom. Monell,
436 U.S. at 694.
_____________________
constitute interference. Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2017) (describing
the state of the law as of September 2013).
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First, because there was no constitutional violation by Trochesset,
there can be no liability against League City. Windham v. Harris Cty., Texas,
875 F.3d 229, 243 (5th Cir. 2017).
Second, Hall has not identified an official policy or custom of League
City that was the moving force or cause of the alleged violation. Hall instead
asserts that there was a “need for a policy” and an absence of or failure to
adopt an appropriate policy. Specifically, Hall asserts that there was a lack of
training or insufficient training on the boundaries of the interference statute,
a widespread pattern or practice of arrests based on speech-only interference
charges, and ratification of Trochesset’s actions both by conducting and
reviewing the arrest. Hall asserts that he is unable to point to a specific policy
because the information is possessed solely by the City, and he cannot access
it because discovery has not been conducted. Insofar as Hall makes this
“policy” argument as it relates to municipal liability, he is unable to show
how the policy or lack thereof “caused” his arrest. As stated above, there was
probable cause to make this arrest, so, again, this argument is defeated by the
independent intermediary doctrine.
Hall has failed to allege facts stating a plausible claim for relief against
the City of League City, Texas, under municipal liability.
D. Whether this Court Should Discontinue Application of the
Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Finally, Hall argues that this Court should discontinue the application
of the principles of the qualified immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court of
the United States has interpreted § 1983 to give absolute immunity to
functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process,” Malley, 475 U.S. 335, 342, quoting Imbler, supra, at 430 (emphasis
added), not from an exaggerated esteem for those who perform these
functions, and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office, but
because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself.
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Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334–335 (1983). We intend no disrespect to
the officer applying for a warrant by observing that his action, while a vital
part of the administration of criminal justice, is further removed from the
judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking
an indictment. The prosecutor's act in seeking an indictment is but the first
step in the process of seeking a conviction. Exposing the prosecutor to
liability for the initial phase of his prosecutorial work could interfere with his
exercise of independent judgment at every phase of his work because the
prosecutor might come to see later decisions in terms of their effect on his
potential liability. Thus, we shield the prosecutor seeking an indictment
because any lesser immunity could impair the performance of a central actor
in the judicial process.
Hall argues that qualified immunity is a “legal fiction” that came from
a faulty interpretation of Section 1983 and describes modern qualified
immunity as “countertextual”. Specifically, Appellant states that decisions
that are not the type of “split-second, heat-of-the-moment choices” made by
officers in a dangerous situation should not be afforded the same protections.
Hall asserts that Trochesset had ample time to check the legality of his
actions in this case and therefore should not avoid liability because he chose
not to do so.
Trochesset urges that this Panel should not exercise authority to
overrule Supreme Court precedent to abolish the doctrine of qualified
immunity. He argues that qualified immunity is an element of a claim against
an executive branch official and should not be eliminated by any appellate
court.
Trochesset’s argument is correct, and this Panel will continue to
employ the use of the doctrine of qualified immunity. This panel is bound by
the Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness, “that one panel of this court may not
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overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the law,
such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or en banc court.”
Jacobs v. National Drug Intelligence Center, 548 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2008).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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