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110 F. 1005

Docket No. 4,540.

Taylor v. Weir

Oregon District Court

Decided August 7, 1901.)

Oregon District Court · decided 1901-08-07

<p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Maritime Coxtracts — Employment to Procure Ch vrter.</p> <p>A contract to obtain a charter for a vessel is not maritime, and a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction of an action thereon to recover commissions, although a clause providing for the payment of such commissions is embodied in the charier party, 1</p>

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ ‘Maritime liens are stricti juris, and do not arise on all contracts, made by the owners to result in profit to the ship. The test is to be applied to the subject, and not to the object. It is the subject-matter of the contract which must be maritime, and not the mere object, — the ship. (Italics supplied.)”’”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 124 F. Supp. 362 - DC Andrews & Company v. United States

Relies on The Thames · Mallory v. The Crystal Stream · Zeigler v. The Paola R.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

On exceptions to libel · Decided 1901-08-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1979

2 federal appellate · 2 district ·

2019011910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Admiralty Jurisdiction — Maritime Coxtracts — Employment to Procure Ch vrter.

¶2A contract to obtain a charter for a vessel is not maritime, and a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction of an action thereon to recover commissions, although a clause providing for the payment of such commissions is embodied in the charier party, 1

¶3Iii Admiralty.

¶4On exceptions to libel.

¶5F. R. Strong, for libelants.

¶6W. W. Cotton, for defendant.

¶8BELLINGER, District Judge.

¶9This is a libel in personam to recover commissions for services as brokers in negotiating a charter for the bark Eaurelbauk. The charter party was concluded on May 10, 1898, between Taylor, Young & Co., as agents for the owners, and (he Portland Flouring Mills Company. The charter party contained this provision: “Vessel to be consigned (inward only) to charterers' agent at port of discharge, and there to pay to charterers, or their order, two and one half per cent, on amount of freight. A commission of five per cent, shall be paid to charterers and Taylor, Young & Co., half each, on the estimated gross freight in U. S. gold coin, at the exchange of 48 pence, on the completion of loading, or should vessel be lost.” A contract like this to obtain a charter for a vessel is not a maritime contract, and admiralty has no jurisdiction over it. The Thames (D. C.) 10 Fed. 848; The Crystal Stream (D. C.) 25 Fed. 575; The Humboldt (D. C.) 86 Fed. 351. “Maritime liens are stricti juris, and do not arise on all contracts made by the owners to result in profit to the ship. The test is to be applied to the subject, and not to the object. It is the subject-matter of the contract which must be maritime, and not the mere object, — the ship.” Zeigler v. The Paola R. (C. C.) 32 Fed. 174. The fact that the agreement for commissions constitutes a clause in the charter party does not make it a maritime contract. The question of jurisdiction does not depend upon the form of the contract, but the substance of the undertaking. Richard v. Hogarth (D. C.) 94 Fed. 684. Exceptions to libel are allowed.

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