Volume 10 — Oklahoma Criminal Reports

<p> Appeal from District Court, Delaware County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>J. R. Copeland and another were convicted of living together in open and notorious adultery, and they appeal.</p>

Ross Hume, Judge. James Irvine was convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquors from one point in Caddo County to another, and he appeals.

CASE FOLLOWED. Huff v. State (No. A-1750), 9 Okla. Cr. 675, 133 Pac. 265, reaffirmed and followed. Appeal from County Court, Love County; R. A. Keller, Judge. S. P. Tyler was convicted of violating the prohibitory law,, and appeals.

<p> Appeal from County Cotirt, Pottawatomie County; Ross F. Lockridge, Judge. </p> <p>Montel Hager was convicted of giving away whisky, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Craig County; S. F. Parks, Judge. </p> <p>Charles Nichols was convicted of violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Appeal — Verdict — Evidence—Sufficiency. While it is well settled that this court will not disturb the verdict on account of the evidence when there is evidence to support it, the converse rule is equally well settled that it is not only the province, but the duty, of the court to set aside such a verdict when it is contrary to the evidence, or where there is no evidence to support it. The performance of this duty on the part of the court is the exercise of legal discretion and judgment as to the sufficiency of the evidence to overcome the legal presumption of innocence, to which every one is entitled who is put upon his trial for an offense. (See opinion for evidence held insufficient to support the verdict and judgment.)</p>

<p>1. PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS — Authority and Duties — Delegation to Assistant. A county attorney is vested with a personal discretion and responsibility as a minister of justice, and not as a mere licensed attorney, and he must act impartially, as well in refraining from prosecuting as in prosecuting. He must guard the real interests of public justice in behalf of all concerned, and he is disqualified from becoming in any way entangled with private interests or grievances connected with the private practice of law, and, while he may employ assistants in various ways not involving his official discretion or responsibility, he cannot delegate this discretion except to an assistant, duly appointed and qualified as provided by law.</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Execution—Signature of Assistant County Attorney. An information signed in the name of the county attorney by a duly appointed and qualified assistant county attorney is valid.</p> <p>3. PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS — Assistants — Authority'—Statutory Provisions. Under the statute (section 1563, Rev. Laws 1910) authorizing county attorneys with the assent of the board of county commissioners to appoint not to exceed four assistants in counties having a population of over 60,000, at salaries fixed by the statute to be paid by the county, an additional assistant appointed and paid by the county attorney himself is not a legally constituted assistant county attorney.</p> <p>4. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Misdemeanor—Signature of Assistant County Attorney. The conviction of a person under an information charging a misdemeanor, not signed by the person designated by law, is void for want of jurisdiction in the trial court.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Death of Appellant — Abatement. In a criminal prosecution, the purpose of the proceeding being to punish the defendant in person, the action must necessarily abate upon his death; and where it is made to appear to the court that a plaintiff in error has died, pending the determination of his appeal, the cause will be abated.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; N. J. Gubser, Judge. </p> <p>M. B. Viers was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court„ Garvin County; W. B. M. Mitchell, Judge.</p> <p>Jack Flynn was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Noble County; ■L. B. Robinson, Judge. </p> <p>J. C. Teague was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>ADULTERY — Instructions—Weight of Evidence. The jury must be left free to determine for themselves whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the law, and an instruction which advises them on that subject invades the province of the jury to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. (See opinion for a statement in the charge of the court held to be a comment on the weight of circumstantial evidence and erroneous.)</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Canadian County; W. A. Maurer, Judge.</p> <p>Carl Oelke was convicted of a misdemeanor, and appeals.</p>

H. Wells, Judge. ■ E. T. Brown was charged with violating the enforcement act, and from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the information, the state appeals.

<p>1. RAPE — -Evidence—Specific Acts. On a trial for statutory rape, evidence of specific acts of unchastity on the part of the prose-cutrix with others than the defendant is inadmissible, unless shown to be a part of res gestae, and it was prejudicial error to permit the prosecutrix to testify as to her acts of unehastity with others than the defendant, and not connected with the act charged in the information.</p> <p>2. SAME — Necessity of Corroboration. While, as a matter of law, corroboration of the prosecutrix’s testimony as to the fact of sexual intercourse is not essential to a conviction, yet where this issue of fact is controverted, and the testimony of the prose-eutrix bears upon its face inherent evidence of improbability, there must be corroboration by other evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime; especially must this rule be held applicable in a case whore the prosecutrix has been successfully impeached.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Harmless Error. Incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence, which tends to excite the passions, arouse the prejudices, and awaken the sympathies, or warp or influence the judgment of jurors, cannot be considered as harmless.</p> <p>i. RAPE — Sufficiency of Evidence. See opinion for evidence held insufficient to support the verdict and judgment.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge. </p> <p>J. M. Dupree was convicted of conducting a roulette game, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from. County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>G. C. Allen was convicted of violating the anti-cigarette law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Bilis County; A. L. Squire, Judge. </p> <p>R. A. Metcalf was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Jackson County; B. N. Woodson, Judge. </p> <p>J. AY. Jones was convicted of keeping a bawdyhouse, and appeals.</p>

<p>Original application for writ of habeas corpus by Roy Burris.</p> <p>M. L. Matson, for petitioner.</p> <p>V. S. Decker, Co. Atty., for the State.</p>

<p>Application for writ of habeas corpus by J. C. Burroughs.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Craig County; Preston S. Davis, Judge. </p> <p>Thomas Monaghan was convicted of robbery, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Garvin County; R. McMillan, Judge. </p> <p>Henry Bloodsworth was convicted of larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p>PERJURY — Evidence—Sufficiency. On a trial of a person charged with perjury, the state is required to show, not only that the testimony given was false and corruptly given, but must also show that it was material to the issue joined in the cause on trial in which such testimony was given. When this is not done, a judgment of conviction cannot be sustained.</p>

<p>1. LARGENY — Evidence. In a prosecution for larceny of live stock, the circumstantial evidence is held sufficient to support the verdict and judgment.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Sufficiency of Evidence. It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine and pass upon the credibility of the testimony, and, if found sufficient to sustain the verdict, the judgment will not be disturbed on account of a conflict of evidence.</p>

Application of W. A. Corley and others for writ of prohibition to the County Court of Adair County.

<p>EVIDENCE — Evidence of Accomplice — Instructions — Corroboration. Where the state relies upon the testimony of an accomplice to secure a conviction, the trial court, if requested,' must instruct the jury that they cannot find the defendant guilty .upon such evidence, unless it is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and that the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. See section 5884, Eev. Laws 1910.</p>

<p>1. WITNESSES — Immunity—Question for Court. The question of immunity is one for the court alone, and should never be submitted to a jury.</p> <p>2. SAME — Immunity—Powers of Justice. A jiistiee of the peace, acting as coroner at an inqixest for murder, is without power to compel a witness to answer questions which might incriminate such witness, and is without power to grant immunity to any witness for answering self-incriminating questions.</p> <p>3. COEONEES — Inquest. A justice of the peace is without jurisdiction to hold an inquest except over the bodies of persons the causes of whose death are unknown, and who are supposed to have died from unlawful means.</p>

Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Jiidge. Fred Hunter was convicted of willfully failing to properly support his minor child, and appeals.

<p>TRIAL — Indorsement of Names of Witnesses — Right to Object — Waiver. Where there are no indorsements on an information or indictment of names of the witnesses for the prosecution, and the defendant goes to trial without taking any action to secure the indorse-ments of such names as directed by statute, he cannot be heard to complain that the names were not so indorsed. And an ob-. jeetion to the testimony of a witness upon the ground that it was not so indorsed should be overruled.</p>

Application of George Crump, Jr., for writ of habeas corpus. On behalf of George Crump, Jr., a duly verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to the Presiding Judge of this court, representing that he was illegally restrained of his liberty and unlawfully imprisoned in the state penitentiary by R. W. Dick, warden.

<p>GAMING — Opening and Maintaining Game — Statutes—Elements of Offense. Rev. Laws 1910, see. 2498, provides that any person who deals, plays, carries on, opens, or conducts, either as owner or employee, any game of roulette, eraps, ete., is guilty of a misdemeanor, etc. Held that, in a prosecution under such section, it was essential, to sustain a conviction, to prove that accused opened up a game of eraps that was played for money, and that the game was played by some person at accused’s place of business for money, cheeks, or other representatives of value.</p>

McKeoivn, Judge. Tom Birdwell was convicted of manslaughter on an indictment charging murder, and appeals. This was an indictment in the District' Court of the United States within and for the Southern District of the Indian Territory for the murder at Bebee, Ind. T., in what is now Pontotoc county, on September 10, 1907, of Jim Goodson, by shooting him with a shotgun loaded with buckshot.

Bailey, Judge. H. C. Davis was convicted of larceny of a hog, and appeals. On May 25, 1911, there was filed in the district court of Stephens county an information, charging the defendant with the theft in Stephens county, on or about the 5th day of March, of a hog, the property of J. Paschal. The case was called for trial on the 8th day of November, and the defendant filed a motion for a continuance, which was overruled.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Pontotoc County; Tom D. McKeown, Judge. </p> <p>H. T. Gillam was convicted of stealing a horse, and he appeals.</p>

Error from District Court, Stephens County; Frank M. Bailey„ Judge. Pete Stark was convicted of assault with intent to do bodily harm on an information charging assault with intent to kill, and brings error.

<p>MANDAMUS — Change of Judge. Where one of the judges of. a judicial district, on application for a change of judge in a criminal case, expressed a willingness to disqualify himself, if the other district judge was willing to try the ease, a writ of mandamus will issue to compel him to certify to, his disqualification.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Verdict, (a) Under the law in Oklahoma controverted questions of fact, involving the guilt or innocence of a person on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, before a jury, are to be settled exclusively by such jury.</p> <p>(b) When an accused is on trial and there is a direct conflict in the testimony between witnesses for the state and witnesses for such accused on the material issues, this court, in the absence of error of law, will not on appeal reverse a conviction.</p> <p>2. NEW TRIAL — Grounds. A supplemental motion for a new trial in a criminal case based on an allegation of newly discovered evidence is properly denied, when the showing made clearly indicates that the testimony is not newly discovered evidence, but cumulative evidence which would tend only to corroborate other • testimony given on the trial.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Judgment. This court will not reverse the judgment of the trial court for lack of evidence where there is competent evidence in the record reasonably tending to sustain the judgment.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Tillman County; Frank Mathews, Judge. </p>

<p>1. RAPE — Sufficiency of Evidence. Evidence reviewed, and held sufficient to sustain verdict of guilty of rape in the second degree.</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Preliminary Examination —Waiver—Effect. Section 17, Bills of Rights, prescribes: "No-person shall be prosecuted for a felony by information without - having had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate, or having waived such preliminary examination.”</p> <p>Held, that it is the fact that there was a preliminary examination, or waiver thereof, and a judicial determination thereon by the examining magistrate, that a felony has been committed, and that there is probable cause to believe defendant is guilty thereof, that confers jurisdiction on the district court; and where a defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination and it appears that the charge in the preliminary eomplaint is substantially the same as that charged in the information in the district court, a motion to quash for want of jurisdiction should be overruled.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Cure of Judgment. Where, upon appeal from a conviction of the crime of statutory rape, the verdict of the jury was "guilty of rape in the second degree,” the faet that the judgment recited that the defendant was guilty of rape in the first degree was not reversible error, since the use of the word "first”' was a clerical error, and did not affect the substantial rights of defendant, and the judgment will be modified and corrected by this court so as to conform to the verdict of the jury.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge. </p> <p>M. A. Cahn was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and. brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court„ Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>D. M. Blunk was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Discretionary Ruling. A motion for continuance, on the ground of absent witnesses, is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed, unless an abuse of discretion appears.</p> <p>2. WITNESSES — Cross-Examination, of Accused — Other Crimes. The prosecution in a criminal case has the right to ask the defendant, when he takes-the .witness stand in his own behalf, whether or not he has been convicted of a particular crime, for the purpose of affecting his credibility.</p> <p>3. CONTINUANCE — Motion for Continuance — Sufficiency. A motion for a continuance in a criminal case was insufficient, where it did not allege that the absent witnesses, had not left the state with defendant's consent or procurement, nor state facts showing-any probability that they would ever be within the court’s jurisdiction, nor state when defendant learned that they had left the state.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Review—Discretion of Trial Court, (a) An application for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and'in the exercise of this discretion it must affirmatively appear that an abuse thereof occurred before this court will interfere with the ruling of the lower court.</p> <p>(b) When an application for continuance is made by a person on trial and overruled by the court, all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence adduced at the trial will be considered by this court in determining whether or not the exercise of discretion by such court was abused in denying the application.</p> <p>2. SAME — Questions of Fact — New Trial, (a) When the evidence disclosed by the record tends reasonably to support the verdict of the jury, such verdict will not be disturbed by this court on appeal.</p> <p>(b) A motion for new trial, based on an allegation that . the evidence does not support the verdict of the jury, is addressed, first, to the sound discretion of the trial court, who has seen and heard the witnesses testify, and who must necessarily know a great deal more about many facts and circumstances produced at the trial, which cannot bo written into a record, than an appellate court can by reading the record after it is written. And when a trial court has considered and passed upon such an issue, it comes to this court only, on the proposition that as a matter of law the verdict is contrary to the evidence.</p> <p>Under this rule, see opinion for facts upon which the verdict in this ease is based, and upon a review of which we cannot say as a matter of law the verdict is contrary to the evidence.</p>

<p> ■Appeal from District Court, Carter County; S. H. Russell, Judge. </p> <p>Oce Jones was convicted of larceny of animals, and appeals.</p>

B. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Olie Sayers and another were convicted of rape, and bring error.

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Assault with Intent to Kill — Information. An information charging that defendant, at a time and place named therein, "did willfully and feloniously, with a certain dangerous weapon, to wit, ■ a pistol, called a revolver, loaded with powder and ball, feloniously make an assault with the felonious intent to then and there kill" is insufficient to eharge the crime of attempt to kill as defined by section 2336, Eev. Laws 1910, but is sufficient to charge an assault with a dangerous weapon as defined by section 2344, Eev. Laws 1910.</p> <p>2.- TEIAL — Instructions—Burden of Proof. Instructions couched in language which implies the expectation of the court that a verdict of guilty will be returned, or an intimation that it is the duty of the jury to conviet, or which tend to shift the burden of proof, are improper.</p> <p>’. HOMICIDE — Sufficiency of Evidence. Evidence examined, and , held insufficient to support the verdict and judgment.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Pawnee County; Fred S. Liscum, Judge. </p> <p>A. A. Moulder was convicted of a violation of the prohibi-tftifi law and appeals.</p>

Clcu'k, Assigned Judge. A. Washmood was convicted of murder, and appeals. The plaintiff in error, A. Washmood, was on the 17th day of October, 1906, indicted by grand jury in the southern district of the Indian Territory, at Ada, charged in eight counts with conspiracy to murder and with the murder of one Ben Collins. J. B. Miller, Henry Pruitt, Clint Pruitt, and Dan Sie were jointly indicted with plaintiff in error.

<p>EVIDENCE — Accomplice Testimony — Necessity of Corroboration. Under Proc. Or. (Eev. Laws 1910^sec. 5884), providing that “a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence -as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof,” there cannot be a conviction unless there is proof of substantial facts tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense aside from and without the aid of the accomplice testimony.</p>

<p>1. COUBTS — Extradition—-Habeas Corpus — Interstate—Grounds—Determination— Beview by Courts — Proceedings — “Magistrate”— Strict Construction of Statute, (a) The power which independent nations have to surrender criminals to other nations as a matter of favor or comity is not possessed by the states of the Union; and no person can be surrendered by one state to another, unless the case falls within the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States.</p> <p>(b) The Governor of a state, .upon whom a demand is made for the return of a fugitive from justice to a sister state, must determine for himself, in the first place, as to whether or not the demand made is in compliance with the law, and as to whether or not the person whose return is sought is in fact a fugitive from justice; but his decision is subject to review by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings, otherwise the Governor would be clothed with arbitrary and despotic power, and there could be no uniform action in such matters in all of the states of the , Union.</p> <p>(e) Under the laws of the United States, an application for a requisition, made upon the Governor of any state for the return of a fugitive from justice, must be accompanied with a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of the state seeking to secure sueh return, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or some other crime; and, unless this provision of the federal statutes is complied with, an order of the Governor for the return of such fugitive is null and void; and it is the duty of the courts in proper proceedings to so determine and order the release of the alleged fugitive from justice.</p> <p>(d) A notary public, who has no other power than to swear witnesses and take depositions in the state in which he is appointed, is not a magistrate within the meaning of the law, and an affidavit made before such notary public is not worth anything more than so much blank paper in extradition proceedings.</p> <p>(e) Extradition proceedings being based upon an act of Congress, and the federal courts having decided that sueh act must be strictly construed, and that all of its requirements must be respected, this court is without the power or authority to construe sueh act liberally, but will be compelled to follow the rule laid down by the federal court, and require that all of the provisions of the federal law relating to requisitions must be strietly observed and respected.</p> <p>2. EXTRADITION — -Arrest—Requisites of Affidavit — Right to Grant Extradition, (a) In order to be the basis,of and support requisition proceedings, where an affidavit made before a magistrate is relied upon, such affidavit must be sworn to positively as a matter of fact. It is the law, both of the United States and of the state of Oklahoma, that no warrant can- be issued for the arrest of any person unless it is supported by some fact certain, positively sworn to before a proper officer. An affidavit verified as a matter of belief by the prosecuting witness is insufficient, and a warrant issued upon such affidavit, if properly objected to, will be set aside.</p> <p>(b) Courts should not tolerate or condone disregard of law and arbitrary usurpation of power on the part of any officer. Ours is a government of law, and not of men, and before any act of any official will be sustained by the courts sueh act must be authorized by law.</p>

Bailey, Judge. R. D. Horton was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals. The plaintiff in error was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, on an information charging him with the murder o.f Reuben Horton on the 5th day of August, 1911.

<p> Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; W. H. Admire, Judge. </p> <p>Floyd Cantrell was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>

<p>■ 1. APPEAL — Procedure. An. appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case is a matter of right; but the Legislature may prescribe the manner in which this right must be exercised.</p> <p>2. SAME — Conviction of Felony — Notice of Appeal. A notice of appeal must be served after the rendition of the judgment in a criminal case, and before the expiration of the time allowed by law. If served before the rendition of the 'judgment, it is a nullity, and such attempted appeal will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Washita County; James R. Tolbert, Judge. </p> <p>A. D. Berry was convicted of perjury, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Cou-rt, Jefferson County; Frank M. Bailey, Judge. </p> <p>Jim Roberts was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Carter County; S. H. Russell, Judge. </p> <p>Oscar J. Payne was convicted of assault with intent to kill, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Major County; James B. Cullison, ’ Judge. </p> <p>W. A. Woody was convicted of adultery, and he appeals-</p>

<p>1. RAPE — Indictment—Sufficiency. To constitute a good charge of attempt to commit the crime of rape under section 2803, Rev. Laws 1910, some act done towards the commission of the crime and the failure must be alleged, and it is also necessary to allege an intent to feloniously have sexual intercourse by committing a rape as defined by section 2414, Rev, Laws 1910.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — -Modification of Judgment. Under section 6003, Rev. Laws 1910, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this court, in the furtherance of justice, has the power to modify any judgment appealed from by reducing the sentence.</p> <p>3. RAPE — Assault with. Intent to Commit Rape — Sufficiency of Evidence. The evidence in this case considered, and held sufficient to show an assault with intent to commit rape.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Pittsburg County; Preslie B. Cole, Judge.</p> <p>-Shelly Larry was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p>WITNESSES — Cross-Examination of Accused — Prior Conviction. The state, in a criminal case, has the right to ask the defendant, as a witn'ess in his own behalf, upon cross-examination, whether or not he has been convicted of a crime, for the purpose of affecting his credibility.</p>

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Eugene Williams. It appears from the record in this cause that the petitioner, Eugene Williams, was legally charged by indictment, and was ■tried and convicted for the crime of grand larceny in the circuit court of Vanderburgh county, in the state of Indiana, on the 12th day of July, 1909, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary of Indiana from one year to fourteen years; that before the expiration of said sentence…

<p> Appeal from District Court, Comanche County; J. T. Johnson, Judge. </p> <p>Charley L. Simpson was convicted of burglary, and appeals.</p>

<p>EVIDENCE — Admissibility—Larceny. Over the defendant’s objection a witness for the state was permitted to testify that the. defendant's father offered to pay him $50 to testify in favor of the defendant. There was no proof tending to show that such offer to pay witness was made by the authority, consent, or knowledge of the defendant. The court, overruling motion to strike out this testimony, said: “This man being the defendant’s father, I will let it stay in.” Held, that the evidence was incompetent and inadmissible and was calculated to prejudice the defendant, and that the erroneous rulings of the court constitute reversible error.</p>

<p>1. WITNESSES — Continuance—Grounds. It is the right of every citizen, when prosecuted for an offense, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of his witnesses, but where the record does not show that a praecipe was filed, nor that a subpoena was issued or served upon absent witnesses, it will be presumed that a motion for a continuance on account of the absence of witnesses was piroperly overruled.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Continuance — Motion — Diligence. Motion for continuance should show diligence.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Frank M. Bailey, Judge. </p> <p>Grover Philips was convicted of rape, and appeals.</p> <p>This is an attempted appeal from a judgment rendered in the district court of Jefferson county, on the 9th day of December, 1911, upon a verdict wherein appellant was convicted of the crime of rape; and Ins punishment was assessed at five years’ confinement in the penitentiary. It was provided in the judgment that appellant should have 00 days in which to prepare and serve a case-made, and thereafter on February 5, 1912, the court made an order extending the time within which to serve the case-made, 30 days from February 7, 1912; and thereafter on March 2, 1912, the court made an additional order, further extending the time to prepare and serve the case-made, five days, thereby granting appellant 35 days from February 7th to serve the case-made, which said time expired on the 13th day of March, 1912. The record, as filed in this court, shows acceptance of service of the case-made by the county attorney of Jefferson county on the 12th day of March, 1912. The Attorney General, however, suggested a diminution of the record, and in support thereof alleged that the case-made was not served until or after March 15, 1912, and after the expiration of the time allowed by the trial court in which to serve the case-made. On the 8th day of March, 1913, this court made an order permitting the state to withdraw the record from this court to be transmitted to the district court of Jefferson county, with directions to the trial court to hear the testimony, and determine as a matter of fact just when the case-made was served on the county attorney of Jefferson county. The trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses in the case, and certified to this court its finding that the case-made was served on the county attorney of Jefferson county on or after the 15th day of March, 1912. All of which appears in the record before us.</p>

<p>1. TRIAL — Instructions—Refusal of Instruction Covered. When the law pertaining to the defense has been clearly and correctly expounded in the instructions given, it is not error to refuse instructions which are merely cumulative.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Harmless Error — Argument of Counsel. In determining the effect of an improper statement made by the prosecuting attorney in the closing argument to the jury, the question is, Was the defendant prejudiced thereby? and the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction will be considered, and, where the guilt of the defendant is clearly established, it is not sufficient for a reversal.</p> <p>S. HOMICIDE — Harmless Error — -Failure to Instruct. Failure to instruct pursuant to Rev. Laws 1910, sec. 5902, relative to the burden resting on defendant in a murder case to prove mitigation or justification, being error in defendant’s favor, is harmless^</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Hughes County; John Caruthcrs, Judge. </p> <p>Daniel Narcome and Jim Franks were convicted of manslaughter, and appeal.</p>

Oldfield, Judge. Newton Plenty was convicted of murder, and appeals.

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Joint Offenders. Separate informations may be filed against defendants complained of • as being joint offenders, and together held for the commission of a single crime.</p> <p>2. SAME' — Eight to Amend — Time. By leave of court, an information may be amended, as to matters of substance or form, after a plea of not guilty has been entered, and before the trial has begun.</p> <p>3. SAME — Preliminary Complaint — Variance. When it appears that the charge in the complaint before the committing magistrate is substantially the same as that charged in the information filed in the district court, a motion to quash, on the ground that the offense charged in the information differs from that charged in the complaint upon which the defendant was held to answer, is unavailing, and was properly overruled.</p> <p>i. APPEAL' — Record—Presumption. Error must affirmatively appear from the record; it is never presumed. Every presumption favors the regularity of the proceedings had upon the trial. The plaintiff in error must affirmatively show prejudicial error; otherwise the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.</p> <p>5. LARCENY — Variance—Number of Animals Stolen. In a prosecution for larceny of animals, a variance between the information and proof as to the number stolen was immaterial.</p>

<p>1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — States — Lieutenant Governor — Absence of Governor — Exercise of Powers, (a) The Constitution of the state grants certain clearly defined powers to the Governor, or the acting Governor, and vests him with a wide discretion in the discharge of many of Ms duties. Courts have no right to substitute their discretion for the discretion of the Governor, or the acting Governor, or to nullify any of his official acts; unless it clearly appears that the Governor, or acting Governor, has usurped power not granted him, or has used his discretion in such a manner as to violate the law.</p> <p>(b) The Constitution intends, and the public necessities require, that some one, with the powers of Governor, should always be in the state to approve bonds, honor requisitions, make appointments, fill vacancies, quell riots, and transact all other business which pertains to this office, without expense or delay to the people or interruptions in the administration of justide.</p> <p>(e) A Governor may visit other states, and travel in foreign countries, as he pleases, without forfeiting his office, and may carry his title with him; but his powers as Governor become dormant the very moment ho crosses the state line, they reviving again,as soon as he returns within the borders of the state.</p> <p>(d) The Governor cannot lawfully say to persons who have-business with his office: “I am going into another state to attend banquets and play golf, or for any other purpose, and you must wait until it suits my convenience to return."</p> <p>(e) During the absence from the state or inability of the Governor to act, the Lieutenant Governor is vested with all of the powers of Governor.</p> <p>2. STATES — Powers of Lieutenant Governor — Absence of Governor. The powers of the Lieutenant Governor to act as Governor during the absence from the state, or the inability of the Governor to-act, are not derived from the invitation or request of the Governor; neither can they be denied at the pleasure of the Governor, but they rest alone upon the provisions of the Constitution of Oklahoma.</p> <p>3. PARDON — What Constitutes — Right to Revoke. An agreement or promise by the Governor, or acting Governor, to pardon a eonviet does not amount to a pardon. An absolute pardon takes effect upon its execution, and delivery, to the person pardoned, or to some one representing him, or as soon as it leaves the Governor for this purpose, and cannot be revoked by any official; but paroles and conditional pardons do not become effective and enforceable until they have been received and accepted by the prisoner, and they may be revoked by the Governor. Ex parte Crump, ante, approved and reaffirmed.</p> <p>4. HABEAS CORPUS — Pleading—Exhibits—Impeachment of Recitals —Inconsistent Position, (a) Where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus has attached to it a parole granted to a petitioner, which has been accepted and agreed to by him, he is bound by the conditions and recitals of such parole, and will not be permitted to contradict or impeach them.</p> <p>(b) Counsel are not permitted to take inconsistent positions in this court.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Instructions—Evidence. It is not error for the court to charge the jury that under the law a person would be guilty of robbery if he took whisky, money, or other property from the immediate presence of the person of the injured party, against his will, by means of force or fear.</p> <p>2. SAME — Submission of Issues — Murder—Elements of Offense, (a) When the facts plainly disclose that a homicide occurred in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery or other felony, the issue of manslaughter should not be submitted to the jury.</p> <p>(b) Premeditated design to effect death is not an element of murder committed in the perpetration of a felony.</p> <p>3. SAME — Self-Defense—Refusal of Instructions. When the proof clearly discloses the fact that an accused was the aggressor and brought on the difficulty by violent and felonious action and without any justification from the deceased, and there is no proof indicating that such accused had withdrawn from the controversy, the law of self-defense cannot be invoked, and it is not error for the court to decline to give an instruction attempting to submit any such issue.</p>

<p>1. CONTINUANCE — Refusal of Continuance — Absent Witnesses. .In reviewing the refusal of a continuance asked on account of an absent witness, the evidence adduced at the trial will be considered by this court for the purpose of determining whether the alleged testimony was probably true, and when it is not probable that the absent witness would swear to the facts stated in the defendant’s affidavit, and where the record shows that the defendant was not put upon his trial until more than a year after ■ the indictment was returned, there is no error in refusing a further continuance.</p> <p>2. RAPE — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for statutory rape, the evidence is held to sustain the verdict and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p>

Carney, Judge. A charge against A. L. McDonald for murder was dismissed without consent of the county attorney, and he was permitted to plead guilty to manslaughter in the second degree, and his punishment assessed without the intervention of a jury, and the State appeals.

<p>1. TRIAL — Instructions—Appeal—Presentation for Review — Harmless Error, (a) The jury must be left free to determine for themselves whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the law, and an instruction which advises them on that subject invades the province of the jury to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. See opinion for instruction held to be on the weight of circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>(b) It would be error for the court to instruct the jury upon the chain and link theory with respect to circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>(e) If attorneys desire to secure reversals on account of erroneous instructions to the jury, they must show that the defendant was injured thereby. The evidence produced on the trial should be incorporated in the record.</p> <p>(d) Where the evidence of the guilt of a defendant is conclusive, and where the jury could not have arrived at any other conclusion, an instruction upon the weight of the evidence will be harmless.</p> <p>(e) Where the testimony is not incorporated in the record on appeal, instructions which were erroneous will not be ground for reversal, if, under any conceivable state of facts, the defendant could not have been injured thereby.</p> <p>2. SAME — “Reasonable Doubt.’’ It is error for the trial court to instruct the jury that a reasonable doubt is one for which there exists a reason which an ordinarily intelligent man could readily give. Such an instruction deprives a defendant of the presumption of innocence, and shifts the burden of proof from the state to the defendant.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Preparation of Case-Made. Where a defendant is able to employ counsel to represent him, and the trial court refused to enter an order requiring the testimony to be extended w'tliout expense to the defendant, such refusal will not constiiute ground for reversal, unless it affirmatively appears from the record (hat the defendant was a pauper, and that such counsel so employed could not have made up a statement of the evidence from memory, and that thereby the trial court had abused its discretion. Por circumstances which clearly sustain the ruling of the trial court in refusing to make such an order, see opinion.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL' — Briefs—Sufficiency. It is an abuse of the privilege of filing typewritten briefs for counsel to úse paper which is so thin that what is written thereon can only be read with difficulty. Typewritten briefs should be upon paper of standard weight, and the work should be so executed as to be legible.</p> <p>2. EMBEZZLEMENT — Statutory Provisions — Attorneys. Section 271, Comp. Laws 1909, is not, and never was, a part of the Penal Code of Oklahoma, and is applicable only in disbarment proceedings against attorneys. _</p> <p>3. TBIAL — Conduct of Counsel — Dilatory Matters. The constant presentation and discussion of questions of law which have no application to a case, the making of dilatory pleas, and objecting and excepting to everything done in the trial of a cause, without reference to the substantial merits of a case, is a practice which should not be encouraged or tolerated by the courts.</p> <p>4. EMBEZZLEMENT — -Prosecution of Attorney — Defense. Where a lawyer from another state moves into Oklahoma, and, without securing admission to the bar of this state, holds himsolf oui to the public as a lawyer, and accepts business as such, and embezzles money collected by him as a lawyer, he cannot escape punishment upon the ground that he was never legally admitted to the bar of Oklahoma.</p> <p>5. SAME — Sufficiency of Evidence. For testimony which conclusively establishes the guilt of defendant, see opinion.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Questions of Pact. Where there is a direct contradiction between the testimony of the complaining witness and that of the defendant, it is for the jury to determine which is worthy of belief, and their determination ordinarily will be sustained.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Instructions—Presumption of Innocence. The court instructed the jury in part as follows: “But, if you find from the evidence that he did not sell, or assist in the sale, or give or otherwise furnish, or assist in giving or otherwise furnishing the said liquor to the said Glen Hall, then you should acquit him. ’ ’ Held error, because it in effect required the jury, before finding for acquittal, to believe from the evidence adduced that the defendant was innocent, and substantially instructs against the presumption of innoeenee until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>

<p>1. ' EVIDENCE — Admissions—Pleading in Civil Action. Where a defendant is upon trial charged with selling whisky or having whisky in his possession with intent to sell the same, it is competent for the state to show, either by direet evidence or by his own admissions, that he was engaged in the business of selling whisky.</p> <p>2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Unlawful Sale — Defense. The fact that a defendant represents a whisky house in another state and delivers whisky on commission to customers in Oklahoma is no defense to a charge for selling such whisky, or having said whisky in his possession with intent to sell same. Landrum v. State, 9 Okla. Or. 599, 132 Pac. 830, reaffirmed. The idea that this court is or ever has been unfriendly to prosecutions for violations of the prohibitory liquor law is absolutely without support in fact, and does great violence to the truth.</p>

<p> Appeal from Cotmty Court, Canadian County; W. A. Maurier, Judge. </p> <p>William Reed was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p> <p>On the 20th day of November, 1911, appellant was convicted in the county court of Canadian county for having violated the prohibitory liquor law, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $500 and six months’ imprisonment in the county jail. From this judgment of conviction he prosecuted an appeal to the Criminal Court of Appeals. On the 13th day of January, 1913, judgment of the lower court was affirmed on said appeal. See Reed v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 738, 128 Pac. 911. On the 24th day of March, 1913, the mandate of the Criminal Court of Appeals was received by the county court of Canadian county with directions to said court to proceed with the execution of the judgment. Thereafter on the 16th day of April, 1913, appellant filed in the county court of Canadian county what is .styled a motion for new trial, based upon alleged newly discovered evidence, fraud, accident, and mistake. On the '20th day of April, 1913, the county court of Canadian county sustained a motion filed by the county attorney to strike out said motion for a new trial. To which the appellant excepted, and the county judge fixed the time in which an appeal might be taken to this court from said order. Appeal dismissed.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, McCurtain County; A. H. Ferguson, Judge. </p> <p>J. P. Kilgore was convicted of aggravated assault, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; N. J. Gubser, Judge. </p> <p>E. Jones and another were convicted of violating the prohibition law, and appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Stephens County; Frank M. Bailey, Judge. </p> <p>Fred Ellsworth was convicted of incest, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Carter County; M. P. Winfrey, Judge.</p> <p>H. T. Allen was convicted of violating the medical practices act, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Testimony Taken on Preliminary Hearing. The constitutional provision that “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him” (Bill of Rights, sec. 20) is not infringed by permitting the testimony given on the preliminry examination of the defendant by a witness who has since died to be read against him upon the trial of the case.</p> <p>2. SAME — Testimony Taken at Preliminary Hearing. Where a witness for the state on the preliminary examination has since died, a transcribed copy of the stenographic notes of his testimony given on the preliminary examination, supported by the stenographer's testimony, is admissible in evidence against the defendant upon any subsequent trial of the case.</p> <p>3. SAME — Testimony Taken on Preliminary Hearing — Hearsay. The rule that hearsay evidence is incompetent does not apply to testimony given on the preliminary examination of the defendant by a witness since deceased.</p> <p>4. HOMICIDE — Manslaughter—Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for murder, evidence examined and held sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.</p>

<p>1. CONTEMPT — Constitutional Law — Due Process. Under that clause of section 25 of the Bill of Bights, providing, "In no case shall a penalty or punishment be imposed for contempt, until an opportunity to be heard is given,” an opportunity to be heard before a penalty or punishment is imposed for contempt is an indispensable essential to the administration of due process of law as contemplated by the constitutional inhibition that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Section 7, Bill of Bights.</p> <p>2. HABEAS CORPUS — Right to Remedy — Abrogation. Section 10 of the Bill of Bights provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this state.” The writ of habeas corpus is an ancient prerogative writ. It is a writ of right, granted to inquire into all eases of illegal imprisonment. The writ cannot be abrogated, or its efficiency impaired by legislative action. And under the constitutional guaranty the cases within the relief afforded by the writ at com-' mon law cannot be placed beyond its reach and remedial action by statute.</p> <p>3. SAME — Scope of Inquiry — Jurisdiction. The provisions of the habeas corpus act (section 4893, Rev. Laws 1910), which provides: "No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process, whereby the party is in custody, or discharge him when the term of commitment has not expired in either of the cases following: * * * Second. Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; or third. For any contempt of any court, officer or body having authority to commit * * *” — only apply when the court has jurisdiction to render the particular judgment. A court of competent jurisdiction is one having power and authority of law at the time of aeting to do the particular act. Jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner, and of the subject matter, is not alone conclusive, but the jurisdiction of the court to render the particular judgment is a proper subject of inquiry. If there was no legal power to render the judgment, or issue the process, there was no court of competent jurisdiction,' and consequently no judgment or process. All is coram non judice, and void.</p> <p>4. SAME — Grounds—Unlawful Imprisonment. When a person”"is’ helcP in custody under a void order of commitment, or is imprisoned without due process of law under the sentence of any court of the state, it is not only within the authority of this court, but it is its duty upon habeas corpus, to inquire into the illegality of the commitment when the matter is properly brought before it by petition, and if it be adjudged that the order of commitment was made without authority of law, the person will be entitled to a discharge from custody in order to preserve the constitutional right of all persons not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.</p> <p>5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ‘ ‘Due Process of Law’ ‘ ‘Law of the Land.” The phrase “due process of law” as used in Const. Bill of Bights, sec. 7, providing that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without duo process of law, ’ ’ is synonymous with the phrase “law of the land” as found in Magna Charta (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 3, p. 2232. See, also, volume 5, p. 4025; vol. 8, pp. 7701, 7702.)</p>

<p>EVIDENCE — Conduct as to Witness. The wife of the prosecuting witness refused to appear upon a subpoena, and was brought into court upon an order of attachment. She did not testify that she was present when the alleged sale of whisky was made, but testified that the defendant sent a party to her, and that the defendant told her, if she would stay hid and not appear against him, he would give her some money, and that he gave her money,, but that it was before this case was started. Held, incompetent and prejudicial, in that no connection with the case on trial was shown.</p>

<p>1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Violation of Ordinance — Prosecution — Abatement. When a prosecution is begun in a municipal court for the violation of any ordinance of the municipality, and the town council repeals or amends such ordinance so as to affect vitally the penalty imposed or offense designated, such prosecution abates with the change unless there be a saving clause in the substitute act.</p> <p>2. SAME. The constitutional and statutory provisions reserving to the state the right to continue prosecutions under such conditions do not apply to municipalities.</p>

<p>HOMICIDE — Manslaughter—Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for murder, the evidence examined, and held sufficient to support the verdict of manslaughter in the second degree, and that no prejudicial error was committed upon the trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Latimer County; W. H. Brown, Judge.</p> <p>Nelson Carney was convicted of the larceny of a domestic animal, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Eight to Amend — Extent of Amendment. An information may be amended in matter of substance or form at any time before the defendant pleads, without leave, and may be amended after plea by leave of court, where the same can be done without material prejudice to the right of the defendant.</p> <p>2. SAME — Right to Amend — Extent of Amendment. By leave of court, an information may be amended as to matters of form, after the jury has been.impaneled, when the same can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights o'f the defendant.</p> <p>3. EVIDENCE — Other Offenses — Rape. The general rule that proof of other offenses is inadmissible, unless a part of the res gestae, does not apply to offenses involving sexual intercourse; and evidence of other acts is admissible to show the relation and familiarity of the parties and as tending to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix as to the particular act relied upon for conviction.</p> <p>4. SAME — Other Offenses. In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence is admissible of sexual acts between the prosecutrix and the defendant prior to and subsequent to the one charged and relied upon for a conviction, as indicating continuousness of the illicit relation.</p> <p>5. RAPE — Sufficiency of Evidence. . In a prosecution for statutory rape, the evidence is held to support the verdict and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Accusation—Essentials— Felonious Nature of Act. It is not necessary, in an indictment or information, to repeat, in connection with each act necessary to constitute the crime of murder, that the defendant did it "feloniously.” It is sufficient where the word becomes a component part of the subsequent allegations. All that is necessary under our system of criminal pleading is that the statement be made in ordinary and concise language, embodying all the material ingredients of the offense.</p> <p>2. HOMICIDE — Dying Declaration — Oral Evidence. Where a person, mortally wounded and without hope of recovery, under the solemn conviction of impending death, makes several complete statements at different times of material facts concerning the cause and circumstances of the homicide, one of which statements was reduced to writing, the prosecution is not confined to the written statement, but may offer oral evidence of the statements made at other times, whether the several statements were similar or not. Should any of such separate statements be inconsistent or contradictory, it is open to the defense to show the fact.</p> <p>3. CONTINUANCE — Absent Witnesses — Preparation. A continuance sought in a murder case was properly denied, where accused was not brought to trial until January 11th following his arrest on October 27th and the motion for continuance did not give the names of the absent witnesses, and there was no showing that any effort had been made to prepare for trial, even though it appeared that accused had been confined in jail since his arrest.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Pontotoc County; Tom. D. McKeown, Judge. </p> <p>Jim Case was convicted of grand larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Essentials—Date of Offense — Rape. It is not required that an indictment or information should set forth with precision some particular day as the time when the offense was committed, except where time is a material ingredient of the offense; and an indictment, charging the crime of statutory rape to have been committed “on the-day of May of A. D. 1911,” is not subject to demurrer because the day of the month is left blank.</p> <p>2. SAME — Language of Statute — Description of Offense. The exact words of the statute defining á crime need not be used in the indictment or information charging it, but any words clearly and intelligibly setting forth the offense are sufficient.</p> <p>3. WITNESSES — Cross-Examination by State — Bias of Witness. The state has the right, on cross-examination, to show the nature of ■ the relations existing between the, witness and the defendant, so far as their relations are such as would create a bias that might reasonably be supposed to affect the credibility of the witness, and this rule cannot be changed by the fact that such evidence would probably prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jury.</p> <p>4. SAME — Impeachment—Proof of Disreputable Conduct — Admissibility. The privilege of degrading a witness by proof of disreputable conduct, not connected with the facts on trial, is one so liable to abuse that it should be closely guarded, and allowed only on the exercise of judicial discretion of the trial court, and then only to affect the credibility of the witness.</p> <p>5'. RAPE — Defense—Previous Defilement. In a prosecution for rape under the statute defining rape as an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female, not the wife of the perpetrator, “where the female is over the age of sixteen years and under the age of eighteen and of previous chaste and virtuous character,” alleged to have been committed “on the-day of May, 1911,” the testimony of the prosecutrix tended to prove several acts constituting the crime charged; the first having occurred in March, and the last in May, 1911. The defendant did not request the court to require the state to elect on which act it would rely, and no election was made. Held, that the defendant, being the author of the child’s defilement, is precluded from taking advantage of his previous wrong-doing to avoid the application of the statute on the theory that at the time alleged in the indictment, or at any time after the first aet of sexual intercourse with the defendant, the child was not chaste, and therefore the defendant could only be convicted for the first act, which the evidence tended to prove.</p> <p>6. SAME — “Previous Chaste and Virtuous Character” — Previous Chaste Character. The phrase ‘' previous chaste and virtuous character, ” as used in the statute defining rape (Bev. Laws 1910, sec. 2414), means actual personal virtue. The allegation in an indictment that prosecutrix was then and there a female of “previous chaste character” meant the same, and was an allegation that she had never had sexual intercourse with any man. In other words, that she yet retained her virginity.</p> <p>7. WITNESSES — Privilege from Giving Incriminating Testimony-Eight to Claim. In a prosecution for statutory rape, the privilege of a witness to refuse to give testimony which would tend to show her guilty of violation of Bev. Laws 1910, see. 2463, prohibiting indecent exposure, was personal to the witness, and should not be taken advantage of by accused.</p> <p>8. EAPE — Statutory Eape — Sufficiency of Evidence. Evidence in a prosecution for statutory rape held to sustain a conviction.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Assault with Intent to Kill — Evidence. In a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, where there is conflicting evidence as to whether or not the person assaulted was armed at the time the assault was made, it is not error to permit the state to show 'that within a short time after the assault a search was made by the persons who cared for the victim, and that no weapons were found on his person or about his clothing.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Refusal of Instructions Covered. Where the charge of the court, considered as a whole, fully and fairly presents the law of the case, it is not error to refuse to give an instruction when the same has, in substance, already been given.</p> <p>3. NEW TRIAL — Newly Discovered Evidence. A new trial will not be granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, where such evidence is cumulative, or for the purpose of impeachment, or only tends to affect the credibility of a" witness.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Carter County; S. H. Russell, Judge. </p> <p>Henry Ameahtubbee was convicted of rape, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Grady County; Frank M. Bailey, Judge. </p> <p>Joe Wilson was convicted of manslaughter,' and appeals.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Motion to Quash Information — Preliminary Hearing. An unverified motion to quash or set aside an information, on the ground “that there has been no preliminary hearing in said^eause before a magistrate, ’ ’ is insufficient to overcome the legal presumption of the regularity of the proceedings, where defendant is held to the district court on a charge of murder, and the transcript of the committing magistrate shows that defendant waived a preliminary examination; and the fact that the county attorney caused the state's witnesses to be sworn and examined after such waiver did not deprive the defendant of any substantial right. The state is not barred from holding a preliminary examination, even though defendant waives his right thereto.</p> <p>2. CONTINUANCE — Grounds—Time for Preparation. The fact of an agreement by and between the defendant and his attorneys three weeks before trial that said attorneys “should do nothing until the amount of their stipulated fee was paid or arranged” is no legal and sufficient cause for a continuance on the ground of lack of time to prepare for trial.</p> <p>3. HOMICIDE — Manslaughter—Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for murder, the evidence is held to support the verdict of manslaughter in the first degree, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Atoka County; Robt. M. Rainey, Judge.</p> <p>George W. Jackson was convicted of the larceny of domestic animals, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Assault With Intent to Kill — Self-Defense—Evidence. In-a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, it is considered by the court that there was no evidence tending to show that the shooting was in self-defense.</p> <p>2. SAME — Harmless Error — Instruction on Self-Defense. Error, if any, in instructions defining the law of self-defense is not prejudicial to the defendant, where the evidence does not justify instructions on self-defense.</p>

<p>1. HOMICIDE — Principals and Accessories. One who is present, aiding and abetting in a murder, is guilty as a principal, though another does the killing.</p> <p>2. WITNESSES — List of Witnesses — Disqualification of Witness. Under section 20, Bill of Bights, the defendant in a capital ease has a constitutional right to be furnished with a list of the witnesses that will be called in chief to prove the allegations of the indictment or information, together with their post-office addresses; such list to be furnished at least two days before the ease" is called for trial. In the instant case, held, that the failure of the state to give the Christian name of a witness in the list of witnesses furnished did not disqualify such witness from testifying, because it affirmatively appears from the record that the defendant was not misled to his prejudice by reason of such omission.</p> <p>3. CRIMINAL LAW — Constitutional Right — Waiver. Where a constitutional right is largely for the benefit of the defendant, and in the nature of a piersonal privilege, the law is well settled that the defendant may waive such right.</p>

Error from Superior Court, Oklahoma County; E. D. Oldfield, Judge. Appeal from supplemental motion for new- trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

<p>1. CONTINUANCE — Refusal of Continuance. Where, without preliminary complaint, the indictment was returned more than 18 months after the alleged offense was committed, and the ease called for trial nine days later, and defendant’s affidavit for continuance contained all the formal allegations required by law, and shows the temporary absence of two material witnesses, and shows what facts defendant expects to prove by said witnesses* and that he has used all possible diligence in endeavoring to get ready for trial, it was error to refuse a continuance.</p> <p>2. LARCENY — Elements of Offense — Felonious Intent. To consti-r tute larceny, there must have existed a felonious intent at the time of the taking.</p> <p>3. SAME — Sufficiency of Evidence. Evidence in this case considered and found insufficient to warrant a conviction.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Pontotoc County; I. M. King, Judge. </p> <p>Lon Jackson was convicted of slander of a female, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. JURY — Harmless Error — Right to Particular Juror. The defendant in a criminal action acquires no vested right to have a particular member of the jury panel sit upon the trial of his case until he has been accepted and sworn. In the instant case, held that, unless it be shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon the defendant after he had exhausted his peremptory challenges, he has no ground for complaint.</p> <p>2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Unlawful Conveyance — Sufficiency of Proof. In prosecutions for unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor, the state is only required to establish by the proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the liquor charged to have been conveyed, or some portion of it, was conveyed as alleged in the information.</p>

<p>1. CEIMINAL LAW — Copy of Accusation — Bights of Defendant. The Constitution gives the accused the right to “be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against Mm and have a copy thereof. ” Section 20, Bill of Eights. Under this provision he has the right to insist upon having a copy of the accusation delivered to him before his trial; and, if he so insists, the trial cannot lawfully proceed until the requirement has been complied with.</p> <p>2. JUEY — Challenge to Panel — Bias of Summoning Officer. Under the provisions of section 5848, Eev., Laws 1910, when a panel is formed, or in part formed, from jurors whose names are not drawn • from the jury box, a challenge may be taken to the panel, on account of any bias of the officer who summoned them, which would be good ground of challenge to a juror.</p> <p>3. SAME — Summoning Officer — Disqualification. It is essential to the fair and impartial administration of justice that an open or special venire should be summoned by an officer who is not disqualified by reason of interest, bias, or prejudice.</p> <p>4. EVIDENCE — Declarations of Codefendant — -Hearsay. Declarations of a co-defendant, made after the commission of the crime and in reference to it, held hearsay and improperly admitted.</p> <p>5. SAME- — Evidence of Other Offenses — Admissibility. Evidence of an offense other than the one charged is admissible only when it tends to prove the offense charged. To be competent and admissible, it must have some logical connection with the offense charged.</p> <p>6. TRIAL — Conduct of Judge — Examination, of Witness. “Judges are as much judges for the defendant as for the state, and are supposed to sit fairly and impartially between the rights of the state, on the one hand, and the defendant, on the other. .To become a partisan either for the state or defendant is to desert the high position to which the judge is elevated, and assume the role of the advocate.”</p>

<p>1. RAPE — Sufficiency of Evidence. The evidence tersely stated in opinion held sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of second degree rape.</p> <p>2. SAME — Punishment. Judgment and' sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment held excessive, and sentence reduced to ten years.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; B: T. Price, Judge. </p> <p>George R. Tucker was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. LARCENY — Appeal—Judgment—Sufficiency of Evidence, (a) A judgment of conviction will not be reversed by this court on any controverted question of fact, when the testimony in the record tends reasonably to support the finding of the jury. (b) For facts sufficient to suppiort a conviction, see opinion.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Change of Venue — Discretion—Hearing, (a) An application for a change of venue, under the law of Oklahoma, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the rulings of the trial court thereon will not be disturbed by this court, unless all the circumstances disclosed by the record clearly indi-caté arbitrary action and abuse of discretion on the part of such court.</p> <p>(b) A trial court may, in its discretion, examine any person or persons it may desire, for the purpose of determining the merits of an application for change of venue, and is not limited under our law to examination only of such persons ’ as file affidavits in support of the application. The law contemplates that the court will avail itself of all reasonable opportunity to determine the right of the accused to a change of venue, as well as the right of the people to resist the same; it being the object and purpose of the law to secure to the accused a fair and impartial trial, and the right of the people to have such trial at a minimum expense.</p> <p>3. CONTINUANCE — Grounds. The rule laid down by this court in Madison v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 356, 118 Pac. 617, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 484, does not support the contention that an accused has the right to a continuance and to the delay of his trial for the personal appearance of witnesses who are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, arid an application for continuance, based on any such contention, is properly overruled.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Choctaw County; A. H. Ferguson, Judge. </p> <p>Dave AVhite was convicted of larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Time for Taking — Dismissal. An appeal from a judgment of a trial court to this court must be taken in the manner and within the time provided by the statute and the orders of the trial court made under the provisions of the statute, in order to give this court jurisdiction to consider the same on the merits.</p> <p>2. SAME — Dismissal. When an appeal is not taken within the time provided by the statute, and under the orders of the trial court made in pursuance of statutory regulations, this court has no jurisdiction to determine any question raised, and can only dismiss the appeal.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Jurisdiction—-Notice of Appeal. Under the provisions of the statute law existing in this state at the time of appeal, a notice of appeal in due form had to be served on the clerk of the district court and the county attorney of the county in which the cause was tried, and proof thereof filed with the record on appeal, before this court could acquire jurisdiction to determine any questions raised on the merits.</p> <p>2. SAME — Service. It is the duty of counsel on behalf of persons desiring to appeal to this court from a judgment of a trial court to see that notices of appeal are served and that proper proof of such service is included in the case-made or transcript.</p> <p>3. SAME — Proof of Service —• Procedure. When a motion to dismiss an appeal is 'filed by the Attorney General on the ground that notices of appeal were not served as provided by law, it is the duty of counsel, instead of filing their statement to the effect that the same were served, to take immediate steps to correct the case-made, in the manner provided by law, to show that such notices'were properly served and to present the matter to this court in person and sécure an order protecting the rights of their clients.</p> <p>4. SAME — Dismissal. When a motion to dismiss an appeal is filed on the ground that the notices of appeal were not served, and no action is taken by counsel to correct the record, although sufficient time has elapsed, and no appearance made when the cause is set for submission, there is no course left to this court but to sustain the motion and order the appeal dismissed.</p>

<p> Appeal from District'Court, McIntosh County; Preslie B. Cole, Judge. </p> <p>Earnest Lockhart was convicted of the larceny of a domestic animal, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Notice of Appeal — Time of Service. In order to confer jurisdiction upon this court to determine any question on the merits raised by a record on appeal, it is necessary for notices of appeal to be served subsequent to rendition of judgment by the trial court, and not prior thereto.</p> <p>2. SAME — Dismissal. An appeal taken to this court, based upon the service of notices of appeal, when such service was had prior to the rendition of judgment, confers no jurisdiction on this court over the cause, and we can only dismiss the same, and direct the enforcement of the judgment of the trial court.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Scott, Judge. </p> <p>Laura Courtney was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Original action for writ of habeas corpus by George E. Winters.</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Brief. When an appeal is taken from the judgment of a trial court to this court, it is the duty of counsel to brief the assignments of error relied upon for reversal.</p> <p>2. SAME — Oral Argument. All cases are assigned in this court for oral argument, and when counsel, .for any sufficient reason, are unable to file briefs, they are entitled to appear and orally argue the assignments of error relied upon.</p> <p>3. SAME — Motion to Affirm. When no appearance is made for oral argument, and no briefs are filed, a motion to affirm for failure to prosecute should be sustained, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed, in the absence of error depriving the accused of substantial rights under the law.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; ■ John W. Hayson, Judge. </p> <p>Elmer Johnson and John Garrett were convicted of gaming, and appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Seminole County; Tom D. McKeown, Judge. </p> <p>John Kitchens was convicted of adultery, and appeals.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error, herein referred ho as defendant, and one Mollie Mitchell were jointly informed against for the crime of adultery. The information, omitting the formal parts, was as follows:</p> <p>“That John Kitchens and Mollie Mitchell did, in Seminole count}'-, and in the state of Oklahoma, on or about the 1st day of April in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twelve, and anterior to the presentment hereof, commit the crime of adultery in the manner and form as follows, that is to say: That on the day and date above mentioned a'nd in said county and state, did unlawfully, willfully, voluntarily, and feloniously associate and cohabit together, living in open and notorious adultery, they, the said defendants, not being then and there married to each other, and him, the said John Kitchens, then and there having a living wife, and the said Mollie Mitchell having a living husband, and they, the said defendants, did unlawfully, voluntarily, and feloniously have carnal knowledge together, each of the body of the other, contrary to,” etc.</p> <p>Upon arraignment the clefendants interposed a demurrer to the information on the ground “that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense against the laws of Oklahoma.” The demurrer was overruled, whereupon defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and asked for and was granted a separate trial. His trial resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged in the information, leaving the punishment to be fixed by the. court. On the 11th day of October, 1912, motion for new trial having been duly filed, the same was overruled, and he was sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for the term of two years. From the judgment and sentence he appeals.</p> <p>The evidence shows without contradiction that defendant was married in Seminole county, in 1900, and had lived in said county with his family until the middle of November, 1910, at which time his wife and their seven children left him, and went to live in Hughes county; that his codefendant, Mollie Mitchell, was the wife of Cal Mitchell, and the mother of three children; that she lived apart from her husband, he having the care and custody of the three children born of their marriage, and all of tender years; that defendant resided upon his farm in a house consisting of one room, a kitchen, and an attic above; that in September, 1911, defendant brought to his house his co-defendant, Mitchell, for the avowed and ostensible purpose of making her his housekeeper, and to care for his aged invalid mother, who made her home there a part of the time, but who also lived much of the time with her other married children. For several weeks, Joe Brooks, the sixteen year old brother of Mrs. Mitchell, stayed on the place, and for a short time two men who worked, picking cotton, for the defendant stayed on the place. There was evidence tending to show that while Mrs. Mitchell was staying at his place, defendant took her with him back and forth on his trips to town, and they were often seen driving together.</p> <p>E. S. King testified: That he lived a mile and a half from defendant, and saw Mollie Mitchell at defendant’s and said to him: “Mr. Kitchens, under these circumstances they will get you, won’t they?” Defendant answered: “No, they will have to prove that I had sexual intercourse with the woman before they can get me.” That he had heard other neighbors complain of the conduct of defendant and Mrs. Mitchell. That defendant brought Mrs. Mitchell to writing school one evening, and the ladies present rebuked her, and the defendant did not come any more.</p> <p>A. J. Morgan testified that he lived about 250 yards from defendant; that Mollie Mitchell stayed there about a year; defendant’s mother was not there all the time; had seen defendant and the Mitchell woman there alone at night; saw defendant at different times with his arms around her; saw her sitting in his lap; called there one evening, and saw Mrs. Mitchell with her arms over defendant’s shoulders, and he was holding her clothes up so that her person was exposed from her waist down. Heard defendant say that he had the clap; that he caught it from Mollie Mitchell; saw defendant and Mrs. Mitchell in bed together.</p> <p>Ed. Morgan testified that he lived with his father, A. J. Morgan; saw defendant at different times with his arms around Mollie Mitchell; saw him take indecent liberties with her person and hold her dress up; heard defendant say he had the clap, and that he caught it from Mollie Mitchell.</p> <p>Neely Ross testified that he worked for defendant; often saw defendant and Mrs. Mitchell sitting in each other’s lap, hugging, kissing, and playing with each other. After Mollie Mitchell had been there about two weeks heard defendant say that he had caught the clap from her.</p> <p>John Crotzer testified that he stopped over night at defendant’s house, and no one else was there except defendant and Mollie Mitchell; that they all slept in the same room; Mrs. Mitchell in one bed, and defendant and witness in another.</p> <p>The evidence further shows that defendant’s neighbors went to his.place and objected to his keeping the Mitchell woman there, and he said to them:</p> <p>"That he had been advised by lawyers that he had a right to keep a cook there, and they would have to catch him doing business with her, and would have to prove it before they could convict him, and that he had been advised that no one had a right inside the inclosure without his permission, and that he was going to shoot the first damn man he caught in there like he would a dog.”</p> <p>On behalf of defendant several witnesses testified that they were often at his home and had never noticed any improper conduct on the part of defendant and Mrs. Mitchell.</p> <p>Oscar Hull testified that he picked cotton for defendant three or four weeks in the fall of 1911, and stayed at his place; that Mrs. Mitchell did the housework; never saw anything indecent between them, and heard no vulgar talk. Defendant’s mother was there a part of the time; that the boys working for defendant went away a night or two fishing and left him and Mrs. Mitchell there alone.</p> <p>Dr. J. C. Dovell testified that he had been defendant’s physician and had treated him during the last two years for malaria and hemorrhoids; did not treat him for gonorrhea; that he had full opportunity to know whether or not defendant had such disease, and did not think that he had ever had it; that about the 1st of October, 1911, he commenced treating Mollie Mitchell for chronic gonorrhea, and treated her for several months; that she was brought to his office by defendant, and he continued to accompany her when coming for treatment while he had the case in charge; that without using preventatives and disinfecting, he did not think it would have been possible for one to have had intercourse with Mrs. Mitchell while he was treating her without catching the disease.</p> <p>Mollie Mitchell testified that she was a married woman, separated from her husband; that she had worked for defendant for more than a year as a servant, and he paid her three dollars a week for her services; that she never stayed alone with defendant. She denied all acts of immoral conduct.</p> <p>Defendant as a witness in. his own behalf testified that he had hired Mollie Mitchell to care for his mother and cook for him and his farm hands; that he had never stayed in the house overnight alone with Mollie Mitchell. He denied all acts of immoral conduct or adulterous intercourse.</p> <p>Defendant introduced testimony tending to impeach the character of certain of the state’s witnesses as to truth and veracity. On rebuttal, evidence was given as to the good character of these witnesses.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge. </p> <p>Otto Tronier was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

B. Merritt, Judge. John Tweedy was convicted of having unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor with intent to sell the same, and appeals.

<p>APPEAL — Failure to Prosecute Appeal — Affirmance. Where a defendant appeals froip a judgment of conviction, and no briefs are filed, or argument presented, this court will make an examination of the record projJer, and, if no prejudicial error is apparent, will affirm the judgment.</p>

P. de Graffenried, Judge. Jesse Alberty was convicted of murder, and appeals. Plaintiff in error, herein referred to as the defendant, was convicted in the district court of Wagoner county upon an information for murder, and was awarded the death penalty by the jury. In accordance with the verdict, on February 19, 1913, the court rendered judgment, and sentenced the defendant to be hanged. To reverse the judgment, an appeal was perfected.

<p>Appeal from County Court, Johnston County; Nick Wolfe, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oaddo County; 0. Boss I-Iunie, Judge.</p> <p>Otto Dishon was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Texas County; W. C. Crow, Judge.</p> <p>W. H. Carlisle was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory Iqw, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Herndon was convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 440 of the city of MeAlester, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>Y. B. McMillan was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Logan County; S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>Dave Weinberger was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Logan Gounty; S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Herber was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Harry Day was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>P. Wietelmann was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Ilayson, Judge.</p> <p>• F. Wietelmann was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County.; John W. Ilayson, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Ross P. Loekridge, Judge.</p> <p>Bert Grant was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Ross P. Loekridge, Judge.</p> <p>Prank Ross was convicted of gambling, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. I-Iayson, Judge.</p> <p>Jake Barnes was convicted of operating a roulette game, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Cherokee County; J. T. Parks, Judge.</p> <p>John Moody was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Ottawa County; W. Y. Quigley, Judge.</p> <p>Jack Reed was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Custer County; J. C. MeKnight, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Cherokee County; John IT. Pitchford, Judge.</p> <p>A. E. Vann was convicted of embezzlement, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Prank M. Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Pruitt was convicted of larceny and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Alfalfa County; James W. Steen, Judge.</p> <p>George H. DeWitt was convicted of felonious assault, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Choctaw County; A. II. Perguson, Judge.</p> <p>Will Williams was convicted of stealing a cow, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Woodward County; Clyde H. Wyand, Judge.</p> <p>John Alden Harness was convicted on a charge of assault, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Johnston County; Nick Wolf, Judge.</p> <p>Jess Hayes was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; B. T. Price, Judge.</p> <p>Andy Anderson and Red Bryson were convicted on a charge of conducting a roulette game, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Haskell County; William L. Crittenden, Judge.</p> <p>Alex Roberts was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Marshall County; J. I. Henshaw, Judge.</p> <p>James Laird was convicted on a charge of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, I-laskell County; William L. Crittenden, Judge.</p> <p>M. A. Hoyt was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Murray County; I-Iarry W. Fielding; Judge.</p> <p>Tave Teer was convicted on a charge of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior (Court, Logan County; S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>Slick Green was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McClain County; W. I-I. Woods, Judge.</p> <p>M. E. Hawk was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; L. M. Poe, Judge.</p> <p>Henry Sanders was convicted of aggravated assault, and appeals. Affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>L. Herndon was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Logan County; S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>Lew Green and Slick Green were convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Adair County; John A. Goodall, Judge.</p> <p>W. A. Corney, P. A. Blanck, Linus A. Williams, and R. R. McCloud were, convicted of misdemeanor in the county eourt of Adair county, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Proctor was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jackson County; B. N. Woodson, Judge.</p> <p>Oscar Loftin was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Cherokee County; J. T. Parks, Judge.</p> <p>Scoot Scott was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Custer County; Walter S. Mills, Special Judge.</p> <p>Jennie Eossett was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; W. H. Admire, Judge.</p> <p>Carsie Elliot was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Payne County; W. H. Wilcox, Judge.</p> <p>M. A. Stitch was convicted of violating the prohibitory ordinance of the city of Stillwater, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; B. T. Price, Judge.</p> <p>Link Brown was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court, Craig County; S. P. Parks, Judge.</p> <p>P. J. Lawless was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law,, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from. County Court, Jackson County; B. N. Woodson, Judge.</p> <p>Fink Murphy was convicted of gaming, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jaekson County; B. N. Woodson, Judge.</p> <p>Pink Wilson was convicted of gaming, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Ellis County; A. L. Squire, Judge.</p> <p>T. N. Miller was convicted of violating a city ordinance of Shat-tuek, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jefferson County; B. T. Price, Judge.</p> <p>Aaron Case was convicted of vagrancy, and appeals.</p>

<p>Original habeas corpus proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, ' Love County; R. A. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>M. O. Wheeler was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; W. I-I. Admire, Judge.</p> <p>Carsie Elliott was convicted of having unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Woodward county; Clyde II. Wyand, Judge.</p> <p>Gordon Davis was convicted of conspiracy to defraud, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from. County Court, Payne Countv; W. H. Wilcox, Judge.</p> <p>J. E. Yates was convicted of libel, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Murray County; I-Iarry W. Fielding, Judge.</p> <p>Prank Wright and others were convicted of gaming, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Major County; P. W. Madison, Judge. Charley Madison was convicted of malicious mischief, and appeals.</p> <p>Dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>Ollie Ostendorf was convicted of vagrancy, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Ross P. Lockridge, Judge.</p> <p>Charles McKnight was convicted of vagrancy, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Garfield County; James B. Cullison, Judge.</p> <p>R. L. C. Davis was convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Seott, Judge.</p> <p>Jim Pinkerton was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Craig County; Preston S. Davis, Judge.</p> <p>AV. ~W. Single was convicted of burglary in the second degree and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Payne County; ,W. H. Wilcox, Judge.</p> <p>M. A. Staitch was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Original habeas corpus proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Ellis County; A. L. Squire, Judge.</p> <p>W. E. Perguson was convicted of conducting a game of poker, and .ppeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Caddo County; C. Boss I-Iume, Judge.</p> <p>W. T. Weber was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Woods County; W. M. Bickel, Judge.</p> <p>Demurrer sustained to information, and the State appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Caddo County; C. Ross Hume, Judge.</p> <p>A. C. Soape and John Cunningham were convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeal.</p>

<p>ApxDeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Boss P. Lockridge, Judge.</p> <p>George Stamper was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; N. J. Gubser, Judge.</p> <p>Robert L. Mills was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Love County; E. A. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>Y. R. Wilson was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Beckham County; E. II. Gipson, Judge.</p> <p>Walter Penner was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garfield County; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>Lee Pierce was convicted of maintaining a place wherein intoxicating liquors were kept for sale, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa .County; N. J. Gubser, Judge.</p> <p>Al Juby was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; N. J. Gubser, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Upton was convicted of having unlawful possession of liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Hughes County; J. Ross Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>Irvin Barrett was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Grady County; Will Linn, Judge.</p> <p>John A. Tucker was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Hughes County; J. Boss Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>M. A. Waits was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Nowata County; Wm. P. Gilluly, Judge.</p> <p>Elmer Deer was convicted of a violation of a city prohibition ordinance, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Nowata County; Wm, P. Gilluly, Judge.</p> <p>Prank Collins was convicted of a violation of a city prohibition ordinance, and appeals. Dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Nowata County; Wm. M. G-illuly, Judge*</p> <p>Prank Palmer was convicted of a violation of a city prohibition ordinance, and appeals.</p> <p>Dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Pontotoc County; Tom D. MeKeown, Judge.</p> <p>T. W. Grant was convicted of embezzlement, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Rogers County; Walter W. Shaw, Judge.</p> <p>Walter Bowers was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Beckham County; G. A. Brown, Judge.</p> <p>Oscar Caudill was convicted of assault and battery, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Hal Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>Nelson Jelts was convicted of violating. the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pontotoc County; I. M. King, Judge.</p> <p>Mark Lancaster was convicted of conducting a gambling bouse, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kingfisher County; R. P. Shutter, Judge.</p> <p>William Brockhaus was convicted of selling intoxicating- liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Jackson Comity; B. N. Woodson, Judge.</p> <p>Hubert Spears was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Johnston County; Nick Wolf, Judge.</p> <p>A. P. McAlexander was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Kiowa County; J. W. Mansell, Judge.</p> <p>Wylie Jones was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pawnee County; Geo. E. Merritt, Judge.</p> <p>J. W. Shoekey was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge.</p> <p>Henry Baker was convicted of violating tlie prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Comanche County; II. N. Whalin, Judge.</p> <p>Val Gardner was convicted of conducting a gambling game, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Cleveland County; F. B. Swank, Judge.</p> <p>Will Briggs whs convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Greer County; Jarrett Todd, Judge.</p> <p>Tom Fleeman was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Okmulgee County; Mark Bozarth, Judge.</p> <p>H. W. Jackson was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court,, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>S. D. Beams was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; Jesse M. Hatchett, Judge.</p> <p>Joel Collins was convicted of larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge.</p> <p>W. S. Biggs was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Oounty Court, LeFlore County;' B. 0. Bolger, Judge.</p> <p>John Gray was convicted of pointing a pistol, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Washington County; James T. Shipman, Judge.</p> <p>Clarence Neal was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Muskogee County; E. C. Allen, Judge.</p> <p>Charles L. Torr was convicted of embezzlement, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Rogers County; Walter W. Shaw, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Oliver was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McCurtain County; E. E. Cochran, Judge.</p> <p>Robert Hilbreth was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, McIntosh County; Ben D. Gross, Judge.</p> <p>Phineas S. Thompson was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Canadian County; Chas. Maurer, Judge.</p> <p>Charles Conners was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, 'Judge.</p> <p>George AVard was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Hughes County; J. Ross Bailey, Judge.</p> <p>. C. G. Trinkle was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court, Kiowa County; J. S. Carpenter, Judge.</p> <p>J. T. Pisher was convicted of the offense of suppressing evidence, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Seminole County; Tom D. MeKeown, Judge.</p> <p>Mollie Mitchell was convicted of adultery, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; A. H. Eerguson,, Judge.</p> <p>Dot Gorrell was convicted of the larceny of a domestic animal, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tillman County; W. C. Lukenbill, Judge.</p> <p>Jack Kindrick was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Murray -County; I-Iarry W. Pieldi-ng, Judge.</p> <p>Jake Beard was convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Grady County; 3ST. M. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>Oscar Peery was convicted of a misdemeanor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Ed Conley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Hal Johnson, Judge.</p> <p>John Hester was convicted of gaming, and appeals.</p>