Volume 118 — United States Reports

This suit was commenced by the defendants in error as plaintiffs, creditors of the firm of A. Butler & Co. One Moores, sole surviving partner, was defendant, and property which had belonged to the firm was attached. The plaintiff in error interpleaded, setting up title to the attached property under an assignment from Moores for the benefit of the creditors of the firm. Judgment for plaintiffs; to review which the interpleading creditor sued out this writ of error.

Held: that, although there was contradictory testimony, it could not, in the absence of ocular inspection, say that the Circuit Court erred in finding infringement. . The decision in Dobson v. Hartford Carpat Co. ( 114 U. S. 439 ,) as to the rule of damages in a suit in equity for the infringement of a patent for a design for a carpet, confirmed.

This was an action against the District of Columbia by a citizen and taxpayer in Washington to recover damages caused to his house and land fronting on Missouri Avenue, in the summer of 1877, by the overflow of foul water from a sewer in that avenue, which the declaration alleged that the defendant knowingly constructed and continued upon an unreasonable and defective plan, and of inadequate capacity for its purpose, and wrongfully permitted to become choked up.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.</p> <p>Bill in equity for the infringement of letters patent. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES EOR THE DISTRICT OE COLORADO.</p> <p>This was a suit at law to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the letters did not constitute a contract with the United States under the provisions of Rev. Stat. §§ 3744-3749.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF" THE STATE OP IOWA.</p> <p>This was a motion to dismiss accompanied by a motion to affirm. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That this was not a final judgment within the meaning, of the acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeals or writs of error. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3 , affirmed and applied. The case, which is stated in the

•APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP OHIO. This was an appeal from an order remanding the cause to the State court from whence it had been removed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>On the facts stated in the opinion of the court, it is held that the assignment of the cause of action to the plaintiff in error was collusively made for the purpose of creating a case cognizable by the Circuit Court of the United States, and that the controversy is really and substantially between one of the counties of California and citizens of California, and is not properly within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.</p>

Held: no error. Although, before the joint resolution was passed, the claimant had received from the President a pardon “for all offences committed by him arising from participation, direct or implied, in the rebellion,” the pardon did not authorize the payment of the claim, nor did the joint resolution take away anything which the pardon had conferred.

Held: that he was entitled to a writ commanding the levy on both species of property. The act of the Legislature of Missouri of May 10, 1871, amending the act of March 23,1868, entitled “An Act to facilitate the construction of railroads in the State of Missouri ” was not repealed by the failure of the legislature to incorporate it into the Revision of 1879.

<p>If a deed of land is in fee, with a covenant of warranty, and there is no defeasance, either in the conveyance or in a collateral paper, parol evidence that it was intended to secure a debt and to operate only as a mortgage, must be clear, unequivocal and convincing, or the presumption that the instrument is what it purports to' be must prevail.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the court. The cause was decided in the Court of Claims on the 18th of February, 1886, and at once brought here on appeal and submitted.

Held: as in other cases of creditors by judgment or decree, to be entitled to the aid of a court of equity to remove a cloud upon the title which obstructed or prevented the enforcement at law of his lien. The jurisdiction is invoked in such cases because it is necessary to give to the complainant the benefit of his remedy at law, which, without it, is not plain, adequate and complete.

Held: That pursuant to the provisions of Rev. Stat. §§ 4401, 4444, the vessel, both when T tendered his services, and when it passed over the bar and up the river, was under the lawful control and direction of a pilot licensed under the laws of the United States, and could not be required to take a pilot licensed under the provisions of the laws of Georgia.

Held: That the statute of limitations could not be set up by the heir at law of A or by the widow against P; that P was the proper party to bring the suit; that the cancellation of the sale restored P to her rights as partnership creditor; and that while the court would not set aside the assignment of dower, no further exaction for detention would be enforced. In equity. The case is stated in the

ORIGINAL. This was a petition to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was a bill in equity to set aside four deeds under which the appellant, who was defendant below, claimed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>The provision in the Louisiana Constitution of 1879, that the general assembly of the State should enact appropriate legislation to liquidate the indebtedness of the city of New Orleans and apply its assets to the satisfaction thereof, contemplated that provision should be made for the payment of the entire debt, whether bonded or floating, and was in harmony with the previously settled law of the State.</p> <p>The holders of the floating debt of the city of New Orleans, existing at the time of the passage of the Act of the Legislature of Louisiana of April 10, 1880, known as No. 188 of that year, who have established the validity of their claims by judicial proceedings, are protected by the provisions of the Constitution of Louisiana adopted' in 1879 from being excluded from sharing in the proceeds of the property and fund which, by that act, were in terms appropriated to purchase and retire the bonds of the city.</p> <p>The legislation of the State of Louisiana respecting the indebtedness of the city of New Orleans reviewed.</p>

This was an action by a citizen of New York against a town in Indiana upon certain bonds and coupons.

Held: that a decree adjudging a corporation bankrupt is in the nature of a decree in rem, as respects the status of the corporation; and that, if the court rendering it has jurisdiction, it can only be assailed by a direct proceeding in a competent court, unless it appears that the decree is void in form, or that due notice of the' petition was never given. No such defect appears in these proceedings.

Held: that they showed a chair-seat of perforated sheet metal, and one of perforated enamelled india-rubber or gutta-percha, containing every feature of ventilation and ornamentation, resulting from perforations, which Gardner’s perforated chair-seat exhibited; and that, in view of those prior perforated seats, there was no patentable novelty in perforating a wooden bottom.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO.</p> <p>This was a motion to dismiss, united with a motion to affirm. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action to recover possession of certain mining ground in Lake County, Colorado. The plaintiffs in the court below, the defendants in error here, asserted title to the premises under a patent of the United States for what was known as the “ Gilt Edge Claim,” of which they were a part. In the original complaint they asserted title by conveyance from the original locators.

This case is reported in Vol. 117, U. S., pages 312 to 327. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered an oral dissent, which is noted on page 327. An imperfect copy of this having found its way ' into print, he prepared and filed the following:

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP MICHIGAN.</p> <p>’ The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That, although it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between vessels so small and insignificant that they do not come within the inspection laws, and larger vessels which do come within them, the Repauno was liable to inspection under the statutes of the United States, The case is stated in the

Held: That the motion was too late. These were motions, supported by affidavits, to reinstate a case dismissed because the amount in dispute did not appear by the record to be sufficient to give the court jurisdiction— see Johnson v. Wilkins, 116 U. S. 392 — and to recall the mandate. The following were the grounds of the motion : “First.

These were motions to reinstate six causes dismissed January-11, 1886. See 116 U. S. 393, 394. The grounds for the motion were stated as follows: “ First. The affidavit taken by the defendant in error denying that the subject-matter in dispute was within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court were taken ex parte and without any notice to the plaintiffs in error or their counsel of record. “ Second.

This was a motion to dismiss. The motion was as follows: “And now comes the defendant in error, and moves the court to dismiss the writ of error in this case for the reasons following, to wit: “ First. The court is without jurisdiction to review the judgment contained in the record, brought up in this cause, there being no Federal question therein presented. “Wm.

This was an action against a bondsman of a defaulting paymaster. After commencement of the suit defendant died,' and his administrator was substituted. The case was tried before a jury, which, under direction of the court, found a verdict for defendant. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court of the Territory, having duly excepted to the ruling of the court.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p>

This was a petitory action in tbe nature of an action of ejectment at common law. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. A former hearing of the cause is reported in Pike v. Evans, 94 U. S. 6.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE KANSAS.</p> <p>This was an action in the nature of ejectment. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM.THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH.</p>

<p>When the same cause is brought to this court by appeal and by writ of error, on the same record, it is not necessary to docket it twice.</p> <p>A complaint or declaration charging a corporation, and individuals who are its agents and servants, with polluting a stream of water belonging to the plaintiff and rendering it unfit for use, and seeking a remedy against the defendants jointly, does not present a controversy separable for the purposes of removal from a State court, although the defendants answer separately setting up separate defences.</p> <p>Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41, and Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 278, affirmed and applied.</p> <p>When a complaint or declaration in an action in a State court sets up a joint cause of action in tort against several defendants for injuries done jointly to plaintiff, separate answers of the defendants setting up that the acts ■ complained of were committed under direction of one of them and were justified by a contract between plaintiff and -that particular defendant, and ' that the acts complained of as done by the other defendants were done by them as his servants and under his directions, do not necessarily change the controversy between the plaintiff and that defendant into a separate controversy, removable to the courts of the United States under the removal acts: and allegations in the petition for removal that the agents were joined as defendants in order to prevent the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United'States are of no avail, if not proved.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity to annul and set aside a listing of coal lands to tbe State of California, and patents of the same granted by the State. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.-</p> <p>Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury on behalf of the United States stated that this suit, although prosecuted in the name of the United States, was prosecuted by private parties and at private cost. Mr. Maury filed a brief on behalf of appellee ; and also showed to the court the authority of the Attorney General for the commencement of the proceedings.</p>

Held: That this question was one of fact to be determined by the Circuit Court of the United States, and not by the State court ; that plaintiff in error was not estopped by the answer from setting up that she was a citizen of New York; and that, as a case for removal was made out on the face of the petition, the petition was improperly denied.

Held: which are created by this act, and both its property and the road, or parts thereof, so held, with its fixtures and the property used in operating the same, shall be liable for the payment of such taxes, in the same manner as railroad property is, in other cases, made liable for taxes properly assessed against the same.” 3 Ind. Stat., Davis’ Ed. (1810), 420, 421.

Held: abolishes all express passive trusts in Michigan, but allows express active trusts when created in accordance with § 5573, cited above. Burdino v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91 , 96; Ready v. Kearsley, 14 Mich. 215 , 227; Steevens v. Earles, 25 Mich. 40 , 44; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214 , 234; Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422 , 430.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH.</p> <p>The case which makes the question of jurisdiction decided by the court is stated in its opinion. The question was not considered by counsel in argument: but on its own suggestion the court gave the parties an opportunity to file briefs, which was done by counsél for plaintiff in error.</p>

This case was argued on'the 20th and 23d of November, 1885, and decided December 14, 1885. 116 U. S. 55. The reasons for setting aside the judgment and dismissing the writ of error are stated in the opinion of the court.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that a prima facie race-neutral law administered in a prejudicial manner infringed upon the right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that upheld the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act of 1885. This Congressional act gave the federal courts jurisdiction in certain Indian-on-Indian crimes, even if they were committed on an Indian reservation. Kagama, a Yurok Native American (Indian) accused of murder, was selected as a test case by the Department of Justice to test the constitutionality of the Act. The importance of the ruling in this particular case was that it tested the constitutionality of the Act and confirmed Congress's authority over Indian affairs. Plenary power over Indian tribes, supposedly granted to the U.S.

This was a suit in equity to restrain the defendants [appellants in this court] from doing certain things charged against them intended to injure the plaintiff, and destroy his property and business. The bill alleged that he was a citizen of Florida, and brought the bill against Richard Francis, individually and as agent for others, and "W. T. Levine and thirty-seven others, who were named, and who were citizens of Louisiana.

■This was a petition in the Court of Claims to recover an unpaid balance of salary claimed to be due defendant in error as Minister Eesident at Hayti. The defence was that Congress, by appropriating a lesser sum, had indicated its purpose to reduce the salary. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Judginent below in favor of the plaintiff from which the defendant appealed.

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886), is a corporate law case of the United States Supreme Court concerning taxation of railroad properties. The case is most notable for a headnote stating that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants constitutional protections to corporations.

<p>This case differs from Santa Ola/ra County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Com- ■ pany, ante, 394, only in this: — that after entry of judgment defendant below paid the taxes claimed under a stipulation that the payment should be “ without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff in the case to proceed for-penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees claimed.” Held that, as the plaintiff would not have been entitled to judgment for the taxes originally claimed, it could not have judgment in its favor for penalty, interest, and. attorney’s fees.</p>

Held: first, that the act of 1851 adopted the general maritime law in reference to limited liability as contra-distinguished from the English law, measuring the liability by the value of ship and freight after, instead of before, the collision; secondly, that the act embraced cases of damage received by collision as well as cases of injury to the cargo of the offending ship; thirdly, that the district courts of the United…

Held: that in awarding damages against the owners, limited to the amount of their interest in the ship, the court is not bound to allow interest on the proceeds of the wreck or strippings ; but may, in its discretion, allow interest or not. The Circuit Court is not bound to allow interest on costs awarded by the District Court, although such costs are included in the decree of the Circuit Court.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action against a railroad corporation for personal injuries received on September 16, 1881, by a passenger (then forty nine years of age), from the car in which he was seated being thrown off the track, in consequence of a worn-out rail and rotten cross-ties, whereby his collar-bone, shoulder-blade, and several ribs were broken, and his sight, hearing, ease of breathing, and capacity to do business impaired.

Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), also known as the Wabash Case, was a Supreme Court decision that severely limited the rights of states to control or impede interstate commerce. It led to the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Held: That there was nothing in the stipulation to deprive this court of the power of reviewing the action of the court below in denying the motion. The case is stated in the

<p>A railroad company, in aid of whose road Congress grants land upon condition that it shall transport mails at such price as Congress may direct, and that until the price be thus fixed the Postmaster-General shall have power to determine the same, is (in the absence of contracts with the department for special service with unusual facilities, or for determined periods) bound to transport mails (until Congress directs the rates) at such reasonable compensation as the Postmaster-General may from time to time prescribe; and the continuance by such company to transport mails after the expiration of the term of a written contract neither implies that it is, after the Postmaster-General has otherwise directed, to be paid the samo rates for transportation which it was paid under the written contract, nor that the contract is renewed for any specific term for which contracts of the Post-office Department may usually be made.</p>

Held: at which it was voted to levy the assessment so called for, whereupon the Comptroller permitted the directors to resume control of the bank. A, being notified of this assessment, paid the amount assessed upon his sixty shares, upon being assured by one of the directors of the bank that there would be no other assessment.

This, like the case last reported, was an action at law by the receiver of the Pacific National Bank of Boston against an alleged stockholder in that bank, to recover an assessment on his stock. The facts in relation to the failure of the bank and the imposition of the assessment by the receiver are the same as those reported in the last case.

Held: That this transaction was not a mortgage, but was an executory conditional sale; and, being free from fraud, that it was valid. This was an appeal from tbe Supreme Court of Utah. The action was brought in the District Court for Weber County, to recover the value of two steam-engines and boilers, and a portable saw-mill connected with each engine.