Volume 10 — Customs Court Reports

<p>1. Pleading — Judgment.</p> <p>Relief not asked for will not be granted in this court.</p> <p>2. Paragraph L, Section III, Tariff Act of 1913 — Cost of Production — Ap-praisement.</p> <p>Silk in the gray was purchased in the United States and shipped to France, there treated by certain preliminary manufacturing processes and returned to the United States to be used in the manufacture of fabrics. It was shown that there was no market for such processed silk in eithér France or the United States. Accompanying the merchandise were invoices showing the various items of charge made for the processing and preparing of the silk. Upon these invoices were items of general expenses and profits, which were, however, less than 10 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, of the outlay of every nature incident to production, which are the minimum additions permitted by paragraph L, Section III, tariff act of 1913, to be made for such items. The claim that the Board of United States General Appraisers proceeded upon a wrong principle of law in making additions, since these additions had already been made in the invoices, can not be sustained; and their decision adding 10 per cent and 8 per cent of the invoice values for general expenses and profits, respectively, is affirmed.</p>

<p>Wood PuU> — Putj?board.</p> <p>Mechanically ground wood pulp, in sheet form, imported in rolls, the sheet being of a.width and thickness especially suitable for the manufacture of a particular kind of pulpboard does not, by reason of its form, become “pulpboard” within the meaning of that term in paragraph 320, tariff act of 1913, but remains “mechanically .ground wood pulp ” within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 649.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43135.</p> <p>[Oral argument Dee. 19,1919, by Mr. Sharretts and Mr. Baldwin.]</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 651, TARIPP ÁCT OP 1913 — “WASTE.”</p> <p>The word “waste” in paragraph 651, tariff act of 1913, does not include only refuse or waste material resulting or left over from a. process of manufacture, and does not exclude manufactured articles which, by wear and tear of use, have become worn-out, unfit and useless for the purposes for which they were made.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 651, Taripp Act op 1913 — Incongruity to be Avoided.</p> <p>It could not have been the intention of Congress, in the enactment of paragraph 651, tariff act of 1913, to admit shoddy free of duty, and to exclude material for maldng shoddy from such exemption.</p> <p>3. Classification — Worn-out Articles.</p> <p>Worn-out articles should, not be subject to the tariff classification they would have received had they been imported new.</p> <p>4. Evidence — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>It is not sufficient for the protestant to establish that the collector’s classification is wrong. He must also show that the one he contends for is right.</p> <p>5. Construction — Doubt Favors Importer.</p> <p>In the construction of statutes of doubtful meaning, the importer is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.</p> <p>6. Worn-out Pulp Felts.</p> <p>Pieces of wool felt, which had been worn out by use on paper-making machines were shown to be imported for the purpose of making shoddy, and to be commercially fit practically for no other purpose. They are admissible free as “wastes not specially provided for,” under paragraph 651, tariff act of 1913, and should not have been classified as a manufacture of wool under paragraph 288.</p>

<p>Fashion Plates.</p> <p>Figures of women wearing fashionable clothes, drawn on cardboard with pen and ink or pencil and colored with water colors, designed to illustrate the clothes, are classifiable as “original drawings and sketches in pen and ink or pencil and water colors” under paragraph 652, tariff act of 1913, rather than as manufactures of paper under paragraph 332. Similar cards, composed in large part of- actual dress goods fabrics and other similar cards representing the interiors of rooms exhibiting designs of drapery, pictures of wall paper and linoleum designs, bolts of dress or upholstery fabrics, a couch with figured covering, and similar articles are not so classifiable; neither are they “works of art” under paragraph 376; their classification as manufactures of paper under paragraph 332 is not disturbed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8289 (T. D. 38145).</p> <p>[Oral argument Dec. 18,1919, by Mr. Frederick W. Brooks, jr., and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 356, Taripp Act op 1913 — “Jewelry.”</p> <p>Prima facie, an article in chief value of material neither precious stone nor precious metal, nor an imitation of either, is not jewelry commonly so called.. American Bead Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 18; T. D. 36259).</p> <p>2. Evidence — Presumption that Common and Commercial Meanings Coincide.</p> <p>Presumptively the commercial meaning of language is the same as its common meaning.</p> <p>3. Bone Articles — Jewelry.</p> <p>Articles made of hone are not jewelry.</p> <p>4. Evidence — Report op Appraiser Made apter Liquidation.</p> <p>The report of the appraiser, made to the collector after liquidation, that the merchandise is commercially known as jewelry is not evidence, the classification having been made prior to the receipt of such report upon the report which the appraiser had, already made to the collector.</p> <p>5. Evidence — Conflict of Presumptions.</p> <p>The report of the collector stated that “certain articles of bone [watch charms] were classified as ‘returned by the appraiser as jewelry.’” Presumptively the collector’s classification is correct. Articles of boné are not commonly known as jewelry. Presumptively commercial and common meanings are the same. The collector’s classification of articles of bone as jewelry can be correct only if it be shown that they are commercially known as jewelry. With no evidence as to commercial designation, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining the protest against their classification as jewelry under paragraph 356 and claiming classification as manufactures of bone under paragraph 368 of the act of 1913 is affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 34, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Prepared”—Cleaning — Drying—Splitting.</p> <p>Cleaning and drying, and splitting for the purpose of cleaning or drying, are not processes of manufacture, and do not ordinarily carry merchandise into the category of “prepared,” as that term is used in tariff nomenclature generally and in paragraph 34, tariff act of 1913, particularly.</p> <p>2. Fish Sounds, Cleaned, Dried, and Split.</p> <p>Fish sounds which have been cleaned and dried, after having been split to facilitate the cleaning and drying, imported to make soup, are not dutiable under paragraph 34, tariff act of 1913, as “prepared fish sounds,” but are admissible free of duty under paragraph 419, as “fish sounds, crude, dried, or salted for preservation only and unmanufactured.”</p>

<p>CoNSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 358, TaRIBT ACT OP 1913. — “APPLIQUÉD”—CONTEXT as Aid.</p> <p>The provisions in the tariff act of 1913 for cotton cloth “colored,” “stained,” “painted,” or “printed” (par. 252) and for plain woven fabrics of any vegetable fiber “colored,” “stained,” “painted,” or “printed” (par. 279), read in connection with the proviso of paragraph 652 that the word “painting” as therein’employed shall not be held to include articles such as are “made wholly or in part by stenciling or any other mechanical process,” make it clear that the word “appliquéd,” in paragraph 358, was not intended to include fabrics ornamented by affixing a floral design of either flock or some metallic substance by means of stenciling with glue or some stamping process. Following United States ’V. Heyliger & Eaubitschek (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 52; T. D. 38297) decided concurrently herewith, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers, sustaining a protest against the classification of such merchandise as “appliquéd” under paragraph 358, claiming classification under the residuary provisions of paragraph 318 for woven silk fabrics not otherwise specially provided for is affirmed. It is essential to the definition of the word “appliquéd” that the appliquéd figure or design must have been independently fabricated and thereafter applied or transferred to another article or fabric.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43291.</p> <p>[Oral argument Dee. 16,1919, by Mr. Hansen and Mr. Brown.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 368, Tariff Act of 1913 — Dyed Straw Articles.</p> <p>Dyed straw is not straw in its “natural state” within that expression in paragraph 368, tariff act of 1913, and articles made of it are not dutiable under the paragraph.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Judicial Notice.</p> <p>The court takes judicial notice that certain exhibits made of straw are dyed.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 385, Tariff Act of 1913 — Nonenumerated Articles — Similitude.</p> <p>When there is no specific provision for merchandise, it can be classified under paragraph 385, tariff act of 1913, as a nonenumerated article only in case it is not, in material, texture, or use, similar to any article enumerated in the act.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 347, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Artificial.”</p> <p>In order to render merchandise classifiable under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, as “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof,” an exact imitation is not essential.</p> <p>5. Millinery Ornaments.</p> <p>Dyed straw millinery ornaments, crudely resembling “fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof,” were held dutiable by the Board of United States General Appraisers as “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains,'leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof,” under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, rather than as nonenumerated articles under paragraph 385, and the decision is affirmed. Merchandise composed of strips of colored straw, but not resembling any of the things named in paragraph 347 should have been classified as claimed, under paragraph 385.</p>

<p>1. MANUFACTURES OF IVORY NOT JEWELRY.</p> <p>Manufactures of ivory with, brass eyelets are not made of precious metal or precious stone or an imitation of either, and are not jewelry. United States v. Mandel Bros. (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 44; T. D. 38294).</p> <p>2. Construction — Doubt Favors Importer.</p> <p>Where the construction of a statute is doubtful, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the importer.</p> <p>3. Ivory Pendants and Brooches — Artificial Flowers.</p> <p>Following Cochran et al. v. United States (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 62; T. D. 38336), decided concurrently Herewith, ivory brooches, pendants, and scarf pins, carved in imitation of various flowers, are not “artificial and ornamental flowers” within paragraph-347, tariff act of 1913. Their-classification as manufactures of ivory under paragraph 369 is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43382.</p> <p>[Oral argument Reb. 25, 1920, by Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Presumption in Favor op Collector’s Finding.</p> <p>The classification by the collector of merchandise composed partly of artificial stem and leaves under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, as artificial flowers and leaves used as millinery ornaments, raises a presumption that the artificial stem and leaves are chief value.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 347, Tarifp Act op 1913 — “Artificial and Ornamental.”</p> <p>. To be classifiable as “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof,” under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, it is not necessary that articles should truly represent fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, or stems. It is sufficient if they simulate natural fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems in physical characteristics and appearance closely enough to cause them in common understanding to be regarded as leaves, stems, flowers, or fruits, produced, not by nature but by the hand of man, and, at the same time, are appropriate and suitable to be used for those purposes of ornamentation to which the natural products may be temporarily devoted.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 368, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Natural State”— Dyed Straw.</p> <p>Dyed straw is not in its “natural state” within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 368, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>4. Miscellaneous Millinery Ornaments.</p> <p>Millinery ornaments consisting of straw spheroids in combination with artificial stems and sprays of artificial leaves, having been classified by the collector under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, it must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the leaves and stems are chief value; and they are dutiable under the paragraph as articles in chief value of “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems.” Millinery ornaments consisting of clusters of black straw wound into the form of berries or grapes and set on black straw leaves attached to stems made of black straw and metal; and millinery ornaments consisting of sprays of black straw leaves and black straw roses sewed with black threads to a stiff fabric foundation were properly classified as “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems” under the same paragraph. Millinery ornaments in chief value of straw, but not in imitation of fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems, are not dutiable under paragraph 347; such of them as are in chief value of undyed straw are dutiable as manufactures in chief value of straw in its natural state, under paragraph 368, and such of them as are in chief value of dyed straw are dutiable as manufactures not provided for under paragraph 385. Millinery ornaments so crudely and grotesquely fashioned as to be scarcely deserving of the description ornamental and not resembling fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems can not be classified under paragraph 347.</p>

<p>1. APPRAISEMENT NOT THE FUNCTION OF COLLECTOR.</p> <p>No tariff or customs law, from the first to the last, has cior in terms authorized collectors of customs, as collectors, to determine the actual or market value of imported articles or goods, and they have no implied power to appraise.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraphs M, N, and R, Section III, Tariff Act of 1913— “Value” of Containers.</p> <p>Paragraph R, Section III,' tariff act o’f 1913, confers no authority to appraise upon collectors of customs. The “value” of the containers of imported merchandise spoken of in this paragraph is their cost. To make dutiable value the collector is authorized by virtue of paragraphs M and N, Section III, to add to the appraised value of the merchandise per se, not the market value, but the cost of the containers thereof; that is to say, the price actually paid for them, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States.</p>

<p>l. Construction, Paragraph R, Section III, Tariff Act of 1913 — Unusuae Coverings.</p> <p>The .manifest purpose of that portion of paragraph R, Section III, tariff act of 1913, which levies additional duty upon unusual coverings or containers of imported merchandise is to penalize, not merchandise used as coverings or containers and imported as merchandise, but merchandise which is imported and sought to be introduced into the country, not as merchandise, but as coverings or containers. To hold otherwise would be to assume that Congress intended to penalize a mere convenience and economy in transportation which neither affected the interests of the Government nor imperiled its revenue.</p> <p>2. Leather Trunks Containing Manufactures of Human Hair.</p> <p>TJpon an importation of leather tranks containing manufactures of human hair, invoiced as leather trunks and human hair, the additional duty levied upon unusual coverings or containers by paragraph R, Section III, tariff act of 1913, should not be levied, since the trunks were imported as merchandise, no attempt being made to introduce them as coverings. The trunks are dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 360 as manufactures of leather, and the hair goods at 35 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 351 as manufactures of human hair.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 347, Tarot? Act op 1913 — Artificial Leaves and Flowers.</p> <p>Certainly not every bended straw or twisted shaving can amount to an artificial and ornamental flower or leaf within the meaning of paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913. Articles made of straw and chip in natural colors, too fragile and crude to be used as millinery ornaments, but imported as raw material for making them, not resembling fruits, grains,- leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof, are not to be classified under this paragraph as “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof.”</p> <p>'2. Construction, Paragraph 368, Tariff Act of 1913 — -“Natural State”— “Separated Fibers” — Aided by Language of Previous Acts and by Context — Change of Language Signifying Change of Meaning.</p> <p>Paragraph 272, tariff act of 1913, levying duty upon floor mattings, makes straw include both round and split straw. Paragraph 335 defines the terms grass and straw as meaning “these substances in their natural form and structure, and not the separated fiber thereof.” Paragraph 368 defines the terms as meaning “these substances in their natural state, and not the separated fibers thereof.” Paragraphs 409 of the act of 1897 and 422 of the act of 1909, the predecessors of paragraph 335 of the act of 1913, defined the terms in the same language as does paragraph 335 of the act of 1913. So also did the ancestors of paragraph 368 of the act of 1913— 354 (1894), 449 (1897), and 463 (1909). But, in paragraph 368 of the act of 1913, the expression “in their natural form and structure” was changed to the expression “in their natural state.” Obviously, this change must be accorded a meaning and obviously the expression “in their natural state” is broader than the _ expression “in their natural form and.structure.” The expression of paragraph 368, tariff act of 1913, “in their natural state, and not the separated fibers thereof, ” will not be construed so as to make the first phrase simply antithetical of the second. The purpose of Congress was to exclude from the paragraph by this provision grass and straw cloth made of grass and straw fibers, which are provided for elsewhere; and the paragraph comprehends split straw, so long as the splitting has not resulted in a decortication of the fibers.</p> <p>3, Millinery Material of Split Straw and Chip.</p> <p>Split straw and chip material for the manufacture of millinery ornaments, too crude for classification under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, as artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems, or parts thereof, are dutiable ■as manufactures of chip and straw, under paragraph 368.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 252, Tariff Act op 1913 — “ Cotton Cloth ” * * * , “COLORED.” AND “NOT * * * COLORED.”</p> <p>Cotton cloth., to be dutiable under paragraph 252, tariff act of 1913, as “cotton clo.th * * * colored,” within the rule of Seeberger v. Schlesinger (152 U. S.. 587), -must have colored yarns or threads, which form a necessary and substantial part of the article. Unbleached cotton duck or canvas, about 28J to 30J inches, wide, having a single blue warp thread equally visible on both surfaces and running-lengthwise of the fabric about an inch from each edge, the blue thread serving'only for a marginal guide in making up the fabric and not affecting the cloth either as-to price, strength, or embellishment, is to be classified under this paragraph as not. colored.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8287 (T. D. 38135).</p> <p>[Oral argument Eeb. 27, 1920, by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Puclchafer.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Subsection 5, Paragraph J, Section IV, Tariff Act of 1913-Materials for Construction of American Vessels — -Manufactures Distinguished.</p> <p>Forced-draft fans, with engines attached, completely finished for the forcing of air through heater boxes into the furnaces of vessels, are not materials for American vessels within subsection 5, paragraph J, Section IV, tariff act of 1913. They are finished manufactures, and the collector’s classification under paragraph 167 as-miscellaneous metal articles is approved.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Presumption in Favor or Collector’s Classification — Article 333, Customs Regulations, 1915 — American Goods Returned.</p> <p>A claim for free entry of engines, having forced-draft fans attached, as American goods returned without advancement or improvement in value or condition under paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, is not supported by a statement in the foreign export entry that the engines were originally of American manufacture, and that they were shipped to Canada “for connection to the fans.” With no other evidence, and without compliance with article 333, Customs Regulations of 1915, pursuant to paragraph 404, the collector’s classification as miscellaneous metal articles under paragraph 167 is approved.</p>

<p>]. Containers of Tea.</p> <p>Where leas than 5 pounds of tea was imported in a tin can and the can inclosed by a-bamboo basket, the can not being an unusual covering designed for use otherwise-than in the bona fide transportation of the tea, the proviso to paragraph 627, tariff act-of 1913, directs that the can should be admitted free and duty levied on the basket. It was error to treat the can and the basket as an entirety and assess duty upon their - combined values as being in chief value of bamboo under paragraph 175. — United] States v. Brown & Co. (9 Ct. Oust. Appls., 45; T. D. 37903) distinguished.</p>

<p>1. Construction — -Processes tor Facilitating Transportation.</p> <p>Numerous provisions of the tariff act expressly grant to importers the right, without increase of duty, to so fashion their merchandise as will facilitate transportation. This right will not he denied to an importer by holding such a process a manufacture or a partial manufacture because it may incidentally be a benefit to the ultimate manufacture of the merchandise in this country.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 614, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Unmanufactured”— Aided by Context — All Parts of Statute to be Given Effect.</p> <p>Paragraph 549, tariff act of 1913, grants free entry to “Minerals, crude, or not advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding, or other process of manufacture * * Paragraph 614 grants free entry to “limestone, unmanufac-tured.” Paragraph 81 levies duty upon “earthy or mineral substances whether wholly or partially manufactured.” Had Congress intended limestone, which had been ‘ ‘ advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding, or by other process of manufacture,” to be denigd free entry, the provision of paragraph 614 for “limestone, unmanufactured, ’ ’ would be i die and surplusage, for it would have been already accomplished by paragraph 549. Congress singled out limestone from paragraphs 81 and 549 for special consideration in paragraph 614, so that limestone, unless completely manufactured, is entitled to free entry under paragraph 614.</p> <p>3. Crushed Limestone.</p> <p>Limestone crushed to diameters of from one-sixteenth inch to 4 inches to facilitate transportation, and needing to be subjected to other manufacturing processes before being used, is admissible free of duty under paragraph 614, tariff act of 1913, as “limestone, unmanufactured,” and not dutiable under paragraph 81 as “Earthy or mineral substances wholly or partially manufactured.”</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 36, TARIFF ACT OF 1913 — “CHICLE * * * ADVANCED in Value.”</p> <p>It is settled law that not every slight advance in value is sufficient to constitute such an advance as to render merchandise dutiable at the higher rates provided for it by the import revenue laws when advanced in value; and paragraph 36, tariff act of 1913, levying a lower rate of duty upon “chicle, crude,” and a higher rate upon it “refined or advanced in value by drying, straining, or any other process or treatment whatever beyond that essential to the proper packing,” will be construed accordingly.</p> <p>2. “Chicle, Crude.”</p> <p>Chicle was shipped from Mexico into Canada and from Canada into the United States. In Canada it was bruised or hammered into smaller, particles and in part resacked, these processes being related to packing and transportation rather than to manufacture and increasing the value only from 28 to 30 cents per pound, the 'crushing enhancing the value only one-half of a cent per pound. As imported into the United States the chicle was intermixed with dirt, bark, sticks, and other foreign substances. This can not be regarded as “chicle * * * refined or advanced in value by drying, straining, or any other process or treatment whatever beyond that essential to the proper packing,” under parargaph 36, tariff act of 1913, but was properly classified as “chicle, crude,” under the same paragraph.</p>

<p>Stipulation.</p> <p>A segregable mixture of linseed and screenings was assessed with duty as linseed. Upon appeal to the Board of United States General Appraisers, the parties stipulated that tbe screenings bore a dutiable value of $10.50 per ton. The board found no value for the screenings and refused to the importers a rehearing asked for on this ground. There was no reversible error.</p>

<p>Squared Timbers — Railroad Ties.</p> <p>Squared timbers imported lor the purpose of being cut up into railroad ties, but suitable for other uses also, not known as railroad ties in the form in which imported, are admissible free as “timber * * * unmanufactured, hewn, or sawed, sided, or squared, ” under paragraph 647, tariff act of 1913, and not dutiable as railroad ties, under paragraph 170. — United States v. Baxter (9 Ot. Oust. Appls., 99; T. D. 37975). distinguished and explained.</p>

<p>1. CLASSIFICATION DETERMINED BY CpNDITION OF MERCHANDISE AT IMPORTATION.</p> <p>Merchanilise which may at one time have been a braid or plait, but which, at the time of importation, is not, can not be so classified, since the condition of the merchandise at the time of importation determines its Classification.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 335, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Braids”—“Plaits.”</p> <p>There seems to be little, if any, difference in meaning between the word “braids” and the word “plaits” in paragraph 335, tariff act of 1913. Two threads twisted together can not be regarded as a braid or plait.</p> <p>3. Hemp Chenille.</p> <p>Merchandise known as hemp chenille, made on a machine by braiding one hemp .and two cotton threads and contemporaneously cutting the hemp thread so that the -finished product is two tightly twisted cotton threads with pieces of hemp thread sticking through the twists is not classifiable under paragraph 335, tariff act of 1913, ■as “braids” or “plaits.” The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers affirming the collector’s classification as a manufacture of hemp under paragraph 284 is affirmed.</p> <p>4. Construction — Statutes Must Be Construed as Written.</p> <p>If the plain and necessary construction of a tariff paragraph should lead to the •incongruous result of taxing the material for a manufacture at a higher rate than the manufacture itself, the remedy is legislative and not judicial.</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph I, Section III, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Clerical Error ”— Additional -Duty.</p> <p>The term “manifest clerical error” in paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913, is one that is apparent and obvious on the face of the papers. It does not include an error which may, by extrinsic evidence, he shown to have been committed. To regard as manifest clerical errors those which depend for their demonstration upon proof dehors the record would put a premium upon fraud or attempted fraud upon the revenue. — United States v. Swedish Produce Co. (4 Ct. Oust. Appls , 223; T. D. 33437). An entry which sets out the extension in yen and the unit of value without stating what currency, obviously states upon its face that the unit of value,is in yen; and extraneous proof that the extension should have been stated in dollars instead of yen does not establish a claim of “manifest clerical error” under the paragraph. The additional duty provided for by the paragraph for undervaluation should have been imposed, since the yen is worth less than the dollar. The action of the appraiser in returning the invoice to the importer for correction after it had come under his observation is forbidden by the paragraph.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 498, TARIFF ACT OF 1913 — “CHEMICAL * * * Compounds” — 1 ‘Chemically Compounded.’’</p> <p>The term “chemical * * * compounds,” in paragraph 5, tariff act of 1913, differs from the term “chemically compounded” in paragraph 498; and a given substance may not be a chemical compound within paragraph 5 but may perhaps be chemically compounded within paragraph 498.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 5, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Chemical * * * Compounds.”</p> <p>“A chemical compound necessarily implies not a mere mingling of components, but a chemical combination of them, resulting in their destruction as distinct entities and in the development by chemical reaction of a new substance possessing properties radically different from those of its constituent elements.” — Strohmeyer v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 285; T. D. 32035). Hydrogenated oil, oil whose hydrogen content has been increased chemically, this process resulting in changing the oil from a liquid to a solid at ordinary room temperatures without altering its essential character and qualities, is not a chemical compound within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 5, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Admission Against Interest.</p> <p>In the trial of protests claiming merchandise not to be fish oil, invoice and entry descriptions of it as such are entitled to substantial evidential weight as being admissions against interest.</p> <p>4. Evidence — -Weight and Sufficiency.</p> <p>In the trial of protests claiming certain hydrogenated oil not to be fish oil, the report of the appraiser that the oil was “unidentifiable” and the testimony of protestants’ chemist that it was not possible to tell what kind of oil it originally was, is clearly outweighed by invoice and entry descriptions of it as fish oil coupled with the testimony of two chemists that their examinations furnished ground for the belief that the original oil was fish oil.</p> <p>5. Construction, Paragraph 44, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Oils.”</p> <p>Fluidity at ordinary room temperatures is not necessary to the meaning of the word “oils,” in paragraph 44, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>6. Pleading — -Protest—Evidence—Presumption In Favor of Collector.</p> <p>A protest against an erroneous classification, making no correct claim, can not be sustained. The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining it must be reversed and the collector’s erroneous classification must stand.</p> <p>7. Hydrogenated Fish Oil:</p> <p>Fish oil which has been hardened by chemically increasing its hydrogen content, its essential characteristics remaining unchanged, is classifiable under paragraph 44, tariff act of 1913, as fish oil, and not under paragraph 5 as a chemical compound, or under paragraph 498 as miscellaneous, not chemically compounded grease, such as is commonly used in soap making or in wire drawing or for stuffing or dressing leather.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph I, Section III, Taripe Act op 1913.</p> <p>While the additional duties prescribed for undervaluation of merchandise by paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913, are not to be construed as penal in character, nevertheless they provide for the assessment of duties in excess of the ordinary or regular rate of duty upon similar merchandise, and they should not accrue against an importer unless the statutes and regulations upon which they depend have been substantially followed in the assessment.</p> <p>2. Construction, Article 582, Customs Regulations op 1915.</p> <p>The Customs Regulations, when established in conformity with the tariff act are intended to secure the rights of importers as well as to enforce their obligations. Article 582, Customs Regulations of 1915, requiring that when the appraiser advances invoice prices to make market value an appropriate red ink notation shall be made on the invoice, must be substantially complied with. The collector has no authority - to condone noncompliance with this regulation; nor is it a rule established for the sole benefit of the Government, so that the importer has no right to complain of its violation. A red ink notation “D” opposite an item deducted by the importer as nondutiable, the notation being intended by the appraiser and understood by the collector to mean that the item should be added again to make market value, is not a sufficient compliance with this regulation, and the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining a protest against the collector’s action , in assessing upon such a foundation the additional duty provided for by paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913, for undervaluation is affirmed.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH N, SECTION III, TARIFF ACT OF 1913 — “OWNER, Importer, Consignee, or Agent” — Protest, Who May Pile.</p> <p>When it is shown that the importations were purchased by the protestant abroad, that he owned them at the time they were brought to the United States, and that he paid the duty on them, it appears that protest was filed by a proper party under , paragraph N, Section III, tariff act of 1913, providing that it may he filed by the-“owner, importer, consignee or agent of such merchandise, ” notwithstanding that, his name does not appear in any of the papers connected with the entry.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Sufficiency- — Presumption.</p> <p>Prom the fact that the entries embraced a large number, of standardized' parts of engines .for use in the building, of certain vessels, and from the reports to the collector of a special agent that nine of such engines had been installed upon such vessels, it can not be inferred that the engines had been assembled abroad and shipped' here in a “knockdown” condition.</p> <p>3. Classification Determined by Condition at Importation.</p> <p>It is well settled that, in the absence of deception, disguise, or artifice résorted to-for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud upon the revenue, imported merchandise must be classified with reference to its condition when imported. Indeed this rule applies in cases where merchandise has been manufactured or prepared for the express purpose of being imported at a lower rate of duty. If the collector may review the entries of one importer for many months covering standardized' engine parts in order to determine for classification purposes how many complete engines were imported, it is difficult to see how this rule is not violated.</p> <p>4. CONSTRUCTION, SUBSECTION 5, PARAGRAPH J, SECTION IY, TARIFF Act OP 1913— “Materials,” Manufactures Distinguished — Standardized Parts.</p> <p>The finished product of one manufacture may become the material for the next in rank. — Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States (171 U. S., 210).' The provision of subsection 5, paragraph J, Section IV, tariff act of 1913, admitting free of duty “materials” necessary for the building of the machinery of American vessels does not mean that such materials must be crude, but includes standardized parts of engines.</p> <p>5. Importation of All Parts is Importation of Whole.</p> <p>The importation in one shipment of enough standardized parts to make a complete engine is an importation of an engine. — United States v. Outerbridge & Co. (7 Ct. Oust. Appls., 223; T. D. 36511). This is not,altered by the fact that the importation contained also other standardized parts of engine’s.</p> <p>fi. Stare Decisis — Res Adjudicata.</p> <p>The case of Carlin v. United States (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 392; T. D. 37643), involving an engine imported in a “knockdown” condition, is neither stare decisis nor res adjudicata of this issue, involving standardized engine parts, but without evidence of “knockdown” condition.</p> <p>7. Subsection 5, Paragraph J, Section IV, Tariff Act of 1913, and Articles 406, 407 and 408, Treasury Regulations, 1915, Pursuant Thereto.</p> <p>Subsection 5, paragraph J, Section IV, tariff act of 1913, provides that certain articles for American vessels may be imported in' bond under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. These regulations are articles 406, 407 and 408, Treasury Regulations, 1915. Where the importer was compelled to pay the duties assessed before the goods were delivered to him no bond was necessary; and where the duty had been paid and there is no dispute that the merchandise was spare engine parts for an engine which was placed upon an American vessel, compliance with the regulations was unnecessary.</p> <p>8. Subsection 5, Paragraph J, Section IV, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Outfit an to Equipment” for American Vessels — SparB'Engine Parts.</p> <p>Spare engine parts for an engine installed upon an American vessel, no claim being made that the number was greater than was necessary or that they were not placed on board for the purpose of replacing the corresponding parts of the engine as they might be broken or wear out, are “outfit and equipment” for American vessels under subsection 5, paragraph J, Section IV, tariff a'ct of 1913. — United States v. Richards (8 Ot. Oust. Appls., 231; T. D. 37496).</p> <p>9. Standardized Engine Parts — Complete Engines — Spare Engine Parts.</p> <p>The protests involve a number of importations at different times of standardized marine engine parts for American-built vessels. They were entitled to admission free of duty under subsection 5, paragraph J, Section IV, tariff act of 1913, as materials necessary for the building of the machinery of American vessels, except that, where one importation included enough of such parts to build one complete engine, that portion should have been classified as an engine, and was properly assessed with duty by the collector as manufactures of metal under paragraph 167. One importation of spare or duplicate parts for an engine already installed on an American vessel was entitled to free entry as “outfit and equipment” for American vessels.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Section 21, Act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 186) — “Absence of Fraud” — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Section 21, act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 186) provides that liquidation shall be-final and conclusive after a year from entry “in the absence of fraud.” Following Vitelli v. United States (250 U. S., 355; T. D. 38179), when reliqliidation is made-under such circumstances, the United States must show fraud.</p> <p>2. Construction, Section 21, Act of June 22,1874 (18 Stat., 186) — “Fraud.”</p> <p>The words “in the absence of fraud and in the absence of protest by the owner-importer, agent, or consignee” (sec. 21, act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 186)), do not. restrict the fraud to the owner, importer, agent, or consignee.</p> <p>3. Evidence, Weight, and Sufficiency — Former Trial.</p> <p>The acquittal of Antonio Zueca upon an indictment charging him with having knowingly participated in fraudulent entries by Zueca & Co. does not show that such entries were not fraudulent.</p> <p>4. Evidence — Introduction of Part of Record.</p> <p>The appellant having placed in evidence part of the record of another trial, the court may examine the whole record.</p> <p>5. Res Adjudicata.</p> <p>It may be taken as settled law that, while a criminal judgment of acquittal may be pleaded as res adjudicata in another criminal proceeding or quasi criminal proceeding such as to enforce a forfeiture or penalty, it is not an estoppel in a civil proceeding.</p> <p>6. Collector’s Power to Take Unofficial Evidence as to Weights.</p> <p>Where it appears that the weights returned by the United States weighers in a series of entries were fraudulent, there is no doubt that the collector may ascertain the true weights by taking unofficial evidence.</p> <p>7. Reliquidation for Fraud, Nature of.</p> <p>A reliquidation more than a year after entry on the ground of fraud is not a criminal or quasi criminal proceeding, nor does it seek to enforce a penalty or work a forfeiture. It is only an assessment of duties properly due and, as such, purely civil in its nature.</p>

<p>Evidence, Invoice As.</p> <p>It can not be said that the invoice has no value whatever as evidence. Not only is it prima facie evidence of what it declares, but it is the evidence which determines the collector’s action as to all imported merchandise which has not been examined. Where there was nothing except the invoice to show the yarn count of cotton cloths under paragraphs 253 and 252, tariff act of 1913, and the invoice was undiscredited and unimpeached, the Board of United States General Appraisers correctly presumed that the yarn count was shown by the invoice, and their decision sustaining the protest and directing reliquidation in accordance with the yarn count stated in the invoice is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8306 (T. D. 38190).</p> <p>(Oral argument Mar. 26, 1920, by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. TompMns.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 381, Taripp Act op 1913 — “ Pipes and Pipe Bowls ”— “Smokers’ Articles” — Parts op Pipes — Pipe Stems.</p> <p>It is not the meaning of paragraph 381, tariff act of 1913, that “pipes and pipe bowls” should he a separate and distinct classification from “smokers’ articles,” so that parts of pipes other than bowls (e. g. stems) should he excluded from the paragraph. Pipe stems are “smokers’ articles” within the paragraph.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Presumption op Correctness Attendant upon Oppicial Actions.</p> <p>Merchandise returned by the appraiser as “pipe stems” and reported by him as being “ready for use as pipe stems without further process of manufacture ” when imported, and found by the collector and the Board of United States General Appraisers to be pipe stems, must, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be regarded as completely manufactured pipe stems.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 381, Taripp Act.op 1913 — “All Smokers’ Articles Whatsoever. ”</p> <p>By using the words “all smokers’ articles whatsoever ” (par. 381, tariff act of 1913) Congress manifested its intention “to reach out into all branches of trade and commerce and to gather within the dutiable provisions of this paragraph everything used chiefly by smokers, in that pursuit, and for that purpose, wherever else they may occur or within whatever other provisions of the tariff law the merchandise may be included. ” — Iinauth ¶. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 334; T. D. 31432) construing the same language in paragraph 459, tariff act of 1897.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 381, Tarim? Act of 1913 — “Articles”—-Materials and Manufactures Distinguished — Pipe Stems.</p> <p>While it is true that the product of one manufacture may be the material for another (Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U. S., 210), and that finished pipe stems may be regarded as material for manufacturing or assembling pipes, still, being separate and distinct subjects of trade and use, and the language of paragraph 381, tariff act of 1913, “all smokers’ articles whatsoever” being so comprehensive, they must be regarded as “articles” within the paragraph.</p> <p>6. Construction, Paragraph 648, Tariff Act of 1913 — -“Cut into Lengths.”</p> <p>Paragraph 648, tariff act of 1913, excludes bamboo which has been “further advanced than cut into lengths.” Bamboo pipe stems cut and pierced behind a joint for the mouth and tapered at the other end for the pipe are “further advanced” and not to be classified under the paragraph.</p> <p>6. Construction, Paragraphs 381 and 176, Tariff Act of 1913 — Relative Specificity — -“Smokers’ Articles”- — “Manufactures of Wood.”</p> <p>With reference to bamboo pipe stems, the provision of paragraph 381, tariff act of 1913, for “smokers’ articles” is obviously more specific than that of paragraph 176 for “manufactures of wood.”</p> <p>7. Bamboo Pipe Stems.</p> <p>“Bamboo pipe stems, 5 inches in length, one end cut off square just back of a joint, thus forming a mouthpiece, and the other end tapered to fit into the pipe, ” are classifiable as “smokers’ articles, ” under paragraph 381, tariff act of 1913, and notas “bamboo” under paragraph 648 or “ manufactures of wood” under paragraph 176.</p>

<p>Pleading — Protest, Suppiciency op — Similitude Paragraph.</p> <p>■A protest should be tested by the rules relating to commercial instruments rather than by the strict rules of legal pleading. While, strictly speaking, the similitude paragraph of the tariff act (par. 386, tariff act of 1913) is itself; in a sense, an assessing paragraph, still it may fairly be said that in the general language and common understanding of those dealing with the" subject, and indeed in the language of many court decisions as well, merchandise which becomes dutiable at a given rate by similitude with enumerated articles is regarded as being brought thereby within the enumerating paragraph for assessment. The similitude paragraph is a legislative rule of.interpretation of the, scope of every duty-assessing provision of the tariff act, and, as such, it should no more be pleaded than any other rule of interpretation, construction, or evidence. Following the principle underlying United States v. Snellenburg & Co. (9 Ct. Gust. Appls., 59; T. D. 37939), which is regarded as stare decisis as to this issue, a protest claiming classification under a certain paragraph is sufficient to support such classification by similitude, even though the protest makes no mention of the similitude paragraph.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph M, Section IY, Tariff Act of 1913 and Articles 709, 710, 747, 748, and 749, Customs Regulations 1915.</p> <p>An oral application to the deputy collector of customs in charge of bonded manufacturing warehouses for the establishment of such a warehouse is not a compliance with paragraph M, section IV, tariff act of 1913, prescribing the mode of establishing such'warehouses and articles 709, 710, 747, 748, and 749, Customs Regulations 1915, promulgated pursuant thereto. Under such circumstances it can not he said that any application was made.</p> <p>2. Importation.</p> <p>Merchandise, entered for consumption and brought into this country for the purpose of being manufactured here and exported, is imported and subject to duty.</p> <p>3. Importations to be Exported Destroyed by Fire.</p> <p>Appellant was accustomed to import merchandise, pay the duties, manufacture it, and export it, taking the drawback. Some of such merchandise was destroyed by fire. He can not escape the payment of duties on it, notwithstanding that the deputy collector may have arbitrarily denied his oral application for the establishment of a bonded manufacturing warehouse and notwithstanding that he may have intended that it should not enter into the commerce of this country.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Section 501, Revenue Act of Septembeb, 8, 1916 — “Synthetic.”</p> <p>Synthesis is the exact opposite of analysis; and, as analysis is the separation of a compound into its constituent parts, so synthesis is the making of the compound by uniting or combining its constituent parts. A synthetic compound which contains alizarin is not “synthetic alizarin” and not embraced by that language in section 501, revenue act of September 8, 1916.</p> <p>2. “Tuscan Red.”</p> <p>“Tuscan red,” a pigment for making paint, is not brought within the exception of section 501, revenue act of September 8, 1916, by reason of the fact that it contains alizarin, and the decision.of the collector subjecting it to the additional duty provided for by the section should have been sustained by the Board of General Appraisers.</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph M, Section III, Tariff Act op 1913 — Effect op Paying Appraisement Appeal Pee Later than Directed.</p> <p>Paragraph M, Section III, tariS act of 1913, provides that an appeal to reappraisement “shall be deemed to be finally abandoned and waived unless within two days from the date .of filing thereof the person who filed such notice shall deposit with the collector of customs a fee of $1 for each entry.” This provision is mandatory, and the action of the Board of General Appraisers in dismissing such appeals for the reason that the fees were paid later than the prescribed two days is approved.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION — DoUBT 'FAVORS IMPORTER. -</p> <p>In cases of doubtful interpretation of a statute the benefit of the doubt must be • given to the importer.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 358, Tariee Act oe 1913 — “Embroideries.”</p> <p>To constitute an embroidery (par. 358, tariff act of 1913) there must be, by needlework processes, an ornamental addition superimposed upon a previously completed fabric or article — not a needlework ornamentation placed upon a fabric regarded as a material only, which ornamentation constitutes substantially the completed fabric or article.</p> <p>3. Commercial Designation.</p> <p>It is incumbent upon a party claiming commercial designation to show that the merchandise was, in the wholesale trade and commerce dealing therewith in this country, at the date of the passage of the act. definitely, uniformly, and generally known as claimed. The rule is not satisfied if it appears that such claimed designation was only partial, local, or personal.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraphs 288 and 358, Tariee Act oe 1913 — Manufactures oe Wool — Tapestry—Embroidery.</p> <p>The merchandise at bar consists of woven flax canvases and colored woolen yarns, the canvases having been stitched by hand with the yarns sufficiently to indicate a preconceived ornamental design and color scheme and the nature of the needlework, and enough of the 'yarns being imported with the canvases to complete the work. When finished, they are to be used on the seats or backs of pieces of furniture, the component material of chief value will be wool, and the canvases uill be substantially, if not entirely, covered by the ornamental designs. A distinction should be made between an article or fabric entirely finished, so far as its ultimate uses are concerned, like wearing apparel, handkerchiefs, tablecloths, or other fabrics or articles which are ready for use and capable of performing the function for which they are made, whether embroidered or not, and the tapestry canvas which is the basic fabric of this merchandise. The importations are not finished articles, but materials. When finished the merchandise will be tapestry in common understanding, though, perhaps, not true tapestry. It is classifiable under paragraph 288, tariff act of 1913, as manufactures of wool, and not under paragraph 358 as embroideries or embroidered articles.</p> <p>5. Construction, Legislative Sanction.</p> <p>' Congress is presumed to have enacted the provision for embroideries, paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, in harmony with the judicial interpretation of the word obtaining at that time.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraphs 153, 631, and 154, Tariff. Act of 1913 — Scrap</p> <p>Lead — Scrap Tin — Metals Unwrought — Solder Unclaimed from Shells. Solder, reclaimed from spoiled brass shells, and consisting substantially of lead and tin in nearly equal parts, with small percentages of other metals, was imported in the shape of ingots, bars, molds, etc., to be rerun and used for various purposes. The tin content is not classifiable under paragraph 631, tariff act of 1913, as scrap tin; nor is the lead content classifiable under paragraph 153 as scrap lead. The merchandise would seem to be classifiable under paragraph 154 as “metals un-wrought;” but, in the absence of any such claim in the protest, the collector’s classification of it under paragraph 167 as articles or wares partly or wholly manufactured of the metals named in the paragraph must, though not approved, be undisturbed.</p> <p>2. Pleading — Practice—Evidence. •</p> <p>A protestant is confined to the claims made in his protest.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Presumption Favors Collector.</p> <p>Where the protest makes no claim for the correct classification, that of the collector, though incorrect, must stand. ' . .</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Judicial Notice.</p> <p>The matter of common acceptation is always one wherein the court will be guided by the samples and its judicial knowledge and will not be controlled against its judgment.</p> <p>2. CONSTRUCTION AlDED BY CONTEXT — JEWELRY, VALUE No CRITERION.</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, for such jewelry as is valued above 20 cents per dozen pieces indicates that, in the congressional view, there is cheaper jewelry, and serves to show that whether or not merchandise is to be classified as jewelry is not to be determined by its value.</p> <p>3. Imitation Pearl Necklaces — Jewelry—Articles Made oe Beads.</p> <p>Necklaces made of wax-filled glass imitation pearl beads permanently strung and fitted with metal clasps and imitation pearl pendants are classifiable as “jewelry’’ (par. 356, tariff act of 1913), and not as articles of beads (par. 333).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 426, Tariff Act op 1913 — “Textbooks”—Pamphlets — Serials.</p> <p>It is not clear that the context of paragraph 426, tariff act of 1913, does not confine the free entry accorded “textbooks” to “books” in the narrower sense, excluding “pamphlets,” particularly serial pamphlets. In view of the fact that serial pamphlets are not of the same contents and not necessarily even of the same subject matter issue by issue, it is a little difficult to understand how free entry could be decreed an entire serial.</p> <p>2. Professional Journals Not Textbooks.</p> <p>By the language of paragraph 426, tariff act of 1913, “textbooks used in schools and other educational institutions” Congress did not intend to admit free of duty all the serial journals and reports issued by associations of the different professions, arts, sciences, industries, businesses, etc.; and the “Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, ’ ’ a paper-bound serial issued quarterly by an English organization known as the “Institute of Actuaries,” being such a publication, must be denied such classification and held dutiable under the general provision of paragraph 329 for books.</p>

<p>1. Paragraph 356, Tariff Act op 1913 — “jewelry.”</p> <p>Certainly not every importation regardless of size, use, or shape, which remotely . resembles a pearl in color, can be regarded as an imitation pearl and assessed as jewelry.</p> <p>2. Construction — Tariff Titles as Aid.</p> <p>That the tariff entitlement of the schedule may be considered as throwing light upon the subject matter of the schedule is well settled.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 167, Tariff Act op 1913 — “Articles or Wares'</p> <p>Plated With Gold or Silver.”</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 167, tariff act of 1913, for “Articles or wares plated with gold or silver” embraces only such articles or wares as are wholly or in chief value of metal.</p> <p>4. Hatpins in Chief Value op Paste.</p> <p>Hatpins with large paste heads of a pearly luster and metal gold-plated stems, the paste heads being the chief value, are classifiable under paragraph 95, tariff act of 1913, as manufactures of paste, and not under paragraph 167 as “Articles or wares plated with gold or silver,” or paragraph 356 as “jewelry.”</p>

<p>Tannic Acid — Ntjtgall Extract.</p> <p>With the evidence establishing that commercial extract of nutgalls is a liquid containing 25 or 30 per cent of tannic acid, and that commercial tannic acid is a powder containing about 70 per cent, or even less, of tannic acid, a powder derived from the extract, containing more than 78 per cent of tannic acid, largely used in weighting silk fibers or fabrics, as a mordant in dyeing silk, and in the manufacture of ink, and not commonly used in tanning leather, is classifiable as tannic acid (par. 1, tariff act of 1913), and not as an extract or decoction of nutgalls (par. 30) or tanning material (par. 624).</p>

<p>Evidence, Burden oe Prooe — Presumption Favors Collector — Paragraph 404, Tariee Act oe 1913, and Article 333, Customs Regulations, 1915— American Goods Returned.</p> <p>Compliance with article 333, Customs Regulations, 1915, promulgated pursuant to paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, and prescribing the method of showing the identity of American goods returned, does not relieve an importer from the burden of proving such identity to support a protest against the decision of the collector against it. The preliminary papers required by the article to be filed with the collector in support of a claim for free entry of merchandise under the paragraph are simply intended to assist the collector in deciding upon the entry and possess no conclusive or binding force upon his official action. If, in such case, the collector, for reasons which seem sufficient to him, decides against the claim for free entry and thereupon assesses duty upon the merchandise, his decision in the first instance is presumed, as in other cases, to be correct; and, upon the trial of a protest in such case, the burden is cast upon the protestant, as in other cases, to establish by lawful evidence any and all facts upon which he relies to overcome that pre-: sumption. -</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Sufficiency of.</p> <p>The uncontradicted testimony o£ two competent and undiscredited witnesses that the importation is commonly used for tanning is sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness attendant upon the collector’s classification denying it such status.</p> <p>2. By-product Lignum Extract Used for Tanning.</p> <p>Lignum extract, obtained as a by-product from the manufacture of wood pulp from spruce and balsam, containing no alcohol but a substantial amount of tannin and commonly used for tanning, should have been classified by the collector as “extracts of other * * * woods * * * such as are commonly used for tanning” (par. 624, tariff act of 1913) rather than as “waste not specially provided for” (par. 384), notwithstanding that such merchandise is used for other purposes than tanning and that the instant importation was not intended to be used for tanning. It is not classifiable as tannin or as an acid not specially provided for (par. 1), as a chemical compound (par. 5), or as a nonenumerated manufactured article (par. 385).</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 648, TARIPP ACT OP 1913 — “CUT INTO LENGTHS.”</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 648, tariff act of 1913, for “Heeds unmanufactured, * * * or not further advanced than cut into lengths suitable for sticks for umbrellas, parasols, sunshades, whips, fishing rods, or walking canes” extends, not restricts, reeds to such as are cut into such suitable lengths; so that the paragraph includes such reeds whether or not they are suitable for the uses named. — Winter & Smillie v. United States (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., 522; T. D. 33939) and Battan & Cane Co. v. United States (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 1; T. D. 35247).</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraphs 173 and 648, Tarim? Act op 1913 — Relative Specificity — Chair Reeds — Rough Reeds.</p> <p>Round reeds in the rough, chiefly used for the making of chairs, are more specifically provided for as chair reeds in paragraph 173, tariff act of 1913, than as reeds in the rough, in paragraph 648. — Rattan & Cane Co. v. United States (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 1; T. D. 35247) and United States v. Gerdau (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 7; T. D. 35248). Reeds which are produced by subjecting the rattans to no manufacturing processes other than removing their bark or enamel and cutting them into lengths are classifiable under paragraph 648, except that such of them as are chiefly used for the manufacture of chairs are classifiable under paragraph 173.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Presumption Favors Collector.</p> <p>A protestant against the classification of reeds as chair reeds, claiming that they are reeds in the rough, must show that they are in the tough and that they are not chiefly used in the manufacture of chairs.</p> <p>4. Chinese Reeds.</p> <p>Chinese reeds in the rough, graded as common, selected, and extra selected, were classified by the collector as chair reeds under paragraph 173, tariff act of 1913, and the importers’ protests claiming them to be classifiable as rough reeds under paragraph 648 were overruled by the Board of United States General Appraisers. The evidence establishing that the common are not chiefly used for making chairs but failing to establish that the other two grades are not so used, the decision of the board is reversed as to the common and affirmed as to the selected and extra selected.</p>

<p>1. MERCHANDISE MANUFACTURED TO ESCAPE DUTY.</p> <p>An importer has the right to fashion his merchandise so that it shall be assessed with duty at the lowest rate.</p> <p>2. Paragraph 461, Tariff Act of 1913 — Regulus of Copper — Copper Matte.</p> <p>That the provision of paragraph 461, tariff act of 1913, for regulus of copper includes copper matte of any lead content less than its predominant component in value is stare decisis, regulus and matte being synonymous.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 461, Tariff Act of 1913 — All Parts of Statute" to be Given Effect — Copper.</p> <p>In order to give effect to all the provisions of paragraph 461, tariff act of 1913, it is necessary to construe it as according free entry to all copper ores and all products of them in whatever shape and whatever form produced short of manufactures of copper.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 461, Tariff Act of 1913 — Aided by Context— Leady Copper Matte.</p> <p>In paragraph 144, tariff act of 1913, Congress provided for “Matte containing antimony but not containing more than 10 per centum of lead. ’ ’ Consideration of this, together with the provision of paragraph 461 for copper regulus without any limitation as to lead content — Congress being fully informed that matte and regulus were .commercially and legally synonymous — makes obvious the congressional intention that paragraph 461 should embrace copper matte of any lead content.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 152, Tariff Act of 1913 — “ Lead-Bearing Ores.”</p> <p>Copper matte is not an ore but a product of an ore and a leady copper matte can not be classified under paragraph 152, tariff act of 1913, as a lead-bearing ore.— United States v. Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. (8 Ot. Oust. Appls., 226; T. D. 37495) distinguished.</p> <p>5. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 153, TARIFF ÁCT OF 1913 — LEAD—COMPONENT Material of Chief Value. — Ejusdem Generis. — “Lead in Any Form.”</p> <p>Under the general rule that merchandise is classified with reference to the component material of chief value, a matte in which copper predominates in value can not be classified under paragraph 153, providing for “Lead dross, lead bullion, or base bullion, lead in pigs and bars, lead in any form not specially provided for.” Moreover, “lead in any form” includes only lead forms ejusdem generis with those named. — United States v. Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 226; T. D. 37495), and a matte is not such.</p> <p>6. Leady Copper Mattes.</p> <p>Copper mattes -with substantial lead contents, the copper, however, being more valuable than the lead, are classifiable under the provision for regulus of copper in paragraph 461, tariff act of 1913, and not as lead-bearing ores under paragraph 152 or as lead in any of the forms named in paragraph 153. — United States v. Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 226; T. D. 37495), distinguished.</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Presumption that Customs Oppicers Discharge Duties.</p> <p>Where liquor was entered for warehouse on July 1 and the gauger’s report was dated August 29, in the. absence of showing as to when the gage was made, it will he presumed that it was made July 1, since the Customs Regulations require it to have been made at that time.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 244, Taripp Act op 1913, and Section 300, War</p> <p>Revenue Act op October 3, 1917 — Gage op Liquor.</p> <p>The proviso of paragraph 244, tariff act of 1913, that the collector can “make no constructive or other allowance for breakage or leakage or damage on wines, liquors, cordials, or distilled spirits” can not be taken to modify section 300, war revenue act of October 3, 1917, taxing liquor in bond at the time of its enactment, so as to make the quantity dutiable under the tariff act the same as that subject to the additional duty imposed by the war revenue act. Section 300 taxes the actual, not the constructive, quantity.</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Consular Certificate of Depreciated Currency — R. S. 2903— Paragraph 692, Consular Regulations 1896, Amended 1916 — Articles 205 and 621, Customs Regulations 1915.</p> <p>The consular certificate as to depreciated currency provided for by paragraph 692, Consular Regulations 1896, amended 1916, and R. S. 2903, and Articles 205 and 621, Customs Regulations 1915, are conclusive as to the extent of the depreciation hut not as to whether the goods were purchased with such depreciated currency or as to whether they were purchased at the price named in the invoice or certificate.</p> <p>2. Additional Duty for Undervaluation — “Manifest Clerical Error” — Paragraph I, Section III, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>The invoice of goods imported from Italy stated the value as 6,488 francs. The hack of the invoice bore the indorsement “Amount of invoice, lire 6,488.” The value of the gold franc and the gold lira was the same, but the paper lúa was depreciated. The consular certificate, erroneously assuming that the lira intended was the paper lira, stated the percentage of depreciation and the value of the merchandise accordingly. Importer entered the merchandise at such depreciated value. This was not “manifest clerical error,” under Paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913, and the additional duty provided for by the paragraph for undervaluation was justly imposed.</p>

<p>1. Rugs Made from “Portions op Carpets or Carpeting.” — Paragraph 303, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>The expression “rugs for floors * * * and other portions of carpets or carpeting * * * ,” paragraph 303, tariff actof 1913, includes long rolls of carpeting intended to be cut at places indicated in the weave, each piece, after being cut, to be bound and fringed into a finished rug. — Beuttell & Sons v. United States (7 Ct. Oust. Appls., 356; T. D. 36905).</p> <p>■2. Paragraphs 300 and 293, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Axminster” Rugs — History of Rug Making — Commercial Designation. '</p> <p>While originally there was no such thing as a machine-made Axminster rug or carpet, as is shown by a review of the history of rug making, it appears that, at the time of the passage of the tariff act of 1913, the trade of this country generally and uniformly included in the designation “Axminster” both the handmade and the machine-made Axminster.</p> <p>3. Paragraph 293, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Chenille” Carpets or.Rugs.</p> <p>A review of the history of the subject shows that originally and now the term “chenille” (par. 293, tariff act of 1913) was and is. commonly and properly used to distinguish that kind of carpet or rug from all other kinds. ' No contrary commercial designation appears at the time of the enactment of the tariff act of 1913. It is therefore concluded that the act of 1913 differentiates between chenille and Axminster carpets and rugs.</p> <p>4. Chenille Rugs.</p> <p>As chenille rugs are made from portions of chenille carpets or carpeting, and are not enumerated in paragraph 300, they are dutiable under paragraph 293, by virtue of paragraph 303, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>5. Handmade “Idaho,” “Kerbela,” “Beirut” and “Calcutta” Rugs — Carpets Woven Whole for Rooms from Specifications — Machine Made Chenille Rugs.</p> <p>Certain handmade rugs known as “Idaho,” “Kerbela,” “Beirut” and “Calcutta” and certain rugs shown to be carpets woven whole for rooms from specifications are dutiable under paragraph 300, tariff act of 1913, and the machine-made chenille wool rugs of the importations, not “woven whole for rooms” are dutiable by virtue of paragraph 303, at the rate imposed on chenille carpets by paragraph 293.</p>

<p>Oat Hulls, Ground, Paragraph 192, Tariff Act of 1913 — Nonenumerated Manufactures, Paragraph 385.</p> <p>In the manufacture of oatmeal, rolled oats, and Quaker oats, the principal products are made from the oat kernels or groats, the coarse outer envelope or hull being ground off as a by-product, as little as possible of the kernels or groats being taken oS with the hulls. This by-product is classifiable eo nomine as oat hulls, under paragraph 192, tariff act of 1913, not as nonenumerated manufactured articles under paragraph 385.</p>

<p>Oat Htjlls, Ground, Paragraph 192, Tariff Act of 1913 — Nonenumerated Manufactures, Paragraph 385.</p> <p>Following Tower & Sons et ais. v. United States, decided concurrently herewith, hulls ground from pats as a by-product in the manufacture, from the kernels, of oatmeal, rolled oats, and Quaker oats, are dutiable as “oat hulls” under paragraph 192, tariff act of 1913, and not as nonenumerated manufactures under paragraph 385.</p>

<p>1. Manifest Clerical Error.</p> <p>Under paragraph I, section III, tariff act of 1913, manifest clerical error needing to be shown by proof dehors the record can not exist. United States v. Swedish Produce Co. (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 223; T. D. 32760). When an entry is made as the entrant intends to make it and carries the intended signification to the mind of the collector, there is no manifest clerical error.- — United States v. Wyman (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 264; T. D. 33106).</p> <p>2. Amending Entry, Time for.</p> <p>An importer can not, after either the invoice or the merchandise has come under the observation of the appraiser, make additions in the entry to or deductions from the cost or value given in the invoice. — Consmiller v. United States (10 Ct. Cust. Appls., 109; T. D. 38373).</p> <p>■3. Evidence — Estoppel to Deny Authority oe Agent to Make Entry.</p> <p>One who accepts an entry made by another and confirms the authority by which it was made by attempting to have it corrected,, instead of disavowing it, the protest not questioning the authority, can not later be heard to'deny it.</p> <p>4. Clerical Error.</p> <p>Merchandise was shipped from Montreal, Canada,' to be entered at Houses Point, N. Y., for transportation to New York, N. Y. The agent of the carrier made, from the invoice, a consumption entry at Rouses Point, very greatly understating the value, the underestimation arising from a misapprehension as to whether the invoice stated the price in francs or dollars. No disavowal of the entry was made, but an attempt was made to correct it. The collector refused to permit the correction for the perfectly-legal reason that the application was received after the invoice and merchandise had come under the observation of the appraiser. Whereupon protest was made by importer’s agent claiming manifest clerical error under paragraph I, section III, tariff act of 1913. There is no such clerical error, as its showing depends upon evidence outside the record.</p>

<p>1. Materials and Manufactures Distinguished — Ships’ Parts and Materials.</p> <p>An importation of boiler parts lacking sucli distinctive and important features as-furnaces, pipe, stay tubes, boiler plates, and other parts, castings, can not be regarded as an importation of complete boilers in knockdown condition within the meaning of United States v. Outerbridge (7 Ot Oust. Appls., 223; T. D. 3G511). Such importations are entitled to entry free of duty under subsection 5, paragraph J, section IV, tariff act of 1913, as materials necessary for the Building of the machinery of American vessels, and are not dutiable uuder paragraph 167 as manufactures of metal.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Papers in Case as.</p> <p>While recitals in the papers of the case may be taken as evidence in the absence-of any other, they do not estop the importer from showing the facts to the contrary, particularly where he satisfactorily explains the discrepancy.</p>

<p>1. Materials and Manufactures — Ships’ Parts and Materials.</p> <p>Merchandise known as “marine surface condensers,” imported for the purpose of being used in connection with steam engines of American vessels to condense the steam and permit of its reuse, the only thing necessary to their operation being their attachment to one or two pumps and the introduction of the steam, are finished 'mechanical devices. They are not admissible free of duty under subsection 5, paragraph J, section TV, tariff act of 1013, as materials necessary for the building of the machinery of American vessels, but are dutiable under paragraph 167. as manufactures of metal.</p> <p>2. Standardized Interchangeable Parts of Engines.</p> <p>The case of United States v. Hannevig (10 Ct. Oust. Appls., 124; T. D. 38384) is distinguished from the case at bar by the fact that the standardized interchangeable parts of engines held free there were necessary to the operation of the engines, while the condensers in this case are not so necessary, and it does not appear that any particular pump was manufactured for the express purpose of fitting them.</p>

<p>1. COMMERCIAL DESIGNATION.</p> <p>The rule that the commercial designation of imported merchandise may be shown to correspond to the tariff designation applies not only to eo nomine designations but also to descriptive terms. — Pritchard & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 2-17; T. D. 31974) followed, and Bosch Magneto Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 50; T. D. 36310) overruled. Tobar the application of this rule the intention of Congress to do so must clearly appear.</p> <p>2. Construction — Paragraphs 595 and 578, Tariff Act op 1913 — “Iridium . * * * and Native Combinations Thereof * * * with Platinum ”— “Platinum * * * in * * * Sheets.”</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 595, tariff act of 1913, admitting free of duty iridium and platinum in native combination does not modify that of paragraph 578 admitting free of duty platinum in sheets, so as to deny free entry to platinum in sheets when artificially combined with iridium. — Bosch Magneto Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Oust. Appls., 50; T. D. 36310) overruled.</p> <p>3. Commercial Designation — Paragraph 578, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Platinum * * * IN * * * Sheets.”</p> <p>Under a protest claiming free entry of merchandise 90 per cent platinum and 10 per cent iridium as platinum in sheets, under paragraph 578, tariff act of 1913, it was error to exclude evidence of commercial designation. — Bosch Magneto Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 50; T. D: 36310) overruled.</p> <p>4. Sheets of Platinum Alloyed with Iridium.</p> <p>Sheets of metal, 90 per cent platinum and 10 per cent iridium in artificial combination, if shown to be known commercially as “platinum in sheets” would be admissible free of duty as such under paragraph 578, tariff act of 1913. — Bosch Magneto Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 50; T. D. 36310) overruled.</p>