Volume 11 — Customs Court Reports

<p>1. “Finished Parts” — Paragraph 119, Tariff Act op 1913 — Materials and Finished Manufactures Distinguished.</p> <p>A finished part is such a part as will perform its proper function when in place. The lubrication of the working surfaces of a machine or any part of it can not be regarded as a manufacturing process. .Nor can the correction of defects or irregularities. Nor can painting, where the painting is designed wholly to preserve from rust and to impart an attractive appearance.</p> <p>2. Automobile Springs.'</p> <p>Automobile springs, such of them as are improperly drilled or bushed needing to have these defects corrected, ready to be put on automobiles after being painted and lubricated, are “finished parts of automobiles” under paragraph 119, tariff act of 1913, and not “articles of metal” under paragraph 167.</p>

<p>1. “Minerals, Crude” — Paragraph 549, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Antimony, Crude.” ■ •</p> <p>Merchandise, known commercially as “antimony crude,” which is impure antimony that has been separated from its ore by liquation, is not classifiable under paragraph 549, tariff act of 1913, as “Minerals, crude, or not advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding,” since the liquation has refined the mineral or ore pro tanto.</p> <p>2. Paragraphs 144 and 39(3, Tariff Act of 1913 — Antimony as Metal and as Orb.</p> <p>It was the intention of Congress to relate paragraph 144, tariff act of 1913, to antimony as metal in a more or less pure form and paragraph 396 to antimony as ore.</p> <p>3. Paragraph 396, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Stibnite.”</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 396, tariff act of 1913, for “Stibnite containing antimony, ’ ’ describes a natural product called an ore, and does not include a product derived from an ore by liquation. The paragraph does not embrace any product of an ore.</p> <p>4. Liquation — Smelting.</p> <p>Liquation, i. e., the extraction of a metal from its ore by heating the ore enough to fuse the metal but not enough to fuse the other contents, is a smelting operation.</p> <p>5. “Antimony Crude” — “Matte”—Paragraph 144, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>“Antimony crude,” an impure antimony derived from the ore by liquation, is a “matte” within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 144, tariff act of 1913, and is not classifiable under paragraph 396 as “antimony ore” or “stibnite containing antimony. ”</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43683.</p>

<p>Atpeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, "unpublished decision dated June 15, 3920.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph M, Section IV, Tariff Act of 1913 and Articles 709, 710, 747, 748, and 749, Customs Regulations 1915.</p> <p>An oral application to the deputy collector of customs in charge of bonded manufacturing warehouses for the establishment of such a warehouse is not a compliance with paragraph M, section IY, tariff act of 1913, prescribing the mode of establishing such warehouses and articles 709, 73 0, 747, 748, and 749, Customs Regulations 1915, promulgated pursuant thereto. Under such circumstances it can not be said that any application was made. — Agency Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. United States (10 Ct. Oust. Appls. 172; T. E>. 38547).</p> <p>2. Importation.</p> <p>Merchandise, entered for consumption and brought into this country for the purpose of being manufactured here and exported, is imported and subject to duty.— Agency Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. United States (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 172 T. D. 38547).</p> <p>3.. Importations to be Exported Destroyed by Fire.</p> <p>Appellant was accustomed to import merchandise, pay the duties, manufacture it, and export it, taking the drawback. Some of such merchandise was destroyed by fire. He can not escape the payment of duties on it, notwithstanding that the deputy collector may have arbitrarily denied his oral application for the establishment of a bonded manufacturing warehouse and notwithstanding that he may have intended that it should not enter into the commerce of this country. — Agency Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. United States (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 172; T.D. 38547),</p> <p>4. Paragraph X, Section III, Tariff Act of 1913 — Abandonment and Delivery of Imported Merchandise.</p> <p>Imported merchandise can not be abandoned under paragraph X, section III, tariff act of 1913, unless it be deliverable at the time of the abandonment. — Thomas & Pierson v. United States (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., 51; T. D. 33305). • It was the intention of Congress that abandonment should not be permitted unless the merchandise was still in esse in a deliverable condition. Appellant maintained a factory for the purpose of manufacturing artillery ammunition for the Russian Government. In the factory were shells of Canadian manufacture upon which duty had been paid, and shells of domestic manufacture. These shells were practically destroyed by fire and explosion. Appellant lodged with the collector a written notification of abandonment of the Canadian shells, but when called on for delivery, was unable to comply for the reason that the identification marks on the Canadian shells had been obliterated or the shells themselves destroyed. There was no valid abandonment.</p> <p>5.-Administrative Practice, Force of.</p> <p>The fact that the collector had not customarily demanded or accepted delivery of abandoned imported merchandise is of no avail to an importer in a case where he did demand delivery and delivery was impossible.</p>

<p>1. Section 21, Act op June 22, 1874 — “Time op Entry.”</p> <p>The “time of entry” spoken of in section 21, act of June 22, 1874, providing that, in the absence' of fraud and protest, liquidation shall be final “after the expiration of one year from the tim‘e,of entry, ■’’■irieatts ithe day of entry rather than the exact minute or hour when the entry was made; ■ "</p> <p>2. Section 21, Act op June 22, 1874 — “One Year prom the Time op Entry.”</p> <p>In calculating “one year from the time of entry, ” under section 21, act of June 22, 1874, providing that, in the absence of fraud and protest, liquidation shall be final “after the expiration of one year from the time of entry, ” the day upon which the entry was made should be excluded. Where the entry was made on July 3, 1918, and reliquidation was had on July 3, 1919, the reliquidation was not “ after the expiration of one year from the time of entry. ”</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43695.</p>

<p>Matched Flooring Bored for Nails.</p> <p>Matched flooring which has, in the process of manufacture, been incidentally bored as a guide for the nails to lessen the danger of splitting the flooring when laid, has not been “further manufactured than sawed, planed, and tongued and grooved” within the meaning of that language in paragraph 647, tariff act of 1913, and is classifiable as such lumber under paragraph 647 rather than as a manufacture of wood not specially provided for, under paragraph 176.</p>

<p>1. Evidence, CoNFi.rcnxo Presumptions — Invoice Recital, Collector's Fino-TNO PREVAILS OVRU.</p> <p>IV here I he evidence is .confined to thoin voice and tlio collector’s finding in contradiction of it, the presumption of correctness attendant upon the collector’s finding prevails.</p> <p>2. Appraisement and Liquidation.</p> <p>The packing charges were stated in the invoice to bo 13 sen per cubic foot. The appraiser wrote under this statement ‘'should be 23 sen per cu. ft.” The collector liquidated in accord with the appraiser’s annotation. This was not an appraisement by the collector but a determination by him of the packing charges, aided, .doubtless, by tlio appraiser’s advisory indorsement.</p>

<p>Evidence, Presumption — Models op Women’s Wearing Apparel.</p> <p>Where models of women’s wearing apparel were imported in bond under subsection 4, paragraph J, section IV, tariff act of 1913, with the intention that they be used in importers’ manufacturing establishments and with no intention to sell them, the sale of some of them, the sending out of some of them to have their embroidery copied, and the exhibition of one of them in various cities where its importer had no establishment raise no presumption that all of them were imported for purposes other than for use as models by importers in their own establishments, and do not subject to duty such of them as are offered for exportation in accordance with the provisions of the subsection. Where importers are in the business of importing and renting or selling models, as was the case in Grab Fashion Co. et al. v. United States (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 39; T. D. 38262), it may well be held that the very nature of such a business necessarily implies that the purpose of importing any particular model can not be determined as of the date of importation, and that, therefore, none of the models can be said to have been imported for the limited uses contemplated by the subsection; but where, as in this case, importers are engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling women's wearing apparel and models thereof, no such thing can be implied.</p>

<p>1. Cauchillo Gum Not a Drug Under Paragraph 477, Tariff Act of 1913..</p> <p>A showing that Colombian or bastard chicle or cauchillo gum is imported principally for use as a substitute for chicle in the manufacture of chewing gum, though sometimes used in making porous plasters, does not establish such a drug use as to bring it within the provision for drugs in paragraph 477, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Gums and Gum Resins — Drugs.</p> <p>The gums and gum resins of paragraph 477, tariff act of 1913, are only such as are drugs. — United States v. Maine Central Railroad Co. (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 114; T. D. 36427).</p> <p>3. Cauchillo Gum Not a Vegetable Substance Under Paragraph 552, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Colombian or bastard chicle or cauchillo gum, though, of course, broadly speaking a vegetable substance, is not such within the meaning of that term in paragraph 552, tariff act of 1913. — Reed & Keller v. United States (5 Ct. Cust. Appls., 95; T. D. 34133).</p> <p>4. Evidence — Similitude a Question of Fact — Presumption in Favor of Board’s Finding.</p> <p>Whether or not such similitude exists between Colombian or bastard chicle or cauchillo gum and chicle as to render it dutiable at the same rate' as chicle under paragraph 36, tariff act of 1913, by virtue of paragraph 386, is a question of fact; and the finding of the Board of United States General Appraisers that it does not exist, not being contrary to or unsupported by the weight of evidence, will not be disturbed.</p> <p>5. Cauchillo Gum a Nonenumerated Unmanufactured Article Under Paragraph 385.</p> <p>The dried resin of a South American tree, known as Colombian or bastard chicle or cauchillo gum, imported for experimental use as a substitute for chicle in manufacturing chewing gum, the experiment proving unsatisfactory, was held by the Board-of United States General Appraisers to be dutiable as a raw or unmanufactured nonenumerated article under paragraph 385, tariff act of 1913, and the decision is affirmed.</p>

<p>Paragraph 79, Tarim? Act oj? 1913 — “Earthenware * * * Ornamented or Decorated in any Manner” — Commercial Designation.</p> <p>In the common acceptation of the words, the provision of paragraph 79, tariff act of 1913, for “earthenware * * * ornamented or decorated in any manner,” does not include only such as has been “ornamented or decorated” (the two words being held to be practically synonymous) by some process applied after molding. But the provision is open to proof of commercial designation, and, upon proof that such is the commerdal understanding, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers classifying earthenware ornamented or decorated in the mold as “plain white” under the paragraph is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8357 (T. D. 38457)..</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8374 IT. D. 38506).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43898.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8399 (T. D. 38574).</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Examination oe Exhibits.</p> <p>Where samples of the importations, used sugar bags, were in evidence and importer’s witness conceded them to be typical and testified specifically regarding them, it was entirely proper for the Board of United States General Appraisers to examine them to ascertain whether there were holes in them and whether the fabric was sound for the purpose of testing the accuracy of the witness’s statements regarding them.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Weight 'and Suepiciency — Presumption in Pavor oe Board’s Finding.</p> <p>The evidence as to the condition of used sugar bags consisted of the testimony of one witness for the importer and one witness for the Government, both competent, and samples conceded by the importer’s witness to be representative. Upon the testimony and an examination of the exhibits, the Board of United States General Appraisers found the issues against the importer and sustained the collector. This court is unable to say that the finding of the board waB against the weight of the evidence or wholly unsupported by it, and the board’s judgment is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8404 (T. D. 38602)</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 44051.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43995.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43966.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 252, Tarim? Act op 1913 — “Colored.”</p> <p>To bring cloth within the designation “colored” (par. 252, act of 1913), it is not necessary that the color should improve the appearance or add to the market value of the cloth or be permanent.</p> <p>2. “Fugitive Tint” in Cloth.</p> <p>Cotton cloth was woven with a double twisted yarn for the warp and a single twisted yarn for the filling. The warp yarn, before weaving, had been treated with a “fugitive tint,” solely for the purpose of assisting the weaver to distinguish the two yarns. This tint imparted a plainly discernible color to a substantial portion of the surface. Notwithstanding that this color is bleached out before the cloth is used, and notwithstanding that it adds nothing to the appearance or market value of the cloth, the importation is “colored” under paragraph 252, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>:3. Condition at Importation Governs Classification.</p> <p>Goods are classified with reference to their condition at the time of importation.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers G. A. 8361 (T. D. 384CG).</p>

<p>Appeal .from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43986.</p>

<p>1. Construction, “Not Specially Provided por.”</p> <p>The limitation “not specially provided for” affects a tariff designation only when such designation is brought into competition with another one of equal specificity. — Drakenfeld v. United States (9 Ct. Oust. Appls., 124; T. D. 37979).</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraphs 258, 265, and 358, Tarifp Act op 1913. — “Jac-</p> <p>quard Figured Upholstery Goods” — “Made on the Nottingham Lace-Curtain Machine ” — “Lace Window Curtains.”</p> <p>Window curtains, if they are not otherwise more specifically provided for and are Jacquard figured, are dutiable as “Jacquard figured upholstery goods,” under paragraph 258, tariff act of 1913. If they are lace window curtains, Jacquard figured, and made on the Nottingham lace-curtain machine, they are dutiable under paragraph 205 as “lace window curtains * * * made on the Nottingham lace-curtain machine.” If they are lace window curtains, Jacquard figured and not made on the Nottingham lace-curtain machine, they are dutiable under paragraph 358 as “lace window curtains not specially provided for.”</p> <p>3. Lace Window Curtains.</p> <p>The importation is lace window curtains of Jacquard figured cotton netting counting nine or more spaces to the inch, made on the Nottingham lace-curtain machine, trimmed with Jacquard cotton lace made on the Lever machine, the part made on the Nottingham machine being 75 per cent and that on the Lever machine 25 per cent of the value of the curtains. Since they are not made wholly .on the Nottingham machine, they can not be so classified under paragraph 265, tariff act of 1913. They are more specifically provided for as “lace window curtains,” in paragraph 358, than as “curtains, * * * and other Jacquard figured upholstery goods,” in paragraph 258, and dutiable accordingly.</p>

<p>Papeb Trays — Entireties—Evidence, Sufficiency.</p> <p>Decorated porcelain toy tea sets and paper trays were imported together. There were more trays than tea sets, and the evidence showed that sometimes the trays were sold with the tea sets and sometimes they were sold alone. The trays are of such size and manufacture as to preclude their classification as toys. The trays and the tea sets should not have been classified together as entireties dutiable as toys in chief value of decorated porcelain under paragraph 80, tariff act of 1913. The trays are a separate entity. The examiner’s report that they were paper trays and the testimony that they were made of pressed paper soaked in glue establishes their proper classification as manufactures of paper under paragraph 332.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 44031.</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Collector's Report.</p> <p>Where the collector, in his report on the protest, conceded that a portion of the importation was'properly classifiable as claimed, the Board of United States General Appraisers should have so held, particularly when the concession was consistent with the other evidence.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 169, Tarh?p Act or 1913 — “ Cabinet Woods ” — Japanese White-Oak Lumber.</p> <p>Certain kinds of Japanese white-oak lumber are classifiable as “cabinet woods” under paragraph 169, tariff act of 1913. The classification in each case depends upon the chief use of the kinds, grades, and conditions in question. If it should be found in any case that the chief use of the importation in question is a cabinet-wood use, it should be classified as a cabinet wood. Cabinet use includes the manufacture of furniture (particularly when of a substantial or superior character), office desks and fixtures, show cases, music boxes, inlaid or parquet flooring, molding, fine panel work, and high-grade interior trim in general. The term does not, however, apply to plain or common flooring or other like carpentry. The evidence in this case is not sufficient to overcome the decision by the board, in harmony with that by the collector, classifying the Japanese white-oak lumber at bar as a ^ cabinet wood under paragraph 169, rather than sawn lumber not specially provided-for, under paragraph 647.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8361 (T. D. 38466).</p>

<p>Motion by appellants to enlarge record.</p>

<p>1. Condiments — Sauces.</p> <p>Condiments are one of the classes of “sauces” under paragraph 201, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Chutney.</p> <p>Chutney, an East Indian condiment, made of fruits and spices cooked together, having-a “sour sweet” taste, and eaten as a relish with meat, is classifiable under paragraph 201, tariff act of 1913 — “sauces of all kinds, not specially provided for; ” and not under paragraph 217 — “comfits, sweet meats, and fruits of all kinds preserved or packed in sugar or having sugar added thereto.”</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 44337.</p>

<p>Counsel’s Control or Litigation.</p> <p>.In accordance with the general rule that an attorney may confess judgment, or consent to a decree against his client, or compromise where there is nothing apparent of imposition, unfairness, or dishonesty, the importers’ counsel in this case had authority to enter into an agreement or stipulation for the overruling of his protest as to certain entries. Subsection 30 of section 28 of the tariff act of 1909, creating the office of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of customs litigation, confers upon him similar authority. It follows that a stipulation between the counsel for the importers and the Assistant Attorney General that a protest be sustained in part and overruled in part is valid and binding upon the Board of United States General Appraisers.</p>

<p>Rehearing; decision rendered June 2,1921 (11 Ct. Cust. Appls., 102; T. D. 38749).</p>

<p>1. Glove Leather.</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 359, tariff act of 1913, contemplates a leather so far advanced in manufacture as to commit it to the making of gloves, and does not include a leather which is suitable for use as a material from which leather for glove making may he manufactured. Merchandise is classified with reference to its condition at importation, and not with reference to what it may become as the' result of manufacturing processes applied subsequent to importation.</p> <p>2. Lambskins, Alum Tanned, are not Glove Leather.</p> <p>Alum-tanned lambskins, shown to be unfit for use for making gloves until after considerable further advancement and shown also to be fit for various other uses after the application of the respective manufacturing processes appropriate to such uses, can not be regarded as “glove leathers” under paragraph 359, tariff act of 1913. They are free of duty under paragraph 530 as leather not specially provided for.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 291, TARIFF Ad' OF 1913 — “INCLUDING SHAWLS.”</p> <p>In the prowsion of paragraph 291, tariff act of 1913, for “articles of wearing apparel of every description, including shawls whether knitted or woven,” the word “including” is not used as an addition so as to make an eo nomine designation of shawls, but is used as a precaution to make clear that shawls are a part of the genus wearing apparel.</p> <p>2. Shawls of Wool Knitted in Imitation of Lace.</p> <p>With, reference to shawls knitted of wool in imitation of lace, the provision of paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, for “wearing apparel * * * of lace or of imitation lace ” is more specific than that of paragraph 291 for “wearing apparel * * * including shawls * * * of wool,” and classifies them for duty.</p>

<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 44095.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8438 (T. D. 38722).</p>

<p>Relative Specificity — Japanese Toweling.</p> <p>With, reference to Japanese toweling, the provision of paragraph 262, tariff act of 1913, for “fabrics with fast edges not exceeding twelve inches in width * * * made of cotton” is more specific than that of paragraph 252, for “cotton cloth * * * colored * * * containing yarns * * * exceeding number nine and not exceeding number nineteen,” and classifies it for duty.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8406 (T. D. 38607).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 44126. --</p>

<p>1. Usual Goverings and Containers.</p> <p>It is the general rule that, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, the usual coverings and containers of free merchandise are themselves entitled to free entry.</p> <p>2. Cream Can Jackets.</p> <p>Jackets of felt and cotton, used on cream cans to keep constant the temperature of the cream, are shown to be usual coverings, and are admissible free of duty with the cream.</p>

<p>United States Court of Customs Appeals Reviews Final Decisions Only.</p> <p>The United States Court of Customs Appeals reviews final decisions only of the Board of United States General Appraisers. — (Sec. 195, Judicial Code.) A motion to remand this cause to the board on the ground of the alleged improper admission of certain evidence is denied without prejudice.</p>

<p>1. Legislative Sanction oe Judicial Construction — Toys.</p> <p>The tariff act of 1913 having been enacted since the decision of the case of Illfelder v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 109; T. D. 31115) with no provision to modify the definition of toys made in that case, Congress must be presumed to have sanctioned that definition.</p> <p>2. Christmas-Tree Ornaments are not Toys.</p> <p>Colored glass ornaments for Christmas trees are not toys under paragraph 342, tariff act of 1913. Their classification, some as colored glass articles under paragraph 84, and some as articles made of glass beads under paragraph 333, is not disturbed.</p>

<p>•Christmas-Tree Ornaments are not Toys.</p> <p>Following Woolworth Oo. v. United States (11 Ot. Oust. Appls., 217; T. D. 38985), decided concurrently herewith, colored glass ornaments for Christmas trees are not toys under paragraph 342, tariff act of 1913. Their classification, some as .glass articles under paragraph 84, and some as articles made of glass beads under paragraph 333, is not disturbed.</p>

<p>CHRISTMAS-TREE ORNAMENTS ARE NOT TOYS.</p> <p>Following Woolworth Co. v. United States (11 Ct. Oust. Appls., 217; T. D. 38985} decided concurrently herewith, colored glass ornaments for Christmas trees are-not toys under paragraph 342, tariff act of 1913. Their classification, some as glass articles under paragraph 84, and some as articles made of glass beads under paragraph 333, is not disturbed.</p>

<p>1. Manifest Clerical Error.</p> <p>The market value of merchandise imported from Calcutta was officially determined as of the date when the vessel bearing it passed an Indian point known as Budge Budge. In the duplicate consular invoice received by the importer this date had originally been stated as May 2, but an attempt had been made to correct it to read May 1. In this attempt an imperfect erasure of the 2 was had and the 1, instead of being superimposed upon the 2, was placed in front of it, so that the date appeared as May 12. Importer, having made a pro forma entry, amended it, fixing the market value of the merchandise as of May 12, and delivered his consular invoice to the collector. The triplicate consular certificate of the invoice received officially at the customhouse stated this date as May 1. Duty was levied on the market value on May 1, and this, being higher than the entered value, the additional duty provided for undervaluation by paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913, was imposed. The clerical error made in stating the date was manifest from a comparison of the duplicate with the" triplicate, both of which were in the hands of the collector as parts of the official record, and the additional duty should not have been imposed.</p> <p>'2. Evidence.</p> <p>Where the seller’s declaration stated that the vessel left Calcutta on May 1, and the consular certificate stated that the vessel passed Budge Budge on May 12, the importer was justified in relying on the consular statement.</p>

<p>APPRAISEMENT, FINALITY OE — ERROR WITHOUT INJURY.</p> <p>360 car wheels were invoiced, entered, and appraised as 180 sets, $1,800. No appeal from the appraisement was taken and duty was had at the correct ad valorem rate upon the $1,800. Proof that a set of such wheels is 4 instead of 2 is of no avail, since the appraised value of §1,800 is, under paragraph M, Section III, tariff act of 1913, final and conclusive.</p>

<p>Internal Revenue — Customs.</p> <p>The provision of section 600 (a), revenue act of 1918 (40 Stats. L., 1057), levying additional taxes on certain imported distilled spirits describes a customs duty and not an internal-revenue tax. Such spirits, imported and warehoused in 1917 and 1920 but withdrawn for consumption after the revenue act went into effect, were subject to the duty imposed by paragraph 237, tariff act of 1913, and also to that imposed by the revenue act.</p>

<p>1. American Goods Returned — Proof op Identity — Stipulation.</p> <p>A stipulation between counsel for the parties as to goods claiming free entry under paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, as American goods returned, that “the parts claimed to be of American manufacture are American goods actually exported,” establishes their identity.</p> <p>2. Advanced in Value or Improved in Condition — Evidence—Judicial Notice.</p> <p>American-made parts had been incorporated abroad in electric generators. The court, in the trial of a protest claiming free entry of such parts under paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, can not judicially know that they have not been “advanced in value or improved in condition by any process of manufacture or other means.” In fact, it seems that they have. The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining a protest against their assessment under paragraph 167 is reversed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8360 (T. D. 38465).</p>

<p>Textbooks — Bilingual Books — Books Printed Chiefly in Languages Other Than English.</p> <p>A series of books of general interest (mainly fiction), known as “Brentano’s Bilingual Series,” consisting of parallel translations in English and another language, are not “textbooks” within the meaning of that provision in paragraph 426, tariff act of 1913. Neither are they printed “chiefly in languages other than English,” under the same paragraph. The collector’s classification of them as books not specially provided for, under paragraph 329, should have been sustained by the Board of United States General Appraisers.</p>

<p>1. Hydrogenated or Hardened Oil.</p> <p>An oil which has been hardened by adding to its hydrogen content is not a chemical compound, but remains the oil it originally was. — United States v. Rockhill & Vietor et al. (10 Ot. Oust. Appls. 113; T. D. 38374).</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraphs 5 and 498, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Chemical * * * Compounds” — “Chemically Compounded.’’</p> <p>Soya-bean oil which has been hardened by adding to its hydrogen content by means of a chemical reaction which produces an oil having properties not possessed by the original oil and available for uses for which the original oil was unsuitable, does not become a chemical compound under paragraph 5, tariff act of 1913, but is a chemically compounded oil within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 498.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Presumption in Favor of Collector — Hardened Soya-Bean Oil.</p> <p>Hardened soya-bean oil was classified by the collector as a chemical compound under paragraph 5, tariff act of 1913, and claimed by the protest to be free of duty as an oil not chemically compounded such as commonly used in soap making. The Board of United States General Appraisers found the oil entitled to entry free of duty as soya-bean oil under paragraph 561, but, in the absence of such claim in' the protest, affirmed, without approving, the collector’s decision, and the decision of the board is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, T. D. 38789 (G. A. 8451)</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 644, Tarim? Act or 1913 — Countervailing Duty on Wheat and Its Products.</p> <p>Paragraph 644, tariff act of 1913, admits wheat and its products free of duty, but levies duty upon them if imported from a jurisdiction “which imposes a duty on wheat or wheat flour or semolina imported from the United States.” This does not mean that wheat or any one of its products is free here if free there; but means what it says — viz, that wheat or any of its products is dutiable here if wheat, wheat flour, or semolina is dutiable there. Consequently wheat imported from a jurisdiction which admits our wheat free of duty but levies duty on our wheat flour or semolina is dutiable under the paragraph.</p> <p>2. Retroactive Feature oe Foreign Tarirr Law Does Not Render Retroactive the Countervailing Duty Provision or Paragraph 644, Tarirr Act or 1913.</p> <p>Paragraph 644, tariff act of 1913, admits wheat and its products free of duty with a countervailing duty proviso. Wheat entered here from Australia at a time when it was dutiable under the proviso is not rendered free of duty by the subsequent passage of an Australian statute meeting the proviso and retroactive past the date of the importation.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 511, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Horn Strips * * * Unmanufactured. ”</p> <p>The prevision of paragraph 511, tariff act of 1913, for “horn strips * * * un-manufactured” obviously contemplates that some manufacturing' process or processes must be applied to the natural horn in order to produce a horn strip, because, of common knowledge, horn does not grow in strips.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Presumption Favors Board’s Finding — “Manufactures of- * * * Horn” — “Horn Strips.”</p> <p>Strips of horn, unpolished and undrilled, with unfinished ends, seeming rather crude, used for ankle supports in shoes, were found by the Board of United States-General Appraisers to be “horn strips * * * unmanufactured,” under paragraph 511, tariff act of 1913, rather than “manufactures of * * * horn” under paragraph 368. The court, being unable to discover from the record that the board has wrongly interpreted the evidence in finding the facts or misapplied the law to the facts as found, affirms the decision.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers G. A. 8455 (T. D. 38793).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, T. D. 38746 (G. A. 8442).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 44417.</p>