Volume 119 — United States Reports

APPEALS PROM "TIE COURT OF CLAIMS. Tie following is the case as stated by the court: There are-two appeals in this case, one by the Choctaw Nation, and the other by the United States, from a judgment rendered by the Court of Claims in favor of the former for the sum of $408,120.32.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE C1RCUIT COUET OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>Iii equity to recover for infringement of letters-patent. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT C0URT- OF THE ■ UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT .OF LOUISIANA. •This was a bill in equity to restrain infringement of letters-patent. The ease is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: and that the proceeds of' the sale' which had been made, or if that should be set aside, of any that might thereafter be made, be divided between them in proportion to the amounts due, them respectively.

Held: and the giving by him of notice of the election; that the election should “be held and conducted and return therepf made as is provided by law; ” and that, if a majority of,the legal voters voting should vote for the donation, the town should)' “by its proper corporate authorities,” make the donation, as should “be cleter- ' mined at said election,” and should issue to the company its bonds,' “ signed by the…

.ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF NEW YORK. This was a motion to dismiss, united with a motion to affirm. The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: or an isolated act done, at a later period.

Held: that such clause had no application, because, the defendant, being a foreign corporation, was not within the jurisdiction of New York, until admitted by the State on a compliance with the condition of admission imposed, namely, the payment of the . tax required as a license fee. The business carried on by the corporation in New York was not a transaction of commerce.

<p>APPEALS FROM THE COUET OF CLAIMS.</p>

Held: that the negotiation between the parties was closed, and that an acceptance by B on December 19 of the original offer did* not bind A. The submission of a question of law to the jury is no ground of exception jf they decide it aright. • This was an action' by a railroad corporation established at Minneapolis in the State of Minnesota against a manufacturing corporation -established- at Columbus in the State of Ohio;…

<p>An attorney at'law, prosecuting- or defending in a civil action, is a competent witness on behalf of his client at the trial of the action.</p> <p>A-Vlien it is within the discretion of the court whether to admit evidence in rebuttal which might have been offered in chief, the party offering it is .entitled to the exercise of the discretion at the time of the offers</p>

Held: and disposed of by an "alien in the same manner iii all respects as by a natural-born British subject, and a title to real and personal property of every description may be derived through, from, or in succession to an alien in the same manner in all respects as' through, from, or in succession to a natural-born .British subject: Provided, (1) that this section shall not confer any right on an alien to hold real…

Held: that the Act of the Legislature, of North Carolina of 1868, c. 20, relating to the removal of county buildings, does not apply to such a case.

OF TEXAS. The following was the cabe as stated by. the court. This was an action of trespass to try the title to certain land in Texas. It is the form in use to recover possession of real property in that State.

Held: in the District Court-of the United States for the District of Maine, in an admiralty suit in personam, that “th¿ ancient doctrine of the common law, founded on the principles of the feudal system, that a private wrong is merged in a felony, is not applicable to the civil polity of this country, and has not been adopted in this State ” (Maine), and that “ a libel may *206 be maintained by a father, in the admiralty,…

Held: that, as the act of March 1st, 1872, did not go into effect till' it was published, and it was not published till March 21st, 1872, -and-required 30 days’ notice of the election, and as the. , bonds were dated April 15th, 18-72, and stated that the election was held April 8th, 1872, and gave the title of the act, and ' the date of its approval, their invalidity appeared on their face, in connection with,the terms of…

Held: on demurrer, that the bill could not be sustained. Although the dissolved corporation assigned its right in the premises to an Illinois corporation organized by the stockholders of the former, whafc ever implied license the former had to use the invention was confined to it, and was not assignable.

This was an action to try title, to ieal estate. After issue joined it came/on for trial “before the court, a trial by jury having been expressly waived by the parties.” In"the courSe of the trial, plaintiff’s counsel took Several exceptions to evidence offered on. defendant’s behalf, all of which were", duly noted.

This was .an appeal from the- judgment of a Circuit Court, remanding a cause which had been removed from a State Court. This case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This action was commenced in the Superior Court of the State of California for the city and county of San Francisco, and removed thence to the Circuit Court of the United States.The material allegations in the complaint were the following: “ The plaintiff' complains of the defendants and shows that on or about the first day of October, a.d. 1870, Juana M. Esta-dillo, José Ramon Estadillo, José Antonio Estadillo, José Vicente Estadillo, Luis D. Estadillo,'Jesus Maria…

<p>APPEAL EROM THE CIRCÜIT OOURT OE THE TOUTED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OE LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The case is stated iu the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That this was a case of damnum absque injurid. ■ Escariaba Oo. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 , and Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205 , affirmed and applied. The case is stated in the

AI*PEAL FROM THE ÓIROUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF- IOWA. This was a process styled “a petition in equity,” commenced by appellee September 4, 1884, in the' District Court of Dubuque County, Iowa, under § 1543 of the Amended Code of Iowa, to recover a fine from appellants for violations of the provisions of §§ 1540 and 1542 of that Code. These sections are as follows: “ Seo. 1540.

Held: That while the preferred stockholders are entitled to a six per cent, dividend in advance of the common stockholders, they are not entitled, as of right, to dividends, payable out of the not profits accruing in any particular year, unless the directors declare or ought to declare a dividend payable out of such profits; and that whether a dividend should be declared in any year, is a matter belonging in the first…

<p>• ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE; TOOTED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF INDIANA. .</p> <p>This Vas an action- brought by plaintiffs in error (who were plaintiffs ’below) to recover from defendant the cost of certain materials and work connected with the furnishing and laying of water pipes for the water works of the city. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>cited: Sprung field v. Maoris, 107 'Mass. 532 ; Dermott v. Jones5 23 How. 220 ; Dermott; v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1; Manufacturing Go. v. United States, 17 Wall. 592; Adams v. Gosby, 48 Ind. 153; Shillvngton v. Templeton, 66 Ind. 5Ó5 ; Dubois v. Del. & Hud. Gandí Go., 12 Wend. 334; Bestor v. United States, 3 C. Cl. 425; Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 N. Y. 196 ; Emerson v. Slater,• 22 How. 28 ; Canal Go. v. Bay, 101 TJ. S. 522; Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298; S. G. 20 Am. Dec. 475; Williams v. Bank of United States, 2 Pet. .96; Swam, v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254; Ins. Co. v. Horton, 96 H. S. 234; . Ins. Co. v. Eggleston, 96 H. S. 572; Ins. Go. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 30; Bhodes v. Thomas, 2 Ind. 638; Bates v. Dehaven, 10 Ind. 319; Billingsley v. Straiten, 11 Ind. 396; Smith v. Gugerty, 4 Barb. 614; Grant v. United States, 5 0. Cl, 71; . Wolcott v. Wolcott, 19 Yt. 37; Jefferson County v. Slagle, 66 Perm. St. 202; Hedida. Cooper, 8 Maine, 32.</p> <p>cited: Crosby v. Wood, 6 N. Y. 369 ; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328 ; Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260; Deaeon v. Gridley, 15 C. B. 295 ; Mallalien v. Hodgson, 16 Q. B. 689; Conover v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. L. (5 Yroom), 54; Cobb v. Cowdery, 40 Yt. 25 ; Ford y. Garner, 15 Ind. 298 ; Rwrmamaker y. Cor dr ary, 54 Ill. 303 ; Ingle v. Jones,' 2 Wall. 163 ; Clark v. New York, 4 N. Y. 338; S. C. 53 Am. Dec. 319. •</p>

APPEAL PROM THE CXROUXT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POK THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP NEW1 YORK. This was a bill in equity for infringing a patent for an invention. The- case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>This was an action for the possession of land. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>The claim of letters-patent No. 187,100, granted to John Clark, February 6th, 1877, for an “improvement in cheese-formers for cider-presses,” namely, “The-guide-frame D, in combination with an extended pomace-rack, and a cloth to inclose a layer of pomace therein, substantially as described,” is invalid, because it did not require invention to use the described guide-frame in connection with the racks and the cloths.</p> <p>.The racks and the cloths had been before used in connection, and' an enclosure was used with them, which enabled the operator to make the pom-ace of uniform depth on each rack, and prevented the lateral spreading of the pomace; and it required only ordinary mechanical skill and Judgment to make either the guide-frame or the rack of the desired size.</p>

. This was an appeal from the Court of Claims. The petition! set. forth contracts between one Cullinane since deceased, the testator of appellants, who were plaintiffs below, and the performance of the work by Cullinane. The contracts called for payments in cash. There was a dispute about the quality of some of the work, which was finally adjusted, and a Settlement made in the manner set forth in the findings of fact by the Court of Claims as follows: “XII.

This was an action at law to fry title to real estate. The declaration was as follows: “ John Halsted, a citizen of the city of New York and of the State of New York, complains of William B. Buster and Eldridge Barrett for that heretofore, to wit, on the first day of February, 1873, the said plaintiff was possessed in fee of a certain tract or parcel of land lying and being in the county of Fayette and State of West Virginia, which land was conveyed by Robert Soulter,…

. This was a bill in equity against a corporation and its stockholders to enforce a ■ debt due from the former against the latter. The base is stated in the opinion of the court. cited: Tasker v. Wallace, 6 Daly, 364; Osgood v. King; 42 Iowa, 478; Wetherbee v. Baker, 35 N. J. Eq. (8 Stewart). 501, 513. cited: Ochiltree v. Rail/road Co., 21 Wall.-249Re State Ins. Co., 14 Fed.

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR' ■ THE WESTERN DISTRICT OP TEXAS.

The original action was debt on § 5198 of the'Revised Statutes, brought- in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against a national banking association established within that district, to recover twice the amount of interest, at the rate of nine per cent., received by the defendant upon the discount of certain promissory notes.

This was au action against- a national bank to recover the value of certain securities deposited in its vaults, and stolen therefrom by burglars. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. cited: National • Bank v. Graham, 100 IT. S. 699; Whitney w. Bank, 1 Morrison’s Transcript, 263; 8. C. 50 Yt. 388; Wiley V. Bank of Brat-tleboro, 47 Yt. 546: Baylis v. Travellers’ Ins. Co., 113 II. S. 316, 320. cited: Alle- : gheny Cownty Workhouse v. Moore, 95 Penn.

APPEAL PROM THE CIRCÜIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ’ . THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IL*LINOIS. This was a bill in equity to recover for tbe infringement of letters-patent. The case is stated in the 'opinion of the conrt.

THE TERRITORY OF 1ÍTAH.. This was an action for the recovery of real estate. Judgment for plaintiff and appeal. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the value of the premises in-dispute did not exceed five thousand dollars, and also to affirrrí - the judgment below.

This was an* action fór the possession of real estate. Judg- • ment. for plaintiff. Defendant; sued out this writ of error. The defendant in error moved to dismiss for want of jurisdictional value in the matter in. dispute.

Held: that tbe action i/n personam in the State Court was a proper one, because it was a common law remedy, which tbe common law was competent to. give, although the State'law gave a ben- on the vessel in tbe case, similar to a lijen-under tbe maritime law, and it was made enforceable by-a writ of sequestration in advance, to bold tbe vessel as á security to respond to a judgment, if recovered against her owner, as a…

Held: that tbe disclaimer took out of the first claim of - the'reissue only so much thereof as • claimed a concrete pavement made of the plastic material laid in ■ detached blocks, without interposing, anything between tbe joints in tbe process of formation, leaving tbe claim to be one for such a pavement' laid -in- .detached blocks, when free joints are made between tbe blocks, by interposing tar-paper or its equivalent.…

“1. Extradited criminals cannot be tried for offences not named in the treaty, or for offences not named in the warrant of extradition.

Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that a fugitive kidnapped from abroad and taken back to the U.S. to be tried for a crime may be tried, regardless of the legality of the kidnapping.

Held: That the presumption of law is -that all that is found in , either copy was in the original; that any important matter found in one which was not in the other-was due to an accidental omission; and, that,' the prima facie case made by the record from Missouri was not 'overcome by the record from the General Land Office.

Held: That ■ 'the State court had jurisdiction so as to bind those who were parties to the suit and those whom the parties'in law represented; (2) that the assignee in bankruptcy having appeared in the State court and litigated his rights there, he .and those whom he represented were bound by the decree. The following is £he case as stated'by the court.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OR THE UNITED STATES 'FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>' .Tbe following is tbe case as stated by tbe court.</p> <p>Tbe case presents tbe following facts: D.. W. McCIung beld tbe office of collector of customs and surveyor of the port of tbe city of Cincinnati, under tbe laws of tbe United States, and J. L. Wartman was employed by him, with tbe approval of the- Secretary of tbe Treasury, as deputy collector of customs. As such deputy Wartman acted as tbe cashier of tbe collector. Section 10 of tbe act of June 10, 1880, c. 190, 21 Stat. 116, is as follows:</p> <p>“. . . That whenever tbe proper officer of the customs shall be duly notified in writing of tbe existence of a lien for freight upon imported goods, wares, or merchandise in bis cu,'-.ody, be shall, before delivering such . . . merchán-, dise to the importer, owner, or consignee thereof, give reasonable notice to tbe party or parties claiming the. ben; and tbe possession by the officers of customs shall not affect tbe discharge of such lien., under such regulations as the Secretary of ’ the Treasury may prescribe; and such officer may refuse the. delivery of such merchandise from any public or bonded ware: house or other place in which the same shall be deposited, until proof to his satisfaction shall be produced that-the freight thereon has been paid or secured; but the rights of the United' States shall not be prejudiced thereby, nor shall the United States or its officers be in any manner hable for losses consequent upon such refusal to deliver: If merchandise so subject to a lien, regarding which notice has been filed, shah be forfeited'to the United States and sold, the freight due,thereon shah be paid from the proceeds of such sale in the same manner-as other charges and expenses authorized by law to be paid , therefrom are paid.” This is part of “ an act to amend the statutes’in relation , to immediate transportation of dutiable goods.”</p> <p>The Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati and Indianapohs Bail-road Company was a common carrier, and as such designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of receiving- •and transporting dutiable goods from the port of arrival to the port of destination- under this act of Congress. As such-carrier,, so designated, this company carried to Cincinnati large • quantities of dutiable goods, the freight and charges upon which amounted in the aggregate to $8417.50, and placed them in the custody and control of McClung as collector of customs and surveyor of the port, and, as is claimed, notified him in writing of its lien as carrier for such freight and charges. "Wartman, as deputy collector, had charge, under McClung,,of the collection of customs payable at the port of Cincinnati,- and of the delivery of imported merchandise to the consignees thereof. He' received the freight and charges due the company from the consignees of these goods at the same time that he ■ received the duties, and delivered the goods to the consignees without notifying the company. The charges were never paid, by him either to the company or to McClung.</p> <p>Such being the conceded, facts, this suit was brought against McClung in the Superior Court of Cincinnati. In the petition’, it is averred that McClung was collector, &c.; that the railroad company had carried and delivered the goods tp him under the act, charged with a lien thereon for freight, of which due notice was given to him in writing, as provided in the act; and “ that it became and was the duty of the defendant, as such officer, to refuse to deliver the said goods and merchandise until such freight thereon had been paid to the' common carrier.” It is then averred that the consignees paid the charges due the company to the defendant, “and the-defendant then and there received ” the same “ for the account and benefit of the said . . . company, and the defendant then and thereupon caused the said goods and merchandise to, ' be delivered to the consignees, . . . without notice to tub • railroad company, whereby its lien for said freight was lost; ^ and that “the defendant, though often requested, has not paid said ” money to the plaintiff, but the same, “ with interest from September 8th, 1881, is now due and unpaid from the defendant' to the plaintiff.”</p> <p>Summons in the action was served on McClung, March 21, 1882, and on thé Ith of November following he filed,'in the . Circuit Court of the United States for the Southfern District of Ohio, his petition, under § 643 of the Kevised Statutes, for a. writ of cert/iorari to the State court, requiring that court to send to the Circuit Court the record and proceedings in the • cause, on the ground that, “ at the time the said acts charged in such petition are alleged to have been done, he was, and still is, an officer of the United States, appointed and acting under the authority of the revenue laws of' the United States, . . , and all his acts in connection with the receipt and delivery of the merchandise described in said petition were done by him under color of his said office.” Upon this petition a writ of certiorari was issued and the record and proceedings removed. Upon the entry of the cause in the Circuit Cóurt-the railroad company moved that it be remanded, “ for the reason that this court has no jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter of the action.” This motion was denied, November 15, 1882, and on the 12th of February, 1883, McClung answered the petition in the suit, denying that he had been notified of the lien, or that it had ever become his duty to refuse to deliver tbe goods until' the freight was paid, and also denying that he had ever received the freight for the benefit of the company.</p> <p>Upon the trial it was shown that the freight and charges were paid to 'W'artman at the same time with the duties, and" that, upon such payment, the goods were delivered to thq consignees, without notice to the carriers. The plaiirtiff also’ offered further evidence “ tending to prove that it had been the general usage and custom prevailing at the custom office of 'Cincinnati for ten years prior to the appointment of, the., defendant, and was the general usage and custom at the said office after the defendant’s appointment, on March 18th, 188Í; and down to the 8th of September, 1881, for the consignees of imported goods brought to the port of Cincinnati by all the'' common carriers who are authorized under said act to trails-' port imported merchandise to the port of its destination, to pay the freights due to such common carrier at the office of' the collector and.of the cashier deputy of the surveyor of the port when a, . . . notice in writing of the existence' of • a lien thereon in favor of the carrier had been given to1 the deputy collector at such office, and that such payments were exacted and required by the deputy collector as a precedent-condition to the delivery of such goods by the surveyor of the. port to the owners and consignees thereof, and that such freights were paid, together with the duties dué. upon such imported goods, to such deputy collector, sometimes, in money, ’ but most, generally in checks, which included duties due to the government and the freights duq for the carriage of said goods, and which Checks were drawn by the -consignees in favor-of the surveyor of the port by name, or of the ‘collector’' orV ‘ surveyor ’ of customs at the port of Cincinnati, which checks * were indorsed and collected by such deputy collector for the’ collector or surveyor in his official capacity, and were collected in the usual course of business by such deputy collector; • and that, upon the receipt of such money or checks in payment of duties and freight, the goods were, by the order of said deputy, t with the acquiescence of the surveyor of the port, delivered to the respective consignees; and that the deputy collector, in his official capacity, accounted with and paid over the freights so collected tp the common carrier of such imported goods, from time to time, as the same were demanded.”</p> <p>There was also evidence tending to prove that the payments in this case Avere made in accordance with this custom and upon'the demand of Wartman.</p> <p>McClung was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and testified that Wartman was acting as deputy -when he came into office, and attending to the receipt of duties, and was continued in the same service by him; that he was never authorized to sign or indorse checks, and that he, McClung, was npt aware that he had ever dene sp. líe alse testified that he had ne knewledge whatever ef the fact that 'Wartman was receiving freight moneys until September 6, 1881, which was after all these payments were made, and that there was net kept in the cffice any account of moneys received for freights.</p> <p>At the close of the testimony the court charged the jury, among other things, as follows:</p> <p>“ In order to authorize a recovery against the defendant for failing to give the seasonable notice to the plaintiff required by the statute, before delivering the goods to the owners or consignees, an averment that the freights due plaintiff and for which it had a lien were owing and unpaid is necessary. There is no such averment in the plaintiff’s petition in this case; on the contrary, it distinctly avers that the consignees did pay the freights to the defendant, and, while it does not say in express tenns that it authorized such payments to be made, by demanding and suing for the same, as it has done, ratifies and confirms the payments, and claims that the money was received for its account and benefit, and demands judgment therefor. This is in fact the gra/oamen of its complaint, the theory upon which its suit rests, and the court instructs that you are liere to try this case upon, the hypothesis that the freights due from the consignees to the plaintiff for the carriage of the goods in question were paid before the goods were delivered by the defendant to the consignees, and that the defendant Avas therefore under no legal duty to give the plaintiff notice of his intention to make such delivery.”</p> <p>“ It was competent for tbe parties, by express contract, or by a tacit understanding resulting from an established course of business, for the benefit and convenience of both parties, to agree that the defendant should receive the freights due the carrier for the account of the latter, and upon receipt thereof deliver the goods to the owners or consignees, ,and that such' receipts by him should be in lieu of the notice which the'law required him to give" the carrier in the contingency described, by the statute. It may be that such tacit or implied' agreement existed between these parties in this case.' This'is the , question for you to determine. The defendant was under no official or legal obligation to .undertake to thus act for the plaintiff. If he did so, he was .but acting in his private capacity and not in the discharge of any official duty. It not' being an official duty, his deputy could not thus act by reason of his official relations to his superior, and the defendant, would not be liable for such extra official action unless he had in some way authorized his deputy so to act, or unless he has st> acted as to estop him from denying that the deputy was in the specific matter complained of acting by his'authority for him.”</p> <p>■ “ If defendant had knowledge of this custom, acquired from observation from the business and books of his office, or through other sources, and acquiesced therein, and permitted the plaintiff to make its collections through his deputy in the belief that he was acting for and as his agent, or.by his acts or declarations represented or held him out as his agent in the matter, the plaintiff and defendant, both understanding and tacitly or otherwise agreeing that the freights due the plaintiff should be paid- in this way, in lieu of the notice which the statute in the contingency described required the defendant as collector to give tó the plaintiff, he would be liable to the 'plaintiff for all sums so paid to the deputy for the plaintiff’s use.”</p> <p>“ If the deputy acted without authority from the defendant, and the defendant did not know of his said action, nor hold, him out to the plaintiff as his agent, nor do nor say anything to mislead the plaintiff nor its officers nor agents, nor under.take nor assume to collect plaintiff’s freight; he woujd not be liable to plaintiff’s demand, and your verdict ough -to be in his favor.”</p> <p>To all this the railroad company excepted. .There were other 'instructions to which exceptions were also taken, but they were all substantially embraced in the above, and it' is unnecessary to repeat them here.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, upon which a judgment was entered, and the case is now ¿ere for review. The errors assigned were (1), that the court overruled the 'motion to remand; and (2), that it instructed the jury as 1 above stated.</p> <p>{Mr. E. W.' Kit-tredge was on the brief) cited; Dignan v. Shields, 51 Texas, ' 322; Badger v. Gutierez, 111 TJ.- S. 734; Ogden v. Maxwell, 3 ' Blatchford, 319; Melnt/yre v. TmombuTl, Y Johns. 35; Mason ,-v. Eea/rson, 9 How. 248; Clinton v. Strong, 9 Johns. 370; Man-tin v. Webb, 110 IT. S. 7; Case v. Bank, 100 TJ. S. 446; King v. Bangs, 120 Mass. 514; Gooding v. Shear, 103 Mass. 360. '</p> <p>cited: United States v. Collier, 3 'Blatchford, 349; .Whitfield v. Le Desjyencer, Cowp. 754; Wig- ■ gins v. Hathcmay, 6 Barb. 632; Connoell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio, 523; S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 206; Brissac v. La/wrence, 2 Blatch-ford, 121; Tennessee v. Damis, 100 TJ- S. 257; Osborn v. Bank - of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738.</p>

This suit was brought -in the Court of Common Pleas of Licking-- County, Ohio, on the 1st of July, 1815, by George Bátes, a citizen of Ohio, against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, a Maryland corporation, and having its principal'office iii that State, to recover damages, for personal injuries.

Held: that, in proceedings in equity commenced by D to determiue the amount of indebtedness from A to C, and to prevent the sale' of the trust property by B, and to obtain a cancellation of the conveyance to B on payment oftlie amount found due to C, B was a necessary party, with interests adverse to D; and as both were citizens of the same State, and as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depended alone upon the…

Held: a set of rules regulating such appeals rvas promulgated by this court, and it is safe to say that there has never been a term since in which many cases of the kind have not been heard *479 and decided without objection from any one.

<p>A having applied for a patent for a placer mine in Montana, B filed an'' adverse clam in tlie register’s office under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 2325, and commenced suit for the settlement of the controversy in the District Court of the Territory "according to the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 232G. In the course of the trial, it appeared that, before the commencement of the suit, B had agreed with C, by a sufficient instrument under seal, to convey the premises in dispute to C “by good and sufficient deed of conveyance duly acknowledged,” and that C was in possession when the suit was begun and still remained in possession. The Code of Montana'provides that “ an action may be brought by any person in possession, by himself or his tenant of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate, or interest. ” The court ordered a nonsuit, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme'Court of the Territory. This court reverses the judgment of the Supreme Cou^'t, and holds that as C was holding under B, and as B was bound to C to have the title quieted, B had a right to have the verdict of the jury on the questions of fact at issue so as to settle the question which the Act of Congress required to be settled.</p>

Held: by certain third persons severally, amounting in all to something like $39,000, and varying from more than $8000 to less than '$10 each. A failure of either of those persons to release any one of those claims would be a breach of the bond ; and for any such breach a just compensation might be estimated in damages.

<p>A transfer of shares in a corporation, procured from the owner, while so intoxicated as to he incapable of transacting business, by fraud, with knowledge of his condition, and for a grossly inadequate consideration, will be set aside in equity; and if, without any fault of his, he is unable to restore the consideration, provisión for its repayment may be made in the final decree.</p>

Held: and took another for the same amount from the new firm in full satisfaction and discharge of the original indebtedness; and that the new firm paid the interest as it thereafter accrued until the time mentioned in the affidavit of loan, to wit, October 30, 1884. On this state of facts, Charles H. Brooks insisted, by way of defence, that he was discharged from all liability.

Held: That the jury would not have been warranted in drawing the conclusion of ’ fact from the evidence that there was such an agreement as that sued on; that the relation of the parties was not such as, in contemplation, of law, to give rise to such liability; and that there was no error in the instruction of the court below to find a verdict for defendant.

Held: when they are different. The ease is stated in the

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: 'the complainants’ invention was anticipated by others long prior to its date.

Held: in that case, that, independently of these considerations, the terms of the ordinance were not violated because the navigable streams were subject to such crossings as the public necessities and convenience might require. The . rivers did not change their character as common highways, if the crossings were allowed under reasonable conditions, and so as not unnecessarily to obstruct them.

This was an action against the plaintiff in error, the acceptor of bills of exchange with forged bills of lading attached, which had been discounted by the defendant in error, and presented for acceptance without knowledge of the fraud in either party. Judgment for defendant, to review which this. writ of error was sued out. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. cited: Baylis v. Tra/oellerg Ins.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIBCUIT COUET OF THE HNITED STATES FOB THE’' DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action to try the title to a tract of land listed to California under § 8 of the act of September 24, 1841. The facts which were claimed to make a Federal question are stated in the opinion of the court.

ORIGINAL. This was a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ .of habeas corpus.

This was an appeal from an order- of the Circuit Court' remanding to a State Court a cahse removed thence, to the' Circuit Court. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.'

■ • This was a bill in equity filed by tbe defendant in error, complainant below, to enforce payment of a judgment rein dered against one John Gordon in his lifetime out of assets belonging to the estate of Gordon which had come into 'the' possession of the various defendants, either as executors or administrators, or as devisees or legatees under his will.

<p>On a finding in the court below (1) that certain parol testimony is inadmissi,- , ble because it tends to vary, explain, contradict or qualify a written instrument discharging a.mortgage; and (2) that if admitted it was not ' Sufficient to prove any qualification or modification of the discharge, — it is immaterial in. this court whether the court below was right in holding that the exception taken there to the parol evidence was error.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>This was an action of forcible entry and detainer. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. It was submitted on the 19th April, 1886, at the last term of court, and was ordered to be argued at the hearing on the merits. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit • Court dismissing a libel for salvage for want- of jurisdiction. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. / cited: Ghen v. Bich, 8 Fed.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>This was' a bill in equity for the infringement of letters-patent. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action for the possession of a tract of land containing thirteen acres and a quarter of an acre in Multnomah. County, Oregon. The plaintiff was a citizen of New York, and the defendants are citizens of Oregon. In the complaint they were alleged to be husband and wife, though they were not sued as such,, and no averment founded Upon that relationship was made; they were sued simply as parties in occupation of the premises.

<p>•Where, tinder the Code of Practice of Louisiana, a steam-tug is sequestered by judicial process, and, under Art. 279, the plaintiff in sequestration gives, a bond, with surety, to the sheriff, and takes the tug into his possession, and uses her, and afterwards restores her to the sheriff, he is . not liable to the defendant in sequestration for the fruits or revenues of her use.</p> <p>Being in the lawful possession of the tug, his agent is not liable to the defendant in sequestration, either in contract or tort, in respect to any earnings of the tug, or any compensation for or value of her use.</p> <p>The claim of the plaintiff in sequestration having been founded on a mortgage on the tug, and it appearing that on a sale of her to him, on a judg- ’ ment in his favor in the sequestration suit, there was a deficiency in the net proceeds of her sale to pay the mortgage debt and certain lien and privileged debts, having precedence of the mortgage, which the plaintiff in sequestration paid, under subrogations, legal as well as express, to the rights of the creditors holding those debts, 'between the date of the seizure of the tug and the day of her sale, no cause of action could exist against the plaintiff in sequestration in respect to any earnings received by him from the use of the tug,'</p>

.APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITEÜ STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNEOTICUT. .' This was a bill in equity to. restrain the infringement of letters-patent. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This was a bill iu equity to enjoin alleged infringements of letters-patent. The bill was dismissed, and the complainant .appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>In Illinois an incorporated “ town " and an incorporated “ village ” are one and the same thing. Welch v. Post, 99 Ill. 471, overruled; and Martin v. People, 87 Ill'. 524, followed.</p> <p>The provision in the act of February 24, 1869, of the legislature of Illinois, giving authority to “any village, city, county, or township organized under the township organization law, or any other law of the state, along or near the route of the railway ” therein mentioned, “ to subscribe to the stock of the railroad company, or make donations to it,” applies to a town along or near the route.</p> <p>The proviso in the clause of the constitution of Illinois regarding municipal subscriptions to the stock of, or donations or loan of credit to, railroads or private corporations, applies to donations as well as to subscriptions to stock.</p> <p>When a question in a certificate of division is stated in broad and indefinite terms, which admit of one answer uuder one set of circumstances, and of a different answer under another set of circumstances, this court must regard it as immaterial to the decision of'the case.</p> <p>The pendency cf a suit relating to the validity of negotiable paper not yet clue is not constructive notice to subsequent holders thereof before maturity; and this general rule cannot be changed by state laws or decisions, so as to affect the rights of persons not residing, and not being within the state.</p> <p>In Illinois the making the place of payment of a municipal bond at a place which is not the office of the treasurer of the municipality does not affect the validity of the bond, or charge the holder- of. such a bond, being negotiable and not yet matured, with notice of judicial proceedings between a previous holder and the municipality so as to work an estoppel.</p>