Volume 111 — United States Reports

Held: *13 1. That the act of February 15th, 1869, authorizing the county of Otoe to issue bonds in aid of a railroad outside of the State, did not conflict with the Constitution of the State. 2. That it Avas a valid exercise of legislative authority, to authorizes county to incur indebtedness ■ and Impose taxation, in aid -of railroad companies. 3.

The original action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nevada, by Henry Feusier, a citizen of California, against George I. Lammon and three other persons, citizens of Nevada, upon a bond given by Lammon, the marshal of the United States for that district, as principal, and by the other defendants as his sureties, and conditioned that Lammon, “ by himself and by his deputies, shall faithfully perform all the duties of the said office of…

Held: to be in as good condition as if he had taken the steps necessary bylaw to secure his right. For these reasons we are of opinion, that the Court of Claims *31 erred in rendering its judgment dismissing the appellant’s petition, and thus disallowing his entire claim. But we are also of opinion that he is not entitled to recover fon so much of it as accrued more than six years before the bringing of his suit.

Held: That it was incident to the plaintiff’s appeal ; and that appeal being sustained in part and overruled in part the whole cause was remanded.

This was an action at law, brought by the. United States against Rudolph "W. Ulrici, principal, and Gerhard Rensberg and Charles Hoppe, his sureties on a distiller’s warehouse'bond, which was payable to the United States in the penalty of $47,000, and was dated May 5th, 1875.

This was a petition on the part of the State of Virginia for a . writ of mandamus upon the Secretary of the Treasury to compel him to pay to the State from the present surplus revenues of the treasury the fourth instalment of surplus revenue directed by the act of June 23d, 1836,5 Stat. 55, to be deposited with the States.

This was an action in a State court in Tennessee to recover a legacy bequeathed the plaintiff by a will proved in Monroe Oounty, Tennessee, in 1859. The defence set up a judgment of a Confederate court, during the rebellion, confiscating the legacy and payment of the judgment. The defence was overruled in the court below where the original trial was had, and sustained in the Supreme Court of Tennessee on appeal. The plaintiff below then sued out this writ of error.

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that upheld the power of Congress to extend copyright protection to photography.

These cases were heard together. The question at issue was whether notes to bearer for a given sum payable in merchandise at retail, paid out and used as circulation, were subject to the ten per cent, tax imposed by the statute of February 8th, 1875, 18 Stat. 311. In the case from Utah it appeared that the notes in question were paid out by the defendant in error, and used as circulation.

<p>APPEAR FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE' UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI.</p>

<p>IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.</p>

This was a suit in equity for an alleged infringement of a reissued patent for improvement in soldering machines. The defence denied the invention, and denied the validity of the reissued patent by reason of defects in the surrender, and because the reissue was not for the same invention which was described in the original. The facts making the case appear in the opinion of the court.

By chapter 46 of the Revised Statutes of Maine of 1857, reenacted in the Revised Statutes of 1871, it is, among other' things, provided that— “ When the charter of a corporation expires, or is terminated, a creditor or stockholder may apply to the Supreme Judicial Court, which may appoint one or more trustees to take charge of its estate and effects, with power to collect its debts and to prosecute and defend suits at law.

This was a creditor’s bill to reach property conveyed by the debtor to his wife, and have it applied to the payment of the debt. The decree below sustained the conveyance, from which the creditor appealed.

This was a suit in equity for infringement of a patent for an improved mop-head. The sole question raised was whether the evidence of damages warranted a judgment for more than nominal damages.

This was a suit on the equity side of the court for the infringement of two patents, issued to the plaintiffs’ intestate, one for an alleged “ new and useful improvement for burning tan bark, bagasse, sawdust, and other kinds of fuel,, in a wet state, for the purpose of creating heat to generate steam, or to be employed in heating or drying operations; ” and the other for a “ new and useful improvement in furnaces, in using ás fuel bagasse and other carbonaceous substances,…

This was a petition for an original process from this court to stay proceedings in the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County, West Virginia, in a suit in which the defendant in these proceedings was plaintiff and the plaintiff in these proceedings was defendant, on the ground that the cause ivas removed to the Federal courts under the removal act, and that the substantial rights of the parties were involved in a suit, pending in this court, in error to the Court of Appeals of…

This was an action at law brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, by the defendants in error, trading as Naylor & Co., against the plaintiffs in error, trading as George Cooper & Co. The suit was brought to recover the sum of $570.56, with interest from March 5th, 1877, for goods sold, part of which was a quantity of star spring steel.

<p>Action — Limitations, Statute of — Parties—Trust.</p> <p>-If que deals with an agent as principal, and the right of action against, the agent becomes Barred by the statute of limitations, it is also barred against ‘ the principal,'unless circumstances of equity are.shpwn to prevent the operation of the statute, or-únless it appears that t^ete was fraud in the con•cealmentr of" the agenby.</p> <p>The circumstances of this ease disclose no trust in favor of the complainants. The heir at law of a deceased person is not the proper party to enforce an alleged trust in personal property made for the benefit of the deceased.</p>

Held: against a marshal of the United States or his deputy, in behalf of'the rightful owner; and whether, on the other hand, it should not have adjudged in favor of the defendant below, that his- possession of the property by virtue of the levy under the writ was, in itself, a complete defence to the action of replevin, without regard to the rightful ownership'.

.IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. This was an action brought by the assignee of a bankrupt to recover the value of property alleged to have been fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt in violation of the provisions of the bankrupt act. The defendant below resisted the recovery on the ground that the action was not brought within two years from the time when the cause accrued; and also on the merits.

This suit was brought by the Monongahela National Bank of Brownsville, Pennsylvania, and judgment was given against Barzilla Stephens, the defendant, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. The grounds of defence as set forth in the affidavit were: 1. That another suit was pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Green County, Pennsylvania, between the same parties for the same identical cause of action. 2.

<p> Jurisdiction'. </p> <p>In order to give this court jurisdiction in error of a State court it must appear affirmatively on the face of the record, not only that the federal question was raised and presented to the highest court of the State for decision, but that it was decided, or that its decision was necessary to the judgment or decree rendered in the case.</p>

Held: That, under § 2505 of the Kevised Statutes (now § 2503, by virtue of § 6 of the act of March 3d, 1883, chap. 121, 22 Stat. 521 ), exempting from duty “ wearing apparel in actual use and other personal effects (not merchandise), ... of persons arriving in the United States,” the proper rule tobe applied was to exempt from duty such of the articles as fulfilled the following conditions: (1) Wearing apparel owned by…

<p>IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT CO^RT OF THE' UNITED ■ STATES FOR THE SOÍJTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. ”</p> <p>This was a suit brought in a court of the State of New York, in June, 1811, and removed by the defendant into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, after answer. The plaintiff is the receiver of the Cook County National Bank, of Chicago, Illinois, and the defendant is a corporation of New York. The complaint alleged that, on the 20th February, 18V5, the defendant held three promissory notes, maturing on that day, for $10,000 each, made by the Charter Oak Life Insurance Company, as collateral security for a loan of $25,000; that the notes were paid to the defendant at maturity, and there was a surplus, beyond what was due to it on the loan, of $5,000; that the notes were at the time the property of the plaintiff, as receiver; that the defendant received notice of such ownership prior to the payment; and that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for such surplus, with interest.</p> <p>The answer averred that, on October 20th, 1874, one Bowen borrowed of the defendant $25,000, and delivered'the three notes to it as collateral security; that they were negotiable and not due, and were duly transferred by Bowen to the defendant, he then having the legal title to them, and then claiming, and the defendant believing him, to be their owner; that the notes were paid February 20th, 1875, when due, and the proceeds were applied to pay the loan, leaving in the hands of the defendant a surplus, due to Bowen; that, on April 14th following, the defendant, then believing, with good reason, that that surplus belonged to Bowen, applied it, on his direction, towards paying other notes then held by the defendant, indorsed by Bowen, which notes it gave up, on such payment. The answer then said: “ Except as hereinbefore stated or admitted, these defendants, on information and belief, deny each and every allegation in the said complaint contained.”</p> <p>The answer then set up, as a second defence, that, in August, 1871, Bowen agreed in writing with the defendant, that all securities which he might thereafter deposit with it should be regarded as security for any money it might loan to him; that, when the three notes were so deposited, the agreement was a continuing one, under which it received and held the notes as security not only for the loan of $25,000, but for indebtedness which thereafter arose from Bowen to it, as indorser on notes,</p> <p>' and existed on February 20th, 1875, to a larger amount than said surplus; that, on the direction of Bowen, it applied that surplus towards paying the last mentioned liability of Bowen; and that at all times it believed, with good reason, and without notice to the contrary from the plaintiff, that the three notes were the property of Bowen and that he had good right to dispose of them and of their proceeds. The answer then said: “ And, as a part of this second and separate defence, these defendants, on information and belief, reiterate their denials, hereinbefore contained, of each and every allegation in said complaint, not herein stated or admitted.”</p> <p>The case was tried' by a jury. The proof at the trial showed that the surplus was applied on a note made by one Benjamin F. Allen and indorsed by Bowen. Bowen was a director in the Cook County Bank, and its agent, and the agent of Allen, in New York, and also a director in the defendant bank. Allen was president of the Cook County Bank, and with one Stephens and one Blennerhasset composed the firm of Allen, Stephens & Co., of New York. He was also a private banker in Iowa. In October, 1814, Allen, Stephens & Co. had the three notes, which they had received from the makers in part payment of a debt. They put the notes into the hands of Bowen, and he pledged them to the defendant as security for a loan of $25,000, and placed the proceeds of the loan to the credit of the Cook County Bank, in a bank in New York city. On the day the three notes matured, and before they were paid, Allen, Stephens & Co. notified the defendant that Bowen never owned the notes, and that the surplus, after paying the loan, should be credited to the Cook County Bank. The plaintiff had been appointed receiver of that bank on February 1st, 1875.</p> <p>The main question in dispute at the trial was as to whether the notes belonged to the Cook County Bank, having been advanced by Allen, Stephens & Go. to that bank and delivered to Bowen to raise money on; or whether, they belonged to Allen individually, and the proceeds of the loan were placed to the credit of the Cook County Bank, in accordance with a custom of Bowen to place to the credit of that bank all moneys belonging to Allen individually. The case went to the jury on the single question of fact as to whether the three notes belonged to the; Cook County Bank or to Allen individually. There was no exception to the charge of the court, but the plaintiff took exceptions to the admission of evidence.</p> <p>In the course of the trial the defendant offered evidence to show that Allen owned the notes. The plaintiff objected to such evidence, on the ground that, under the answer, the defendant could only prove that Bowen owned them. The defendant contended that, under the general denial in the answer, it could prove ownership of the notes in Allen or in any one else, because the answer raised the issue of title in the plaintiff. The court admitted the evidence and the plaintiff excepted.</p> <p>The verdict and judgment were for the defendant. The plaintiff brought this writ of error.</p>

This was an appeal from a decree in equity, in favor of the holder of promissory notes secured by a mortgage of land in Chicago, for the payment by the appellant personally of the sum due on those notes.

This action was brought by the plaintiff in error to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in error. After the evidence in • the cause had been closed, the court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.

This was an action at law brought by Walker, the defendant in error, against Teal, the plaintiff in error.

This action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff below, Preston, was a, citizen of that State, while the defendant was the consul at the port of New York, for the Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden. The object of the action was to recover damages for the alleged unlawful conversion by defendant, to his own use, of certain articles of merchandise.

<p>APPEAR FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>This case was commenced by a bill in chancery filed by the appellants, Lovell and wife, citizens of Tennessee, against the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company and the St. Louis Life Insurance Company, for relief in relation to a certain policy of insurance issued by the former company through an agent at Nashville, Tennessee, to Lovell on his own life for the sum of $5,000, for the benefit of his wife, and to be paid to her on his death. The policy was dated the 24th of April, 1868, and stipulated for the payment of an annual premium • of $162.14, payable (in the words of -the instrument) as follows : “An annual premium note of $53, and a semi-annual cash premium of $54.57 on the 24th days of April and October, the first one of said notes, and the first semi-annual cash premium, commencing with the date of this policy.” There was a condition in the policy that if, after the payment of the first three annual premiums, a default should be made in the payment of the annual premiums thereafter to become due, then (in the words of the condition) “ such default shall not work a forfeiture of this policy, but the sum of $5,000, the amount insured, shall be then commuted or reduced to the sum of the annual premiums paid.” After setting out the policy the bill stated the following facts. The premiums called for by the policy were all paid down to and including the 24th of April, 1873; a new premium note being given at the end of each year, and any dividends due to the insured being credited thereon, the company being a mutual one. At, or shortly after, the last payment (which was made to one Foote, agent of the company at Louisville, Kentucky, the agency at Nashville having been "discontinued), Lovell made known to Foote his desire to receive a paid-up policy for what he was entitled to, and a return of his premium note; he and the agent agreeing, as had also been represented by the agent at Nashville, on the issuing of the policy, that all the money he had paid by way of premiums (amounting to $822 less the amount of his outstanding note) would be credited to him, and that he could have a paid-up policy for such amount as that money under the regulations of the company would entitle him to if he had paid it all at once for a paid-up policy. "With this view and understanding he surrendered his policy to the agent, to be transmitted to the home office at St. Louis and exchanged for a paid up policy in its stead. Lovell being engaged' in steamboating on the Mississippi, gave the matter no further thought, supposing that it would be all right. But after some time, he was surprised at receiving notice to pay the interest on his note, and on going to his home he found that instead of a paid-up policy, the original policy had been returned with an indorsement on the margin in the words and figures following:</p> <p>“ In default of payment of renewal premium due 24th October, 1873, this policy is commuted and reduced to eight hundred and twenty-two dollars on condition that the interest on outstanding premium notes is paid annually in advance.</p> <p>“M. A. Campbell, Assignee.”</p> <p>The complainant, Lovell, tyent to the agent at Louisville and protested against the course of the company, and insisted that he was to have received a paid-up policy, and a. return of his note; but the agent told him that since the agreement made with him for a paid-up policy the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company had sold out to the Mound City Life Insurance Company (whose name was afterwards changed to the St. Louis Life Insurance Company), and that such a thing as issuing to him a paid-up policy, or even restoring or reinstating his policy, was wholly outside of the contract with the Mound City Company, and that the policy was now forfeited.</p> <p>The bill charged that after the original policy was surrendered for exchange as aforesaid, Avithout the knoAvledge or consent of complainant, the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company sold and transferred its entire assets, name, good . Avill, &c., to the Mound City Life Insurance Company, before any interest had accrued on his premium note. The complainant insisted that he had been guilty-of no default that ought to Avork a forfeiture of his policy; and that the money paid by him on his policy should be refunded to him with interest, and that his outstanding note should be delivered up to be cancelled. The bill further stated that there Avas in the hands of William MorroAV, treasurer of the State of Tennessee, $20,000 of State bonds, held as the property of the insurance company, under the laAvs of Tennessee, as indemnity against loss to citizens of Tennessee on life policies such as that of complainant; he therefore prayed for an attachment and an injunction to hold said fund subject to the orders of the court, until the claim of the complainant should be satisfied. • The bill concluded Avith a prayer for general relief. .</p> <p>An attachment and injunction were issued as prayed, and the defendants appeared and ansAvered the bill.</p> <p>The ansAver did not question the material averments of the bill, and admitted that the affairs of the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company having become greatly embarrassed, on the 7th of October, 1873, the superintendent of the Insurance Department. of the State of Missouri filed in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County a' petition setting forth that the company was insolvent and praying for an injunction against its carrying on the business further, and that such an injunction was issued; and that, in due course, the court pronounced the company insolvent and restrained it from reinsuring its risks without the order and consent of the court. "What further took place in reference to the affairs of the company is shown by the following extracts from the joint answer of the two companies; that is to say:</p> <p>“ In .the progress of said matter said Frank P. Blair; superintendent as aforesaid, on December 18th, 1873, filed his- motion in said cause, praying said court to order said company to rein-sure all the risks held by it in the Mound City Life Insurance Company upon the terms set forth in said motion, and allow him to dismiss his suit as aforesaid. Said terms were that said St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company should transfer to said Mound City Life Insurance Company all of its assets, real, personal, or mixed, wheresoever situated, and that in consideration of said transfer said Mound City Life Insurance Company, whose name was afterward changed to the St. Louis Life Insurance Company, should reinsure all risks of said St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, and assunie all its liabilities, and should for these purposes increase its capital stock to the sum of §1,000,000, such increase to be secured and paid according to the laws of the State of Missouri, and to the satisfaction of said superintendent. Said motion was duly considered by said court, and was ultimately granted. ...</p> <p>“No policy holder of said St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, and no stockholder therein, appeared in opposition thereto, or • made any objections, and said arrangement was accordingly fully consummated and carried out according to the terms of said motion.</p> <p>“ And said St. Louis Life Insurance Company in good faith undertook, and is now undertaking, so to carry out said arrangement, and to perform all the terms and conditions, covenants, promises, and' agreements thereof. All the stockholders of the said St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company have, in good faith, accepted the said transfer and reinsurance under the order of said court, and a very large majority of its policy holders, to wit, more than 8,000, have surrendered their policies in it, and accepted policies in lieu from the St. Louis Life Insurance Company, which is, moreover, by the terms of its contract with the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, so approved as aforesaid, directly liable on any and all policies issued by said last mentioned company to the same extent as itself would have been. . . .</p> <p>“'Said contract was made and said transfer and assumption of liabilities executed, and said increase of capital stock made on or before January 17th, 1874.”</p> <p>Lovell, being sworn as a witness in the cause, fully verified all the allegations of the bill, and there ivas no conflicting evidence. lie showed that when he surrendered his policy to be exchanged for a paid-up policy, in April, 1873, it was with the distinct understanding, both of himself and the agent of the company, that he was entitled to, and would receive, a paid-up policy for an amount which the aggregate sum of premiums paid, less the premium note, would purchase if paid as a single premium, and would also receive his premium note; and that the company kept his policy from the time of its surrender in April until after October, and after the company had become insolvent and had been put under injunction, without giving him any notice that he would not recéive what he supposed himself entitled to.</p> <p>The cause came on to be heard before the circuit judge and district judge, holding the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee, and the judges differing in opinion upon the questions arising in- the case, in accordance with the opinion of the circuit judge, the bill of complaint was dismissed; and the following questions were certified for the opinion of this court, to wit:</p> <p>“Ist. Whether during the lifetime of complainant, James W. Lovell, any suit is maintainable upon the policy of life insurance set forth in the record in this case.</p> <p>“ 2d. Whether the insolvency of the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company and its contract of reinsurance of December, 1813, with the Mound City Life Insurance Company, accompanied by the transfer of the assets of the former to the latter company, as sot forth in the record of this case, operated to confer upon complainants, or either of them, any right of action or suit against the St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, or against the St. Louis Life Insurance Company.</p> <p>“ 3d. Whether, if so, complainants can maintain this suit upon this record apart from the other policy holders of said St.- Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, whose policies were in force at the time of said reinsurance transaction, and who, equally with-complainants, dissented therefrom.”</p>

Held: That under the circumstances the assignee of B, the lessee, was estopped in equity from setting up the subsequently acquired legal title against A, the lessor. This was a suit in equity commenced in Garland Circuit Court in Arkansas, and removed under the Removal Act to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

This was a suit in equity for the alleged infringement of a patent for improvement in dyes from anthracine. The nature of the invention, the extent of the claims, and the facts which went to show the infringement or to affect the validity of the patent are fully brought out in the opinion of the court, from the large mass of testimony in the record. Judgment below sustaining the validity of the patent, from which the alleged infringers appealed.

This is an action brought by Habn against Armour and others (of whom' Armour alone was served with process), to recover damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff while employed as a carpenter in the erection of a building for the defendants.

<p>APPEAL FROM' THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF. CONNECTICUT.</p> <p>' This was a bill in equity brought by the appellees to enjoin the appellants from infringing their rights as assignees of a patent for an improvement in egg-beaters. The decree below granted the injunction and determined the amount of profits. From this decree the defendant below appealed.. The invention and claims are set forth in the opinion of the court.</p>

The bill of complaint in this case was filed by Dunham, the appellee, against Irvine, the appellant.

This was an action upon a policy of insurance issued by the American Life Insurance Company'of Philadelphia. By its terms the amount insured — $10,000—was payable to Emilie Moulor, the plaintiff in error, her executors, administrators, and assigns, within sixty days after due notice and satisfactory proof of interest and of the death of her husband, the insured, certain indebtedness to the company being first deducted.

This was a suit in equity, to vacate a patent of the United States issued to one August Cluensen, on the 15th of May, 1874, embracing a tract of land in the county of Pipestone, in the State of Missouri, described as the southwesterly quarter of section one (1), in township one hundred and six; (106), range forty-six (46), west of the fifth (5th) principal meridian, according to the government surveys.

Held: in order to make the case where work on one of them shall answer the statute as to all of them. It is not difficult, in looking at the policy of the government in regard to its mineral lands, to understand the purpose of this provision.

<p> Practice. </p> <p>The Supreme Court of a -Territory states as conclusion of law matter which should be stated as finding of fact. This court treats it as a finding of fact, under the act of April 7th, 1874,18 Stat. 37</p>

This was an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court remanding the cause back to the State court from whence it had been removed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: at its January Term, 1883, that county bonds issued by county commissioners, under the act of 1869, as a loan to an individual to aid in building a public grist-mill and Avater-poAver in the county, Avere valid. But this court adhered to its vieAV that the act did not cover the construction of a steam grist-mill, and denied the rehearing. Osborne v. Adams County, 109 U. S. 1 .

Held: That any claim of the lessee against the lessor, or against the mortgaged property, for money paid to take up coupons, was released and discharged.

. in error to the circuit court of the united states for the NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO. There ivas a voluminous record in this case, with a long assignment of errors, and an elaborate brief on behalf of the plaintiffs in error. The court gave no opinion on the questions discussed, but dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA.</p>

This bill was filed by the appellant on May 11th, 1880. Its material allegations were as follows: The appellant, ivas born in 1806, and was the daughter of the late Daniel Clark of the city of New Orleans. On July 13th, 1813, Clark duly executed his last will and testament, by which he devised and bequeathed to the appellant all his estate. He died August 16th, 1813. Appellant did not know that she was the daughter of Clark until 1834.

This was an action of debt, brought by the appellee, the plaintiff below, as bankrupt assignee of Howard, Cole & Co., against the county of Claiborne, Tennessee,, on its bond or obligation, dated 7th day of April, 1868, payable to one V. H. Sturm or order for $5,000, with interest, and indorsed by Sturm to Howard, Cole & Co. The following is a copy of the bond, together with the indorsement thereon, to wit: “ County Court.

Held: That, in view of the Spanish usages, and of the action of the Spanish authorities, and of the action of Congress and of United States officials, all of which are referred to, the concession extended in the designated courses to the depth of eighty arpents from the river. In case of doubt, a legislative grant should always be construed most strongly against the grantee.

<p>Evidence — Promissory Note.</p> <p>When in the course of dealings A gives to B one series of his own notes pay- ' able to his own order to be used for purchase of an article on his account; another series of like notes as accommodation paper to be protected by the other party at maturity ; and a third series, part of which is accommodation paper and a part is issued for the purchase of the article, it is for the jury to say, on a suit against A by a bank to which B had hypothecated_ one of the third series as collateral, whether B had the right to pledge it for his own debt.</p>

<p>IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p>

Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that Congress may grant inferior courts concurrent jurisdiction over issues where the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction as long as the issue is not required by the Constitution to be filed directly in the Supreme Court.

The only question argued and decided in this case was whether the cause was properly removed from the State court under the Removal Act after a general demurrer to the complaint for showing no cause of action had been heard and overruled with leave to answer and answers had been filed'. The facts appear more at length in the opinion of the court.

Held: more than half a century ago, that the seal affixed in this way was sufficient for the purposes of evidence under a statute, of which sec. 886 is a reenactment. The transcript is certified by the auditor, and authenticated under the seal of the Treasury Department affixed by the Secretary, its lawful custodian.

Held: should be paid. From the verdict of the jury, under the instructions of the court, it must also be accepted as a fact, that the company never consented to a transfer of the stock to its name on the books, or to that of its president, and it is undisputed that for seven years before the failure of the bank, and at least five years before its embarrassments were known to the company or the public, the stock had been…

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>Tbe case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that, to give effect to the statute, the agent must be allowed to swear in the only manner in Avhich he could safely swear, except in some few particular cases, namely, to the best of his knoAvledge and belief.

On the 26fckof June, 1880, the Pacific'Railroad (of Missouri), a Missouri corporation, filed a bill in equity, in the Circuit Court oí the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri, against the Missouri Pacific Railway Qonipany, another Missouri corporation, and various individual defendants, citizens of Missouri, Massachusetts and New York, and a New York corporation.

Held: in accordance with the decisions of other courts, to be so far in the nature of a debt, that the wife might sue the husband for it in another State, and might contest the validity of a conveyance of property made by him with the fraudulent intent of preventing her from recovering the alimony. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 ; Livermore v. Boutelle, 11 Gray, 217 ; Bouslough v. Bouslough, 68 Penn. St. 495 .

This action was brought by the First National Bank of Toledo, Ohio, a national banking association established at Toledo, against William H. Standley, William H. Whiteside, Josephus Atkinson, Edward R. Thompson and Joseph Uhl, as -partners in the business of private bankers at Logansport, Indiana, under the name of the People’s Bank, upon a draft for $5,000, drawn and accepted by the partnership on August 25th, 1877, payable in ninety days after date to the order of the…

Held: which he could alien, and which was liable at law or in equity for the payment of his debts, passed by its terms ; and in that decision we concur. Such was the manifest intent of the grantor, and the language of the deed to which we have referred is broad enough to effect it.

<p>Court and Jury — Deceit.</p> <p>"Where the complaint in an action on the ease for deceit by false representations whereby a party was induced to enter into a contract, charged a positive misrepresentation of an existing fact, and all the evidence intended to establish fraud was directed to the proof of that specific misrepresentation, it was error in the presiding judge not to confine his instructions,to the point in issue, and when requested by the jury for instruction as to the effect of withholding information concerning the subject of the contract, not to instruct them that there was no evidence in the case which authorized their request for instructions on that point.</p>

Held: subject to the life estate of . James B. Colt, deceased, and now for distribution, upon the basis of their right therein as owners of the 500 shares, and of the 100 shares each, given them in the will, making 900 shares in all.

<p>IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The facts making the case are fully stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.</p> <p>The. facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p> Claims against the United States-. </p> <p>If a treasury agent for the collection of cotton, who was convicted by a military commission of defrauding the United States, and was sentenced to paya fine, and paid the fine and was then released, consents after his release that the money may pass into the treasury, ho cannot maintain an action in the Court of Claims to recover it back on an implied contract to refund it,. either on the ground that the fine was illegally imposed, or that it was paid under duress.</p>

Held: in that case, not to be admissible without proof that he acted on them. Whether the opinions of non-experts, in connection with a statement, under oath, of the facts, are admissible upon an in *623 quiry as to the insanity of an individual, was not involved or determined in that case.

On the 20th day of November, 1883, one O. H. Bayley was arrested in the city of San Francisco, California, and delivered to W. L. Robb, who had been empowered by the Governor of the State of Oregon to take and receive him from the proper authorities of the State of California, and convey him to the former State, to be there dealt with according to law.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

In October, 1871, Henry Clews & Co. opened a line of credit on their London house of Clews, Ilabicht & Co., for £6,000 in favor of Hennequin & Co., a firm doing business in New York and Paris, authorizing the latter to draw from tipie to time bills of exchange on the London house at ninety days from date, with the privilege of renewal, it being agreed that Hennequin & Co. should remit to Clews, Ilabicht & Co., a few days before the maturity of each bill, the necessary funds…

<p>Appeal — Jurisdiction—Parties.</p> <p>A decree in a suit in a circuit court for the foreclosure of a railroad, fixing the compensation to bo paid to the trustees under the mortgage from the fund, realized from the sale, is a final decree as to that matter, and this court has jurisdiction on appeal.</p> <p>A holder of railroad bonds secured by a mortgage under foreclosure, has an interest in the amount of the trustee's compensation which entitles him to intervene, and to contest it, and to appeal from an adverse decision.</p> <p>"When purchasers at a sale of a railroad under foreclosure purchase under an agreement, recognized by the court and referred to in the decree, that a new mortgage shall bp issued after the sale, a part of which is to be applied to the. payment of the foreclosure debt and a part, to the payment of expenses, which expenses include the compensation of the trustees under the mortgage foreclosed, the purchasing committee named in that agreement have an interest in fixing (hat compensation which entitles them to intervene, and to be heard, and to appeal from an adverse decision.</p> <p>On the facts in this case the allowances made below are held to bo excessive.</p>

<p>APPEALS EEOM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court</p>

On the 29th of November, 1S73, the relator, Nelson, recovered in the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Martin, in Louisiana, a judgment against the Parish for $i,500, with interest at eight per cent, per annum from October 5th, 1S68.

' This was a suit in equity brought by a judgment creditor, to set aside a conveyance of real estate in Washington belonging" to his wife, to trustees for the benefit of the wife and their children. The facts which made the issues appear in the opinion of the court. Ón the' 31st of March, 1884-, the court announced a decision in appellant’s-■ favor.

<p>IN error to the circuit court of the united states for the EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The facts constituting the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: and' still hold, that the phrase has a broader meaning; that it includes those fundamental privileges and immunities which .belong essentially to the citizens of every free government, among which Mr. Justice Washington enumerates ; the right of protection; the right to pursue and obtain .happiness and safety; the right to pass through ■ and reside in any • State for purposes of trade, agriculture, profbssibnal…

This was an application by Mr. John Hitz for a writ of certiorari commanding the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to certify to this court an indictment and the proceedings thereunder against him in 'that court, on the ground that when the indictment was filed, and when the offences therein charged where committed, he was the diplomatic representative of the Swiss Confederation, duly accredited to and received and recognized by the ..United States, under-the title…

<p>IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated by the court in its opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL • FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF- THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WFST VIRGINIA.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF IOWA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE.SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p>

<p> National Bank </p> <p>A creditor of an insolvent national bank, who establishes his debt by suit and ' judgment after refusal by the Comptroller of the Currency to allow it, is entitled to share in dividends upon the debt and interest so established as of the day of the failure of the bank; and not upon the basis of the judgment if it includes interest subsequent to that date.</p>

Held: That A was entitled to interest according to the'agreement on deferred payments as to all lands of which he was in possession whethe, in suit or not ; (2) that as to all lands held adversely he was entitled to interest from the entry of judgment in his favor in the ejectment suits; (3) as to lands within the bounds of the description, the title to which was acquired by him after its date, to interest only, from the…

<p> Jurisdiction. </p> <p>In ejectment in which several defendants are joined who hold separate tracts adversely to the plaintiff, this court will not dismiss the writ of error because each separate tract is not of the jurisdictional value, if their combined . values are sufficient to give jurisdiction.</p>

<p>This was a motion to correct an error in the mandate issued on the judgment reported in Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568.</p>