Volume 11 — Oklahoma Criminal Reports

C. Lukenbill, Judge. A. Overton was convicted of having unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor with intent to sell the 'same, and appeals.

<p> Appeal from District Cotirt, Craig County; Preston S. Davis, Judge. </p> <p>Charles Culver was convicted of statutory rape, and appeals.</p>

<p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Unlawful Sale — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, the evidence examined, and held to be sufficient to sustain the verdict.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge. </p> <p>Massa Silva was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Craig County; Preston S. Davis, Judge. . </p> <p>Jesse Harrison was convicted of robbery,• and appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Presentation for Review — Affirmance. Where the defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, and no briefs are filed, or oral argument presented, this court will make an examination of the information, instructions excepted to, and the judgment, and if no error is apparent will affirm the judgment.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Assault with Intent to Kill — Sufficiency of Evidence. The' evidence upon a trial of an information for assault and battery with intent to kill, examined, and held to be sufficient to warrant a verdict convicting the defendant of assault and battery.</p> <p>2. SAME — Appeal—Harmless Error — Instruction. Where the information charges assault and battery with intent to kill, and the defendant is convicted of assault and battery, an exception taken to an instruction upon the issue of assault and battery with intent to kill, will not be considered upon the appeal.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Plea of Self-Defense — Availability—Aggressor. One who seeks and brings on an affray cannot shield himself under a plea of self-defense.</p> <p>2. SAME — Harmless Error — Instructions. Error, if any, in instructions defining the law of self-defense could not be prejudicial to the defendant, where the evidence did not justify instructions on self-defense.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Cleveland County; R. McMillan, Judge. </p> <p>George Foster was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL- — -Dismissal. Where a defendant has been convicted and sentenced. and perfects an appeal, this court will not consider his appeal, unless defendant is where he can be made to respond to any judgment or order which may be rendered in the case. And where a defendant makes his escape from the custody of the law, and becomes a fugitive from justice, the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Joe Bell was convicted of the offense of unlawfully attempting to vote, and appeals.</p>

<p>BAIL — Conviction—Form of Bond. Under Bill of Bights, sec. 8, bail is a matter of right before conviction, “except for capital offenses when the proof of guilt is evident, or the presumption thereof is great. ” The right of bail after conviction pending-appeal is purely statutory, and would not exist in the absence of the statute. The statute prescribes the form and conditions of the bond, and a defendant is not entitled to bail pending-appeal, except upon a bond conditioned as required by the statute.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Atoka County; Summers Hardy, Judge. </p> <p>S. E. Hughes was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Karl Feige was convicted of practicing medicine without lawful authority, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Appeal—Ground for Reversal. When a person is tried for murder and convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, and the proof clearly shows that a mjich lighter punishment was imposed than under the law and the facts should have been, this court will not reverse a cpnvietion, in the absence of substantial error.</p> <p>2. SAME — Deadly Assault — Justification—Trespass. A landowner is not justified in making an assault upon another with a dangerous or deadly weapon in resisting a trespass on his premises, when no felony is attempted.</p> <p>3. SAME — Self-Defense. The law of self-defense is a rule of necessity, and can only be invoked in justification of a homicide, in order to prevent an actual or reasonably apparent compassion of a felony against the person or property, and the necessity mast be imminent at the time of the killing and not prior thereto.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. TRIAL — Continuance—Appeal—Discretionary Ruling, (a) A motion for continuance, based upon the ground that counsel were employed immediately prior to the calling of the case for trial, and had no time for preparation for the trial on that account, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and his rulings thereon will not be disturbed by this court, unless it clearly appears that such court aeted arbitrarily and not in the dispassionate exercise of the discretion contemplated by law.</p> <p>(b)- When an information has been pending more than two terms of court, and the accused has had able counsel employed, and upon the day the cause is set, for trial discharges such counsel and retains other counsel to represent him in the trial of his case without any indication that he was without fault in the premises, and the trial court declines to grant a continuance upon the application of the newly employed counsel, this court will not undertake to say there has been an arbitrary abuse of discretion on the part of the court.</p> <p>2. SAME — Continuance—Grounds—Diligence, (a) An application for continuance, based upon the ground that certain material witnesses were absent, is properly overruled by the trial court, when there is no showing that any diligence was used in an effort to procure the attendance of the witnesses desired.</p> <p>(b) An accused, who has had a criminal charge pending against him for two or three terms of court, and who has paid money to prosecuting witnesses to leave the jurisdiction of the court, and has at no time had process issued for witnesses in Ms own behalf, is entitled to little consideration of a motion for continuance on the ground of the absence of Ms witnesses, by the trial court, and none by this court.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Review—Denial of Continuance. When an application for continuance has been overruled by a trial court, this court will look to the entire record with a view of determining whether or not an injustice has been done, and when it clearly appears from the testimony introduced at the trial, and especially the testimony of the accused himself, that he has no defense, and that the conviction was just and proper, a judgment will not be reversed, in the absence of fundamental error.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Beckham County; ' James R. Tolbert„ Judge.</p> <p>Ed Mayes was convicted of receiving stolen property and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Okfuskee County; John Caruthers,. Judge.</p> <p>Will Bohannan was convicted of burglary, and appeals.</p>

Stanfield, Judge. Frank Hawkins was convicted of murder, and appeals. The plaintiff in error, Frank Hawkins, and one Lewis Price were jointly informed against for the murder of Will Crockett, in Creek county, on or about the 6th day of April, 1912. A severance was granted, and the state elected to try the defendant Hawkins first. Fie was convicted, and his punishment assessed at death.

<p>APPEAL — Homicide—Affirmance. In a prosecution for murder, the evidence is held to support a verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of murder and assessing his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life at hard labor, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. FORGERY — Indictment and Information — Requesites. (a) Under section 2631, Rev. Laws 1910, any person who has in his posses- , sion a forged or counterfeited instrument knowing the same to be forged or counterfeited, with intent to injure or defraud any person whomsoever, is guilty of forgery in the second degree.</p> <p>(b) It is not neecssary for an information under the foregoing section to allege that any particular person was intended to be injured, and the insertion of any sueh name in the information is purely surplusage. •</p> <p>(c) The striking out or adding to an information language which is entirely superfluous, and which has no bearing whatever on the validity of the information or the charge therein, does not affect the proceedings.</p> <p>2. SAME — Information—Requisites — Sufficiency — Elements of Offense. (a) Under section 2631, Rev. Laws 1910, supra, it is not necessary for the information to allege that the person who committed the forgery of the document the accused is charged with having in his possession with intent to defraud by uttering the same as true committed the forgery with intent to injure or defraud. This is purely a statutory offense, and it is sufficient to lay the charge substantially in the language of the statute.</p> <p>(b) Under section 5743, Rev. Laws 1910, an erroneous allegation in the information as to the person injured or intended to be injured is not material under prosecutions of this character. An intent to defraud any person, association, or body politic or corporate is sufficient. Section 2837, Rev. Laws 1910.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Presentation Below — Sufficiency of Verdict. When a person is charged by information with having the possession of a forged or counterfeited instrument with intent to injure another by uttering the same, and the jury returns a general verdict of guilty, fixing the punishment within the limit prescribed by statute for such offenses, and counsel save no exceptions or make no complaint of the. sufficiency of the verdict at the time, this court will not reverse a just conviction. See Bowlegs v. State, 9 'Okla. Or. 69, 130 Pae. 824.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District' Court, Choctaw County; Summers Hardy, Judge. </p> <p>John Buxton was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Cleveland County; F. B. Swank, Judge. </p> <p>J. A. Estep was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Time for Perfecting. In misdemeanor cases the appeal must be taken within 60 days after the judgment is rendered, provided, however, that the trial court or judge may for good cause shown extend the time in which an appeal may be taken, not exceeding 60 days. In such cases the appeal is taken by filing in this court a petition in error with case-made attached, or transcript of the record, together with proof of service of notices of appeal as required by statute, and when this is not done within the time prescribed by Procedure Criminal (section 5991, Eev. Laws 1910), this court does not acquire jurisdiction of the appeal, and such an appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>2. SAME — Time for Perfecting. The statute limiting the time within which appeals can bo taken to this court is mandatory. The law makes no provision for delays occasioned by miscarriage by mail, and a plaintiff in error at his peril takes the chances of delay by sending the record through the mail.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; F. L. McCain, Judge. </p> <p>Tom Owens was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, McClain County; R. McMillan, Judge. </p> <p>A. G. Cross was convicted of larceny of domestic animals, .and appeals.</p>

<p>Application of E. J. Warner for writ of prohibition to the District Court of Blaine County and Hon. Frank Mathews, Special Judge, to prohibit further proceedings on certain informa-tions filed against petitioner.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Murder — Indictment and Information — Sufficiency For an information charging murder, approved and held sufficient, see opinion.</p> <p>2. CONTINUANCE — -Absent Witnesses — Cumulative Evidence. The denial of an application for continuance, although sufficient on its face, will not justify a reversal of a judgment of conviction when, under the light of other proof in the record, it is clear that the evidence desired from the absent witness would have been of no value if produced, or at best merely cumulative.</p> <p>3. HOMICIDE — Self-Serving Declarations — Res Gestae. Declarations which are self-serving in their nature and which do not form a part of the res gestae constitute no part of competent proof in the trial of a homicide charge.</p> <p>4. SAME — Self-Defense. When the issues in a homicide case are based upon the contention that the plaintiff in error acted in his necessary self-defense from actual and impending danger, proof of statements made by the deceased relative to remote difficulties he had had with others are not properly admissible; at least, when there is no contention based upon apparent danger, and when the state's case must stand or fall upon the homicide being established as a deliberate, unwarranted, and premeditated murder. The purpose of this character of testimony in all cases is limited to a proper and well defined sphere.</p> <p>5. SAME — Inspection of Scene by Jury — Discretion. The rulings of the trial court in sending or declining to send the trial jury to the scene of a homicide for the purpose of permitting them to make a personal inspection of the premises and surroundings will not be disturbed by this court, unless it is made clearly to appear that such court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion under circumstances which tend reasonably to indicate that the substantial rights of the person on trial were prejudiced thereby.</p> <p>6. WITNESSES — Age—Competency—Discretion of Court, (a) Objections to receiving the testimony of a witness on the ground that he was of such tender age as to be incompetent, are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.</p> <p>(b) In reviewing an assignment of error based on this contention this court will examine carefully the whole record of the examination of such witness, testing his intelligence and qualifications as well as the testimony given by him at the trial, and unless a clear abuse of discretion is apparent the rulings of the trial court will not be disturbed.</p> <p>(c) In this case the objection to receiving the testimony of witness Verne Stanford on this ground is wholly without merit, and the trial court properly permitted him to testify.</p> <p>7. EVIDENCE — Rebuttal—-Definition, (a) When the state makes out a olear case in chief, the fact that certain testimony was reserved for rebuttal which would have been admissible in establishing the case in chief but which is clearly in rebuttal of the material defense, or testimony introduced in defense, does not render the same inadmissible in rebuttal.</p> <p>(b) Rebuttal testimony is properly that testimony which is given to explain, repel, counteract, disprove, or destroy facts given in evidence by an adverse party. Any evidence may be given in rebuttal which is a direct reply to that produced by the other side or a contradiction thereof, or which tends to destroy the effect of the same. For testimony held to be admissible in rebuttal, see opinion.</p> <p>8. APPEAL — Instructions. Instructions of the court are to be considered as a whole, and when so considered, if they do not disclose prejudicial error, will be sustained on appeal.</p> <p>(b) Assignments of error based on the refusal to give requested instructions when the record discloses that the material and proper elements of the instructions are given by the court, are without merit.</p> <p>9. NEW TRIAL — Newly-Discovered Evidence — Appeal—Review, (a) A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, unless an abuse of that discretion is disclosed by the record brought here for review, the rulings of the trial court will not be disturbed.</p> <p>(b) The entire record of the trial, as well as the record made upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, will be examined by this court in determining whether or not. the trial court properly exercised its discretion in passing upon such motion.</p> <p>(c) For facts which sustain the rulings of the trial court in- denying a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>APPEAL — Affirmance. Where the defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, and no briefs are filed, or oral argument made, this court will make an examination of the information, and the instructions excepted to, and, if no error is apparent, will affirm the judgment.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. PBOHIBITION — Nature of Writ. The writ of prohibition is that process by which an appellate court prevents an inferior court from usurping or exercising unauthorized jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. SAME — Grant of New Trial. In a criminal action, after final judgment has been entered and the term has expired, the trial court has no authority to entertain a motion for new trial, unless the motion is made under the provisions of section 5938, Bev. Laws 1910 (Code of Criminal Procedure), which provides that “a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made after judgment at the term in which the case was tried, or in vacation, before the judge, or at the next term of court;” and so, where a district judge entertains a motion for and grants a new trial upon a motion made at the next term after the judgment was entered, which motion was made on the ground of misconduct of the jury, the motion is insufficient to give ihe court or judge thereof jurisdiction to make an order vacating the judgment and granting- a new trial, and upon the state’s application for a writ of prohibition, the writ will be awarded, prohibiting further proceeding except that necessary to carry the judgment and sentence into execution.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>APPEAL — Dismissal. Where an appeal is taken from an alleged judgment of conviction in a criminal ease, and the transcript of the record or case-made contains no copy of the judgment of the trial court, such record or case-made presents no question to this court for its determination, and the appeal will ■ be dismissed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Eight to Defend Domicile — Extent. A man has the right to defend his domicile against every unlawful invasion and to defend himself and those within it against every and all violence, without the necessity of retreat, even to the extent of taking life, if it be actually or apparently necessary to do <. so in order to prevent the commission of a felony thereon or therein.</p> <p>2. SAME. “A man’s house, however humble, is his castle; and his castle he is entitled to protect against invasion;” and a man in his own habitation has a right to resist force with force and repel the entrance against his will of one who in a violent manner attempts to enter for the manifest purpose of assaulting or offering violence to him, or to inmates under his protecting care, even to the extent of taking life, if it be actually or apparently necessary to do so in order to prevent such unlawful entrance.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Bryan County; J. L. Rappolec, Judge. </p> <p>Harrison Jenkins was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Time for Proceeding — Dismissal. Procedure Criminal, sec. 5991 (Eev. Laws 1910) provides that: "In misdemeanor cases the appeal must be taken within sixty days after the judgment is rendered: Provided, however, that the trial court or judge may, for good cause shown, extend the time in which such appeal-may be taken not exceeding sixty days.” Held, that when ah' appeal is not taken within the time prescribed by this section of the statute, this court is without jurisdiction to review it, and such appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court,, Stephens County; J. W. Marshall, Judge.</p> <p>Bill Browder, convicted of unlawfully selling liquor, appeals.</p>

<p>1. TBIAL — Instructions—Presumption of Innocence. An instruction in these words, “In this ease, if you should believe from the evidence that the defendant bought the property in question at the town of Bromide, openly and publicly, in good faith, and was not concerned, or aided and abetted others in the theft of the cow, then, if you should so find, you could not convict the defendant, and it would bo your duty to acquit him," held prejudicial error, in that it deprives the defendant of the benefit of the presumption of innocence, which prevails until the contrary is proved by competent evidence, and places the burden of proof on hini to establish his innocence.</p> <p>2. SAME — Evidence—Order of Proof — Discretion. The introduction of testimony out of its order rests in the discretion of the trial court, and it may admit, on rebuttal, testimony which is properly a part of the state’s ease in chief, but where the county attorney knew, before the trial commenced, that a codefendant ■ would be called as a witness for the state, but intentionally failed to indorse his name on the information, and held this witness back until after the defense rested, it was an abuse of discretion to permit the name of this witness to be indorsed on the information, and to admit on rebuttal his testimony to facts belonging to the case in chief.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Sequoyah County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>E. M. Bryan was convicted of larceny of a domestic animal, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Sufficiency of Evidence — Verdict. (a) When an examination of the entire record and a review of all the facts discloses the commission of a wanton and deliberate assassination, and that, beyond question, the person convicted fired the fatal shot without semblance of justification, this court will not reverse a conviction, unless the record discloses fundamental error which did, or was reasonably calculated to, deprive the person on trial of substantial rights.</p> <p>(b) For facts held sufficient to sustain a conviction of murder, see opinion.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Harmless Error — Instructions—Reasonable Doubt. For an instruction which is not sufficiently erroneous to justify a reversal of conviction under the record, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; Jesse M. Hatchett, Judge. </p> <p>Joel Collins was convicted of larceny of domestic animals, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Bryan County; Jesse M. Hatchett, Judge. </p> <p>Ed Macready was convicted of crime, and brings error.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Ground for Reversal — Failure to Instruct. Procedure Criminal, see. 5933 (Rev. Laws 1910), provides that in all eases of a verdict of conviction, the jury may, and shall upon the request of the defendant, assess and declare the punishment in their verdict within the limitations fixed by law. Held, that on the trial of an information charging a misdemeanor, the failure of the court to instruct the jury that in the event they found a verdict of guilty they should assess and declare the punishment in their verdict, will not necessarily require a reversal of the judgment, but this court upon appeal may so modify the judgment as will prevent injury to the defendant.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Character of Defendant — Right to Attack. The state cannot attack the character of a defendant unless he first puts that in issue by introducing evidence of his good character.</p> <p>2. WITNESSES — Cross-Examination of Accused — Right. A defendant, by_availing himself of the statutory privilege of becoming a witness in his own behalf, has voluhtarily changed his status from defendant to witness, and consequently may be cross-examined within the usual boundaries, and thus be discredited and impeached.</p> <p>3. SAME — Impeachment—Reputation—Scope of Inquiry. Where the purpose of testimony is to impeach a witness for want of truth ■ and veracity, the inquiry and the answer must be as to his general character or reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which he resides, and testimony as to the general reputation of a defendant for being a bootlegger is incompetent to impeach the credibility of a defendant as a witness in his own behalf, or for any other ■ purpose.</p> <p>4. TRIAL — Instructions—Circumstantial Evidence. Where the evidence relied upon by the state is entirely circumstantial, it is error for the court to refuse to give a requested instruction on the law applicable thereto.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Rogers County; T. L. Brown, Judge. </p> <p>John Etter was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Washington County; R. H. Hudson, Judge. </p> <p>John C. Duncan was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.</p>

<p>1. GAMING — Prosecution—Scope of Inquiry — Evidence. When an indictment or information charges the person or persons on trial with gaming, under the provisions of section 2499, Rev. Laws 1910, the sole and only issue is: Was such offense committed in the manner and form charged?</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Ground for Reversal — New Trial. This court has often held in its opinions that the proof introduced on the trial of a person charged with a specific offense should conform to the issue as laid, and the county attorneys have been warned repeatedly from excursions into other issues which could have no purpose other than by improper methods to prejudice the minds of the jurors. When the record discloses the fact that the county attorney has been guilty of such unfair conduct and ruthless disregard of the rules of evidence, the trial court should set aside a verdict of conviction and see' that the case is tried according 'to law; otherwise this court will reverse a judgment and require him so to do.</p> <p>3. EVIDENCE — Other Offenses. On the trial of a person or persons charged with gaming, the county attorney has no right to attempt to prove that the person or persons charged were engaged in the maintaining of a place where intoxicating liquors were kept and sold, or that any one of them has been guilty of corruption in 0--.ee, or that any one of them has been advised by others to discontinue a lawful business and engage in conducting a saloon. Such offenses are foreign to the issue and should be prosecuted by separate information or indictment, if the facts so warrant.</p> <p>4. TRIAL — Instructions—Circumstantial Evidence. When the proof on the part of the state is wholly circumstantial, it is the duty of the trial court to give the law of circumstantial evidence in his instructions.</p> <p>5. SAME, (a) It is as much the duty of the trial court to give a correct statement of the law of circumstantial evidence as it is to give any instruction whatever.</p> <p>(b) Por an instruction condemned as incomplete and not a fair statement of the law of circumstantial evidence, as applied to the facts in the record of the ease at bar, see opinion.</p> <p>(c) Por a correct statement of the law of circumstantial evidence which should have been given by the trial court, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior'Court, Pittsburg County; W. C. Liedtke, Judge. </p> <p>Tony Petitti was convicted of arson, and appeals.</p>

Carney, Judge. J. M. Rule was acquitted of grand larceny and obtaining a warrant under false pretenses, and the State appeals on questions reserved. Questions answered in opinion. This case comes to this court under the third subdivision of section 5990, Rev. Raws, upon exceptions taken by the prosecuting attorney to certain rulings of the trial court, excluding evidence offered by the state.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Choctaw County; Simmers Hardy, Judge. </p> <p>Gabriel Nelson was convicted of robbery in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge. </p> <p>George Caffee was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma Coimty; John W. Hayson, Judge. </p> <p>Howard A. Tucker was convicted of violating an ordinance of Oklahoma City. On appeal to the county court the complaint was set aside, and the City appeals.</p>

<p>1. LEWDNESS — Adultery—Proof. In a prosecution for adultery, positive evidence of the direct fact is not required. The fact of carnal intercourse may be inferred from circumstances that lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion.</p> <p>2. SAME — Living in Adultery — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for open and 'notorious adultery, the evidence considered, and conviction affirmed.</p> <p>3. SAME — Elements of Offense — “Living Together in Open and Notorious Adultery.’’ The courts, when called upon to determine what constitutes the state of “living together in open and notorious adultery,” have defined it as the state of cohabiting. In other words, the parties must dwell together openly and notoriously, upon terms as if the conjugal relation existed between them. There must be an habitual illicit intercourse between them.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Mayes County; Preston S. Davis, Judge. </p> <p>Sequoyah West was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Osage County; Paul B. Mason, Judge. </p> <p>Jessie Findley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Decision Appealable — Denial of New Trial. There is no statute authorizing an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial, except as instant to an appeal from a judgment of conviction, and no appeal lies from an order denying a motion for a new trial made after the time allowed by law for taking an appeal has expired.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appear from County Court, Jefferson County; J. M. Adams, Judge. </p> <p>Monk Dulaney was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>1. EMBEZZLEMENT — Evidence—Best and Secondary — Record, (a) The fact that there is a record of the election of certain officers of a lodge does not preclude the state from proving by other competent evidence the fact that one acted in such capacity.</p> <p>(b) If a person assumes to act in the capacity of a lodge officer, is so recognized by the members thereof, and receives and disburses the money of the lodge, proof of these facts is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the embezzlement of the funds, of the lodge as an officer of the same.</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Pleading and Proof — Appeal — Harmless Error, (a) It is the duty of the county attorney to introduce proof of facts sufficient to establish all the material allegations set out in the information presented by him, in the manner and form as charged, and in keeping with the rules of law.</p> <p>(b) The fact, however, that a county attorney fails of efficiency or through oversight to comply with the rules of law strictly construed, does not justify this court in permitting a criminal to escape punishment when such criminal has been deprived of no substantial right and is clearly guilty of the crime charged.</p> <p>(c) The admission of incompetent evidence does not necessarily justify the reversal of a conviction when there is competent evidence in the record which conclusively establishes the guilt of the accused, and no defense whatever is offered.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Woodward County; Clyde H. Wyand, Judge. </p> <p>John W. Appleby was convicted of a misdemeanor, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Seminole County; Tom D. McKeown, Judge. </p> <p>Jess Humphrey, convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, appeals.</p>

Cole, Judge. Major Wesley, Jonas Lewis, and Samson Lewis were jointly convicted of murder, and they appeal. The plaintiffs in error, Major Wesley, Jonas Lewis, and Samson Lewis, were jointly informed against for the murder of John Asbury, alleged to have been committed on or about the 3d day of November, 1911.

P. de Graff enried, Judge. William M. Irvin, convicted of murder, appeals.

Lockridge, Judge. A. T. Walker and others were convicted of having in their possession intoxicating liquors with the intention of selling, bartering, giving away, and otherwise furnishing the same in violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and appeal.

H. Huston, Assigned Judge. Alverta B. Gentry was. convicted of murder, and she appeals. The plaintiff in error, Alverta B. Gentry, and Maurice Weightman and Jess K. Mackey were charged jointly with the murder of Thomas J. Géntry, alleged to have been committed in Oklahoma county, on the 6th day of January, A. D. 1912, by shooting with a pistol.

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Custer County; , J. W. Lazvfer, Judge. </p> <p>Arthur Montour, convicted of rape in the second degree, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; J. M. Adams, Judge. </p> <p>Jack Kendrick was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>COURTS — Opinion—Habeas Corpus Proceedings. When a petition for the writ of habeas corpus is filed in this court and a majority of the members of the court agree that the petitioners are entitled to be released from custody, but are unable to agree upon a determination of the legal questions raised, such petitioners will be discharged by a memorandum order and especially when no good purpose can be served by an extensive discussion of the questions raised.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Character Evidence — Admissibility. The state cannot prove the bad character of a defendant until he has put his character in issue.</p> <p>2. WITNESSES — Impeachment—Examination. On the proposition of impeaching the credibility of a witness for truth and veracity, the examination must be confined to the established rules as laid down in the books and by the courts, and not to the question of whether or not the accused has the reputation of having violated any specific statute or any other law.</p> <p>3. TRIAL — Issues—Reputation—Evidence. In the trial of a criminal case the issue is singular, and is based upon the question, Did the accused commit the crime charged? and not upon the question, Has the accused the reputation of having committed the crime charged, or some similar crime?</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Pottazvatomie County; Geo. C. Abernathy, Judge. </p> <p>J. E. Hopkins was convicted of pandering, and appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Evidence—Sufficiency. The Criminal Court of Appeals will not reverse the judgment of the trial court upon the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, when there is testimony in the record tending clearly to support the findings of the jury.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. JUEY — Challenge to Panel — Grounds. Rev. Laws 1910, secs. 5827, 5829, provide that the clerk of the court "must prepare separate ballots, containing the names of the persons returned as jurors, which must be folded as nearly alike as possible, and so that the same cannot be seen, and must deposit them in a sufficient box,” . and "before the name of any juror is drawn, the box must be closed and shaken, so as to intermingle the ballots therein. The clerk must then, without looking' at the ballots, draw them from the box.” Held, that it is the duty of the court to require the clerk to proceed according to the statutory provisions, and where the ballots drawn from the jury box were not folded so as to conceal the names therein written, a challenge to the panel should have been sustained.</p> <p>2. SAME — Competency of Juror — Voir T)ire Examination. A juror, on his voir dire examination, stated, "I would think he was guilty, or he would not be charged,” and "I think he wouldn't be charged if he was not guilty.” The Court: "I wish you would explain yourself a little further,-if you ca.n, as to that statement that you think a man must be guilty if charged.” A. "It seems somebody believes that he is guilty, or he would not be charged.” Held, that the juror was incompetent, and the challenge for cause should have been sustained.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. PARDON — Definition and Effect. A “pardon” is an act of graee and mercy bestowed by the state through its chief executive upon offenders against its laws after conviction, and a full, unconditional pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; it obliterates, in legal contemplation, the offense itself, and lienee its effect is to make the offender a new man.</p> <p>2. SAME — Time of Taking Effect — Delivery. A pardon takes effect upon delivery either to the person who is the subject of the favor or to some one actiug for him or in his behalf.</p> <p>3. HABEAS CORPUS — Validity of Pardon — Review by Court. This court has no power to control or in any manner interfere with the functions of the executive department of the state government, but it has jurisdiction and power to inquire upon habeas corpus into the validity of a pardon under which the petitioner seeks to be discharged from the penitentiary, where after the delivery'of the pardon he is detained in the custody of the warden upon an order of the Governor purporting to revoke the pardon.</p> <p>4. PARDON — Issuance by Acting Governor — Validity—Revocation. The pardon in this case was granted by the Lieutenant Governor, acting as Governor in the absence of the .Governor from the state. Held, that under the Constitution, art. 6, sec. 16 (165, Williams’), in the absence of the Governor from the state for any purpose or for any period of time, the constitutional functions of his office devolve pro tempore upon the Lieutenant Governor, and a pardon granted and delivered by the Lieutenant Governor as acting Governor, in the absence of the Governor from the state, is a valid and effectual pardon. A fortiori the warden has no authority to disregard it, and the Governor’s order purporting' to revoke such pardon was necessarily a nullity.</p> <p>5. APPEAL — -'Ground for Dismissal — Procurement of Pardon. When an appeal from a judgment of conviction is pending in this court, and the plaintiff in error applies for a pardon, and the same is granted, and the fact that a pardon has been granted is brought to the attention of this court, the appeal mil be dismissed as having been abandoned.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Application by Robert Davis for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Jackson County; Frank Mathezvs, Judge. </p> <p>Earl Helm was convicted of assault and battery, and appeals.</p>

C. Allen, Judge. J. M. Lyon was convicted of assault with a sharp and dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, and appeals.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Haskell County; W. H. Brown, Judge. </p> <p>Sam Hays, convicted of the larceny of domestic animals, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Garvin County; R. McMillan, Judge. </p> <p>Alex Jeffries, convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Pushmataha County; L. P. Davenport, Judge. </p> <p>Charlie Harris, convicted of petit larceny, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W: Hayson, Judge. </p> <p>James Montgomery was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Adair County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>Earl R. Horine was convicted of embezzlement, and appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL- — Pardon—Dismissal. When an appeal from a judgment of conviction is pending in this court, and. the plaintiff in error applies for a pardon, and the same is granted, and the fact that a pardon has been granted is brought to the attention of this court, the appeal will be dismissed as having been abandoned.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFOKMATION — Duplicity — Redundancy. The information alleged that the defendant did "unlawfully, knowingly, willfully sell, barter, give away and otherwise furnish spirituous, vinous, fermented and malt liquors and imitations thereof and substitutes therefor, to . wit, whisky, beer, ale and wine." Held, not duplicitous, as it only charges an unlawful sale, and the words, "and otherwise furnish," may be rejected as mere •redundance.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Verdict—Evidence—Credibility of Witnesses. The credibility of witnesses is a question solely for the jury’s determination; and, to reverse a judgment on the ground that the verdict is contrary to law and to the evidence, this court must find as a matter of law that the evidence'is insufficient to warrant the conviction.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Craig County; Preston S. Davis, Judge. </p> <p>Elmer Adams was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Manslaughter—Sufficiency of Evidence. On a trial for murder the conviction was for manslaughter in the first degree. Held, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Refusal of Instructions Covered. When the instructions given, considered as a whole, substantially present the law of the ease fairly to the jury, it is not error to refuse to give requested instructions fully covered by the instructions given.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Jackson County; J. M. Williams, Judge. </p> <p>.Oscar Loftin was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Mandamus by James F. McCullough against Preston S. Davis, District Judge.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, 7'illman County; Frank Mathezvs, Judge. </p> <p>Henry Petty was convicted of statutory rape, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Duplicity—Larceny. In a prosecution for the larceny of domestic animals, the indictment held not to be subject to the charge of being duplicitous.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Refusal of Instructions Covered. Where the charge of the court fairly and fully presented the issues in the ease to be jury, it is not error to refuse to give requested instructions.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Sequoyah County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>Dave Barks was convicted of aggravated assault, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

Cole, Assigned Judge. Robert Moody and Will Cowan were convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily injury, and appeal.

<p> Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; Conn Linn, Judge. </p> <p>W. P. Miles and Bob Miles were convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeal.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Evidence—Sufficiency. The credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given their testimony is a question solely for the jury's determination; and, to reverse a judgment on the ground that the verdict is contrary to 'law and the evidence, this court must find as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to warrant the conviction.</p> <p>2. INTOXICATING LIQUOR — Sale—Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, tie evidence examined and held sufficient to sustain the verdict.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.) )</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Burden of Proof — Reasonable Doubt. In the trial of a criminal ease the burden is never upon the accused to establish any issue beyond a reasonable doubt. In certain cases he may be required to furnish sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt, unless the proof on the part of the state raises such reasonable doubt; but more is never required of him.</p> <p>2, APPEAL — Instructions on Burden of Proof — Reversal. If, in the course of the trial, the court submits to the jury an instruction which has the effi'eet of requiring the accused to establish his innocence or any other material fact beyond a reasonable doubt, and a conviction is had, a reversal will follow on appeal.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Parrar L. McCain, Judge. </p> <p>George Caffee, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Sufficiency—Time for Objection. The constitutional right of a defendant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him entitles him to insist, at the outset by demurrer and after verdiet by motion in arrest of judgment, that the indictment or information shall apprise him of the crime charged with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense. The question of the sufficiency of the indictment or information must usually be called in question by a motion to set aside, or by demurrer before the trial. If the indictment or information states no offense within the jurisdiction of the court, that fact is fatal at any stage of the proceedings and is not waived by a failure to take advantage thereof by motion or demurrer,</p> <p>2. SAME — Objection—Felonious Assault — Description of Weapon. The information charged that the defendant "did then and there wrongfully and unlawfully, with the intent to do bodily harm and without justifiable or excusable cause, commit an assault upon the person of Wah-kah-tah-he-um-pah, by unlawfully and feloniously striking and beating the said Wah-kah-tah-he-um-pah with a dangerous weapon, towit, a long rod or bar of steel or iron.” Held, that the information was insufficient to charge the defendant with assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm as against an objection taken to the introduction of evidence because the information did not charge an offense within the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. COURTS — Terms of Court — Expiration. Where a general term of the court has been once regularly convened, on the day fixed by law, it can expire only by operation of law, or by an adjournment sine die, and will not so expire by operation of law until the first day of the next general term.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Challenge to Juror — Prejudicial Error. Where there is nothing in the record to show that an incompetent, disqualified or otherwise objectionable juror was forced upon the defendant, this court will not consider assignments of error based upon rulings of the court on challenges for cause.</p> <p>3. TRIAL — Instructions. Where the instructions requested, so far as legal and pertinent, were fully and fairly covered by the instructions given, the instructions requested were rightly refused.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Oklahoma County; Bdzvard Dezves Oldfield, Judge. </p> <p>Frank Sibenaler, convicted of a felony, appeals.</p>

<p>1. TRIAL — Evidence—Sufficiency—Demurrer. When the evidence introduced on behalf of the state fails to establish the crime charged in the information, and a demurrer is interposed to the evidence, the same should be sustained and the accused discharged.</p> <p>2. EVIDENCE — Burden of Proof — Dismissal. It is the duty of the law officers of the state to introduce testimony to establish the contentions of the state beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal cases, and when this cannot be done, prosecution should not be instituted.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Quantity in Possession. Under section 6, chapter 26, Session Laws 1913, providing that: “The keeping in excess of - one quart of any spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquors, or any imitation thereof, or substitute therefor, or any liquors or compounds of any kind or description whatsoever, whether medicated or not, which contain as much as one-half of one per centum of alcohol, measured by volume, and which is capable of being used as a beverage, except preparations compounded by any licensed pharmacist, the sale of which would not subject him to the payment of the special tax required by the laws of the United. States, or in any maimer permitting any other person to have or keep any such liquors in or about his place of business, or any place of amusement, or recreation, or any public resort, or any club room * * * shall be prima facie evidence of an intention to convey, sell, or otherwise dispose of such liquors,” it is error to instruct the jury that, “By prima facie evidence is meant such evidence as, in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to establish and prove any fact or thing beyond a reasonable doubt,” since the statute only means to make such evidence competent to prove the unlawful intent, and sufficient to justify the jury in finding a defendant guilty, provided it satisfies them beyond a reasonable doubt, but not otherwise.”</p> <p>2. SAME — “Prima Facie Evidence”- — Question, for Jury — -The phrase “prima facie evidence,” as used in the statute, is such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish the fact, if it be credited by the jury, and unless rebutted or the contrary proved, it remains sufficient for that purpose. Whether or not such evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence of a defendant, and to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when all the evidence including the presumptions are considered, is for the determination of the jury.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Burden of Prosecution — Demurrer to Evidence — Dismissal — When the testimony introduced by the state not only fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, but negatives any idea of guilt, the trial court should sustain a demurrer to the evidence and discharge the accused.</p> <p>2 INTOXICATING- LIQUORS — Insufficiency of Evidence. For evidence which is insufficient to sustain a conviction of two sixteen-year-old boys on a charge of unlawfully giving away whisty, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. PARDONS — Parole — Conditions, Precedent and Subsequent- — ■ Power of Governor. The Governor of the state has the power to annex to a pardon or parole any condition precedent or subsequent, provided it be not illegal, immoral, or impossible to be performed.</p> <p>2. SAME — Revocation — Hearing. An executive order revoking a parole and directing the re-arrest and return to custody of the convict without giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not violative of the constitutional guaranties that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law, and “that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,” since being a eonviet at large by executive clemency, which he has accepted on the conditions therein stated, the legal status of the convict upon the revocation of the parole becomes the same as it was before the parole was granted.</p> <p>3. SAME — Revocation Without Notice. A convict was granted and accepted a parole which expressly provided that the Governor might revoke the same and remand the party to prison for a violation of the conditions, or “for any other reason by him deemed sufficient.” Held, that the Governor may order the convict to be so remanded without notice to him, and without giving him an opportunity to be heard.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. FOEMEE JEOPAEDY — Necessity to Plead — -Cognizance of Eec-ord. Special pleas of former acquittal or conviction, as are provided for by statute, are allowable and in most 'instances required in subsequent prosecutions for an offense which has before been tried in some other tribunal, or in the same court under another and' distinct proceeding from the case in which the plea of jeopardy is interposed, and where such a plea is essential in order to present before the court matters dehors the record then before the court. However, such special plea is unnecessary and not required when the record then within the judicial knowledge of the court presents all the facts concerning’ the prior trial and its results. Upon the question being raised, the court will take cognizance of such facts from the record, and determine their proper legal effect as if upon a demurrer to a plea reciting them.</p> <p>2. SAME — Informations—Same Offense — Test. On a plea of former aequittal, in determining whether the two informations charge the same offense, the test is whether the evidence necessary to support the second information would have -been sufficient to procure a conviction upon the first information.</p> <p>3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Conveyance and. Possession — Former Jeopardy. Having been previously tried in the same court for unlawfully conveying certain intoxicating liquors and acquitted of that charge, the defendant was tried and convicted on the charge that he did unlawfully have in his possession the same intoxicating liquors with the intent to sell the same. An essential ingredient of both offenses charged is the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors; the two informations alleged the same date and have reference to the same intoxicating liquors, and while the offenses charged are not necessarily the same, they are of the same nature and kind. An acquittal under the first information was a finding that the defendant did not have possession of the liquors in question, and he should not be again put in jeopardy for that of which he has been acquitted.</p> <p>i. FORMER JEOPARDY — Waiver—Time to Plead. The constitutional privilege of immunity from a second prosecution is not waived if at any time before the jury has been empaneled to try the ease the defendant interposes a plea of former acquittal or conviction; and where, as in the instant case, the facts are all before the court as a part of its own record of the case, and the objection of former jeopardy raises only a question of law, the constitutional right will not be considered as waived where the defendant, upon the reading of the information to the jury and before the taking of any testimony, interposes a plea of former acquittal.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Pardon—Dismissal. When an appeal from a judgment of conviction is pending in this court, and the plaintiff in error applies for a pardon, and the same is granted, and the fact that a pardon has been granted is brought to the attention of this court, the appeal will be dismissed as having been abandoned.</p> <p>2. PAEDQN — Executive Power — Costs—Liability After Pardon. Under our Constitution, art. 6, sec. 10 (359 Williams’), the Governor is empowered to grant, "after conviction, reprieves, commutations, paroles, and pardons for all offenses, except cases of impeachment,” but his pardoning power can go no further than the public may be interested, and a pardon granted by the Governor will not release the convict from the liability to pay the costs, because the right to such costs are vested rights which can not be disturbed or abridged or lessened by any pardon which the Governor may grant.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Cherokee County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>Jack Ghormley, convicted of assault with intent to kill, appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Notice—Failure to Serve — Dismissal. Under Proc. Grim. (see. 5992, Rev. Laws 1910), notice of appeal and proof thereof given and made within the time prescribed for perfecting an appeal is jurisdictional, and where the record fails to show the service of such notice, the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>PABDON — Power to Pardon — Where Vested. County judges, county attorneys, and sheriffs have no power or authority to pardon persons convicted in the courts of this state. The power to pardon after conviction, is under the constitution, vested exclusively in the Governor.</p> <p>SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT — Execution—When Satisfied. The time fixed for execution of a sentence, or for the commencement of its execution, is not one of its essential elements, and, strictly speaking, forms no part of the judgment and sentence, which is the penalty of the law as declared by the court; while the direction with respect to the time of carrying it into effect is in the nature of an award of execution, so that, where the penalty is imprisonment, the sentence may be satisfied only by the actual suffering of the imprisonment imposed, unless remitted by death or some legal authority.</p> <p>3. SAME — Lapse of Time. Where a convicted defendant is at liberty and has not served his sentence, and the same is not stayed as provided by law, he may be arrested as on escape and ordered into custody on the unexecuted judgment.</p> <p>4- SAME — Expiration of Time. Expiration of time without imprisonment is in no sense an execution of the sentence.</p>

<p>1. CHATTEL MORTGAGES — Sale of Mortgaged Property — Legal Effect. Section 2755, Rev. Laws 1910 was enacted for the purpose of protecting mortgagees from fraud, annoyance and expense, and was intended only to give such mortgagees fair protection without imposing unnecessary, harmful and burdensome restrictions upon mortgagors.</p> <p>2. SAME — Construction of Statutes. In order for the foregoing section of the statute to bo upheld, it is necessary that a reasonable, fair and liberal construction be given the same. If a strict, literal construction of the act as written be followed, it would become of doubtful validity.</p> <p>3. SAME — Puni-hment. The foregoing act subjects each and every person who violates the provisions thereof with intent to defraud a mortgagee, or who violates the provisions thereof and by reason of his act a fraud results against the rights of the mortgagee, to the punishment therein provided.</p> <p>4. SAME — Mitigation—Payment—Consent. A mortgagor who is prosecuted under this provision is always entitled to prove in mitigation of punishment that the moi-tgage debt has been paid, or tlxat he had the verbal consent of the mortgagee to remove the property.</p> <p>5. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Prima Facie Case — Proof Necessary- An information in the language of the statute, and proof tending reasonably to establish the allegations set forth in sxxch inforamtion, would make a prima facie ease on. behalf of the state.</p> <p>6. CHATTEL MORTGAGES — Fraud — Intent. The proposition of whether or not a fraud was intended, or whether or not a fraud resulted to the mortgagee, would be a matter of defense.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Costs—Clerk’s Fees — Paupers. An appeal may be taken by the defendant, as a matter of right from any judgment in a criminal action against him, but the manner of taking and perfecting such appeal is a proper matter for legislative control, and under the statute requiring the plaintiff in error to pay to the clerk fifteen dollars advance fees, and when said sum shall have, been exhausted by proper charges, to make further deposit of a sufficient sum to cover all additional costs that may accrue, or in lieu of such payment an affidavit showing that the plaintiff in error is wholly without means and by reason of his poverty is unable to pay the costs of the appeal, such right of appeal does not contemplate an appeal at the expense of the county and state, except in the ease of a pauper.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Embezzlement—Transfer of Property — Rights as Pauper. A defendant convicted of embezzlement of public funds, who subsequent to his conviction and after perfecting his appeal, voluntarily conveys 'certain real property to his intended bondsmen, is not entitled to a transcript of the testimony taken upon the trial at the expense of the county, and is not entitled to prosecute an appeal in forma pauperis, at the expense of the state-</p> <p>3. SAME — Transferee! Property — Pending Appeal. The plaintiff in error, on filing his appeal, paid to the clerk fifteen dollars advance fees. After perfecting his appeal he filed and tendered to this court for its approval a supersedeas bond. In the qualifications of two of the sureties they scheduled certain real property. The exceptions filed by the state to the sufficiency of said bond showed that said real property had been conveyed by the plaintiff in error and his wife subsequent to his conviction. One of said deeds recites a consideration of $4,400, and acknowledges the receipt thereof- This court refused to approve the bond. Thereupon the plaintiff in error filed Ms affidavit in forma pauperis, for the purpose of avoiding the further payment of costs. Held, that the plaintiff in error, even though he is wholly without means, will be estopped by the record from contending that the property conveyed by him to his bondsmen and scheduled by them as valuable, was, and is of no value, and having voluntarily placed himself in that situation he is estopped from claiming the benefit of the statute.</p> <p>4. SAME — Failure to Pay Costs — Dismissal. The plaintiff in error, having failed and refused to pay the costs that have accrued on his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>Syllabus.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — -Evidence—Verdict—Punishment. In a prosecution for murder, the evidence examined and held to sustain a joint verdict of guilty with imprisonment for life at hard labor as the punishment.</p> <p>2. TRIAL- — Instructions—Sufficiency. The instructions must be considered as a whole, and when so considered, if they fairly and correctly state the law applicable to the case, they will be sufficient.</p> <p>3. HOMICIDE — Verdict—Parties — Conviction and Acquittal. On a trial of two persons upon a charge of murder, the court properly instructed the jury that though one of the defendants should be found guilty, the other might be acquitted, and the forms of verdict in that respect were properly submitted.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Greer County; G. A. Brown, Judge. </p> <p>Frank Cowle)'-, convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, appeals.</p>

<p>1. ASSAULT — Indictment and Information — Form and Sufficiency. Ordinarily, on a state of facts which tend to establish that a person committed an assault with a knife or other sharp or dangerous instrument, an infornnition should not be predicated on section 2336, but should be based upon section 2344, Eev. Laws 1910.</p> <p>2. SAME — Instructions—Grade of Offense. Upon the trial of a person charged with assault with intent to kill, under section 2336, Eev. Laws 1910, when the testimony indicates that the assault was committed with a sharp or dangerous weapon, the trial court should submit to the jury the proposition of whether or not the accused was guilty under section 2344, and it is reversible error to refuse to do so.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Alcoholic Insanity — Defense. In a prosecution for murder, alcoholic insanity, or mental incapacity produced by voluntary intoxication existing only temporarily at the time of the homicide is no justification or excuse therefor. To constitute insanity, caused by intoxication, a defense in a trial for murder, it must be insanity caused by chronic alcoholism and not a mere temporary mental condition.</p> <p>2. INSANITY — Delirium Tremens — Responsibility for Act. Insanity though superinduced by excessive and long continued indulgence in alcoholic liquors and known as ‘ ‘ delirium t/r.emens, ’ ’ or “mainia a potu,” renders a person so afflicted irresponsible for his acts, if it be of such a character as to deprive him of the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, as applied to the particular act, whether he be under the influence of liquor at the time of the commission of the act or not; but, to do so, his affliction must be settled or fixed insanity, not a mere fit of drunkenness. ■ A person, not previously laboring under such a disease or affliction, who voluntarily becomes intoxicated to such an extent and for such a period of time as to cause unconsciousness of his acts, is not irresponsible under the law for the acts done by him while in such mental condition.</p> <p>3. HOMICIDE' — Defense Intoxication — Premeditation- Intoxication, either voluntary or involuntary, is to be considered by the jury in a imosecuti'on for murder in which a premeditated design to effect death is essential, with reference to its effect upon the ability of the defendant at the time to form and entertain such a design, not because, per se, it either excuses or mitigates the crime, but because in connection with other facts, an absence of malice or premeditation may appear.</p> <p>4. SAME — Murder or Manslaughter — Intoxication. Under our penal code, section 2313, Rev. Laws 1910, homicide is murder “When perpetrated without authority of law, and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any other human being,” and evidence of intoxication is admissible to show an absence of the premeditated design to kill, for the purpose of determining whether the offense was murder or manslaughter, and a state of intoxication which will reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter in the first degree, must be of such character and-extent as to render the defendant incapable of entertaining or forming a design to effect death. And the question is for the jury to determine.</p> <p>5. SAME — Premeditation. A person who commits a homicide while so drunk as to be incapable of forming a premeditated design to kill, if he had formed no purpose to commit the crime prior to the time he became so intoxicated, is not guilty of murder, but is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.</p> <p>6. TRIAL — Instructions—Degree of Crime. In a prosecution for murder, the court should submit the ease to the jury for consideration upon every degree of homicide which the evidence in any reasonable view of it suggests, and if the evidence tends to prove different degrees, the law of each degree which the evidence tends to prove should be submitted to the jury, and where there was evidence of the intoxication of the defendant to the extent of being deprived of the mental capacity to deliberate or premeditate at the time of the homicide, it was prejudicial error to refuse to submit to the jury an instruction in reference to manslaughter in the first degree.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; H. N. Whalin, Judge. </p> <p>Mike Markeson, convicted of selling intoxicating licuor, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; Conn Linn, Judge. </p> <p>Ben Dew, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from" County Court, McIntosh County; Ben D. Gross, Judge. </p> <p>Alex Sellers, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>1. INSURANCE — License—Agency—“Compensation.” A prosecution based on the following provision of sec. 3750, Snyder's Comp. Laws of Oklahoma, 1909, to-wit: “Whoever shall assume to act as such agent, or, unless a licensed broker, shall in any manner for compensation negotiate contracts of insurance on behalf of such corporation for a person other than himself, prior to the filing of such notices of appointment or after receiving notice of such finding of unsuitability, shall be subject to the penalties provided by this act for soliciting insurance without license” — penalizes and was intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while actng in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation.</p> <p>2. SAME — Indictment and Information — Necessary Allegations. An information based upon this provision must contain an allegation to the effect that such insurance contracts were negotiated for compensation.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; H. N. Wlhalin, Judge.</p> <p>Emma Brumbaugh was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. EMBEZZLEMENT — Bank Deposits — Specific Funds. Under section 2673, Eev. Laws 1910, (see. 2612, Comp. Laws 1909), which penalizes any person acting as trustee, banker, merchant, etc., contemplates the prosecution of a banker for embezzling the funds of any bank as such, or any specific fund or property which is left for safe-keeping as distinguished from money or its equivalent deposited on account.</p> <p>2. BANKS AND BANKING — Cash Deposits — Eight to Specific Currency. Cash or equivalent when deposited in a bank becomes immediately the property of the bank, and no depositor -in the ordinary course of business has any right to have the specific currency or cash item returned.</p> <p>3. SAME — Embezzlement of Deposits. Any transaction had with an officer in charge of a banking institution, which transaction is within the scope of the bank’s business and which clearly was intended to be a transaction with the bank, is conclusively presumed to be such. If any employee of a bank, after funds have been deposited with the bank by a customer, embezzles the same, the embezzlement is against the property of the bank and not the property of the depositor.</p> <p>4. EMBEZZLEMENT — Indictment—Bank Deposits — Allegations. An information which attempts to charge offense under see. 2673, Eev. Laws, supra., should not attempt to charge that the embezzlement was made from a depositor and at the same time contain allega- , tions that the transaction was had with the embezzler as an agent of the bank by a customer of the bank, transacting the regular and ordinary business of a depositor.</p> <p>5. SAME — Allegation as to Party Defended. Nor an information which is held insufficient to charge an offense under sec. 2673, Rev. Laws 1910, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Malice — Bes Gestae — Other Offenses. Testimony which tends to establish intent or malice upon the part of a defendant, or which tends to identify him as the person who committed the crime for which he is on trial or which is a part of the res gestae, is admissible in evidence when of substantive value, even though such testimony may disclose the commission of other separate and distinct offenses.</p> <p>2. SAME — Confession of Other Party. A defendant who is being tried on a criminal charge is not entitled to introduce proof which has for its purpose the establishing before the jury the fact that some other person has confessed that he committed the crime, and that the defendant had nothing to do therewith and was not concerned therein. For a discussion of this principle, see quotation in the opinion from Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Okmulgee County; Wade S. Stanfield, Judge. </p> <p>Arthur Powell, convicted of rape, appeals.</p>

<p>1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Possession—Evidence of Reputation. Upon a trial on an information charging that the defendant did have the possession of intoxicating liquors with the intent to sell the same, evidence of the general reputation of his home was incompetent to prove the charge.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Evidence—Hearsay Testimony. Where hearsay testimony has been received which contributed to a verdict of guilty, the reception of such evidence does not constitute harmless error, but will be ground for reversal.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Sufficiency of Charge-Conformity to Statute. An information which fails to conform to the statute by setting forth sufficient facts to charge the commission of an offense, is fatally defective and cannot be made the basis of a judgment of conviction.</p> <p>2. IiARt^ — ríY—Proper Indictment. An information which intends 'to charge larceny should conform to section 2652, Revised Laws, 1910, or section 1, chapter 92, Session Laws of 1911, as construed by this court in Crowell v. State, 6 Otla. Or., 154; Hughes ■ v. State, 8 Oída. Or. 28, and Bryan v. State, ante; 144 Pae., 693.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; H. N. Whalin, Judge. </p> <p>Harve Morris was convicted of -violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

Appeal. from District Court, Greer County; G. A. Brown, Judge. Appeal by the state from a legal question reserved at the trial in the case of State of Oklahoma v. C. J. Gillaspie, charged with embezzlement.

<p>1. APPEAL — Service of Case-made — Extension of Time — Record. A purported order of a trial judge extending the time in which to make and serve a case-made, is .-without force, where the ease-made fails to show affirmatively that such order was made, and where it does not appear that such order was ever filed in the case in the lower court or entered of record in the journal of the court, as required by section 5317. Rev. Laws 1910.</p> <p>2. SAME Limitations of Time. An order granting an extension of time to make and serve a ease-made beyond six months from the date of the judgment, limited for the prosecution of proceedings in error, is a nullity.</p> <p>3. SAJVCE — Time for Amendments. It was error for the trial judge to settle the case-made without allowing the defendant in error the statutory three days from the expiration of the period limited, from the service of the ease-made, to suggest amendments, though such allowance would have extended settlement beyond the time limited for filing the case in the appellate court.</p> <p>4. SAME — Settlement of Case-made — Presence of Defendant. A proceeding in error, brought to this court on a ease-made, wherein it does not appear from the record or otherwise that the defendant was present, either personally or by counsel, at the settlement, or that he suggested amendments thereto, or had the opportunity to do so, or that notice of the time thereof was served or waived, will be dismissed on motion of defendant in error.</p> <p>5. SAME — Notice to Defendant. Where it appears from the record that the court in a proceeding had under the provisions of the statute, (section 5246, Rev. Laws 1910), made an order fixing the time but failed to designate the place for settling and signing the case-made, the certificate of the trial judge must show a compliance with such order by showing that it was settled and signed at the time when the defendant was directed to be present.</p> <p>6. SAME — Settlement Out of Time — Nullity. An original ease-made settled and signed after the time limited by the statute for filing it in this court, is a nullity, and could not be legally filed here as this court would have no jurisdiction to review it.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. PARDONS — Powers of Governor — Lieutenant Governor Acting. Under the constitution, article 6, section 16 (165 William’s) in the absence of the Governor from the state for any purpose or for any period of time, the constitutional functions of his office devolve pro tempore upon the Lieutenant Governor, and a conditional pardon or parole granted by the Lieutenant Governor as acting governor, in the absence of the Governor from the state, which has been duly accepted under the conditions therein prescribed, is valid.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Tillman County; Frank Mathews, Judge. </p> <p>Chas. E. Petty, convicted of statutory rape, appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Canadian County; W. A. Maurer, Judge. </p> <p>Willie Armstead, convicted of vagrancy, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Cimarron County; E. H. Loofbourrow, Judge.</p> <p>E. E. Davis was convicted of crime, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; J. W. Marshall, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Berry was convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Craig County; S. F. Parks, Judge.</p> <p>M. L. Pierce was convicted of a breach of the peace, and appeals.</p>

<p>Application of C. S. Clift for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kingfisher County. E. P. Shutler, Judge. *</p> <p>E. E. Davis was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pontotoc County; I. M. King, Judge.</p> <p>Walter Eaton was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kiowa County; Joseph Beasley, Special Judge.</p> <p>Dud Harris was convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>

<p>Bill Browder and John Hall were convicted of misdemeanor, and appeal. Two cases.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garvin County; W R. Wallace, Judge.</p> <p>J. D. Cobble was convicted of a misdemeanor and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Grady County; N. M. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>G. L. Elliott and Carsie Elliott were convicted of a violation' of the prohibitory law and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pawnee County; Geo. E. Merritt, Judge.</p> <p>John Myers was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Beaver County; Geo. II. Healy, Judge.</p> <p>Jerome Wilson was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Carter County; Stilwell H. Russell, Judge.</p> <p>W. A. Merritt convicted of the larceny of a domestic animal, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; J. W. Marshall, Judge.</p> <p>Prank Blumhoff and Henry Blumhoff were convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeal.</p>

<p>Application for writs of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garvin County; W. B. Wallace, Judge.</p> <p>Jack Flynn was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; I-Ial Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>Frank Cole was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge.</p> <p>W. E. Parks was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Coal County; P. E. Wilhelm, Judge.</p> <p>Martin Masoner was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McCurtain County; E. E. Cochran, Judge.</p> <p>Robert Hildreth was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Greer County; Jarret Todd, Judge.</p> <p>Glenn Einley was convicted of direct contempt, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court , Hughes County;</p> <p>W. E. Boyce was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kingfisher County; John M. Graham, Judge.</p> <p>Dan McLeod was convicted of violating a prohibitory ordinance of the city of Kingfisher, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garvin County; W. R. Wallace, Judge.</p> <p>M. L. Bryant was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pawnee County; Geo. E. Merritt, Judge.</p> <p>C. W. Sutherland was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Atoka County; Baxter Taylor, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Bassam was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McIntosh County; Ben. D. Gross, Judge.</p> <p>Walter Alexander was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition for the writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Love County; J. H. Hays, Judge.</p> <p>Jack Hill was convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pawnee County; Geo. E. Merritt, Judge.</p> <p>James Ammerman was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Seibert was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Haskell County; William L. Crittenden, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Custer County; J. C. MeKnight, Judge.</p> <p>I. y. Anson was convicted of violating the medical practices act, and appeals.</p>

<p>Application for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Wagoner County; B. P. deGraffenried, Judge.</p> <p>Stanley Baker was convicted of the larceny of live stock and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Canadian County; W. A. Maurer, Judge.</p> <p>C. II. Conner was convicted of violating the prohibitory law in three cases, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eistrict Court, Okmulgee County; Wade S. Stanfield, Judge.</p> <p>Haaron Henderson was convicted of assisting prisoners to escape, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Osage County; Paul B. Mason, Judge.</p> <p>Dave Sears was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Custer County; J. W. Lawter, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Cox was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Bryan County; J. L. Eappolee, Judge.</p> <p>W. E. Sanders was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; J. W. Marshal], Judge.</p> <p>Nicholas Billy was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Sequoyah County; John H. Pitehford, Judge.</p> <p>Will Morris was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McIntosh County; Ben. D. Gross, Judge.</p> <p>S. M. Rogers was convicted of violating the prohibitory law and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Hal Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>Oscar Cofer was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and a2-'peals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; W. II. Admire, Judge.</p> <p>E. E. Merchant was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge.</p> <p>G. E. Sillix was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Rogers County; Walter W. Shaw, Judge.</p> <p>Gus Sahm was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Okmulgee County; Mark L. Bozarth, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge.</p> <p>Pete Pastoría was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge.</p> <p>Ed Chambliss was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pawnee County; Geo. B. Merritt, Judge.</p> <p>O. Morgan was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Bob Chandler was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Seminole County; A. S. Norvell, Judge.</p> <p>John Sears was . convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Bryan County; Jesse M. Hatchett, Judge.</p> <p>Bun McGee was convicted of assault and battery, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; J. M. Adams, Judge.</p> <p>Monk Dulaney was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kiowa County; J. S. Carpenter, Judge.</p> <p>William Smiley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Hughes County; J. Eoss Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>S. H. Ehine was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; J.' M. Adams, Judge.</p> <p>Dillard Roberts was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge.</p> <p>B. W. Bradley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kingfisher County; John M. Graham, Judge.</p> <p>Appeal by the city of Kingfisher from an adverse judgment in action against H. II. McFadden.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McIntosh County; Ben D. Gross, Judge.</p> <p>Steve Shannon was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar McCain, Judge.</p> <p>B. W. Bradley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pontotoc County; I. M. King, Judge.</p> <p>George High was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; J. W. Marshall, Judge</p> <p>Nicholas Billy was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; I-I. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>George Hopkins, convicted of violating the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; H. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>Mike Markeson, convicted of violating the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; J. M. Adams, Judge.</p> <p>Link Brown and Mrs. Link Brown were convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Wagoner County; W. T. Hunt, Judge.</p> <p>C. P. Carr, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Parrar L. McCain, Judge".</p> <p>George White, convicted of a volation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Osage County; Paul B. Mason, Judge.</p> <p>John Myers was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition for the writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kiowa County; J. S. Carpenter, Judge.</p> <p>Will Pillingim was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Hal Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>Burt Grant, convicted of violating the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Coal County; P. E. Wilhelm, Judge.</p> <p>Albert Allen, convicted of selling cider, appeals.</p>

<p>Write of habeas corpus awarded, and petitioner discharged.</p>

<p>Petition of Warren Zimmerman for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of Joe Mulholland for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Ilayson, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Proctor convicted of violatnig the prohbitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>A1 Franklin and Elmer Johnson were convicted of gaming, and appeal.</p>

<p>Application of Bird Gee for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of H. H. Brown for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of Joe Hasty for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of C. U. Crittenden for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of Chester Parkey for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of O. A. Sloan for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of Frank Guinn for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of George I-Iieks, Jr., for a writ of habeas corpus,</p>

<p>Petition of John Graham for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Hal Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>P. E. Noll, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Applications of R. Grissett and Kent Anglin for writs of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Greer County; H. M. Thacker, Judge.</p> <p>Harve Walker was convicted of assault and battery, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of Charles Bashara for writ of habeas corpus, to be let to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County. Court, Lincoln County; H. M. Jarrett, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Porter was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Murray County; Harry W. Fielding, Judge.</p> <p>Allen Donahoe, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; H. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>Eve Shoemake, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanelie County; I-I. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>A. F. Holmes, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; ■ H. N. Whalen, Judge.</p> <p>May Bichards was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals-</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; II- N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>Lottie Turner was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of C. W. Maddox for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of A. Washmood for writ of habeas corpus, to be let to bail.</p>

<p>Petition of E. N. Bryant for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of Silman Thomas for writ of habeas corpus, for the purpose of being admitted to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Adair County; John A. Goodall, Judge.</p> <p>I-Iill Stansill, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Rogers County; Walter W. Shaw, Judge.</p> <p>Pred Hill, convicted of violating the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Washita County; L. E. Shean. Judge,</p> <p>Leo I-Iinds was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of .Earnest Eenstermaeher for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court; Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, .Judge.</p> <p>P. M. Vick, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, McIntosh County; Preslie B. Cole, Judge.</p> <p>Henry Keiser was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor to a miner, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of John 0. Lindsey for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of David Almerigo for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Grady County; N. M. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>Fender Polk was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of George S. Best for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; Conn Linn, Judge-</p> <p>Dutch Weete, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Greer County; H. M. Thacker, Judge.</p> <p>Bob Bark, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory' law, appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of Maurine Holford for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; H. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>Emma Brumbaugh was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Payne County; W. H. Wilcox, Judge.</p> <p>B. D. Brewer was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Craig C.ounty; Edw. II. Brady, Judge.</p> <p>P. J. Lawless, convicted of a misdemeanor, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Creek County; Warren H. Brown, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Choctaw County; W. T. Glenn, Judge.</p> <p>Bob Hinch was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanehe County; TI. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>George Morgan, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Osage County; Paul B. Mason, Judge.</p> <p>Back Bartlett, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Washita County; L. E. Shean , Judge.</p> <p>William Ensey, convicted of violation of the prohibitory law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Tillman County; Frank Mathews, Judge.</p> <p>C. W. Rollins and John Whitt were convicted of violating a city ordinance, and appeal.</p>

<p>Petition of John Russell for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of Robert Malone for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of James Morrison for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Petition of Bob Young for.writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Caddo County; J. T. Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>Ered Branham, convicted of assault and battery, appeals.</p>

<p>Application of Josiah Hawkins for writ of habeas corpus-</p>

<p>Application of Joe Kelly for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Aplieation of William Shaffer for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of Ed Mayes for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of A. B. Wright for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of Charley Robinson to be admitted to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Ottawa County. Yern E. Thomas, Judge.</p> <p>William White, convicted of a misdemeanor, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garvin County; W. E. Wallace, Judge.</p> <p>T. S. McFarland, convicted of petit larceny, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, I-Iughes County. J. Eoss Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>Harry Sullivan, convicted of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors, appeals-</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Custer County; 1-Ion. J. W. Lawter, Judge.</p> <p>W. 0. Bray was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Payne County; A. H. Huston, Judge.</p> <p>J. F: Fitzsimmons, convicted of fenony; appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Canadian County; W. A. Maurer, Judge.</p> <p>J. J. Shawver was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County. Hon. Conn Linn, Judge.</p> <p>J. A. Tilley was eonvieted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>